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I

attempt to analyze, reconstruct, and otherwise defend William Alston's vindication of

the cognitive status of mystical experience.

practice approach to epistemology,

I

begin by reconstructing Alston’s doxastic

which provides him with general

determine whether or not mystical experience contributes
mystical beliefs.

I

to the justification

then present Alston’s case for the claim

epistemic position, there

is

a

way of forming

we have

perception of God which

by autonomous ways of forming
jure for other practices.

I

beliefs about

that,

it is

way of forming

by which

God on

of an agent's

the basis of the

is reliable.

socially established and that the beliefs generated

beliefs are not necessarily subject to epistemic

attempt to discredit Alston

s

I

attempt to provide a

subject sense-perceptual beliefs.

IV

norms de

appeal to social establishment as

should not be subject to the
rationale for Alston’s claim that mystical beliefs

we

At the

beliefs should be regarded as

grounds for imputing presumptive epistemic innocence and

epistemic norms to which

to

according to his general

adequate epistemic reason to believe

heart of Alston’s case are the claims that a

presumptively reliable so long as

criteria

same
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INTRODUCTION

Religious belief is a popular whipping boy for the philosophic community.

Whether as a crushing counter-example

to

some proposal

in

epistemology

— “your

epistemic principles would license the rationality of belief in God, hence they must be

wrong!”

—

or the object of full scale critique, religious belief serves well

its

function as

the "other’ of well-formed, rational, epistemically proper, scientific, belief. But not

us think that religious belief is

other,

all that irrational; at least, its

more well-regarded ways of forming

a fight, or at least,

we

try to.

I

will discuss

The most promising option
which

I

am

aware

is

that

its

And

every once in a while,

one such attempt

movement

in the

1

of

not any more dubious than

in

we

put up

what follows.

for vindicating the rationality of religious belief

moniker "Reformed Epistemology.’
are also

beliefs.

all

of

philosophy of religion which has acquired the

The most prominent

participants in that

movement

founding members, William Alston, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and Alvin

Plantinga. Although their several formulations of the

Reformed approach

differ as to

Faith
The moniker is self-imposed (at least by Plantinga and Wolterstorff) in the introduction to
of
University
IN.:
Dame,
and Rationality, Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, eds., (Notre
Reformed corpus.
Notre Dame Press, 1983), a volume widely regarded as fundamental to the
'.

1

their details ,

2

and sometimes

in

much more

than the details, the triumvirate has pursued a

recognizably coherent project for the past twenty years.

Reformed Epistemology
in

which we ought

to

form

is

beliefs,

not a positive program;

it

is

approach

is

modernity,

to discredit

rather,

God

be justified an adhering to that
those

who

believe in

manifestations,

God

not an account of the

it

is

way

not an account of

it

is

not an apology to religion’s

unabashedly destructive; the heart of the Reformed

an interlocking

viz., that belief in

is

that project?

not an attempt to identify the reliable belief-

forming practices to which human beings have access;

It is,

it

is

even form beliefs about God;

epistemic justification or of knowledge;

cultured despisers.

What

set

of prejudices which

is

extremely influential in

requires propositional support in order for an agent to

belief, that belief in

God

lacks that support, and thus that

are epistemically defective. In each of

Reformed Epistemology incorporates

its

the claim that

various

we

should consider

religious belief “innocent until proven guilty” rather than “guilty until proven innocent.”

Religious belief can be rational even

they

may employ

if religious

agents have access to no evidence which

to convince their non-theistic compatriots of the truth of their

convictions.

2
.

For example, each of the three differ significantly

in

where they come down on the

manifestations, Alston
internalism/externalism debate. Wolterstorff rejects reliabilism in all of its
as an element in his broader
retains it with an internalist twist, and Plantinga subsumes reliabilism

Foundations?” in
Theory of Proper Function. See “Can Belief in God be Rational if it has no
Press, 1995),
University
Cambridge
Faith and Rationality, and Divine Discourse (Cambridge:
Justification:
in Epistemic
s views on the matter, “An Internalist Externalisin,”
for Wolterstorff

Press, 1989), for Alston's,
Essays on the Theory of Knowledge, (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University
Press,
1993), for Plantinga’s.
University
and Warrant and Proper Function, (Oxford: Oxford

2

More

recently,

however, Reformed Epistemologists have made the transition from

a critical to a constructive enterprise. Alston, Plantinga and Wolterstorff have
attempted
to provide an account

of how

we do and

will attempt to articulate, defend

and

should form beliefs about God. In this essay,

criticize

William Alston's version of that

I

story.

Alston focuses primarily on the contribution of ‘mystical experience’ to the formation

and justification of belief about God. (Although
Alston

is

no Schleiermacher,

that

is,

his focus

is

on religious experience,

he does not believe that the entirety of a given

agent’s theological convictions are generated by her experience of God. Appeal to sacred

texts, tradition

and reason have

We will

their role to play as well.)

soon enough. Before we begin, however,

I

want

to indicate

why

I

get into the details

decided to tackle

Alston’s version of the Reformed Project, and not Wolterstorff s or Plantinga’ s. (Or,
forbid, each of their versions!) Three features of Alston's version of

Epistemology are particularly
First,

in

God

Reformed

attractive.

Alston has articulated an account of the

which he accords systematic significance

way

to the social

theists

form

established and socially monitored

in

God

dimensions of belief. Alston has

articulated a doxastic practice approach to epistemology according to

agent forms are the consequence of her participation

beliefs about

which the

and socialization

ways of evaluating and corroborating

beliefs an

into socially

belief.

He does

not construe the problem of the epistemic status of religious belief as that of whether or
not the individual, regarded independently of her relations

has enough evidence for her beliefs. In

this respect

3

to,

and dependance on,

others,

he differs importantly from Plantinga

in particular

and Wolterstorff

to

some

degree.

Rather, he construes the problem of the

'

epistemic status of religious belief as that of whether or not an agent

who

herself participating in various socially established

beliefs is rational if

ways of forming

already finds

she continues to adhere to her practices of forming beliefs about God, specifically, the
practice of forming beliefs about

God on the

basis of what she takes to be perceptions of

God.
Second, Alston provides a spirited defense of the autonomy of distinct belief-

forming practices, especially religious practices. The way an agent forms and evaluates
beliefs about

God on

the basis of religious experience

forms and evaluates, for example, sense-perceptual
different, religious

is

way

very different from the

beliefs.

and sensory experience are appropriately

Alston argues

different.

We

that,

she

though

should not

evaluate the beliefs formed by engaging religious belief-forming practices in light of the

same

criteria

we employ

to evaluate the beliefs

forming practice. Otherwise

formed

put, the social practice

in

our sense-perceptual belief-

of forming beliefs on the basis of

apparent experience of God differs quite properly from the social practice of forming
beliefs about the physical world

When put that way,

on the basis of sensory experience.

however, Alston’s version of Reformed Epistemology takes

on a predictable, even pedestrian,

tone. After

all,

hasn’t that territory already been staked

out by Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion like D. Z. Phillips? This brings

third point

3
.

me

to the

of interest. Alston combines an appreciation both for the social embeddedness

Plantinga’s individualist bias

is

reflected in his construal of the problem of the epistemic status

produce
of religious belief (and of belief generally) as whether or not the cognitive faculties which
a given belief are functioning properly.

4

of the way

we form

beliefs

and the distinctiveness of the way agents form religious

beliefs with a realist understanding of religious belief. Unlike sprachspeilists
like

Alston argues that religious forms of life involve the making of truth-claims

Phillips,

about an objective reality which

is

what

it

is

independently of any possible or actual

epistemic relations between cognitive agents and that

reality.

Alston, then, articulates a metaphysically robust defense of religious belief which

recognizes the historicity and autonomy of religious belief.

What

results is his

own

blend

of religious epistemology and, more particularly, a strategy for defending the rationality
of religious belief which ineradicably hinges on each of the three points of interest

As

noted.

I

will argue, the social entrenchment of religious

crucial to Alston’s claim that religious

innocent; the

autonomy of religious

ways of forming

practices

is

ways of forming

I

have

beliefs is

beliefs are presumptively

crucial to a defense of mystical

experience from imputations of guilt, and the realism of religious belief-forming practices

is

crucial to vindicating the

point

strikingly in contrast to

is

which

belief, in

about objective

eccentric a

The
belief

is

proven

autonomy of religious ways of forming

way

its

defenders claim

that,

to vindicate the

as their form of

very simple:

it

my
is

life

(This latter

autonomy of religious

because religious beliefs make no truth claims

realities, religious believers are free to

structure of

guilty.

most attempts

beliefs.

form

beliefs in as idiosyncratic

and

allows.)

presentation and evaluation of Alston's defense ot religious

organized around the claim that religious belief is innocent

In the first chapter,

I

articulate Alston’s doxastic practice

approach to

epistemology. The discussion therein provides an opportunity to identify the criteria

5

until

[(EP9) and (EP10)] Alston claims that

wc

should employ to evaluate the epistemic

standing of any and every doxastic practice. Those criteria encode
Alston

innocent

until

proven

guilty’ dictum.

Note

that those criteria

make no

s

version of the

reference at

to

all

religious belief; they are guidelines for imputing presumptive innocence to
any and every

belief forming practice, whether religious or not.

In the second chapter,

I

reconstruct Alston’s argument in support of the claim that

religious belief enjoys positive epistemic status, at least, as judged according to the

doxastic practice approach sketched in the

Alston’s argument

argument

in

argument.

I

is

selective with a purpose:

which the appeal

to the

chapter.

first

I

Note

that

my

reconstruction of

highlight those aspects of Alston's

autonomy of religious

belief

is

crucial to the

have therefore included focused on aspects of Alston’s version of Reformed

Epistemology which other treatments, governed by other concerns, may very well regard
as of

little

selectivity

importance and therefore as not meriting sustained consideration.
because

of forming beliefs

I

is

I

justify

believe that a proper appreciation of the autonomy of religious

essential to a fair

my

ways

and even-handed evaluation of their epistemic

status.

In the third chapter,

that religious belief is

practices are

way

which she forms

attempt to provide an argument in support of Alston's claim

autonomous.

autonomous

claim that the

I

is

I

argue that the claim that distinct belief-forming

derivable from what

a rational agent forms beliefs

beliefs.

that Alston attempts to

I

is

call the

Ontological Principle,

viz., the

constrained by the nature of that about

Unfortunately, the appeal to autonomy engenders the concern

undermine criticism of religious belief altogether.

6

I

attempt to

show, therefore, that a healthy appreciation for the autonomy of religious
belief-forming
practices does not render impossible attempts to

show

that

such practices are unreliable.

That religious ways of forming beliefs are autonomous does not render vacuous the

Reformed claim

that religious belief is only presumptively innocent.

In the fourth chapter,

on the

on the second

I

take issue with that claim.

restrictions at all

on the practices a

In a concluding reflection,

reflection for the

I

is rational,

the

I

should place no

provide the merest hint of a more adequate avenue for

in support

Reformed Epistemologist should
its

we

rational agent regards as presumptively innocent.

Reformed Epistemologist. Instead of appealing

religion’s social entrenchment,

unreliable.

Reformed mantra, but

argue, on the contrary, that

entrenchment of religious belief-forming practices
belief

part of the

Alston asserts that only socially established practices enjoy presumptive

first.

innocence.

focus, not

I

to the social

of the claim that religious

investigate the

ways

in

which

habitual alliance with the powers that be, renders

it

A doxastic practice approach to epistemology provides an opportunity to

address those political and moral questions which

I

believe are inextricably entwined with

epistemic questions but which Alston ducks entirely.

Before

we

get started,

I

believe

I

owe

the reader an apology. There are very

few

dead horses beaten more times and with greater vim and vigor than issues of the
rationality

of religious belief

.

4
I

am

afraid

I

will inflict the

community of philosophers

of course, a reason why we keep beating that horse. Discussions of the rationality of
religious belief are generally conducted in secularized or secularizing societies, or at least, in
in
societies which are perceived by its members to be secularized or secularizing. In a context

4

.

There

is,

which more and more people cease to believe in God, its natural to raise the various
epistemological questions which inhabit analytic philosophy of religion. Its only when we rub
(continued...)

7

with another.

it

shows me

problem
and

I

think,

however, that

in a better or

worse

I

have an excuse. (Like many excuses, I’m not sure

light.)

in the first place; originally,

I

The excuse
wanted

is

that

to discuss

I

didn’t

want

much more

to address that

interesting moral

political questions like, “Is religious belief irremediably ideological?”

religious belief provide us with grounds for moral critique to

apart from religious belief?” But

it

and “Does

which we have no access

turned out that addressing those kinds of questions

lands one right in the middle of the thicket of epistemological questions which are the
fare

of more traditional philosophy of religion. After

all, it

hardly

makes sense

whether or not religious belief provides us with adequate grounds for
lack the confidence that religious

What good would

it

do

ways of forming

to “to take

goes nowadays) against the
reasonably confident that

state,

to ask

social critique if

belief are anything but irrational mush.

up a prophetic stance”

in the

name of God

(as the lingo

or capitalism, or even the institutional church,

God does

we

not exist? So, although

I

if

we

are

think that the most

interesting questions religious belief raises for the philosophy of religion are moral and

political,

I

have pulled

in

my

horns and addressed just a few more conventional questions

regarding the rationality of religious belief.

(I

wanted

to write

one

dissertation, not

two or

three.)

4

(..

.continued)

elbows with lots of people who doubt what we believe that we begin to ask ourselves whether or
not what we believe is rational, justified, warranted, epistemically apt, etc. This implies, what I
take to be the case, that the issue of the epistemic status of religious belief is most insistently raised

some social contexts and is relatively unimportant in others. Insofar as 'first world societies are
more secular than, say, ‘third world societies, the problem of the rationality of religious belief is a
in

Gustavo
‘first-world problem.’ Other kinds of social context breed other priorities. Perhaps, as
of
problem
Guttierrez has claimed, the central problem for religious belief in ‘third world is the
gratuitous and undeserved suffering.

8

A caveat to supplement my apology and excuse.
primarily with the rationality of religious belief,
religious belief is primarily or

entertaining hypotheses.

religious beliefs

make

As

I

I

Although

do not assume

I

am

think

truth claims,

is

moment

for a

most importantly a matter of adhering

that

to propositions or

clear in the following, although

and

concerned

I

take

it

of

that

that religious beliefs enjoy cognitive status, so

recognizing militates not a whit against a thoroughgoing appreciation of the fact that
religion

is

way of life,

a

a

way

in

which agents express themselves,

to

which they

are

hardly indifferent, and in which they participate long before they are capable of reflecting
abstractly

on the epistemic

make

truth claims,

belief

is true,

status their religious convictions enjoy. Religious beliefs can

and we can attempt

to

determine whether or not a given religious

without transmuting passionately held religious convictions into tepidly

held hypotheses.

Why
belief?

do that?

Because

I

Why

bother with the truth claims and epistemic status of religious

think that long term survival in modernity requires rational vindication;

transmitting religious convictions to future generations requires that

of rational argumentation. The problem, as

make room
from the

for epistemic criteria

I

will attempt to

show

we

in the sequel, is to

which do not cook the game against

start.

9

use the currency

religious belief

CHAPTER

1

THE THEORY OF DOXASTIC PRACTICES
Our

central epistemic aim, according to Alston,

with a favorable truth-falsity
1

beliefs.

ratio, i.e., to

maximize our

Whether or not the way an agent forms

achieve that aim, that

is,

is

to

true

amass a

large

body of beliefs

and minimize our

false

beliefs puts her in a "strong position" to

whether or not the way she forms her beliefs renders

it

likely that

2

her beliefs are true, determines whether or not she

her beliefs.

I

is

epistemically justified in forming

outline Alston's account of epistemic justification in

The discussion of epistemic justification provides

( 1

.

1 ).

the background for an account

of what Alston regards as the most fundamental problem of epistemology. 3 Given that
our central epistemic aim

that the basic

answer

ways

in

is to

believe the true and not to believe the false, can

we show

An

adequate

which we customarily form our

to that question requires reflection

The

condition.

practices (1.2),

fruits

beliefs are reliable?

on our general epistemic, and indeed human,

of Alston's reflections are an account of the nature of doxastic

and a denial

a strong position (1.3). All

that

is

we can show

not

lost,

that

engagement

in such practices puts us in

however, as Alston argues

that

it

is

weakly rational

A Realist Conception

of Truth, (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 231-64;
"Concepts of Epistemic Justification," in Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of
Knowledge (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 83, 97; The Reliability of Sense
,

Perception, (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 3-4. See Alvin Goldman,
Epistemology and Cognition, (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 97-103;
Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard
University Press, 1985), pp. 6-7.
2
.

"Internalism and Externalism

.

The

3

Reliability

Of Sense

in

Epistemology,"

Perception, pp. 2-4.

10

in

Epistemic Justification, pp. 200-201.

for an agent to believe that socially

( 1 .4),

and

that

it

and psychologically entrenched practices are

moderately rational for an agent

is

to believe that

weakly

reliable

rational

practices are reliable, the outputs of which are both internally consistent
and compatible

with the outputs of other such practices

(1.5).

Moreover, there

is

a

way of further

strengthening the epistemic standing ot the belief that moderately rational practices are
reliable, viz.,

practices

is

by showing

that they enjoy significant self-support (1.6).

strongly rational. Alston, surprisingly,

fails to

his resolution

on the issue

agent's belief

ground.

.

I

is

such

indicate Alston's

defend Alston from the claim that

incompatible with his defense of religious belief

to

an

anti-realist

(1.8).

Epistemic Justification

What

4

In a final section,

I

of the fundamental problem of epistemology commits him

metaphysic which

1.1

(1.7).

in

address the question as to the

standing of non- socially and psychologically entrenched practices;
likely position

Engaging

4

An

is it

is

for

some

prima facie justified

agent's belief

Perceiving God:

University Press, 1991),

in

is

if

and only

if

ultima facie justified

her belief is based on an adequate

if

and only

The Epistemology of Religious Experience,
p. 73, 108,

on Epistemic Justification,"
Externalism,”

belief to be epistemically justified? According to Alston, an

in

if

she lacks sufficient

(Ithaca,

NY.: Cornell

147; “Concepts of Epistemic Justification,”

Philosophia 19\2 (October, 1989):

Epistemic Justification,

p.

1

19-20;

“An

p.

99;

"Goldman

Internalist

227. Alston distinguishes between two generic

concepts of epistemic justification, an evaluative and a deontological. The latter concept is framed
as an agent’s being permitted to assent to some proposition in virtue of her assent’s not violating

some epistemic

obligation; the deontological concept

is

internally related to normative

The evaluative concept is framed as an agent s so
believing as to achieve some epistemic good, more precisely, believing the truth and avoiding the
mention this because the term ‘justification’ would seem to have affinities to the
false.
deontological conception which Alston rejects; most centrally, because it assumes that we have
prohibitions, permissions, and forbiddings.

I

greater control over

what we believe than we

in fact

11

have.

Any

deontological connotations

reason to regard as inadequately grounded what

ground

is in fact

a belief based on an adequate

5
.

First,

grounds. In asking whether or not an agent's belief B

we

is justified,

interested in whether her beliefs and experiences sufficiently indicate the truth
of

Beliefs which simply

pop

into an agent's

mind without any connection

to other

B

are

6
.

of that

agent's psychological states cannot be justified. Flence, an agent has to have something to

"go on"

in

forming her

agent has to go on

beliefs, that

limited to her beliefs and experiences. That

is

‘justification’ has should be
5
.

"To be ultima

What an

A has adequate grounds

suppressed for the remainder.

by virtue of the satisfaction of conditions, C,
one will be unqualifiedly justified in that belief provided there are no

sufficient 'overriders,' that
.

7
.

facie justified in believing that p

to be so situated that

6

she must have grounds for her beliefs

is,

"Level Confusions

in

is,

no sufficient reasons

Epistemology,"

in

to the contrary."

Epistemic Justification,

Perceiving God,
p.

170;

"An

is

p. 72.

Internalist

p. 230; "The Role of Reason in the Regulation of Belief," in Rationality in the
Calvinian Tradition, Hendrik Hart, Johann van der Hoeven, and Nicholas Wolterstorff, eds.,

Externalism,"

(Lanham, MD.: University Press of America, 1983),

p.

139.

1

Alston believes that, in order for an agent to be justified in assenting to p, she must not only
base that belief on an adequate ground, but also have fairly direct access to the ground on which
she bases her belief (not, however, to the adequacy of those grounds). See Perceiving God, 75;
.

238 and "Goldman on Epistemic Justification," pp. 125-27.
Because this internalist twist does not play much of a role in his argument in support of the
rationality of religious belief, he suppresses it in Perceiving God.
Nevertheless, it is an important qualification because certain critics, e.g., Susan Haack,

"An

Internalist Externalism," p.

reject reliabilism

on the grounds

epistemically justified

which

that belief

is

in

that, if true, reliabilism

adhering to some belief even

based. See Evidence

139ff. Alston’s reliabilism

is

would

entail that

she has no idea

if

A justified

however favorable

237. See “Concepts of Epistemic Justification,”

point.

12

grounds on

Publishers, 1993), pp.

belief must based on a ground, and

belief in question, cannot be grounds of the belief in the required sense.
p.

at all as to the

and Inquiry, (Oxford: Blackwell

not of that sort.

“facts that obtain independently of the subject’s psyche,

Externalism,”

an agent could be

p.

to the truth of the

"An

Internalist

109 for more on

this last

which B adheres

for a belief to

belief.

by

is,

irrelevant to the epistemic status of B's

itself,

8

That an agent

adhering to some belief depends upon the grounds

s justification for

within her purview has as a consequence that justification

is

always person-relative.

Different agents have different perspectives on the world, and because justification

depends upon the grounds available

to a

given agent, different agents

may be justified

in

adhering to different and incompatible beliefs. 9

Note

that the

ground of a belief is not

which a given agent could base a given
agent in fact takes into account

given animal

is

when forming

they

on those aspects of the input which an

her beliefs.

10

An

agent

who

make be

looking

roughly equivalent perceptual

Even though both agents may have access

at the collie

skills, etc.,

features of their perceptual experience,

In short, “the ground of a belief

is

from basically the same vantage
the

i.e.,

two agents take

to the

point,

same

have

into account different

they base their beliefs on different grounds.

made up of those

features of the input to the formation

of that belief that were actually taken account of in the belief-formation.”

8

believes that a

on the basis of different grounds than does another agent who

takes any large dog to be a collie.

—

belief, but

on

a collie in virtue of recognizing certain distinctive collie-indicative

features forms her beliefs

input

identical to the “total concrete input”

11

See Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, pp. 74-7.

.

A

9
.

Realist Conception of Truth,

p.

192; see Paul Moser,

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp.
10
.

“An

Internalist Externalism,” p. 23

“Alston’s Internalistic Externalism,”
".

“An

in

Internalist Externalism,” p. 23

of belief for which

it

is

not at

all

1

1

Knowledge and Evidence,

43ff.

For discussion of this claim, see Marshall Swain,
Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988): 468-72.

.

.

A

brief note. Plantinga argues that there are certain types

plausible to suppose that there

13

is

any ground

at all.

Memory

Second, adequacy.
probably true given that

it

A belief is based on an adequate ground iff that belief is

was formed on

the

ground

sufficiently indicative of the truth of the belief

given belief is adequately grounded

What makes

belief.)

iff that

that

it

formed on

was,

its

i.e., if

basis

12

ground reliably indicates the

is

such that those

Limbaugh on economic policy normally vote Republican.
a Republican because she overheard

right

is

on

because the world

is

such

belief [that

beliefs, for

is

that, at least in the

the ground [that

that

who

way

in

13

is

.

agree with

Rush

If Sally believes that

Johnny

is

Limbaugh's analysis of progressive
grounded.

an objective probability that
kinds of situations in which

Johnny agrees with Limbaugh]

Johnny

of that

It is

so grounded

such that agreement with Limbaugh on economic matters reliably

indicates party affiliation. "It

world

him claiming

target, then Sally's belief is adequately

is

truth

a ground adequate (a reliable indicator) has to do with the

Suppose, for example, that the world

is

(Alternatively, a

.

which an agent's doxastic dispositions mesh with the way the world

taxation

a ground

is

a Republican ]."

A

However, Alston claims

in

that “with the

The

typically find ourselves,

a reliable indication of the truth of the

you,” passively and without being generated by

priori beliefs as well

Plantinga, “What’s the Question?,” in

we

question here.

14

example, are “simply formed

antecedent states of mind.

is

is in

seem

to lack

any identifiable ground. Alvin

The Journal of Philosophical Research 20
former

I

(1995): 25.

take the conscious basis to be the ‘sense of

and as for the latter, there is the air of
obviousness (‘clear and distinct perception’) that accompanies the entertainment of the
proposition.” “Goldman on Epistemic Justification,” p. 125. See Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and
pastness’ with which the proposition

comes

to one;

Proper Function, (Oxford: Oxford University
12
.

Perceiving God,

.

See

1.3.1 for

.

"An

Internalist Externalism," p. 232.

13

14

Press, 1993), pp. 185-93.

p. 74.

more on

the concept of reliability.

14

An

Third, based on.

that p, she

agent must not only have an adequate ground for her belief

must also base her belief on

good reason

to regard

ground

that

Johnny as a Republican.

she actually goes on in forming her belief -

is

15
.

If the

Suppose once again

ground of her conviction

not justified in believing that Johnny

her belief but, because she

What

fails to

base

be causally dependent upon that ground
Sally’s belief

is

.

16
.

is

She has an adequate ground

that ground, her belief lacks justification

on a ground? Crudely
18

.

overweight), then Sally

put,

it

is

for

17
.

for that belief to

What kind of causal dependence?

After

all,

causally dependent on certain brain states, yet her belief is not based on

those brain states

15

on

it

for a belief to be based

is it

a Republican

is

— what

the irrational and unfounded belief that

overweight people are normally Republicans (and that Johnny
is

that Sally has

14
.

Perceiving God,

Briefly, according to Alston, the type of causal relation proper to

p. 74;

84-5; “Concepts of Epistemic Justification,” pp. 99-100;

Internalist Externalism," p. 229;

"Our Knowledge of God,"

in

Faith,

"An
Reason and Skepticism,

Marcus Hester (ed.), (Philadelphia. PA.: Temple University Press, 1992), p. 30; “Richard Foley’s
Theory of Epistemic Rationality,” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44
(September, 1989): 144-45. See Alvin Goldman's defense of this source-relevant account of
justification in Epistemology and Cognition, pp. 80-93 and Paul Moser’s defense in Knowledge
and Evidence, pp. 156ff..
16
.

Perceiving God,

Rationality, (Cambridge,
17
.

An

For the contrary, compare Richard Foley, The Theory of Epistemic

p. 74.

MA.: Harvard University

Press, 1987), pp. 174-208.

agent must base her belief on adequate grounds, and not just have those grounds, “because

adopting the

latter strategy

would require us

to

approve beliefs that are adopted on wildly

bases." William Alston, "Alvin Plantinga’s Epistemology of Religious Belief,"

Plantinga,
1985),

p.

Reason,”

J.

E.

Tomberlin and Peter van Inwagen,

irrational

Alvin

eds., (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.,

“Swinburne on Faith and
Reason and the Christian Religion, Alan Padgett, ed., (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

292. See “Concepts of Epistemic Justification,”
in

in

p. 103;

1994), p. 31.
18
.

Perceiving God,

p. 175.

See Robert Audi, "The Causal Structure of Indirect

The Structure of Justification, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Susan Haack, Evidence and Inquiry, pp. 76f.
19
.

Alternatively, Sally’s reasons

that

Johnny

may

cause her to believe

rejects progressive taxation

may

upset her,

15

in

Justification," in

Press, 1993), pp. 214-232;

some wayward manner; her

which causes her

belief

to leap up, hit her head,

basing relations

is

of taking account ot features of the experiences and forming

that

beliefs in the light of them, rather than just involving

What an agent

takes account ot

is

some subcognitive

transaction.

’

20

distinct from, not only the causal underpinnings

of belief-formation, but also various other beliefs which are a necessary
condition of her

forming that

belief.

within her purview,

Agent
if

A couldn

t

form the

belief, e.g., that there is a purple

she didn’t also adhere to certain other beliefs,

objects exist, that purple

requires, presupposes, a

is

a color, that something exists,

whole network of other

beliefs.

e.g. that

forming her

belief, they

belief.

do not count as

condition of my having the belief at

all

Because
part

A

fails to

take

of the basis of her

(whatever

its

belief

Although the beliefs constitutive

of that network constitute a necessary condition of the formation of her
count as part of the basis ot her

colored

Forming a given

etc.

flower

them

belief, they

into account

belief.

epistemic status)

“A
is

do not

when

necessary

not a necessary

condition of the belief s being justified rather than unjustified.” 21

Consider another example.
typically

assume

When

that the conditions

normal agents form perceptual

of perception are normal.

perceives a purple flower, she will normally assume that she

bathed by purple

would not form

light,

such

that,

were she

if

apparently

not in an environment

to believe that conditions

beliefs as she does. Nonetheless, that

she would not believe as she does

is

When A

beliefs, they

were abnormal, she

A makes that assumption, and that

she did not believe that the assumption holds, does

and subsequently affirm Johnny’s Republicanhood. See Richard Foley, The Theory of Epistemic
Rationality,
20

p.

177f.

.

“An

.

Perceiving God,

21

Internalist Externalism,” p. 229.
p.

78.

16

not imply that she bases her belief that there
field

is

on her assumed belief that the conditions

Of course,

a purple flower in the center of her visual
are normal.

an adequate defense of her perceptual belief would require her to
take

into account the conditions of observation.

flower in front of her

may be based upon

of her belief would no doubt advert

normal circumstances

Although A’s belief that there

in

A would have to advert to

order to defend her belief in no

was based on those assumptions. 22 Of course, her
assumptions are

an object’s looking purple in

reliably indicates the proximity of purple objects

and adequacy assumptions

true; but they

may be

a purple

the flower’s looking purple, an adequate defense

to the claims (1) that

conditions were in fact normal. But that

is

belief

is

way

and (2)

that

some such normality

implies that her belief

justified only if these

true without A’s believing them, being justified in

believing them, thinking about them, having the conceptual apparatus necessary for

forming those
1.1.1

Prima

beliefs, or the like.

Ultima Facie Justification

vs.

Obviously enough, an agent

grounded what

22
.

“Whatever

is

may have good

reasons for regarding as inadequately

normally an adequately grounded belief

23
,

For example, Sally

the basis of a belief, that basis can serve to justify the belief only if

the task, only if

it

is

it

is

may

adequate to

true that that basis constitutes a sufficient indication of the truth of the target

adequacy of my justifying grounds must itself be one of those
justifying grounds confuses the role of what justifies and that by virtue of which it does so, just as
surely as confusing the premises of a valid argument and that by virtue of which they suffice to
belief. ...Supposing that the

entail the conclusion.”
23
.

Perceiving God,

p. 86.

"Concepts of Epistemic Justification,"

Justification,

p.

Belief," in Faith

177;

"An

p.

109; "Justification and Knowledge," in Epistemic

Internalist Externalism," p. 238; "Christian

and Rationality,

p.

112;

Experience and Christian

“The Autonomy of Religious Experience,”

in

International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 31 (June, 1992): 2. Alston s claim that an
agent who is justified in believing that a reliably formed belief is unreliable is not ultima facie
justified in adhering to that belief indicates a respect in

17

which he

resists identifying justification

learn,

on good

expressed

authority, that Johnny's heaping of encomiums on

satire,

and

that

believing that Johnny

is

Johnny

in fact a closet radical.

is

a Republican

may normally

Limbaugh

Though

be adequate

Sally's

- what

is

subtly

ground

for

could better

indicate an agent's convictions than an apparently sincere
expression of belief - that

ground

may

be overridden by her justified belief that that ground lacks

justificatory force

-

4

An

ordinary

by her justified belief that Johnny’s professions of faith are

Hence, Alston distinguishes between prima facie and ultima
justification.

its

agent's belief

is

prima facie justified

iff

it

is

satirical.

facie (unqualified)

based on an adequate

ground. In order for an agent’s belief to be ultima facie justified, that agent must have no
sufficient reason to regard as inadequately

An

grounded what

is

in fact an adequately

grounded

belief.

that p, as

S did, was a good thing from the epistemic point of view,

agent S

is

ultima facie justified "in believing that p

was based on adequate grounds and S lacked
contrary ."

agent

25

is in

It

does not work the other

believing that belief B

is

iff S's

believing

in that S's belief that p

sufficient overriding reasons to the

way around though

adequately grounded,

26
.

if

No
B

is

matter

how justified

an

not in fact adequately

with reliability. Just as reliably formed beliefs which are not based on any grounds at

all

cannot

count as prima facie justified, so also do reliably formed beliefs which an agent has good reason to
believe are false, or have been unreliably formed, lack ultima facie justification. In both cases,

“A Doxastic Practice Approach to
Knowledge and Skepticism, Marjorie Clay and Keith Lehrer, eds., (Boulder,

Alston complicates the straightforward externalist account. See

Epistemology,”

in

CO.: Westview Press, 1989),
24
.

25

Perceiving God,

"The Role of Reason,"

.

"Concepts of Epistemic

.

"Concepts of Epistemic Justification,"

26

Justification," in
p.

p. 72;

p. 2.

p.

141.

Justification," p. 77.

Epistemic Justification,

p.
p.

95; "The Deontological Conception of Epistemic

145-46; “Christian Experience and Christian Belief,"

115.

18

grounded, then

B

not justified, not even prima facie justified. 27
(See

is

1

.2.2 for

more on

overriding prima facie justified beliefs.)
1.1.2 Justification as

Property and as Process

Alston distinguishes between the state of being justified and the
activity of
28

justifying.

To justify

grounds are adequate,

assent to a proposition, an agent must

i.e.,

adduce evidence

grounds are adequate. To be justified

show

those mental states gives

articulate

of the claim

that that beliefs

some proposition an agent need not

and thus suffice prima facie

rise.

An

grounds for believing

to be justified;

much

less

to justify, the beliefs to

27
.

Note

that one's

food

that an agent

is

need she actually do

so.

29

As Alston

that one's beliefs are reliably

nourishing

need not show

which

grounds are adequate in order for
notes in a discussion of

formed

is

no more

necessary for their being reliably formed and hence their counting as knowledge

knowing

may

agent need be neither able nor willing explicitly to

that a justified belief B's

knowledge of God, "knowing

the

in assenting to

that that beliefs

anything: merely seeing a tree, or recalling a past event, or feeling depressed,

reliably indicate the truth of,

B

in support

show

is

...

necessary for nourishment to take place."

that a given

than

30

prima facie justified belief has not been defeated;

she need only have no sufficient defeaters of that belief. So long as Sally has no justified belief
that

not

Johnny

show

is

that

speaking

he

is

satirically, she is justified in believing

him

to be a Republican; she

need

not speaking satirically.

28

Perceiving God, pp. 71-2, 85; “Concepts of Epistemic Justification,” pp. 82-3; " Level
Confusions in Epistemology," p. 154, 166; "Justification and Knowledge," p. 180; "An Internalist
Externalism," p. 235. Robert Audi Distinguishes between justification as a process and as a
.

property

in

"The Foundationalism-Coherentism Controversy,"

in

The Structure of Justification,

pp. 122f.
29
.

30

Perceiving God, P-71.

We

Christian Perspectives on Religious Knowledge, C. S.
Evans and Merold Westphal, eds., (Grand Rapids, MI.: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1993 ), p. 22.
.

"On Knowing That

Know,"

in

19

1.1.3

Mediate

vs.

Immediate

Justification

Alston also distinguishes between mediate and immediate
justification
mediately justified

is

comes

iff

it

is

based upon reliably indicative

it .”

based on non-doxastic reliable indicators

belief

beliefs; “the justification

32

33
.

A belief is immediately justified

room

justified; if

that belief

is

I

is

based upon

form

my

that belief

is

if

my

belief that

you are

by inferring

it

from the

fact that

I

smell your perfume, then

mediately justified.

"The Role of Reason,"
in

it

perception that you are, then that belief is immediately

p.

140-141; "Intemalism and Externalism

"Two Types of Foundationalism,"
Refuted?"

iff

(A beliefs justification may be a function of

both mediate and immediate justification. 34 ) Thus, for example,

31

A

via appropriate inferential or grounding relations between
the target belief and the

beliefs that constitute one’s reasons for

in the

31
.

Epistemic Justification,

in

Epistemic Justification,

Epistemic Justification,

p. 58;

p.

42; What's

“Self-Warrant:

Wrong

p.

in

Epistemology,"

p.

189;

20; "Has Foundationalism

with Immediate Knowledge,"

A Neglected Form

of Privileged Access,”

Been

in
in

Epistemic Justification, pp. 292-93.
32
.

33
.

Perceiving God,
“This

beliefs

belief

is

p. 71.

a wastebasket category;

it

includes any justification by something other than justified

on the subject. Prominent candidates

is

for

immediate justifiers are

(a) experience

of what the

about, (b) the self-evidence of the proposition believed, and (c) the proposition's being of

a certain category, for example, a proposition about one’s current conscious experience.”

Perceiving God,

p.

71

epistemic justification
beliefs

.

is

Alston denies what John Pollock calls ’doxastic assumption,' that
a function solely of the relation

and non-doxastic perceptual and memory

between one's

beliefs.

is,

that

Rather, "both

states are relevant to the justifiedness

of a

Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, (Savage, MD.: Rowman and Littlefield
Publishers, 1986), p. 90. He is committed to denying, therefore, claims made by the likes of
belief."

no such thing as justification which is not a relation between
propositions." Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University
Press, 1979), pp. 182-83. See Susan Haack, Evidence and Inquiry, p. 69.
Richard Rorty, that "there

34
.

is

Perceptual beliefs are often based upon both doxastic and non-doxastic inputs, as

car which, though indistinguishable from many others, I believe
Perceiving God, pp. 78-9.
it is located in your driveway.

20

to be yours,

because

when
1

I

see a

believe that

1.1.4 Higher-level

Epistemic Requirements

For any belief B, an agent
reliably formed, that

epistemic norms,

etc.

it

is

may form

various beliefs about B,

e.g., that

based upon an adequate ground, that adhering to

In general, for

B

B

violates no

any belief B, we may distinguish between

plethora of'“higher-lever beliefs about B’s epistemic status. That

is,

there

has been

is

B and

a

always a

hierarchy of epistemic levels correlated to a given belief, and those
levels are marked off

by the

iteration

of pistic and epistemic operators. For example,

P
justified that p
justified that justified that

p...

P
believe that p
believe that believe that

p...

P
justified in believing that p
justified in believing that justified in believing that

Why

is it

important to distinguish

among

epistemic levels?

belief to be justified at one level often differs from what

at another.

This

is

it

p....

First,

it

takes for a

takes for a belief to be justified

apparent with respect to perceptual beliefs.

in believing that there is a

what

An

agent

may

be justified

green tree in front of her in virtue of the fact that sensory

presentations of the sort she just experienced and in the context in which she experienced

them normally give

35
.

That

is,

rise to true beliefs

about green

trees.

0

But having

those sensory impressions constitute adequate grounds.

21

that experience in

those circumstances need not contribute to the justification
of the (2nd level) belief that

she

to

justified in believing anything about green trees. In
order for that (2nd level) belief

is

be justified, an agent must show that having that sort of sensory
experience

of environment normally results

in the formation

of true

in that

Hence, what

beliefs.

is

kind

required

for a belief to be justified differs given a difference in epistemic
level. (In this the case,

the difference in requirement

is

a beliefs being based on an adequate ground as distinct

from showing

is

based on an adequate ground.)

that that belief

Second, lack of justification

at

the justification of lower level beliefs.

belief

B

is

higher levels
'

6

of showing that

B

or not she

That an agent

is

justified in that belief.

is

justified in adhering to

generally, being justified in believing that one

Perceiving God,

p.

147;

is

does not impugn

not justified in believing that her

If,

for

example, she

B

(not of

B

37

itself).

justified in believing that

"Our Knowledge of God,"

Epistemology,” passim; “Higher Level Requirements

A

is

it

is

incapable

based on an adequate ground, that only impugns the justification of

is

her (2nd level) belief that she

.

not retroactive:

based on an adequate ground need not impugn the adequacy of the ground for

B and hence whether

36

is

in

p.

B

More
not a

is

38; “Level Confusions in

Epistemology,”

U.S.-Soviet Philosophy Summit, Keith Lehrer and Ernest Sosa,

in

The Opened Curtain:

eds., (Boulder,

CO.: Westview

Press, 1992), passim.
37
.

A

level confusion

of this

sort vitiates

Robert Pasnau's argument

the meta-practice by which an agent determines whether or not

it

is

that,

given the unreliability of

rational for her to

practice (that practice constituted by an agent's pursuing the epistemic policy Alston
in

Perceiving God),

it

follows that none of the beliefs formed by engaging

engage

in a

recommends

in the latter practices

belief-forming
According to Pasnau, if an agent decides to engage
practice on the basis of inadequate grounds, she is lucky, has stumbled on to the truth, and is not
justified in so forming beliefs. "Justified Until Proven Guilty," in Philosophical Studies 72
(1993): 23-28. Alston argues that, no matter how an agent happens to engage in a reliable
in a reliable

are justified.

and she has no good reason to believe that it is not, she
is not epistemically derelict in so doing. Pasnau confuses "the reliability of a certain way of
forming beliefs" with "the reliability of choosing a way forming beliefs...." "Reply to Pasnau," in
practice, so long as that practice

is

reliable,

Philosophical Studies 72 (1993): 42.

22

.

necessary condition of being justified in believing
that B. That

denying that there are any higher
1.1.5

is

way of

just another

level requirements for justified belief.

Summary
Note

that Alston's reliabilist account

of epistemic justification presupposes the

legitimacy of the distinctions between being justified and justifying,
mediate and

immediate justification, and among epistemic
bases her belief

pnma
for

B

B on

a ground G, and if

facie justified; she

to be

activity

B

of justifying

is

the contrary, that, in order for

indicates B, then one

is

B

G

reliably indicative

just another

B

to

beliefs.

is

.

Why does Alston

that the

38
.

If

that

B

is

immediately

committed

to

denying

B

is

of B in order
second level

one claims,

an agent must further show that

G

reliably

If

one

that there are

any

justified.

to

(Alternatively, conflation of the state of being justified and

the activity of justification leads one to think that

38

way of denying

be prima facie justified

to

denying

adopts this stance as a general policy, one

immediately justified

is in fact

to be justified,

committed

an agent

indicates the truth of belief B,

is

necessary for

to Alston, if

G reliably

need not show that

prima facie justified. That

According

levels.

all

justification

is

mediate.

39
)

That

is,

to

refuse to impose higher level requirements on lower level beliefs? Because

so to impose commits one to requiring of epistemic agents that they adhere to an infinite hierarchy

of beliefs. Because
requirement

is

it

is

absurd.

absurd implication?

If,

impossible for a

Why does

human agent

to

for S to be justified in assenting to B, S

higher level belief B' that the grounds on which S bases
in

assenting to B', she must further be justified

reliable indicators.

Justification,

p.

Requirements

in

Similarly for B".

And

in

.

infinity

of beliefs, imposing that

B"

B

must be further justified

in the

are adequate, then, for S to be justified

that the

grounds on which

so on. See “Epistemic Circularity,”

B' are
in

based are

Epistemic

Epistemology," pp. 153-71; "Higher Level
Epistemology," pp. 9-25; "Reply to Critics," in Religious Studies, 30 (1994):

332; "Level Confusions

in

171.
39

form an

Alston believe that imposing higher level requirements has this

Perceiving God,

p. 71

23

impose on an agent the requirement

that for

any belief B (whether reliably formed or not)

she must engage in the second level activity of justifying
that all justification

A

1.2

show

reliable ?

that

some

40

Alston's

It is

what

it

is

for a belief to be justified,

belief is justified, Alston addresses

viz.,

can

we show

that our basic

not difficult to understand

scheme of things.

geese flying overhead

is

If

we

justified,

we must show

why

that

B

is

saw them, whether anyone

know enough

will

.

this question

have been formed

want

B must

to

p.

is

for an agent

beliefs are

looms so large

in

be based on grounds that

be justified

further south

e.g.,

in believing that

B

is

we do

B

is

so by

by determining whether anyone

saw them, whether those who saw them

justified, the beliefs

at least partly

etc.

Though we

by appeal

to

which we

on the basis of a process of belief-formation

on the basis of which B was formed. That

"Epistemic Circularity,"

it

be the central

to

about birds to distinguish between ducks, geese, swans,

similar to that

40

what he takes

based on adequate grounds. Suppose

succeed in justifying our belief that

it

and what

ways of forming

headed south for the winter,

empirical investigation into the facts of the matter,

justify

be committed to claiming

are justified in adhering to belief B, that the flock of

reliably indicate the truth of that belief. If we

may

to

mediate.

articulated

epistemic question,

else

is

Doxastic Practice Approach to Epistemology

Having
to

is

B

321. According to Alston, this

they will be grounded

is,

is

at least

the central question of the Theory

of Knowledge for Thomas Reid, by whom Alston has been greatly influenced. See "Thomas Reid
on Epistemic Principles," in The History of Philosophy Quarterly 214 (October, 1995): 436-3 7.
See also Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Can Belief in God be Rational if it has no Foundations?,” pp.
149ff.;

Nicholas Wolterstorff,

“Hume and

Reid,”

The Monist 70

24

(October, 1989): 406f.

in part

on a configuration of sensory impressions

some

indicative of

state

of affairs

in the

physical world.

Those

same

exactly the

may be justified. But we

beliefs

situation that

we

We may do this by

justify them.

will stand with respect to those beliefs in

empirical investigation were normal, whether

we

we engaged

collected

making an informed judgement, whether we made any
beliefs

we

want

naturally

following the same procedure as before. Hence,

attempt to determine whether the conditions in which

some of the

We will

stood with respect to B.

all

in

to

we

will

our previous bout of

the evidence necessary to

At

inferential gaffs, etc.

least

arrive at via our second tier of empirical investigation will have

been based on our practice of forming beliefs about the natural and

social

worlds given

specific configurations of sensory impressions.

Those
exactly the

may be justified. But we

beliefs

same

situation as

which we desired

to

this regress in the

bud only

we found

will stand with respect to those beliefs in

ourselves twice before with perceptual beliefs

show were adequately grounded. And
if

we

.

Because

reliability,

show

that

it

is

not at

all

plausible to suppose that

our belief that SP
it

is

reliable,

is

will nip

can provide adequate grounds for trusting our whole

practice of forming beliefs about our environment

41

we

so on. Clearly,

reliable

which requires

is

on the basis of sense perception (SP ). 41

we have

experiential grounds indicative of SP’s

not immediately justified. If justified,

that

we adduce

reasons

in its

we

will

have to

support, in which case

it

will

be mediately justified. See, however, Stephen Jacobsen, “Alston on Iterative Foundationalism and
Cartesian Epistemology,”

in

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

22/1 (March, 1992): 133-44.

This point exemplifies a hitherto suppressed point. Alston's multi-tiered account of
epistemic justification has as a consequence

that,

mediate or immediate justification, our higher
justification.

although our lower-level beliefs

level beliefs invariably enjoy only

may

enjoy either

mediate

Beliefs about the epistemic status of beliefs are mediately, not immediately, justified.

Although an agent may be immediately justified

in

believing that there

is

a purple flower in the

center of her visual field as a consequence of her experiential awareness of that flower, she will

have to adduce reasons

in

support of the claim that presentations of that sort are truth-conducively

25

Although we are capable indefinitely of justifying
beliefs, that those other beliefs

depend

particular beliefs

for their justification

on the

by appeal

reliability

to other

of the same

type of belief-forming process raises the question as to
whether or not that whole

doing things
Alston.

Hence

is reliable.

the importance of the central epistemic question for

42

In order to broach that question,

which

I

address in the next subsection, Alston

develops the notion of a doxastic practice (DP).
beliefs.

4

The

"

The second
beliefs

way of

is

first tier is

is

in the first tier (1.2.2).

A

beliefs in light of

genuine

DP

way of forming

a two-tiered

composed of a family of belief-forming

composed of procedures and

formed

A DP

dispositions (1.2.1).

which agents evaluate

the

has several other properties which

I

discuss in 1.2.3.

1.2.1

Doxastic Practice as a Family of Belief-forming Dispositions

A belief-forming disposition (bfd) is an input-output mechanism by which an agent's
being

in a

given type of mental state causes her to assent to a proposition the content of

connected with beliefs with that content
justified.

if

the higher level belief that her belief

is

justified

is

to be

See Michael Sudduth, “Alstonian Foundationalism and Higher-Level Evidentialism,”

in

International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 37 (February, 1995): 33.
42
.

The

Reliability of Sense Perception, pp. 19-22. Note that Alston does not claim that

addressing this most fundamental question

is

required of an agent

because he imposes no higher level requirements on justified
agent must be justified

be justified

in

in

that

forming beliefs

SP

is

any strong sense. That

in

those ways.

We may

reliable.

be epistemically justified
if

we have no

Rather, Alston believes that the question

is,

he does not claim that an

believing that our basic ways of forming beliefs are reliable

about middle-sized physical objects on the basis of SP even

showing

in

beliefs,

is

of

idea

in

if

we

are to

forming beliefs

how

to

go about

intrinsic interest

and

will naturally occur to the reflective and inquisitive agent. See “Epistemic Circularity,” pp. 32 1

23.
43
.

Perceiving God,

p.

104.

26

-

which

is

determined by the correlated mental

previous subsection, a bfd

is

kind ot ground. That ground
thereof

45

.

Each

belief-

44
.

In the terminology articulated in the

a tendency to form a certain kind of belief given
a certain

may

be another

belief,

an experience, or some combination

forming disposition realizes a function which takes the cognitive

agent whose disposition
doxastic output.

state

Which

it

is

from a doxastic and/or experiential input

function a bfd realizes individuates that bfd

Thus, for example,

many

ot us have a maple-tree bfd,

about maple trees upon having a experience of the sort
being appeared

to'

by an actual maple

tree.

i.e.,

we would

to a correlated

46
.

we

tend to form beliefs

expect to have were

we

That disposition realizes a function that takes

us from sensory inputs of a specific type of (maple-tree-like) configuration to beliefs with
a specific kind of content (about maple trees).

Our maple-tree bfd

is

thereby

distinguished from those bfds the function realized by which goes from sensory inputs of

an elm-tree-like sensory configuration to doxastic outputs with an elm-tree output.

4J
.

ed.,
4

Belief-Forming Practices and the Social,"

(Lanham, MD.: Rovvman and

\ Perceiving God,

in

Socializing Epistemology, Frederick Schmitt,

Littlefield Publishers, 1994), p. 30.

P- 71.

46

A lot of epistemological hay has been made recently by the problem of individuating bfds.
According to Alston, in order to determine whether or not a given belief has been reliably formed,
we need to determine whether or not the grounds on which that belief is based are reliable
indicators, "what it was that the psyche was taking account of in forming that belief. So the
question of whether this belief was reliably formed is the question of whether the activation of a
function of going from inputs of just that sort to a belief output of just that sort would, in a suitable
spread of cases, yield mostly true beliefs." "Our Knowledge of God," p. 33. The answers to such
questions are, according to Alston, properly provided by cognitive psychology, however
.

inadequate

it

currently

is

"Goldman on Epistemic

to that task.

See "Belief-Forming Practices and the Social,"

Justification," pp.

1

19-20.

27

p. 3

1 ;

and

The

first tier

of a

belong to that grouping

DP

is

composed of a grouping of many

is

determined,

among

bfds.

47

other things, by similarity

Which

bfds

among

the

functions realized by those bfds and by the
inputs/outputs operated on by those

For example, our basketball,

functions.

tree, television,

each take as inputs sensory impressions and eventuate

mountain, and centipede bfds

in beliefs

about the external,

physico-temporal world. Hence, they are similar in respect of the
inputs by which they
are activated and by the outputs eventuating from their
activation. Moreover, each of

those bfds realizes a function, roughly, of going from 'appears to be
an X' to

consequence of

a

in a

their similar functions, inputs,

more general DP, which Alston
All

human

an

'is

X.’

As

and outputs, these dispositions are nested

calls a sense-perceptual practice (SP).

beings are genetically predisposed to develop the kinds of bfds

constitutive of SP. Alston considers several other universal doxastic practices. All

normal human beings have a mnemonic doxastic practice, by which we form beliefs
about our past experience or that some

state

of affairs obtained

in the past.

All of us have

an introspective DP, made up of mechanisms that go from a "current conscious
the belief that one

beliefs based

is

.

49

All of us have an inferential DP, by which

on the formal properties of other

by which we form

47

in that state.

beliefs

beliefs.

state to

we form

All of us have a testimonial DP.

by relying on the testimony of competent

authorities.

50

Perceiving God, pp. 155-57, 165-67; The Reliability of Sense Perception, p. 7-8; "Christian
p. 110; "Belief-Forming Practices and the Social," p. 31;

Experience and Christian Belief,"

A Realist Account of Doxastic Practices,” in Philosophy
Timothy Tessin and Mario van der Ruhr, eds., (London:

“Taking the Curse Off Language Games:

and the

Grammar of Religious

St.

Martin’s Press, 1995),

4

Perceiving God,

p.

157, 185.

Perceiving God,

p.

1

\

49
.

50
.

C. A.

J.

Belief,

p. 34.

56.

Coady, Testimony:

A

Philosophical Study, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).

28

Alston also mentions various particular doxastic
practices. Only some of us
adhere to religious beliefs, and thus engage in religious
DPs, ordinarily as a consequence
ol socialization or decision.

Such

DPs

religious

are similar to other practices, like the

reading of entrails, astrology, theoretical physics, and
wine-tasting, in respect of the

human beings engage

extent to which

in

them.

Alston also distinguishes between basic and non-basic doxastic
practices
basic practice

one premise
is

is

to

one which can be shown

which an agent

is

to

be reliable by only those arguments

A

at least

justified in adhering only if that practice is reliable:

an (epistemically) basic source of belief =
df

reliability

of O will use premises drawn from

reliability

of which

may be

51
.

Any

O

"O

(otherwise) cogent argument for the

." 52

A

non-basic practice

is

one the

supported by sound arguments the conclusion of which an

agent need not be justified in believing

of its (crucial) premises. (As

we

if

she

is to

be justified in assenting to

will see further on, a basic practice can be supported

epistemically circular arguments and no other.) Alston claims that SP,

discussed in the next chapter, are basic practices

which we evaluate them.

.

Perceiving God,

p.

.

53
.

53
.

which we form

beliefs, but also

ways

in

In addition to being a nexus of dispositions, a given practice

Knowledge of God,”

"Epistemic Circularity,"

Coady argues

in

107; "Belief-Forming Practices and the Social,"

Diversity and Perceptual
52

God

Evaluative Aspects of Doxastic Practices
Doxastic practices are not just ways

51

by

memory,

inference, and introspection, as well as the various practices of forming beliefs about

1.2.2

one

(at best)

p.

in

p.

is

37-8; “Religious

Faith and Philosophy 5/4 (October, 1988): 436.

326.

similarly for testimony. Testimony, pp. 133-51.

29

composed

of evaluative procedures and justified beliefs
a participant uses to corroborate

and disqualify

First, "a

basis of one of

They

beliefs.

are evaluative in

two

respects.

fundamental presupposition of any DP"

its

constituent dispositions

assenting to that belief.

4

According

is

that to

for an agent to be

is

form a belief on the

prima

facie justified in

to the standards internal to a given practice, a

disposition to go from inputs of a certain type to outputs of a certain
type

time a principle of justification: "when a belief of type
input of type

in a

for

prima

an agent

is,

those

who

are

actually justified in the beliefs so formed

54
.

55
.

56
.

.''

7

to regarding a given practice as

"Attached to each practice

p.

to

whether or not

56

is its

overrider

an ’overrider system’ of beliefs and procedures

is

"Belief-Forming Practices and the Social,"

Perceiving God,

as sufficient

I

.

of a doxastic practice

tier

same

Those who already engage

of course leaves open the question as

Second, central to the evaluative

system

committed

the

formed on the basis of an

having a disposition to form a belief B on the basis of input

facie justification. This

is

is

that belief is thereby (prima facie) justified ." 55

I,

given practice, that

reliable, take

B

is at

p. 32.

158.

we may distinguish between internal and external evaluations of a given belief. An
B is prima facie justified in an internal sense just when, according to the standards
constitutive of a given practice, that belief is reliably formed. Thus, given SP as we

Thus,

agent’s belief
partly

currently engage

in

it,

forming the belief that there

upon having the kind of visual experience
doubt prima facie justified
sense just

when

it

is

justified externally

internally.

An

I

is

a computer in the center of

agent’s belief

based on an adequate ground. So

when

I

if

form beliefs about computers

B

is

SP

prima facie justified
is

in the

in fact reliable,

I

“Religious Diversity and Doxastic Practices,”

in

Perceiving God,

p. 79,

field

no

an external

am no

doubt

See Robert Adams,
Research
Phenomenological
Philosophy and

54/4 (December, 1994): 885.
.

in

is

conditions just specified. (A

parallel distinction applies, obviously, for ultima facie justification.)

57

my visual

normally have when perceiving a computer,

104; “Taking the Curse Off Language

30

Games,”

p.

35.

that the subject

can use

that is called for .’

08

in subjecting

An

overrider system

procedures by which an agent

some

belief

is

may be

grounds for believing

like

reason to believe

I

am

it

my

determine whether the prima facie justification of

whether or not

my

belief that

my

my

But

if

know

I

that

I

I

Note

An

agent

that, the tests

prima facie

may have independent

may have

reason to

much

it.

like

until

sill

window

cat to the vet,

my

not ultima facie justified in adhering to

cat

A

on the window

my

has escaped and returned home, then

whose

59
.

see a cat on the

took

prima facie justified belief as neutralized

closer inspection

overridden

cat is sitting

care of my neighbor's cat, and her cat looks very

regard

is

it

usual justificatory force (an underminer or neutralizer ). 60

its

cat.

when

a stock of justified beliefs and investigative

(be prima facie justified) because

initial credibility

rebutted and

is

that that belief is false (a rebutter); or she

Thus, for example,

much

is,

facie justified beliefs to further tests

overridden in one of two ways.

believe that a ground lacks

looks very

may

ultima tacie, that

justified belief

prima

may have
sill

which

and have no

prima facie justified belief is
Alternatively, if

my

own, then

such time as

I

I

I

will

am

taking

have

to

determine on

it is.

and procedures constitutive of an overrider system not only

disqualify prima facie justified beliefs, they also corroborate them. Beliefs do not just

the relevant tests, they also pass

58
.

Perceiving God,

p.

159.

.

Perceiving God,

p.

189, 262.

.

Perceiving God,

p. 79;

59

60

"An

them

61
.

.

Perceiving God,

p.

if

I

know

that

Internalist Externalism," p. 228.

Contemporary Theories of Epistemology,
61

Hence,

pp. 36-39.

209.

31

my

cat

wags her

See John Pollock,

tail in

fail

a

particularly unique

that

way

unique

Note
system

62

my own

is

corroborates

to perceive the cat

my

prima facie justified

beliefs

by reference

depends upon other

and dismissing beliefs

we

I

I

I

check whether or not the

identify that pattern in

in

A practice

my

"grades

its

own

and the procedures she uses

finally that overrider

my

my

e.g.,

overrider

my window

where

my

cat

behavior by acquiring

cat's

in SP, e.g.,

wrist, etc.

about the

In short,

we make

a given practice to evaluate beliefs formed by

examinations ."

what an agent learns from a practice grounds both the
facie justified belief

its tail in

cat in

have acquired by means of SP,

of other beliefs formed by engaging

by engaging

learn

in that practice.

Note

wagging

sill

belief.

of the clock on the mantelpiece, the watch on

use of what

engaging

in light

which

to

beliefs

tends to be at that time of the day.

reliability

on the window

further the circularity of the evaluative function performed
by

The

.

way, then

63

As noted

later on,

beliefs she uses to defeat a

to evaluate

prima facie justified

prima

beliefs.

systems will have different features given different

doxastic practices. Although beliefs formed by engaging in SP, for example, are

normally subject to checks by independent observers, imposing
introspective practice

latter practice are

would have

ultima facie justified.

prediction and therefore of checking

.

requirement on our

as a result that no beliefs formed by engaging in the

And

equally absurd to discriminate against our

62

that

clearly that

mnemonic

memory

beliefs

would be absurd.

practice because

by the degree

to

it

It

does not admit of

which

Perceiving God, p.211,217; "The Autonomy of Religious Experience,"

would be

p.

its

9- 1 0.

217; "Is Religious Belief Rational?," in The Life of Religion, Stanley M.
Harrison and Richard C. Taylor, eds., (New York, NY.: University Press of America, 1986), p. 10.

63

.

Perceiving God,

p.

32

predictions are accurate.

we

distinguish different

those

DPs

64
.

The moral of the

DPs

often warrant us in imposing different evaluative

This will be extremely important later on (in chapter two)

the epistemic standing of religious

1.2.3

story? That the properties in virtue of which

ways of forming

activation of our bfds and

beliefs

we

my

DPs do

beliefs.

cat is sitting

on the window

it

we form

beliefs via the

DP

also has the following six properties.

sill,

65
.

In evaluating

it

is difficult to

not to rely on our

memory

how SP

see
66

Nor

.

is it

clear

tests that are relevant to a given doxastic practice are

subject matter dealt with therein." "The
65
.

"A Doxastic

Social,
66
.

" p.

Practice

Approach

to

Epistemology,"

There are other respects

in

p. 6;

Games,”

is at

my

the

how we

could adequately
67
.

determined by the nature of the

Autonomy of Religious

32; “Taking the Curse Off Language

inferential practices gets their

belief

could have a viable overrider

evaluate perceptual beliefs without relying on the testimony of others

"The

my

appeal to other justified beliefs stored in

I

cat tends to be at a given time of day, whether she

veterinarian, etc. Indeed,

system were

structure:

not operate independently of each other

memory — where my

.

discuss

evaluate those beliefs in light of a nexus of background

and investigative procedures. Every
First,

64

when we

Miscellaneous Features of Doxastic Practices

Every doxastic practice has a two-tiered

that

norms on

Experience,"

p. 10.

"Belief-Forming Practices and the

p. 35.

which our doxastic practices function interdependently. Our
premises from other practices, just as our mnemonic practice gets

information from sense-perception, or introspection. Our evaluation of sense-perceptual beliefs
nearly always relies on generalizations about the
to
67
.

way

the world functions, and hence

our (inductive) inferential practice. See Perceiving God, pp. 159-161.

Coady, Testimony,

p.

147.

33

is

beholden

its

Second,
before

we

we

acquire and engage in

DPs

prior to our 'age of accountability,' that

are able explicitly to thematize and reflect

on them

68
.

For example, our

practice of forming beliefs about the natural and social
environments

our psyche long before

we

are

which we engage contribute
identity, dispositions,

aware

that this

is

is

well-grounded

So ingrained,

the case.

is

in

the practices in

crucially to the continuity and content of our personality,

and character. This makes impossible a reflection on the epistemic

propriety of engaging in a given practice without practical implications: to
evaluate a
practice

is

to risk

Third,

changing one’s

we form

beliefs,

lifestyle, identity,

and hence engage

ends other than the mere formation of beliefs
intrinsically interested in truth, but also

are looking for something

to locate

point

is

we have

69
.

because

lost, etc.

purpose

in

DPs,

in the context

We

form

beliefs, not just

we need something

We recall

misplaced possessions, to ruminate over bygone days,

particularly important given the

common

.

Perceiving God,

p.

163;

"A Doxastic

Practice

"Belief-Forming Practices and the Social,"
69
.

Perceiving God,

p.

163-64;

in his

to eat, or

etc.

because

we

misunderstanding that those intent on

Approach

somehow

or other committed to

to Epistemology," p. 7;

p.

Approach to Epistemology," p. 8;
32; “Taking the Curse Off Language Games,’'
Practice

essay “Overcoming Epistemology,”

in

After Philosophy:

ideals, viz., a

is

plausible in large part because

model of the knowing subject

eds.,

though a foundationalist, rejects those

it

p. 36.

End of
(Cambridge:

University Press, 1987), claims that traditional philosophy, understood as an

of representationalism and foundationalism,
moral

are

Recognition of this

Transformation?, Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman and Thomas McCarthy,

Cambridge

we

because

p. 32.

"A Doxastic

"Belief-Forming Practices and the Social,
Charles Taylor,

of our pursuit of

people to re-experience old joys,

determining the epistemic standing of religious belief are

68

in life, etc.

amalgam

satisfies certain

as disinterested, isolated and punctual. Alston,

ideals; his doxastic practice

approach to epistemology

is

thoroughly inimical to attempts to bracket the social embeddedness and historicity of cognitive
subjects.

See section

1

.8

below.

34

the claim that religious belief

life,

is

a hypothesis to be entertained, divorced from
everyday

has no relation to praxis, consists of disinterested or tepid
endorsement of

propositions, etc.

Fourth, whatever the role played by innate mechanisms,
established and socially monitored

70
.

We

acquire

them via

DPs

are socially

socialization and hence via

our initiation into empirically effective social institutions. Although Alston
does not
specify the

mechanisms by which DPs

are institutionalized

-

of this feature of DPs to his argument, he spends surprisingly

one can assume

that

we

are initiated into the

DPs

the family, church, public and private schools,

Fifth,

DPs change

71
.

justified beliefs change, as

This

in

indeed, given the centrality

little

time analyzing

which we engage by

mass media, work

it

-

institutions like

place, etc.

obviously the case with overrider systems, since our

is

do our investigative procedures.

It is

equally obviously the

case with the degree of social establishment, witness the decline in membership and
social influence of the

DPs

70
.

Western Church, the primary

of the religious

discussed in the next chapter.

Perceiving God,

reason for this

is

p.

163; “Taking the Curse

at least for the

any belief-formation, and
that

Off Language Games,”

p. 36.

"The most obvious

that the concepts that provide the content for one's doxastic outputs are not

themselves innate,

show

institutional carrier

most

...The

part.

mere

fact that learned concepts are involved in

that concept-acquisition invariably involves socialization,

even perceptual and simple

inferential belief formation

is

enough

to

have a social aspect."

Note that Alston's claim that our conceptual
"Belief-Formation and the Social," pp. 30-3
structures are, by and large, acquired via socialization is in no way inconsistent with his claim that
1

the distinguishing feature of perception

is

.

a presentation of objects to consciousness without the

necessary mediation of conceptual structure. (See. 2.1 below.)
necessary to the formation of

objects, to the output of perceptual belief formation but not to
71
.

Perceiving God,

p.

Why?

Crudely, concepts are

perceptual beliefs but not to the 'animal' presentation of physical

163-64;

“A

its

input.

Doxastic Practice Approach to Epistemology,”

35

p. 4.

Sixth, there

is

an irreducible plurality of [doxastic] practices

72
.

There

is

no

Ur-practice of which our sense-perceptual, introspective,
mnemonic, inferential and other
practices are constituent elements.

They enjoy

this

autonomy

in virtue

of differences of

inputs/outputs, functions realized, conceptual structure, object domain,
overrider system

conditions of justification and/or universality. "There
or knowledge,"

7

is

no unique source of justification

even though, as mentioned above, the various practices often function

'

interdependently.

autonomous

is

As we

will discuss later in chapter three, that different

essential to Alston's

approach

to

DPs

are

epistemology and to his defense of

religious experience as a source of justified beliefs about God.

1.3 Alston’s

Central Epistemic Question

Alston argues that there are no, nor are there are likely to be, extant arguments

which show

introspection, and inference

which show

of the "standard package,’

that the practices constitutive

that

we

74

we

Hence,

.

viz.,

SP, memory,

enjoy, and are likely to enjoy, no arguments

are justified in regarding such practices as reliable. (That

we

such arguments does not, of course, imply that those practices are unreliable, or

them

are not epistemically justified in regarding

72
.

Perceiving God,

p. 162;

the Curse Off Language
73

“A

p.

Approach

35-6.

.

Actually, Alston vacillates between the claim that

SP

is

reliable (Perceiving

conclusion that SP

argument

is

God,

reliable

we

Doxastic Practice Approach to Epistemology,” pp. 5-7; “Taking

Games,”

"A Doxastic

74

that

as reliable.)

.

Practice

lack

p.

to Epistemology," p. 15.

76) and the claim

have failed thus

to that conclusion (Perceiving

God,

far,

it

that,

we

impossible non-circularly to show that

because

all

such arguments to the

are unlikely to discover an adequate

p. 143).

36

is

The

latter

claim seems the wiser.

I

outline Alston's argument in

two

steps.

a practice's being reliable (1.3.1). Second,

First,

indicate

I

I

briefly indicate

why

what he means by

he believes that

all

otherwise

adequate arguments which purport to show that any of our
universal DPs are reliable
suffer

from what Alston

calls epistemic circularity (1.3.2).

1.3.1 Reliability

A doxastic practice is reliable iff the beliefs formed on its basis are (1
true (2) in the circumstances in

Ad

( 1 ):

which the practice

In order to be reliable, a

DP

is

)

likely to be

normally employed. 75

need not invariably produce true

beliefs;

need do so only most of the time. (Alston does not get very specific about what

amounts

to

--

it

'most'

nor can he be expected to given the nature of the case. 76 Moreover, this
)

tendency must not just be true of a practice as agents have

in fact

engaged

in that practice.

A practice which because of limited or selected employment produces a high proportion
of true

beliefs, but

engaged

in

it

would not have produced

in a systematic

that high proportion

were agents

and sustained manner, ought not be regarded as

to

have

reliable.

Rather, only those practices are reliable which would produce a high proportion of true

beliefs

were they employed

in a systematic, sustained,

and varied manner, whether or not

they have in fact been so employed.

75
.

Perceiving God,

p.

104;

The

Reliability of Sense Perception,

p. 8;

"Epistemic Circularity,"

pp. 320-23; "On Knowing That We Know," pp. 17-19; "Our Knowledge of God," pp. 32-34;
"Belief-Forming Practices and the Social," pp. 33-4; "Goldman on Epistemic Justification," p.

123-24.
76
.

The

Reliability of Sense Perception, p. 9. Alston also argues that different degrees of

reliability are rightly expected for different DPs. It is typically much more difficult to identify
another agent's state of mind than the number of objects on a nearby table; hence, we ought to
expect our interpersonal DP to be less reliable than SP. See "Goldman on Epistemic Justification,"
p. 121.

37

This counter-factual feature of the concept of reliability

internally related to

is

Alston's requirement that an adequate ground render
objectively probable the belief based

upon

What

it.

A DP

that relation?

is

a grouping of bfds, and a bfd

is

agent has to form a belief B upon having a correlated ground
G.
just in case an agent’s having

that

B

And

is true.

obtains, then that

And

that belief.

it

G (in normal

the world

would be

because a

is

it

would be

(2):

An

DP just

is

even

if

a grouping of bfds, "a practice

are reliable."

...

no-one engaged

who engages

the spatio-temporal world, of sound

beliefs if she

is in

different

from those

in

aliens, or,

which

more

that practice

normal, conditions. But Alston

being's

engaging

in

— DPs

is

in

in

.

77

it;

e.g.,

etc.

Hence,

if

is

it

— may

ones subject

if

is

DP

a given

not reliable,

it

its

is

would not

—

in

form few or no true

to interference

was

acquired. That a practice

that

it

is

unreliable in

concerned with whether

we

all,

by

evil

is

not reliable

especially

can show that our —actual

are reliable. Hence, he need be concerned only with whether or not

our practices tends to produce true beliefs in the contexts

"A Doxastic

reliable iff

generally, those environments sufficiently

normally find ourselves.

77

a given ground

it.

mind and body,

under any and every condition does not imply

human

if

in a practice reliable in standard conditions

non-standard conditions,

demons, manipulation by

B

the case whether or not anyone ever has that ground or forms

reliable

agent

indicates

circumstances) renders objectively probable

be reliable whether or not anyone ever engaged

Ad

G reliably

such that a given belief is likely true

distinctive belief-forming [dispositions]

reliable,

a tendency an

is

Practice

Approach

to

Epistemology,"

38

p. 7.

in

which we

Suppose

normal human beings do

that

form beliefs

in fact

cognitive faculties are adequate to the epistemic task.
secretively, to a

way we

reliably; our native

Were we whisked, suddenly and

world governed by a Cartesian demon, we would form

currently do, although in that world

by hypothesis, we would form

obligation. Because,

either world, Alvin

we would

Goldman

“intuits” that

we form

fail to

same

beliefs in the

discharge our epistemic

beliefs in exactly the

same way

in

beliefs justifiably in both cases.

Hence, he adopts “normal worlds reliabilism;” a belief is formed reliably when

it

is

generated by a process which enjoys a high truth-falsity ratio in normal worlds, where a

normal world

is

one “consistent with our general

Alston rejects Goldman’s proposal, charging

most blatant

sort .”

74

it

beliefs about the actual

world .”

78

with normal world “chauvinism of the

Whether or not a given belief is formed

reliably

depends upon the

conditions which standardly obtain in that world, not upon the similarity of those

conditions to the standard conditions in our (actual) world. Thus,

if

God

so hard wired

cognitive agents as to form beliefs on a mere whim, and so governed their cognitive

processes as to forestall massive contradictions, that

which DPs unreliable
forming beliefs on a
then,

is

in the actual

whim would

is, if

world were standardly

reliable in that world, then

relativized to standard conditions of employment, not to closeness to the actual

.

Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition,

.

“Goldman on Epistemic

79

created a world in

be justified for inhabitants of that world. Reliability,

world.

8

God had

Justification,” p. 124.

39

p. 107.

1.3.2

Epistemic Circularity and Sense Perception
In his attempt to

show that

there are no non-circular and sound arguments

underwriting the reliability of our most familiar practices
the universal ones

to

-

-

Alston pursues the following strategy.

arguments which purport to show

that

SP

is reliable,

Alston has his eye

First,

he

initially

on

restricts his attention

primarily because

more energy

has been expended on that effort than lor any other practice. Second,
he criticizes the

most important extant arguments
problem

likely to vitiate

support of SP’s reliability. Third, Alston indicates a

in

any such argument, and concludes

that

it is

unlikely that

we

will

ever construct sound arguments in support of the practices constitutive of the standard

package.

(Note, however, that Alston never claims to suspend belief in SP's reliability.

Indeed, he assumes that

Alston's task

It

is

"to

SP

is

reliable

determine what,

would take us too

if

and

anything, can be done to

far afield to

each of the arguments he canvasses

81
.

that claims to the contrary are false.

show

that

it

is

Rather,

reliable.”

80
)

respond to Alston's formulation and critique of

Anyway,

I

agree with his conclusion. Hence,

I

will

just indicate the kind of problem Alston claims afflicts otherwise adequate arguments in

support of the reliability of SP.

Consider the following argument

80
.

81
.

Perceiving God,

p.

in support

of SP's

reliability.

106.

Alston presents the most thorough treatment of arguments

in

support of the reliability of

SP of

I am aware.
See The Reliability of Sense Perception, passim; Perceiving God, pp.
102-145; “Epistemic Circularity,” pp. 323-36; and "The Role of Reason," pp. 157-167. He

which

concludes that none of them, whether empirical, transcendental, inference
or linguistic, carry the day.

40

to the best explanation,

Only

( 1 )

reliable access to the social

and physical world

is

conducive

our

to

survival as a species.
(2)

We

(3)

Hence,

(4)

Our only access

(5)

Hence, sense-perception

What
It is

is

have survived as a species.
we have reliable access

wrong with

undoubtedly

valid.

one of the premises.

argument
(5).

is justified in

this

It is

It is

to the social

to the social and physical world.
and physical world is by sense-perception

is reliable.

82

argument, even granting that

not logically circular

what Alston

-

all

of its premises are true?

the conclusion

is

calls epistemically circular', the

believing (1) and (2) only

if

she

is

not to be found in

proponent of the

already justified in believing

We believe the first premise only by totting up a lot of evidence for the theory of

evolution, and

we

gather that evidence by forming beliefs about the world by

sense-perception. Hence, if sense-perception

assenting to

is

we

not trustworthy (5),

are not justified in

(1).

What

is

epistemic circularity?

An

argument

is

epistemically circular

iff

it

"involves a commitment to the conclusion as a presupposition of our supposing ourselves

to

be justified

in

holding the premises...."

belief that q if assenting to p but not q

would assenting
following

is

to q but not

8

.

An

would be

agent's belief that p

irrational,

commits her

incomprehensible,

p be irrational? Alston does not say, but

consonant with Alston's approach to epistemology.

An

I

to the

etc.

Why

think that the

agent S

is irrational

82

The argument here is of the same spirit as Quine's observation that "creatures inveterately
wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their
kind." Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, (New York, NY.: Columbia University Press,
.

1969), p. 126.
83
.

Perceiving God,

p.

108; "Belief-Forming Practices and the Social," p. 37;

Approach to Epistemology,’' pp. 2-3; "Epistemic
Journal of Philosophy 83 (November, 1986): 658.

Practice
in

41

“A

Doxastic

Circularity," passim.; "Perceiving God,"

.

in

assenting to p but not q, and

is

thus committed to assenting to
q

if

she assents to

p, iff

either S could not detend
p without also defending q or her reasons for assenting to
p

would lack probative force were
q

false.

Thus, S

is

committed

given that she adheres to the theory of evolution because a

undermined her confidence
evolution. Again, S

is

in

to the reliability

critic

who

successfully

SP would render her incapable of defending

committed

to the reliability

the theory of

of SP given that she adheres to the

theory of evolution because the evidence on which she might base that theory

only

SP

if it

of SP

indicates something about the physical world,

is

probative

which would not be the case were

unreliable.

What

is

wrong with epistemic

level requirements

belief that p

is

on epistemic

justification.

justified in order for

in believing that

SP

be justified

sill

to

am

not justified in

is

circularity? Recall that Alston

my

Hence, what

some perceptual

need not be justified

belief that p to be justified;

reliable in order for

(1.1 .2).

I

is

my

belief that

my

I

in believing that

my

need not be justified

cat is sitting

wrong with epistemic

belief (2) because

I

imposes no higher

on the window

circularity is

cannot show that SP

not that

is

1

reliable

84
( 5).

Indeed, that

believing

SP

SP

in support

assumption

me my

84
.

to

may be justified

I

be reliable allows

of SP's

[that

SP

reliability.

me

in perceptual beliefs without being justified in

to

adduce the various

Because

is reliable], in

I

need not be

beliefs

formed by engaging

"justified in

making

p.

33

th[e]

order to be justified in the perceptual beliefs that give

premises..., epistemic circularity does not prevent justification

“Epistemic Circularity,”

in

1

42

from being

transmitted from the premises to a conclusion that
would have been unjustified except for
this

I

argument ." 85

may

If

SP

is

reliable, then beliefs

therefore appeal to those beliefs to

What, then,

is

wrong with epistemic

insufficiently discriminating

point of view,

astrology

hence

may

is reliable,

may be used

to

show

what we

The

Do we

88

practice,

But

have reason for supposing

that

reliable, all

those practices as to their reliability.

we

If,

say,

the antecedent true? Is

SP

is

and Astrology

reliable

is

Practice
p.

how humid

it

Approach

is

was

outside.

wildly defective,

accurate but that the second

is

I

I

t2 , 1

in

results.

is

not,

first

first

I

first,

is

p.

we

40.

I

wanted

1

barometer and use

it

to use to

to test itself: at

repeat this test over an extended

and they no doubt will unless the

barometer

dismally unreliable. If the

barometer

first

Suppose further

support of the second barometer:

Because the

Because the second

to discriminate is clearly

owned two barometers

take another.

conclude that the

same

I

decide to take the

first

is

reliable.

that the first

barometer

is

I

repeat the test for

barometer
reliable,

I

is

highly

have

Unfortunately, an exactly parallel claim could

sufficient evidence for the barometer's reliability.

reliability.

of

— without being able to

148; "Belief-Forming Practices and the Social,"

the second barometer, with the

be presented

And

in a variety

to Epistemology," p. 3.

take a reading and shortly, thereafter, at

instrument

we engage

p. 17.

period of time. If the second reading corroborates the

its

circularity.

ask whether one or another source of belief is reliable,

Reliability of Sense Perception,

determine
I

is

of which surely are not

Perhaps an analogy would be helpful. Suppose that

.

arguments of this sort are

no matter how dubious from an epistemic

activity appears to be like a black box:

require: "...when

Perceiving God,

.

t,

among

"A Doxastic

87

circularity? That

86
.

88

discriminate

.

reliable

that astrology is reliable.

DPs - any of which may be

.

Any

is

SP are justified and

the beliefs formed by engaging in that practice will be justified and

Our epistemic

85

87
.

SP

that

in

be justified by arguments afflicted with epistemic

Astrology reliable?
not ?

show

formed by engaging

if

it

reliable,

is
I

reliable, then

lack that evidence. Unfortunately, if

from the unreliable barometer, neither argument helps

43

I

have sufficient evidence

have adequate evidence for

me

a whit.

1

its

tor

reliability.

desire to distinguish the reliable

are interested in discriminating those that
reasonably can be trusted from those that

cannot."

89

That we, apparently, lack adequate grounds so to
discriminate constitutes our

most important epistemic predicament.

1.4 Alston’s

Proposal for Evaluating Doxastic Practices

What should we do given

that

we

cannot show that our basic

without falling prey to epistemic circularity? Alston argues
understanding of the

engage

in socially

given practice

is

human

committed

to the belief that

in support

.

is reliable,

from practical

of the claim that

Perceiving God,

p.

Second,

rationality (1.4.1).

it

it

is

to

is

to

is

engage

in a

practically rational

and psychologically established practices as

reliable.

90

I

distinguish epistemic

I

present Alston's central argument

practically rational for an agent to regard as reliable

socially and psychologically established

89

it

present Alston's argument in two steps. First,

justification

given an adequate

and psychologically established DPs. And because

to be

are reliable

condition, the practically rational course of action

for an agent to regard socially

I

that,

DPs

DPs

(1.4.2).

148.

90

Note the importance of the way in which Alston has framed the central epistemic question
the plausibility of his argument. Only because doxastic practices are the focus of attention,
.

because Alston
relevant.

is

concerned with our doxastic

is

of a practical

sort

of some principle of epistemic justification,
the most rational course of action would not arise, "since we would not be

Were Alston concerned

questions as to what

activity, are considerations

to

to prove the truth

discussing doings." Perceiving God,

p.

174.

44

.

1.4.1 Practical Rationality

Alston
belief-

s

it

Justification

defense of his account of the epistemic norms governing
a rational agent's

forming activity makes use of both instrumental and
epistemic premises

does not, however, describe
calls

and Epistemic

in great detail

'practical rationality') to be.

what he takes instrumental

by engaging

it

1.4.1. 1

Nor, more importantly, does he indicate the proper

take to comport with Alston's argument, though

a fair

in

amount of poetic

-

employs

agent

may

engaging

will be determined

in

some

admit that

I

formulated

in light

of various types of
92

.

Which

by the purpose for which she evaluates her
its

criteria she

Thus, for

beliefs.

goal the determination of whether or not

practice enables an agent efficiently to satisfy her norms, desires, etc.

have recourse

will therefore

instrumentally rational only

On

DP

instrumental, aesthetic, moral, religious, epistemic, etc

Agents who so evaluate

.

outline an

license.

evaluate engagement in a given

example, instrumental evaluation has as

91

I

I

Types of Evaluative Criteria

An
criteria

I

He

rationality (or as he

function of instrumental grounds in epistemic discourse. In this section,

account which

91
.

if

it

is

the most efficient

to a criterion like: a given action is

means

to a desired

end

—

the end not

the importance of distinguishing between practical rationality and epistemic justification,

see William Alston, "Reply to Pasnau," pp. 36-39; and William Alston, "Reply to Critics,"

Journal of Philosophical Research 20
92
.

(

1

"Concepts of Epistemic Justification,"

Epistemology,"

p.

995): 68-7
p. 84,

in

1

97; "The Deontological Conception of

116; "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 113; and

Lawrence

Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, pp. 5-8; Paul K. Moser, Knowledge and
Evidence, pp. 47ff. The following relies somewhat on a train of thought Habermas articulates

"On

the

and Application: Remarks on
Cronin, (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 1-17; and

Employments of Practical Reason,"

Discourse Ethics,
Richard Foley,

trans.

Ciaran

P.

The Theory of Epistemic

in

Justification

Rationality, pp. 130-45 and 209ff.
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in

being subject to critique. Moral evaluation has as
not engaging in

some

her obligations, etc.

goal the determination of whether or

practice enables an agent to further the

The

maxim

iff

is

a rational agent could will that

universal law, etc. Epistemic evaluation has as

not engaging in

some

false, beliefs.

Thus the proposal: an agent

its

practice enables an agent to

is

good, discharge
morally permitted

maxim

to

be a

goal the determination of whether or

maximize her

true,

and minimize her

justified in assenting to a given proposition

that belief coheres sufficiently with her other beliefs.

given kind of practice

common

relevant criteria are familiar, e.g., an agent

to act in accord with a given

iff

its

satisfies the relevant criteria,

and

Whether or not engaging
is

in a

therefore conducive to

achieving the desired goal, determines whether or not engaging in that kind of practice
instrumentally, morally or epistemically a

good

thing.

The priority of different kinds of criteria
of discourse. For example,

to

for evaluation

demarcate different kinds

in instrumental discourse, instrumental criteria are

important, relevant, germane,

etc.,

is

than other kinds of criteria. Hence,

if

more

an agent's goal

is

determine which kind of car will enable her to travel to and from work the most

rapidly, then the speed of the different candidates (say, a Mazzeratti vs. a Lada) will be

relevant to determining

how

their production will not.

she ought to achieve her goal; the exploitative conditions of

What does

it

mean

for certain kinds of consideration to be

relevant? At the very least, that they override other kinds: faced with a choice between a

fast car

a just

93
.

A

produced under exploitative conditions (the Mazzeratti) or a slow car produced

economy

in

(the Lada), the rational interlocutor in an instrumental discourse chooses

Realist Conception of Truth, pp. 231-64.

46

the former

94

More

.

precisely, instrumental considerations override

all

others

when

instrumental considerations decide the issue; other kinds
of consideration are permissible
in instrumental discourse

only

if

instrumental considerations are indecisive. Given two

equally speedy kinds ot car (a Lada or a Chevrolet), an agent

Lada) because the other (the Chevrolet) was produced
Similarly for epistemic and moral discourse

adduced
issue

in

95

in

may choose

the

one

(the

an unjust economic system.

Instrumental conditions are properly

.

an epistemic discourse only when epistemic considerations do not decide the

96
.

1.4.1.2

Epistemic Justification,

Weak and Moderate

Alston intends to show that engaging
specified in the next chapter)

is

Rationality

in a religious doxastic practice (to

epistemically proper

97
.

He

be

therefore intends his defense

94

I admit that this can not be the whole story, because Alston regularly
dismisses epistemic
proposals on the ground that they are too demanding, or too rigorous, even though, strictly
.

speaking, the

more demanding

or rigorous policy

is

more conducive

to achieving

our central

epistemic aim.
9

\

An

agent might wish to engage

in a

discussion of the epistemic value of performing

some

action, say, torturing a captive so that she divulges information about the

enemy, and bracket either
moral or instrumental considerations. When the epistemic issues have been resolved, the
interlocutors may subsequently evaluate the moral standing of performing that action. In that
subsequent discussion, they may conclude that, though the epistemic value of engaging in the
practice in question

objectionable

all

is

very high, engaging

in the practice is

morally objectionable and, therefore,

things considered. Hence, that epistemic considerations override moral

considerations in instrumental discourse does not entail that epistemic considerations,

all

things

considered, override moral considerations.
96

we cannot provide truth conducive reasons for
we can only have recourse to practical considerations for
regarding certain practices as reliable. When addressing issues at the foundations of epistemology,
epistemological considerations fail us and we have to decide those issues on the basis of
.

To

anticipate, Alston will argue that, because

regarding our basic practices as reliable,

instrumental considerations. Perceiving

God,

p.

182.

97

Epistemic propriety should not be confused with epistemic justification. Moreover, showing
that a DP is epistemically proper is not necessary for that DP's being epistemically proper, nor
.

even to claiming that that

DP

is

epistemically proper.

47

Much

confusion

—

see Gale's "The Overall

.

of that practice to be a contribution

to epistemic discourse

about religious belief. But he

does so by weaving together two different types of ground:
epistemic, which are
truth-conducive (that

instrumental,

is,

which render

the belief based

on them probably

true),

and

which are not truth-conducive.

In order clearly to

mark

the difference between arguments employing

truth-conducive (epistemic) and those employing non-truth-conducive
instrumental) grounds, and thus to pinpoint

contribution to epistemology,

why

will distinguish

I

moderate practical rationality and epistemic

(e. g.,

Alston regards his argument as a

between weak

justification.

practical rationality,

(Later

I

discuss strong practical

rationality.)

Alston admits that

DPs

are trustworthy.

their trustworthiness

it

would be

Were he

were he able directly

successful in doing so, and were

to

we

show

that our central

to base

our belief in

on the premises of his argument, we would be epistemically justified

in a strong sense in believing

status a belief enjoys

ideal

which

them

is

to

be reliable. For the kind of positive epistemic

based solely on truth-conducive grounds,

I

reserve the

concept epistemic justification. Using the distinction between prima facie and ultima

facie justification discussed earlier:

Argument of Perceiving God,"

in

Religious Studies 30 (1994): 144-45 and

Norman Kretzmann's

"St. Theresa, William Alston and the Broad-minded Atheist," in the Journal of Philosophical
Research 20 (1995): 45-66, for two examples -- is caused by overlooking that point. Alston
writes, "...I have made epistemic claims for CMP, e.g., that CMP is reliable. But do not say here
I

have provided epistemic justification for those claims," in "Response
Religious Studies 30 (1994): 172. See William Alston, "Reply to Critics,’
Philosophical Research, pp. 76-77

that

I

48

to Critics," in
in

Journal of

(EP1):

An

agent’s belief

B

(EP2):

An

agent’s belief

B

prima facie epistemically justified

is

grounds which render

B

ultima facie epistemically justified

is

grounds which render B objectively probable and
nor rebutted by truth-conducive grounds.

(This

is

B

based on

is

B

is

iff

B

neither

based on
undermined
is

just a recapitulation of the concept of epistemic justification
articulated in 1.1.)

Alston denies that

and thus

that

we

that our basic

we

are likely to

are capable of

DPs

showing

As

are reliable.

universal and basic

DPs

engage

will

show

that

that SP, or

we

any other basic DP,

is reliable,

are epistemically justified in believing

be clear shortly, Alston’s reasons for regarding

as reliable are instrumental and thus have no direct bearing

the issue as to whether or not such

to

iff

objectively probable.

in those practices, if

and enduring needs, Alston

DPs

are reliable. If there

engaging

will

is

good instrumental reason

in those practices enables

have shown

that

we

on

an agent to satisfy deep

are practically rational in a

weak

sense in regarding those practices as reliable. For beliefs which pass evaluative muster

with respect to instrumental

(EP3):

An

criteria,

agent's belief

B

I

reserve the term

is rational,, iff

B

is

weak

rationality, or rationality w

.

based on adequate instrumental

grounds.

To remain
given

DP

As Alston

satisfied with

as reliable

showing only

that

an agent

is rational,, in

would take Alston outside of the bounds of an epistemic

notes, for S "to believe that p because

it

discourse.

gives peace of mind or because

stimulates effort [or one might add, contributes to social stability]

to the attainment

regarding a

may

it

not be conducive

of truth and the avoidance of error"; hence, "none of this would render

49

it

a good thing for S to believe that
p from the epistemic point of view." 98 Alston therefore

employs a hybrid concept which employs both epistemic and
instrumental considerations
and which

is

such

that, if

a belief meets the criteria for the application of that term,
that

belief would enjoy (some) positive epistemic status, that

rationality,,,.

override

all

is,

moderate rationality or

Recall that a discourse counts as epistemic iff epistemic
considerations

others

when epistemic

considerations decide the issue. So long as epistemic

considerations override instrumental considerations,

we remain

within the ambit of

epistemic discourse. Thus,
(EP4):

An

agent's belief

B

which indicate the

B

rational m iff (1)

no considerations are available
B is weakly rational; and

of B; (2) adhering to

if

S has no

way of showing B

to

be

true,

has compelling interests in

assenting to the truth of some belief B and has no reason whatever to believe that
false,

then

An

B

is

moderately rational for

B

is

S.

argument, therefore, to the conclusion that a given belief is either

epistemically justified or rational^,

argument

(3)

not overridden by truth-conducive grounds.

is

Alternatively put:

is

truth

is

properly advanced in an epistemic discourse.

An

to the conclusion that a given belief is solely rational,, is not relevant to a

discourse concerning the epistemic standing of that belief. However, showing that an

agent

98
.

is rational,, in

believing as she does

"Concepts of Epistemic Justification,"

p.

essential to

is

96.

50

showing

that she

is

also rational^

A

1.4.2

Argument

Practical

Support of Basic Doxastic Practices

in

Alston begins his argument

DPs

be reliable by showing that

to

does so

two

in

steps.

in support

it

it is

practice

is

rational w to

engage

Recall that

on the

it is

are reliable.

rational for an agent to engage

is

(1. 4.2.1)."

given practice

activity, if so

doing

to the satisfaction

in socially

committed to believing

is

that that

Human

Condition

is

some

proposition, or engage in

essential to satisfying crucial interests or desires.

engage

in certain central

of deep and enduring human

DPs (memory,
interests.

It is

clearly

SP, etc.) essential as that

They

are "intimately

intertwined" with wider cultural, economic, political, religious, and social forms of

and we engage

in

them well before we

are able to reflect

on

that fact.

100

99

it

mildly, "a very arduous task."

Although (EP3)

.

some

isolates

what

it

is

101

They

unnecessarily,

are therefore a "going concern" for

for an agent to have practical-rational grounds for believing

I

will

use rationality w and

in

order to avoid proliferating distinctions

rationality,,, to

evaluate not just believings but other

actions as well, such as engaging in belief-forming practices.
°.

101
.

them would

proposition, considerations of instrumental rationality also apply to actions like engaging

doxastic practice. In the rest of this chapter,

I0

life

They have

therefore sunk their roots deep into our self-identity and ceasing to engage in

be, to put

He

Second, he shows that an agent for

rational w for an agent to assent to

rational w for an agent to

is

in a

it

DPs

reliable (1 .4.2.2).

1.4.2. 1 Reflections

some

rational w to believe that those

he shows that

First,

and psychologically established DPs

whom

is

of the rationality m of believing our central

Perceiving God,

p.

169;

Perceiving God,

p.

169.

"The Autonomy of Religious Experience,"

51

p.

20.

in

a

those

who engage

engaging

in the

them

in

forms of

102
.

In short,

life in

Given
life

engaging

engaging
social

engage

in the

remember, smell, look, touch,

in those

in socially

in those

DPs which

practical reason to participate in the

partly constitute those

and given

socially established DPs.

establishment renders

it

that she

that

engaging

and personal goals,

To quote

who

Since

we

is

it

sufficient reason to

is

do so ."

is

in

DP

is

in a

life

to continue

given certain

put,

committed

DPs

rational w for an agent to

way

and given

essential to

in socially established

engage

forms of

which
that to

and hence

to willing

is

essential

engage

in

social

abandon

that this

it

should not be

103

cannot non-circularly show that socially and psychologically established

in those practices, "there are

.

Perceiving God,

p.

248.

.

Perceiving God,

p.

276.

103

forms of life

Alston, "the most basic

practically rational [w] to

practices are reliable, and since

102

their identity,

wills the ends

would be a disruption of established modes of social
is

essential to

most people have good

and psychologically established DPs. Alternatively

to achieving those social

done unless there

that

forms of life, most people have good practical reason

to those ends,

is

etc. is death.

forms of life which sustain

and personal goals, and given

means

DPs

ot course seriously understated: the certain

of which they are always already members, and given

membership

the

is

most people have good

that

practical reason to

that

to

in socially established

which we always already

find ourselves implicated. All this

consequence of refusing

engaging

we have good

no alternatives

practical reasons for continuing to

that

52

commend

themselves to rational

engage

reflection as superior" than to

concern

engage

in those practices in

which we

in

have a going

104
.

Given

that

we

will inevitably run into epistemic circularity at

some

point(s) in

any attempt to provide direct arguments for the reliability
of one or another
DP, we should draw the conclusion that there is no appeal beyond
the
practices we find firmly established, psychologically and
socially. We cannot
look into any issue without employing some way of forming
and evaluating

much

beliefs; that applies as

any

to issues

concerning the

reliability

of DPs as to

Hence what alternative is there to employing the practices we find
ourselves using, to which we find ourselves firmly committed, and which
we
could abandon or replace only with extreme difficulty if at all ? 105

Note

issue.

that the only practices in

which

it

is

practically rational w for an agent to

those in which she has a going concern. That a practice

entrenched

is

not adequate reason for engaging in

her society and psyche

104
.

Perceiving God,

epistemic policy
rational.

To show

alternative

one.

I

is at

which

is

As

p. 168.

this statement

engage

makes

only

in

socially

and psychologically

if that practice is

entrenched in

106
it .

clear,

Alston purports to show that his

any other, not that it is the most rational, or that
unsound, therefore, I will need to show that there

least as rational as

that his
is

rational for her to

it

it;

is

engage are

argument

is

rationally superior to his policy, not that that alternative

attempt to do so

is

the

most

just

it

is

is

some

rational

in 4.3.

105

Perceiving God, pp. 149-50. Here is another formulation of Alston's argument. Given that
non-circularly show that any basic DP in which we currently engage is reliable, we are
faced with three alternatives:
.

we cannot
(a)

continue to engage

(b)

change practices;

(c) stop

(C)

is

impossible for actual

engage

which we already engage;

forming beliefs altogether.

predicament;
to

in the practices in

we have no

fare

human

beings. (B) won't extricate us from our epistemic

reason to believe that any alternative practices

any better than SP with respect

seems
in which case we ought

to the ubiquity

in

of epistemic

which we might choose
circularity.

So, (a)

to be the only rational choice (unless those practices are themselves massively inconsistent,

106
.

I

note just

in

to cease

from engaging

in

some of those

practices).

passing that Alston provides no precise criteria which are of use

in

determining

degrees of social and psychological establishment. Although this generates some confusion as to

whether certain doxastic practices count as socially established and therefore as presumptively
innocent for those

who engage

criteria: clear criteria are not

in

them, he can hardly be faulted for failing to provide such

forthcoming because the subject matter doesn’t lend

53

itself to precise

1. 4.2.2

Practical Implication
In judging

it

to

be rational w to engage in a given DP, an agent thereby
commits

herself to the rationality of judging that practice to be
w
reliable

way forming

In judging that

beliefs.

it

is

rational, to engage in the practice of playing chess

rational, to play according to the rules of chess.

is

to

So

are

to

judge

that

it

is

to

win

committed

To form

committed

perform a series of moves designed

is

is

committed

rational, for an agent to take the beliefs

be

that

is

is

it

to

it

is

form

true, just as to play

some DP

to taking to

formed via a

DP

be

to

true.

is

to

chess

judge that she

Generalizing,

be (by and large)

be committed to taking the outputs of a practice to be (by and large) true

be committed to taking that practice to be reliable

way

judging that

DPs

a

match by checkmating an opponent

rational, for an agent to engage in

rational, in forming beliefs she

to

beliefs via

to taking to

the

who judges

is

some DP, an

rational, in forming beliefs in the

constitutive ol that practice. Similarly, for example, an agent

which participating agents

Why? A DP just

rational, for an agent to engage in

is

agent commits herselt to judging that she

beliefs

107
.

109
.

Hence,

in

judging

is

it

it

true.

108
.

is

is

And

to

ipso facto to

to

be rational.

measurement.
107
.

108
.

in a

“A

Doxastic Practice Approach to Epistemology,”

p.

38; "Reply to Pasnau,"

p. 38.

Pasnau argues that an agent need not be committed to taking the beliefs she forms by engaging
why not treat them 'as if they are true? "Justified Until Proven Guilty,"

given practice as true;

p. 12.

Alston admits that he and Pasnau

may

be faced with a "rock bottom clash of intuitions."

"Reply to Pasnau," p. 38. Just because doxastic practices are practices of forming beliefs in which
an agent engages over long stretches of time, beliefs are the kinds of things one takes to be either

one confidently forms them (as we do), one naturally takes them
Alston finds irrational an agent who forms beliefs without taking them to be true.

true or false,

be true,
109
.

and such

Perceiving God,

that, if

p.

179.

54

to

engage

to

DP

that

in

some DP an agent

committed

very clear that judging

is

tantamount to judging

An

example.

parallel

God's revelation

it

it

to

be rational

it

to

to believe that

be rational w to engage in a given

agent

who judges

DP

is reliable.

beings, even if that

is in fact

the case.

is

for

it

to

Rather, to judge that

be committed to judging that

is to

To be committed

reliable.

the case

judge that of X.

t

be

to

:

showing)

it

is

it

is

Simply

put, an agent

know what

a revelation

rational, to

engage

rational, to believe that

As Alston

notes, his

even though p does not

sufficient evidence for q, assenting to

not

Consider a

irrational, incoherent, senseless, etc. for her to assert

validity of pragmatic implication

would

is

SP

is.

in a

is

judging q to be the case given that an agent judges p

other attitude towards q than acceptance. 111

It

110

DP

X to be a Bible does not thereby judge that X is

never have thought to reflect on the Bible's authorship or

given practice

.

judging

be rational, to believe that

to

human

to

Hence, she needn

uo

to

is reliable.

Alston

may

is

to

be

p and take any

argument hinges on the

entail q,

nor does

p renders incoherent a refusal also

it

provide

to assent to q.

112

certainly be desirable directly to prove (provide truth-conducive grounds

that our

most familiar and fundamental DPs are

reliable.

Thus, for example, Richard Gale incorrectly formulates one step

in

But given the paucity

the above argument as

follows: "If one accepts as true the beliefs derived from engagement in a DP, one thereby accepts
the

DP

as reliable...."

realize that truth

is

every output of a

He

then argues that

it

is

possible for those unfamiliar with logic "not to

agglomerative or collective with respect to a conjunction and thus believe of

DP

that

it

is

true, but not believe that all or

even most of these propositions and

thereby reliable." "The Overall Argument of Perceiving God," pp. 141-42. So
long as Alston does not claim that an agent "thereby" regards a practice as reliable given that she
believes that most of the beliefs formed by it are true, but only that it is irrational for her not so to

that the practice

conclude

m

if

is

she asks the question. Gale's objection lacks force.

.

Perceiving God,

p.

1

78-79.

.

Perceiving God,

p.

1

80.

I12

55

ot the resources available to us

fundamental epistemic
reliable

the best

is

level,

we can

—

given the ubiquity of epistemic circularity

showing

that

is

is

of the essence of practical

rationality,

to grasp as clearly as possible the limitations forced

upon us by our human condition. And
condition:"

at this

are rational in believing that they are

do. Recognizing that

insofar as to be practically rational

human

we

—

that

we can do no

better

is

a consequence of our

'

We

are just not in a position to get beyond, or behind, our familiar practices

and

criticize

them from

that deeper or

cognitive situation does not permit

endeavors without engaging
reasonable alternative
intimately familiar?"

1. 4.2.3

is

in

it.

more objective
...

position.

We cannot take a step

some doxastic

Our human
in intellectual

practice(s) or other,

there to practicing the ones with

and what

which we are

4

Reliability as the Best Explanation of Social Establishment

Just a bookkeeping matter.

I

will

assume

for the duration that Alston’s social

establishment criterion does not presuppose that the social entrenchment of a given
practice

about

is

this;

engaged

indicative of the reliability of that practice.

He does seem

sometimes he claims

numbers of individuals have

in a

given practice over long periods of time

that practice provides its

Thus,

we may

practice

"3
.

A

is

that the fact that large

infer

reliable.

position

in

members with

from the

.

fact that a practice has

best explained by the fact that

it

to provide.

been socially established that

that

Thus, Alston writes,

which Alston follows Reid's

Perceiving God,

be of two minds

the insight into reality that they take

lead; see

447.
"4

is

to

p.

1

50.

56

"Thomas Reid on Epistemic

Principles,"

p.

When a doxastic practice has persisted over an number of generations, it has
earned a right to be considered seriously in a way that
[idiosyncratic practices
have] not. It is a reasonable supposition that a practice would
not have
persisted over large segments of the population unless it was
putting people
into effective touch with some aspect(s) of reality and
proving itself as such
by its fruits. But there are no such grounds for presumption in the case
of
idiosyncratic practices. Hence, we will proceed more reasonably,
as well as
by giving

efficiently,

established practices

initial,

ungrounded credence

Alston’s endorsement of this “reasonable supposition”
ringing.

He

to only the socially

115
.

is

not, fortunately,

always so

also notes that there are alternative explanations available for the social

entrenchment of a given way of forming beliefs and

that these alternatives

weaken

the

inference from social entrenchment to reliability. Thus,

There

are,

of course, other possible explanations of the social establishment of

The

a doxastic practice.

Freud supposes

power

beliefs

elite that the beliefs

possibilities.

it

may satisfy deep human needs, as
It may be in the interest of some
generally shared. And there are other

yields

that religious beliefs do.
it

yields be

Since reliability

is

not the only explanation with

some

antecedent plausibility, social establishment does not constitute a very strong

reason for

would

But since

reliability.

nicely account for the

does constitute one explanation that

reliability

phenomenon,

reason for supposing that explanation to obtain

It

seems

to

me

that

a given practice

is

even the

last

sentence

is

its

social

us with any reason to believe of that practice that

to take

with respect to the

Perceiving God,
"6
.

its

p.

it is

genesis and sustenance,

reliability

.'

16

objectionable.

a possible explanation of

regarding the manner of

phenomenon does give some

that

it

The

fact that the reliability

entrenchment doesn't

“Belief-Forming Practices and the Social,”

p.

57

47.

provide

reliable.

Apart from information

seems

me

to

that the proper attitude

of socially established practices

170.

itself

of

is

agnosticism

--

so

long as

which

we know
judge

to

only that a practice

is

socially entrenched,

Ot course, Alston

its reliability.

does not require that social establishment
a fallback position to

whether or not engaging

1. 4.2.4

on

indicative of reliability. Rather, that appeal

is

given our inability to show

to retreat

Social establishment

in a practice is practically rational

Practical Rationality

seems on

The appeal

is

relevant to determining

and not whether or not

that

its

and Epistemic Circularity

face that Alston's practical argument

to social establishment in support

doxastic practices in which

we engage

know,

is

for

example, that SP

the only

means we have

is

epistemically circular

we

are justified in believing that the

are in fact socially established. But

socially established without relying

available to us

117
.

of the practical rationality of regarding

doxastic practices as reliable presupposes that

is

all

is reliable.

It

SP

basis at

appeal to social establishment criterion

which Alston was compelled

that basic doxastic practices are reliable.

practice

is

s

we have no

which affords us

on

how

are

we

to

that very practice?

reliable access to our

natural and social environment. But if epistemic circularity vitiates truth-conducive

arguments

in support

Responding

of SP,

introspection,

doesn't

it

vitiate

Alston's practical argument as well?

to this objection provides the opportunity to clarify exactly

Alston’s practical argument

does he suggest that

why

we

is

supposed

to

show. Alston, as

I

noted, never doubts, nor

doubt, the reliability of our standard package,

memory, and

rational intuition.

"7

what

viz.,

SP,

But whether or not the standard package

is

See Perceiving God, pp. 175-76; Richard Gale, “The Overall Argument of Perceiving God,”
pp. 140ff.; and Alvin Plantinga, “What’s the Question?,” passim.
.
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reliable is entirely distinct

from whether or not we can show

attempts to determine whether or not

examining the various arguments

we

undermines any general claim

can show that our basic practices are reliable by

in support

This has an important implication: that

that

that they are reliable. Alston

we

of SP’s

reliability.

This

is

an agent

is

is

all fail.

reliable

epistemically up to snuff only if she can

the crucial negative point Alston needs to

the claim characteristic of

argues that

cannot show that even SP

provide adequate justification for believing that the practices
reliable.

He

Reformed Epistemology,

in

which she engages

make

if

he

to

is

viz., that religious

are

make good

in

doxastic practices

are innocent until proven guilty.

Philosophers are generally in the business of providing reasons for and against
certain theses and so, given that he believes that

less than direct vindication

SP

is reliable,

he attempts to provide a

of that conviction. As a consequence of our

that the practices constitutive

of the standard package are

reliable,

other kind of consideration which supports the desired conclusion.

rationality.

But because considerations of practical

because those

who

present

them do not claim

arguments should be evaluated

in light

fail:

were we

show

he casts about for some

He

settles

on

practical

rationality are not truth conducive,

that they indicate reliability, practical

of different standards than are epistemic

arguments. Judged by the standards internal

arguments

inability to

to epistemic discourse, epistemically circular

to accept as legitimate epistemically circular

attempting to determine whether or not some claim was true,

arguments when

we would

not likely satisfy

the obligation to believe the true and not the false. But because practical arguments do

not purport to provide us with reason to believe that a given proposition

59

is

true,

because

1

they provide us with reason to believe that a given action
sort, that

which

vitiates the

former does not necessarily

is

effective or something of the

vitiate the latter.

arguments are relevant because we don’t have anything

else to

Practical

go on; but they should be

evaluated in light of the criteria appropriate to practical discourse and
not epistemic
discourse.

So long,

then, as

arguments, so long as

we keep

we remember

clear about the point of the appeal to practical

that Alston

is

just trying to provide reason of a non-

epistemic sort in support ot a conclusion for which
will not dismiss Alston's practical

1.5

Grounds

we wish we had

argument

socially established

argument without adequate justification.

DP

is

is

sound,

it

is

rational w for an agent to believe that a given

reliable iff she has a sufficient stake in

aware, appears to be unduly conservative.

He

i.e.,

by providing

i.e.,

rational^

He

criteria for

identifies

118

Hence,

This, Alston

is

DPs

rational

engagement,

are epistemically subpar,

criteria.

any practice which persistently gives

beliefs cannot be reliable.

DPs from

determining whether rational w

two such

it.

attempts to dispel that appearance by

indicating (truth-conducive) grounds for disqualifying

"8

we

for Rejecting Socially Established Doxastic Practices

If Alston's

First,

epistemic support,

it

is

rise to a

high ratio of contradictory

not a good thing from the epistemic point of

"The Autonomy of Religious Experience," p. 18; “A Doxastic
p.
7; “Taking the Curse Off Language Games," p. 4
Actually, internal inconsistency is not a function solely of the incompatible beliefs generated by a
given doxastic practice, but of the incompatible beliefs generated by that practice which pass the
tests constitutive of its overrider system. That is, only that doxastic practice is unreliable which
.

Perceiving God,

p.

170, 234;

Practice Approach to Epistemology,”

.

1

generates a high degree of inconsistent ultima facie justified beliefs (justification

understood as internal justification).

60

in this

sense

.

view

for an agent to

beliefs

—

engage

in

Of course,

it.

recall the divergent versions of eyewitness' accounts

a "fantastically rigoristic epistemology"

epistemic good in regarding

SP

(or

were extensive and

beliefs.

persistent"

any other) as unreliable.

the outputs of different

1

.

'

1

If,

of an accident. But only on
as abdicating

is

DPs

Only

"

from her

tendency to produce inconsistent
to regard that practice

of the case, cashing out with precision to what

impossible.

is

if the

would we have good reason

Second, and more dicey than the

practices as unreliable

11

(In the nature

extensive and persistent amounts

among

would an agent count

give rise to contradictory

as reliable simply because engaging in that practice

sometimes produces contradictory
beliefs

DPs

our universal

first,

120
)

extensive and persistent inconsistency

sufficient reason for regarding as least

say, the products of

engaging

in

SP

one of those

are inconsistent with the

products of rational intuition and deduction (Parmenides and Zeno), then one of those
three practices

is

SP ought

to

sort,

unreliable.

And

although some have claimed that in a conflict of that

be regarded as unreliable,

this

there are such inconsistencies, that does not

According

tell

.

us which

to Alston, that practice is to be

persistently inconsistent with the output of a

ll9

conclusion

Perceiving God,

p.

171. This

is

is

is

not at

to be

all

obvious. “Even

if

condemned .” 122

condemned which

is

"more firmly established"

massively and

DP

123
.

Wide

not to say that this position has not been held. Alston

mentions Plato and Descartes as two who have.
12

°.

121
.

Perceiving God,

p.

236.

Perceiving God,

p.

171; "The

Practice
122

Approach

to Epistemology,” pp. 17-8;

.

Perceiving God,

p.

171.

.

Perceiving God,

p.

171.

123

Autonomy of Religious

Experience,"

p. 18;

“A

Doxastic

“Taking the Curse Off Language Games,”

61

p.

41

acceptance, definite structure, importance for our lives, innateness,
ineluctability, and

obvious truth are the kinds of properties which render one practice
more firmly

To

established than another.

engage

take the opposite course of action,

in less firmly established doxastic practices,

bizarre beliefs.

Let

e.g., to

continue to

would saddle us with

all

sorts

of

124

me

summarize the epistemic principles Alston employs

briefly

standing of beliefs about the reliability of DPs.

A

to evaluate the

belief is rational^ iff there are

compelling instrumental grounds for adhering to that belief (EP3). Although one would
think that there are acceptable instrumental grounds of other sorts, Alston appears to

argue that

it

is

rational w for an agent to regard a practice as reliable only if

and psychologically established. 12
(EP5)
is

It is

socially

DP

iff that

no compelling truth-conducive grounds

iff there are

which

that Alston

He does

(EP6)

it

is

rational w for

an agent to engage (EP4). Once again, one

would condone instrumental grounds other than

It is

not.

social

124
.

125

DP

is

and

may be

Thus,

rational m for an agent to regard as reliable a given

DP

DP

iff (1)

be reliable; (2)
socially and psychologically established; and (3) the products of

there are no truth-conducive grounds for believing that
that

DP

for refusing to

psychological establishment by which the rationality m of a given practice
established.

socially

Thus,

rational w for an agent to regard as reliable a given

in a practice in

would think

is

and psychologically established.

A belief is rational m
engage

'

it

Perceiving God,

p.

to

172.

not just any old instrumental grounds are acceptable in epistemic discourse, e.g.,
peace-of-mind-conducivity, political-expedience-conducivity, etc. This
conducivity,
happinessdubious assumption causes problems for Alston's argument, as I argue in 4.2
.

That

is,

62

DP

that

are substantially internally consistent and cohere
sufficiently with
other firmly established DPs.

Clearly, our basic DPs, introspection, SP,
established.

there

is

And

although there

is

a

memory,

rational intuition, are socially

modicum of intra- and

extrapractice inconsistency,

not enough to warrant our rejecting those basic practices. According
to Alston’s

epistemic criteria tor evaluating doxastic practices, then, our basic

it, it

is

rational m for us to regard

them

contact with reality,

so placing us.

doxastic practices,

By engaging

chapter three.)

we

When

equivalents thereof,

which enjoy those
learn that certain

viz.,

that he allows for another important

by what

in doxastic practices

I

shall

comparison

which we

criticism.

(See

are confident put us in

learn that certain features of those practices are responsible for

its

other practices either lack those features, or lack the functional

we

regard them as having a lesser epistemic status than the practices

features.

Similarly,

ways of forming

members of other

pass muster; that

as reliable.

[A close reading of Alston’s work indicates

way of discrediting

DPs

by engaging

beliefs inhibit us

in our core doxastic practices,

from gaining access

practices form beliefs in just those ways,

we

to reality.

we

When

regard them with

suspicion or outright reject them.]

1.6 Significant

No

Self-Support

doubt a DP's being socially established, internally consistent, and not

massively inconsistent with other

DPs

is

a very slim reed indeed on

63

which

to

ground the

which we may

bolster our confidence in the

which enjoys

significant self- support" thereby enjoys a strengthening
of

status

DPs

which we engage? Yes.

in

its

A practice
epistemic

126
.

What

is

significant self-support? Significant self-support involves
an internal

coherence between the beliefs formed by engaging
together’ in appropriate

use what

we

learn

ways

127

Consider, for a final time in this chapter, SP.

.

by engaging

given practice; those beliefs ‘hang

in a

in

SP

to predict events in the future.

We may

determine

whether or not those events occur by employing SP. And the success we enjoy
predicting events underwrites our confidence in SP.

SP

in predicting events

reliability

Why? Not

crucial premise in any such

we know

premises of that argument

argument from prediction

—

namely

—

however, SP

is

is

we

by employing SP

we wish

to

prove

self-supporting in this way,

Not only do many other DPs not enable us

SP need not have done

so.

Because not every

DP

— the

to determine

are justified in assenting to the

that our predictions are accurate

already justified in assenting to the conclusion

self-supporting.

because the success of

that our predictions are in general accurate

whether or not our predications are accurate. But then

if,

in so

provides the basis for a non-circular argument in support of the

of SP. The only way

Even

We may

it

is

— only

— that SP

if

we

are

is reliable.

significantly

to predict events accurately,

supports itself in the

way SP

does, and

,26

Perceiving God, pp. 173-75; "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," p. 18;
"Belief-Forming Practices and the Social," pp. 40-1 “A Doxastic Practice Approach to
Epistemology,” pp. 18ff; “Taking the Curse Off Language Games,” pp. 42f.
.

;

127
.

Significant self-support

make

the end

all

and be

all

is

of

similar to the various elements of coherence that

epistemic justification.

64

some

theorists

because SP supports
reliability

therefore

itself in

a

way

it

might not have,

than were SP not so to support

much

stronger than

predictive success

Why
such support

—

is

more confident

are justly

in its

SP's claim to positive epistemic status

which might have, but which

in fact lacks,

is

significant self-support epistemically important if any

is

epistemically circular? If epistemic circularity vitiates arguments in

self-support of any kind

—

why

it

-

a feature of

is

some

And

was not

because self-support

practices but not

all,

just in case

it

is

need not

It is rational,,

for

It

enjoys strong rationality or

an agent

to regard a given

moderately rational in believing that that practice
enjoys significant

Note

A

significant self-support, then, enjoys a higher epistemic standing

than mere moderate rationality.

(EP7):

we

that they are

"extend to every practice," 128 such arguments are not insufficiently discriminating.

which enjoys

or

strengthen claims to positive epistemic status? Because, as

the problem with epistemically circular arguments

significant just in case

argument featuring

does Alston claim that significant self-support

unsound, but that they are insufficiently discriminating.

practice

is

crystal ball gazing, astrology, etc.

support of the reliability of SP,

saw above,

DP

a

itself.

we

DP
is

rationality,..

as reliable iff (1) she

reliable

and

(2) that

is

DP

self- support.

that enabling

an agent accurately to predict

is

not the only property

possession of which confers upon a practice the property of being significantly

self-supporting.

agent to predict

128

129

For

is to

to require

require of those practices that

.

Perceiving God,

p. 173.

.

Perceiving God,

p.

129

of rational reflection and inference that they enable an

250; "The

which they cannot,

Autonomy of Religious
65

Experience,"

in virtue

p. 9.

of their

.

"very nature," enable. 130 Moreover, the function of SP in
an agent’s

navigate her

way through

rational intuition

life is to

enable her to

her social and psychological environment. The function
of

very different. Hence, Alston suggests that the function
of a

is

participants form of

life

determines what counts as

self-

DP

in its

support and what does not. 131

1.7 Status of Non-Socially Established Doxastic Practices

What of those
established?

What

practices in

is their

which we do not engage, which

are not firmly

epistemic status? Under what conditions

from the epistemic point of view

for an agent to

engage

is it

in a practice

and psychologically established? Alston does not address

a

good thing

which

is

not socially

this question systematically.

Apparently, however, social and psychological establishment

is

the only kind of

instrumental support Alston condones: that engaging in a practice would

make an

happy, or further her vocational goals, or just be interesting, does not establish
rationality,

132

Obviously, to prove

arguments of the

°.

m
.

132
.

weak

rationality

of regarding a practice as

Thus, Alston takes the rather hard line that “newcomers will have to prove

themselves.”

13

its

whether weak, moderate or strong. Social and psychological establishment

not just sufficient but also necessary for the

reliable.

agent

sort

itself,

a

newcomer can

rely neither

on

practical

Alston adduces in support of our familiar practices nor on

Perceiving God,

p.

Perceiving God,

p.

Perceiving God,

p.

174.

25

1

170;

“A

Doxastic Practice Approach to Epistemology,”

66

p. 17.

is

epistemically circular arguments.

It

would seem

that the only other option is the

following:

(EP8)

It is rational, (or rationalj for an agent
to regard as reliable a given
non-socially and non-psychologically established DP iff that practice
has been

shown

be reliable by premises formed by engaging

to

in practices in

which

it

is

already rational, (or rational ) for her to engage.
m

Let

me sum

up the epistemic principles Alston suggests we adopt for evaluating

the epistemic standing of doxastic practices.

Given Alston

s reliabilist

concept of epistemic justification, according to which engaging
epistemically justified iff that practice

is in fact reliable,

rendering of the

in a practice is

Alston adopts the following two

principles:

(EP9):
that

It is

DP

is

rational m for an agent to regard a

(1) socially

DP

as epistemically justified iff

and psychologically established, substantially internally

consistent, and coheres sufficiently with other firmly established DPs; or (2)

or a non-socially and non-psychologically established practice that has been

shown
is,

to

be reliable by premises formed by engaging

in virtue

(EP10):

of satisfying

It is

rational, for

justified iff that

DP

is (1

in practices in

which

it

(1), already rational m for her to engage.

)

an agent to regard a given
socially

DP

as epistemically

and psychologically established,

substantially internally consistent, coheres sufficiently with other firmly

established DPs, and enjoys significant self-support; or (2) a non-socially and

non-psychologically established practice that has been shown to be reliable by

premises formed by engaging
(1),

in practices in

which

it is,

in virtue

of satisfying

already rational, for her to engage.

Recall that, at the heart of the Reformed approach, religious doxastic practices should be

regarded as innocent until proven guilty. (EP9) and (EP10) provide criteria for
distinguishing between presumptively guilty and presumptively innocent practices. In

both (EP9) and (EP10), (1) identifies those practices to which, according to Alston,

67

we

should impute presumptive innocence and, in both (EP9)
and (EP10), (2) identifies those
practices

we

should regard as provisionally guilty. That

is,

an agent

who engages

in a

socially established practice should impute a presumptive
reliability to that practice, and

she

may remove

An

inconsistent.

that

presumption by showing that

agent

who engages

regard her practice as guilty, that

is,

in a practice

it

internally or externally

is

which lacks

as unreliable, until

shown

social

to

entrenchment should

be reliable on the

evidence afforded by practices with an established epistemic standing.

Some

blanche

at the

use of legal terminology such as the Reformed

Epistemologists are wont to employ. Thus, for example, Matthew Bagger writes, “the
frequent references to the principle of jurisprudence, 'innocent until proven guilty,’ signal

Alston

s

...

protective intentions. Injudicial reasoning

we employ

system, not because of its a priori necessity, but because
individual as

scholars

much

as

who propose

should explain

is

feasible

that

why we

we

we wish

this tenet in

our

to protect the

from mistaken prosecution and punishment.

accused

...The

consider religious perception 'innocent until proven guilty’

should wish to protect religious perception in

Several reactions are in order. First,

its

hard to understand

this

manner.”

why one would

133

object to a

principle proscribing mistaken prosecution and punishment whether in legal or epistemic

discourse. Second, Alston does not intend to protect only religious belief from external

critique.

As

the universal applicability of (EP9) and (EP10) testifies, all socially and

psychologically practices should be accorded presumptive innocence. Third, the legal

metaphor

l33
.

is

of use

in getting the points across that (a)

“The Miracle of Minimal Foundationalism,”

in

68

we

cannot but engage in certain

Religious Studies 29 (1993): 303.

doxastic practices without already having proven their
reliability and (b) that this fact

does not render them immune from criticism. Insofar as that

proven

guilty'

metaphor means,

I

think

The use of legal metaphor,
religious doxastic practices

that

it

criticism.

when we employ (EP9) and (EP10) we

blameworthiness. Nor does

it

imply

what the ‘innocent

some

Nor does

intention to protect

it

connote, or presuppose,

are attempting to determine epistemic

that the search for the truth is

than cooperative process. Rather, the metaphor
guidelines governing what assumptions

until

entirely defensible.

then, does not indicate

from external

is

is

it

is

an adversarial rather

a helpful device for expressing

rational for an agent to adopt in her search

for the truth.

1.8

Realism, Foundationalism, and Doxastic Practices

To

those for

whom

theory of justification,"

1

14

answering skepticism

is

“an essential task of a non-skeptical

Alston's resolution of the central epistemic question will count

as an unadulterated failure.

1

""

By

his

own

admission,

it is

strongly or moderately rational in engaging in a given

achieve her central epistemic aim.

136

DP

l34
.

Paul Moser,

all

and nevertheless

fail utterly

of their pockmarks,

Knowledge and Evidence,

p.

foibles,

human

and

cognitive agents in social

frailties,

can hardly lay claim to

91.

,35

"Two Types of Foundationalism," p. 33. As Jeffrey Stout argues in The Flight from
Authority, (Notre Dame, IN.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 25-36.
.

I36
.

Perceiving God,

to

Indeed, that he admits to that possibility, and that he

accords systematic significance to the immersion of all

practices which, with

possible that an agent be either

p. 178.

69

our uncritical acceptance,

may seem

to put Alston in a

camp peopled by

the likes of

Richard Rorty. According to Rorty, to show that our epistemic
principles are rationally

compelling

(to

answer skepticism) requires

by which we may compare our

reality

beliefs to determine

human

beliefs

are privy to a God's-eye

and the

realities

to escape the ethnocentricism

view of

we form

about which

whether or not the former accurately represent the

"skyhook with which
actual

we

that

latter ,

137

or a

produced by enculturation ." 138 That

beings cannot achieve a God's-eye view of reality requires us to pull in our

epistemic horns, to weaken our understanding of truth as correspondence to reality to
truth as that with

inability to

(to

wax

show

which our peers
that our basic

theological)

mere

will let us get

DPs

are reliable, that our DP's function

Alston

is

and

social practices,

doxastic practices- cum-social practices]

momentous, or

away. Recognizing, as Alston does, our

is

that, therefore,

forced, while leaving others dead, trivial, or optional,"

to relativism

with, and under

"our acculturation [into

what makes certain options

headed down the same primrose path

in,

paved

live,

13 "

or

may

indicate that

(or at least, repaved)

by Rorty.

The kind of critique Rorty
one salvo

levels at objectivity, reality, representationalism, etc.

in a long-lasting conflict

which

persists,

I

believe, primarily because the

disputants face their interlocutors with a series of false alternatives

137
.

etc.;

140
.

The incessant

Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, pp. 170, 176, 178,281,335,361,

Objectivism, Relativism, and Truth, (Cambridge, MA.: Cambridge University Press,

1991), pp- 6-7, 13.
138
.

Richard Rorty, Objectivism, Relativism and Truth,

p. 2.

.

Richard Rorty, Objectivism, Relativism and Truth,

p. 13.

139

I4

°.

A

dispute recent chapters in which Richard Bernstein has documented

70

in his

Beyond

is

alternation

between these alternatives

of some of the distinctions crucial

is

not necessary, and

to Alston's

not faced with only two alternatives: either
settle for

to

and those of his

ilk

I

his defense

on the posing of false

it is.

It

will,

of religious

he tack

I

to

community

we

are

view of reality or we

standards.

I

would

like

alternatives to render their position

more importantly,
which we

indicate

why

more

Alston believes that he

is

will see (two chapters hence) is crucial to

belief.

will take to articulate Alston's attempt to navigate through these

treacherous waters

in

aspire to a God's-eye

clear that

think that doing so will expose the dependence of Rorty

entitled to the metaphysical realism

1

we

it

the course Alston proposes to steer between the Scylla of relativism
and

the Scarybdis of objectivism.

plausible than

believe that an appreciation

epistemology renders

an identification of truth with adherence

comment on

I

is

to argue that his doxastic practice

any way incompatible with foundationalism. Alston

approach to epistemology

is,

in fact, a foundationalist

believes that his doxastic practice approach to epistemology

inconsistent, or even in tension, with his foundationalism.

is

is

not in any

Why

not

and

way

take that tack? Because

Alston's version of foundationalism provides an account of how an agent can be justified

in

forming beliefs as a consequence of contact with

a 'skyhook'

showing

lifting

without assuming that she has

her out of the mire of contingency, politics, self-deception,

that Alston’s

doxastic practices,

reality

I

modest foundationalism

propose to show

how

is

fully

etc.

compatible with his account of

cognitive contact with reality

is

possible even

Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis, (Philadelphia, PA.:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983).
71

By

we

though

lack the 'unmediated' access to reality Rorty denies

mortals like us and even though

we

is

available to

mere

cannot escape mundane processes like enculturation,

socialization, etc. Moreover, critics like Rorty

assume

that,

when

they demolish their

favorite version of foundationalism, they have succeeded in
undermining various other

positions historically connected with foundationalism, viz., realism, the
correspondence

theory of truth, objective knowledge, etc

According
belief

142

.

to Alston, foundationalism is

an account of the structure of justified

Foundationalists claim that justified beliefs are of two sorts: they are either

mediately or immediately justified

is

141
.

143
.

As

I

mentioned

one the justification of which depends upon

its

earlier, a

relation to

mediately justified belief

some other justified

belief;

an immediately justified belief is one the justification of which does not depend upon
relation to

some

its

other justified belief(s). Foundational beliefs, those which constitute the

substructure of the edifice of knowledge, are immediately justified; they are justified, for

example, by virtue of their being based upon certain experiences, as of being appeared
redly, rockly, etc.

Superstructural beliefs

justified beliefs but

l4

‘.

On

proximately based upon other mediately

the line, on pain of either an infinite regress of

the claim that access to reality presupposes indubitable, infallible

formation, see
142

somewhere along

may be

A

to

modes of belief

Realist Conception of the Truth, pp. 99f.

"Two Types of Foundationalism," p. 19.
See Robert Audi, "Overview," p. 3; "Psychological Foundationalism," in The Structure of
Justification," pp. 49f.; Richard Foley, The Theory of Epistemic Rationality, p. 95; Ernest
Sosa, “The Raft and the Pyramid,” in Knowledge in Perspective, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991), p. 167f.; Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate, (Oxford:
.

"Has Foundationalism Been Refuted?,"

Oxford University
143
.

pp. 41-2;

Press, 1993), pp. 67-69.

Alston argues that although foundationalism presupposes that there are immediately justified
some beliefs are immediately justified does not presuppose foundationalism.

beliefs, the claim that

"What's

Wrong

with Immediate Knowledge?,"

p. 61.

72

justified beliefs or

beliefs.

That

is,

of

circularity, those beliefs

must be based upon immediately justified

superstructural (mediately justified) beliefs are, whether
remotely or

proximately, based upon substructural (immediately justified)
beliefs.

Various kinds of material
the kind of material

is

possibilities,

we

may

be poured into

this structure.

Of

use to construct the foundations. There are

first

many

importance

different

foundational beliefs must be indubitable, incorrigible, presenting,

self-presenting, reliably formed, certain, necessary, clearly and distinctly
perceived, etc

The version of foundationalism

articulated

by Descartes and Locke, sometimes called

classical foundationalism, placed severe restrictions on what can count as foundational

critics

144
.

145
;

of foundationalism, mistaking the genus for the species, have identified classical

foundationalism with foundationalism tout court

146
.

That

is,

critics identify

foundationalism with both an account of the structure of justification and certain
restrictions

on what can count as foundational, they show

indefensible, and on that basis reject foundationalism

144
.

See Alvin Plantinga, "Reason and Belief

in

God,"

p.

147
.

that those restrictions are

(Perhaps this

is

because the job

55-9.

145

Thus, Descartes: "Reason leads me to think that should hold back my assent from opinions
which are not completely certain and indubitable just as carefully as do from those which are
patently false." Meditations of First Philosophy in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes,
vol. 2, trans. John (Nottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, (Cambridge: Cambridge
I

.

1

University Press, 1984),

p. 12.

146

Thus, Rorty conflates, not just foundationalism, but also epistemology, with classical
foundationalism. “The theory of knowledge will be the search for that which compels the mind to
.

belief as soon as

it

is

unveiled. Philosophy-as-epistemology will be the search for the immutable

—

structures set by
which knowledge life and culture must be contained
privileged representations which it studies.” Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 163.

structures within

147

"The distinctive thing about foundationalism is the structure of justification it asserts; and this
structure can be imposed on justification of varying strengths. Once more a band of camp
followers has been mistaken for the main garrison." "Two Types of Foundationalism," p. 53. See
Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, p. 79f; Ernest Sosa, “The Raft and the Pyramid,
.
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of the epistemologist

is

assumed

to

be to answer the skeptic, and

this requires us, in

order

not to beg the skeptic's questions, to restrict what can count
as foundational to the
indubitable, certain, etc.)

Alston has no intention of allowing the agenda to be

needs to require of foundational
that they be reliably

distinctness,

is,

formed

148
.

beliefs, in addition to

On

being immediately justified, only

edifice.

starts.

If,

On what,

then, are foundational beliefs

for example, X’s appearing redly to S

reliably indicates the existence of a red object in S's vicinity,

Moser, Knowledge and Evidence,

p. 2, 145.

misconceptions. “From this perspective, foundationalists

...

and

Here

if

is

are those

S forms the belief

is

the central,

if

not the only, philosophical discipline.

B

a sampling of such

who want

to

...

provide

[knowledge] with a justification where possible, and a critique where none is possible,
rest all our knowledge on a firm, indubitable, unshakable basis. For foundationalists,
epistemology

and

together with immediacy, necessary and sufficient for a beliefs being part

experiences of reality, for

pp. 170-71; Paul

by the skeptic and thus

Reliability, not indubitability, incorrigibility, clarity

of the substructure of an agent's cognitive

based?

set

Its

task

is

in

order to

to tell us in a

way what can and cannot be counted on in the edifice of human knowledge.” Rick
Roderick, Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory, (Oxford: St. Martin’s Press,
1986), p. 8. “A foundationalist position in philosophy is one which claims that philosophy can. by

timelessly true

some method, demonstrate

morality.” Stephen K. White,

University Press, 1988),

some conception of knowledge or
of Jurgen Habermas, (Cambridge: Cambridge

the absolute, universal validity of

The Recent Work
“A fallibilistic (as opposed

p. 129.

to foundationalist) understanding

of

which do
no one can predict whether changes

validity takes into account that claims to validity are raised in actual, historical contexts,

not remain stationary but are subject to change, and also that
in

context will have an effect on what

is

accepted here and

now

as sufficient justification in

Maeve Cooke, Language and Reason, Cambridge,
“The epistemological hierarchy characteristic of foundational
theories of knowledge and justification, which makes experiential knowledge in some quite
general way epistemologically prior to knowledge of the world, emerges as a by-product of the
fundamental motives for skepticism.” Michael Williams, Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological
support of the validity of a given claim.”

MA.: MIT

Press, 1994), pp. 2-3.

Realism and the Basis of Skepticism, (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University
8

.

,48
.

"Has Foundationalism Been Refuted?"

p.

47.

74

Press, 1996), pp. 57-

that there is a red object

belief

on any of her other
But

if

B

is

beliefs, then

to

she doesn't base that

counts as foundational.

being overridden, doesn't that

mean

B

is

not immediately justified?

merely reliable and thus dubitable and corrigible, and

if

S

the basis ot the further belief that she

dependent for

its

justification

No. Although other

on those other
turns out that

edifice

B

if

foundational beliefs need only be reliable, and reliably formed
beliefs are

always subject
If

on the basis of her experiencing X, and

and

beliefs;

B

all

beliefs

B

is false,

of

is

room bathed

on S’s belief that she

may

is

may doubt

not in a

B no

S's

experience of being appeared to redly

S's beliefs essentially

given ground without having to base

not based

149
.

If

it

dependent for their (mediate) justification on B's

B on

it

is

B on

possible for an agent to base

other beliefs, that

B

is

experience as of seeing a red object and

B

is

a

defeasible does not

render impossible immediate justification. In Robert Audi's terminology,

S's

is

red light?

longer belongs to the substructure of her doxastic

being justified also drop out. But so long as

dependent on

B

room bathed with

B

on

truth

its

in red light, then isn't

override the prima facie justification of B,

based on

then

in a

is

that

B

is

positively

negatively dependent on

the lack of defeaters. Foundational beliefs cannot be positively, but can be negatively,

dependent on other beliefs

150
.

Foundationalists are committed to unmoving, but not

unmovable, movers.
In addition to denying that substructural beliefs

must be based on indubitable,

incorrigible, etc., grounds, Alston also denies that substructural beliefs

l49
.

I5

°.

See section

must

be, not only

1.1.
in Robert Audi, The Structure of
Warrant and Proper Function, p. 185.

"Foundationalism, Epistemic Dependence, Defeasibility,"

Justification, pp. 105-1 12; see also Alvin Plantinga,

75

immediately justified, but also shown

B must

foundational,

is

to be justified.

That

is,

for belief

B

to count as

be based on reliably indicative grounds, but S need not show that

based on reliably indicative grounds. Iterative foundationalism

is

B

the claim that a

higher level requirement of this sort must be imposed on foundational
beliefs

151
.

Alston rejects both classical and iterative foundationalism, and he does so for the

same

The

reason.

principle

familiar regress argument

Suppose

some way

152
.

in support

The following

contra foundationalism,

that,

justified, then,

in

argument

all

of a foundationalist epistemology

is

the

a simplified version of that argument.

is

justification

of belief is mediate.

A belief B

is

by being based upon a different justified belief B *. 153 B* must be justified

or other; because

all

justification is mediate,

B* must be based upon

a

further justified belief B**. Similarly with B**. Either this sequence of justifications

never ends, or

it

terminates. If

it

does not terminate, then anyone

belief must ipso facto have an infinite hierarchy of beliefs

who

— which

has a justified

seems quite a burden

impose on any and every justified belief no matter how simple and uncontroversial.

to

the sequence of justification does terminate,

based on non-doxastic grounds
B**'s being based on nothing

151
.

cannot conclude either with B**'s being

it

(as foundationalists like Alston

at all.

"Two Types of Foundationalism,"

The

first

If

would have

it)

or with

case would violate the condition that

all

p. 25.

152

"Two Types of Foundationalism," pp. 26-7; Lawrence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical
Knowledge," pp. 17fi; Susan Haack, Evidence and Inquiry, p. 21. Interestingly enough, Michael
Williams claims that it is the most powerful argument in support of skepticism as well! See
Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Skepticism, pp. 6-8.
.

153
.

just

I

am

simplifying for the sake of clarity. Most mediately justified beliefs are not just based on

one other

belief;

hence the unilinear structure of justification employed

drastic oversimplification. But

I

cannot see that

it

76

in

the argument

prejudices the conclusion unfairly.

is

a

justification is mediate; the second

in the

sequence

its

hard to see

how B

which B** surely would be

belief,

option.

B

is

But that gives

B

-

or B*.

It

justified

would render suspect

if

it

or

B* could be justified

rise to a vicious circularity:

foundationalists are correct:

B

we must deny
all

if

based on an unjustified

lacked grounds altogether. There

by being based on one ot the

seems, then, that

the justification of earlier steps

is

beliefs in the

is

only one other

sequence prior to

it.

based on B*, B* on B** and B** on either

that all justification

is

mediate;

mediately justified beliefs must (proximately or remotely)

be based upon immediately justified beliefs.

According

to Alston, the regress

argument provides foundationalism with

its

strongest support. Nothing in the regress argument, however, requires either (1) that

immediately justified beliefs must be indubitable, incorrigible,

etc.;

or (2) that an agent be

justified in believing that her immediately justified beliefs are immediately justified. 154

And, because neither

(1) nor (2) are essential to foundationalism's strongest argument,

foundationists like Alston are free to reject them. Alston, as a reliabilist of sorts, requires

of substructural beliefs only that they be reliably formed, thus rejecting classical
foundationalism.

justification,

belief

B

if

As we saw

earlier,

and therefore denies

she

is

foundationalism

Alston rejects higher-level requirements for

that

an agent can only be justified

justified in believing that

is

B

is

reliably formed;

in

adhering to some

hence his version of

inconsistent with iterative foundationalism. Nevertheless, because he

retains the structural claim distinctive to foundationalism, that

is,

the claim that beliefs

are of two sorts, mediate and immediate, with the former enjoying their justification by

l54
.

"Two Types of Foundationalism,"

p.

29; "Has Foundationalism Been Refuted?"

77

p. 50.

.

being based on, whether remotely or proximately. the

latter,

he remains within the ambit

of foundationalism.

Note

that Alston’s claim that substructural beliefs are immediately
justified

does

not entail that substructural beliefs do not depend for their generation
and maintenance on
other beliefs, cultural mores, social practices, linguistic practices, forms of

conceptual structures, or the like

entail that

it

is

155

The immediacy of a foundational

.

life,

belief does not

absolutely independent of the social (any more, of course, than

it

entails

independence of an agent's neurophysiology); foundationalists are "not committed

view

that the possibility

of

first

cognitions in no

way depends on

to the

the existence of

anything outside one's momentary states of mind ." 156 Were Alston to require of
substructural beliefs that they be causally independent of the social, there

would be a

crucial incoherence in his general epistemology; his doxastic practice approach to

epistemology would be inconsistent with his foundationalism. Rather, according to
Alston,

155
.

immediacy

entails only that the justification

of a

belief, not its existence, is

This pace, e.g., Charles Taylor. “Even in our theoretical stance to the world we are agents.
to find out about the world and formulate disinterested pictures, we have to come to grips

Even
with

it,

experiment, set ourselves to observe, control conditions. But

indispensable basis of theory,

we

in all this,

which forms the

are engaged as agents coping with things.... But once one takes

undermined. Obviously foundationalism
the kinds of objects we pick out as whole, enduring

this point, then the entire epistemological position is

goes, since
entities, for

our representation of things —
grounded
instance —
are

way we

in the

deal with these things.”

“Overcoming

p. 476. Taylor confuses the causally necessary conditions of the existence of some
belief with the necessary conditions for its justification. Just because an agent can form beliefs
about some object only because she manipulates it, interacts with it in various and sundry ways,

Epistemology,”

does not entail that her beliefs about that object are based on her manipulations and thus are
justified in virtue of being so based.
156
.

"Two Types of Foundationalism,"

p.

4

1

78

independent of other beliefs, cultural mores, social institutions, and
the

like

157
.

Alston

writes.

The question of what

[justifies] a belief only arises once a belief is formed.
That question presupposes the existence of the belief and thus presupposes
any necessary conditions of that existence. ...To suppose that the conditions

forming the belief are themselves conditions of [justification], and hence
determinative of the choice between mediate and immediate, is to confuse the
tor

levels

of questioning.

would be

arguing that since a necessary
condition of my making a request (orally) is that I have vocal chords, part of
what makes me justified in making that request is that I have vocal chords.
It

like

The existence of immediate knowledge is quite compatible with a
thoroughgoing coherence theory of concepts, according to which one would
not have a single concept without having a whole system of concepts, and
even with the further view that the possession of a system of concepts requires
having various pieces of knowledge involving those concepts 158
.

In short, a

"minimal foundation

justification

its

is

from none. But

independent of every other cognition in that

that

by no means implies

that

it

is

it

derives

nomologically possible

for such a belief to occur without a supporting context of social practices ." 159

Alston's minimal foundationalism dovetails nicely with his doxastic practice

approach

to epistemology.

An

agent learns to form beliefs as she does by being

socialized into a given social practice.

socialization enable her to

way minimal

157
.

form

1

"What's

skills

she acquires during the process of

consequence of contact with

would have

Thus, Alston's version of foundationalism

is

Wrong

MIT

Press, 1992), p. 176.

with Immediate Knowledge?" pp. 63-4. See also “Self-Warrant: A Neglected
p. 293; and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Locke and the Ethics of Belief,

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),
.

That she cannot extricate herself

compatible with Searle's thesis that "to have one

form of Privileged Access,”

159

it.

reality, in the

have to have a whole Network of other beliefs and desires." The Rediscovery

of the Mind, (Cambridge, MA.:
.

beliefs as a

foundationalists like Alston

belief or desire,

158

The

"Has Foundationalism Been Refuted?"

p. 100.

pp. 43-4.
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Irom her socio-cultural
for the claim that the

skin, in the sense that she cannot provide non-circular
justification

way

in

which she has been socialized puts her

get at the truth, does not obviate the fact, if

manner. (She

even

if

A justified

she cannot

show

in

is.

she

is

It is,

is

a fact, that she forms beliefs in a reliable

forming beliefs as she has been socialized

that she is so justified.

that she is not in a strong position

she

it

in a strong position to

160
)

to

form

She has no epistemic reason

to think

and she has every instrumental reason for thinking

therefore, moderately rational for her to continue forming beliefs in the

accustomed

to

forming

epistemology allows an agent

beliefs.

to

appropriate to the

human

In this chapter,

I

that

way

In short, Alston’s doxastic practice approach to

claim that she forms her beliefs about reality without

saddling her with the impossible onus of attaining a God's-eye view of reality.

is

beliefs

As

such,

it

condition.

have attempted

to articulate the contours

of Alston's doxastic

practice approach to epistemology. (EP9) and (EP10) are the apex of that approach.

Alston believes that rational reflection on the human condition, and more particularly, on
the limitations of our cognitive powers,

policy for us to adapt.

l60
.

I

mentioned

He

commends (EP9) and (EP10)

as the

most

rational

also claims that religious beliefs formed on the basis of

earlier three distinctions crucial to Alston's doxastic practice

approach to

epistemology: between the state of being justified and the activity of justifying, defending,
providing reasons, arguing, between mediate and immediate justification, and between epistemic
levels. Alston employs each in his formulation and defense of minimal foundationalism. One can

of the immanence of human cognitive activity in socially and
culturally conditioned doxastic practices with his claim that human beings can form justified
beliefs about an independently existing reality if one appreciates (1 ) that an agent can Rejustified
'reconcile' Alston's full appreciation

in

forming beliefs about

reality without

having any idea as to

how

to justify that claim; (2) that

requiring of an agent that she defend the (higher level) belief that she has justified beliefs about
reality should not be

confused with the requirement that she be justified

in the

(lower level) beliefs

she forms about reality; and (3) that an inability to vindicate the higher level belief does not

impugn

the justification of lower level beliefs.

80

mystical experience count as epistemically proper according to
that policy,

case for that matter now.

81

I

turn to his

CHAPTER 2
THE VINDICATION OF PERCEPTION OF GOD

Alston attempts to vindicate the epistemic standing of a practice of forming
beliefs about

that

God which

he calls the Christian Mystical Practice (CMP).

he cannot non-circularly show that

reliable.

He

has to

settle, therefore, for

agent to believe that

regard

CMP

is reliable.

CMP

is

In order to

that

it

show

is

stipulates

he cannot show that SP

reliable, just as

showing

He

is

rational and rational, for an

that

it

is

rational m for an agent to

CMP as reliable, Alston needs to show that engaging in CMP is weakly rational.

In order to

show

that

CMP

is

weakly

rational,

Alston needs to show

CMP is a genuine doxastic practice; and
that CMP is socially and psychologically established.
that

(a)

(b)

In order to

show

that

CMP is moderately rational as well, Alston needs to show,

further,

that

CMP is internally consistent; and
that CMP is consistent with more well-established practices.
that

(c)

(d)

In order to

show

that an agent is strongly rational in regarding

CMP as reliable, Alston

needs to show as well

(e)

In (2.1),

I

that

CMP enjoys significant self-support.

present Alston's argument in support of the claim that

CMP

is

a species of a

perceptual doxastic practice, and in (2.2), Alston's response to objections to the claim that

CMP

is

a genuine socially established practice (a and

b).

If

he succeeds in so arguing,

Alston will have established the weak rationality of believing that
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CMP

is reliable.

In

(2.3),

I

present Alston’s response to various arguments to the
conclusion that

internally inconsistent, inconsistent with

some

other respect (c and d).

more well-established

establishing the moderate rationality of believing that
the respect in

which

CMP

is

practices, or unreliable in

successful, Alston will have gone a long

It

CMP

is reliable.

way toward

In (2.4),

I

explain

CMP enjoys significant self-support (e), and thus enjoys strong

rationality.

2.1

Vindication of the

Weak Rationality of the Christian

Given Alston's account of DPs

(1.2), the

Mystical Practice

case for the rationality w of believing

CMP to be reliable must consist of showing that CMP is constituted by a family of bfds
and an overrider system, and
interdependent, etc.

beings

to

who

human

1

that

CMP

is

socially established, autonomous,

Alston will conclude as follows.

appear to themselves to perceive God;

consciousness; and

it

is

possible that

it

God

is

is

possible that

Third,

beliefs about

God employ an

DP — where

This should

make

it

genuine does not entail

in

CMP

SP, and engaging

engaging

in

CMP and

SP, his claim that

practices.

God which meets

clear that Alston's argument

conclusion that engaging

it

in
is

See Perceiving God,

is rational,,

SP

is

p.

is

There

is

the criteria for counting

reliable.

not an argument from analogy,

because engagement

in

CMP

is

viz., to the

analogous to

Although Alston often compares (favorably)
to engage in CMP is grounded in the theory of doxastic

rational,.

rational,

human

Second, agents

(2.1.1).

CMP enjoys the various other features of a genuine DP (2.1.3).

as a genuine

presents himself

overrider system to evaluate those beliefs (2.1.2).

apparently a practice of forming beliefs about

'.

God

causally related to

consciousness in the manner appropriate to perceived objects

who form

some human

First, there are

223.
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2.1.1

The Christian Mystical
Alston argues that

constitutive of

CMP,

from 'seems

be X' to

to

Practice

CMP is a species of perceptual practice.

like those constitutive

'is

X.'

That

is,

the bfds

of SP, realize a function which takes an agent

In so doing he pursues the following strategy: he analyzes

the paradigmatic instance of perceptual practice, viz., SP, identifies
those features of

which make

it

a perceptual practice and then determines whether or not

those features. Analysis of

SP

members of a

CMP possesses

indicates that the family of bfds constitutive of the

of any prospective perceptual practice must

satisfy

two

sets

of requirements.

first tier

First,

perceptual practice must form beliefs on the basis of experiences with a

given phenomenological character, a

mode of consciousness

Second, for members of a perceptual

DP to

perceive, they

I

discuss in (2. 1.1.1).

must not just be

consciousness, but they must also be rightly related to that which

is

in that state

perceived.

these external, non-phenomenological, requirements of perception in (2.1

2. 1.1.1

SP

I

of

discuss

.1 .2).

The Phenomenology of Perception
What kind of character does an

perceptual beliefs?

According

What does an

to Alston, the

agent's consciousness have

when forming

agent appear to herself to undergo

paradigm of perceptual consciousness

herself to be directly presented with an object.

is

when

perceiving?

that an agent appears to

2

2

Faced with the objection that this account of perceptual consciousness is too broad, in that it
does not rule out especially vivid memories as apparent perceptions, Alston further develops his
analysis. The object with which an agent is apparently presented also appears to be external to the
.

perceiver, thus ruling out introspective states as objects of perceptions, as well as presently

George Pappas, "Perception and Mystical Experience," and William
in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54/4
Commentators,"
"Reply
to
Alston,
(December, 1994): p. 881 and 896 respectively.
existing memories. See
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First,

presentation. Essential to perception, according to Alston,

phenomenon of presentation
aware of that

object, if

front of my computer,

it

is

my

given

for, or

or imagine

it,

it

presented

eyes open and mind

me. The computer assumes a place

my computer;

my

in

it

is

no longer present

to

it.

It is

to,

alert,

in

my

me.

If

once again become aware of the computer, and
merely remembering or imagining

agent perceives an object only

I

her consciousness.

I

I

turn

my

of it

my

head,

may

I

head

am aware

again present to

my

turn

visual field.

I

When

I

if

she

is

sit in

perceive that computer in front of

visual field. If

no longer occupies a place

but

An

to consciousness.

the

is

I

no longer see
computer,

recall that

to its

former position,

in a different

I

manner than

consciousness.

Presentation to consciousness distinguishes perception from mere conception, fantasizing,

judging, believing, hoping, wishing,

etc.'

and cannot be reduced

of judgements, ways of conceiving, or the

to, structures

Presentation to consciousness

so even if all perceptual awareness of facts involves judgement,

that all

3
.

we

are

aware of in such perception

Perceiving God,

p. 5,

is

a judgement .”

it

is

distinct from,

like.

“And

by no means follows

4

14-5, 27, 36-38, 55, 186; "Externalist Theories of Perception," in

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (September, 1990): 96; "Precis of Perceiving
God," in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54/4 (December, 1994): 863; "The
Perception of God," in Philosophical Topics 16 (Fall, 1988): 28f.; “Literal and Nonliteral Reports
of Mystical Experience,” in Mysticism and Language, Stephen Katz, ed., (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1992), pp. 84-5. What about the all-important problem of hallucinations? What
does an agent perceive when hallucinating? Visual images, of the sort many have regarded as the

only objects of which an agent
a mental image to be what

is

is

directly aware.

external physical object or state of affairs
4
.

A

Realist Conception of Truth,

judgement even

if

"As

1

construe the theory [of Appearing],

directly presented to consciousness only in those cases in

the former

is

p. 94.

is

available for this role." Perceiving

Presentation

Woudenberg, “Book Review: Perceiving God,”
1

(October, 1994):

1

distinct

causally related to the latter

with some object unavoidably involves conceptualizing

Religion, 3

is

in

in

p. 56.

from conceptualization and

such a way that being presented
some way or other. See Rene

in

International Journal for the Philosophy of

17-24; and Paul Moser,
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it

God,

takes

it

which no

Knowledge and Evidence,

p. 87.

Adequately

to appreciate this feature ot perceptual consciousness
requires that

we

distinguish between an object’s appearing as such and such and
an agent's taking that

object to be such and such.

An

object

may

look a certain

conceiving that object as being that way: an agent
property of greenness without having

at

may

way

to an agent without her

be aware of a tree with the

her disposal the concept of green and thus

without conceiving of that tree as green. This

the case even though, as Alston notes,

is

something's looking green typically evokes in an agent attributions of greenness
attributions

do require conceptualization

Normal

perceptual experience

Nevertheless, what
just thinking about

is

6

- which

Alston writes.

.

shot through with 'interpretation.'

makes this a matter of perceiving the house, rather than
or remembering it, is the fact of presentation,

it

givenness, the fact that something

is

presented to consciousness,

is

something

I am directly aware.
And this is something that is distinguishable
from any elements of conceptualization, judgment, belief, or other forms of

of which

'interpretation,'

however, rarely the former

adult experience

may be found

without the

Alston mentions several reasons for denying that presentation
conception, judgement,

5
.

Perceiving God,

principle, for this

think of

it

p.

book

etc.

and thus

that perceiving

to visually present itself to
it

as blue, judge

William Alston, "Experience of God:

identical to

an object necessitates

A

me

it

as blue even if

I

"It is possible, in

do not take

it

Perceptual Model," quoted in

Radical Conceptualization of Experience,”

Mark McLeod, Rationality

p. 18.

See Fred Dretske,

1969), pp. 4-18. For the

“The Propositional Structure of Perception,” and “The
Worldviews and Perceiving God, (Oxford: St.

in

Martin’s Press, 1993), pp. 3-22 and 23-44 respectively.
.

7
.

Perceiving God,
Perceiving God,

be blue,

Proudfoot, Religious Experience, (Berkeley, CA.: University of California

Press, 1985), pp. 41-74; and Joseph Runzo,

6

to

to be blue, or anything else of the sort."

and Theistic Belief, (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1993),
Seeing and Knowing, (Chicago, IL.: University of Chicago Press,

Wayne

is

36-9; "Externalist Theories of Perception," pp. 79-80, 82.

as blue, conceptualize

contrary, see

latter in

7
.

p. 37.

p.

See John Searle,

The Rediscovery of Mind,

27.
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pp. 133-37.

.

The most simple

conceptualization.

phenomenon, whereas conception

X

is

Y

identical to

and

X is

that presentation

not.

If

is

a non-intensional

X (say, a Bible) presents itself to an agent and

(God's definitive revelation to humanity), then

presents itself to that agent.

Bible),

is

is

If,

identical to Y,

it

however, an agent conceives of an object
it

Y

follows that

O

does not follow that she conceives of O as

as

X (as a

Y (as God’s

definitive revelation to humanity).

Second, direct presentation. According to Alston, presentation of objects to
consciousness

may

(external) object

perceive

X

iff

agent directly perceives

some

X differs from the conscious state of perceiving X and she does not

X in virtue of perceiving any other object An agent indirectly perceives some
8

.

(external) object

X iff X differs from the

perceives x in virtue of perceiving

tree

An

be either direct or indirect.

by looking

some

state

of consciousness of perceiving

other (external) object.

When

X and if she

she perceives a

into a mirror, an agent perceives that tree in virtue of perceiving

some

object distinct from the tree, viz., the mirror. If an agent perceives an object (e.g., her

face) in virtue of perceiving

and the former indirectly

some other

object (a mirror), she perceives the latter directly

9
.

Getting clear on what Alston means by direct presentation requires that

we

distinguish that concept from others in the neighborhood. Both direct and indirect

perception differ from what Alston calls ‘indirect perceptual recognition.'

indirectly recognizes a given object

8
.

Perceiving God,

p. 35.

.

Perceiving God,

p.

9

when

she perceives

21

87

some

object

An

agent

which functions

as a

.

sign or indication of another such that she has to infer the
presence of the signified from

her perception ot the signifier. 10 Thus, an agent
sky, and infer

plane

from her perception of the

never perceived, but

is

its

may

trail that

directly perceive a vapor trail in the

a plane has recently passed by.

The

existence has been inferred from that which has been

seen.

Direct presentation

An

is

agent's awareness of her conscious states

absolutely immediate'); that

she

also distinct from

is in

is,

there

is

is

what Alston
unmediated

calls ‘absolute

(or

what Alston terms

no distinction between an agent's being aware that

a given conscious state and the conscious state of which she

states are identical.

immediacy.’

Thus, for example, when an agent

is

is

aware.

11

The two

aware of feeling glum, she

is

not

aware of an object distinguishable from her feeling glum. This immediacy does not
obtain between objects directly perceived and the state of perceiving

directly perceives a tree, she perceives

it

through a conscious

state,

(Of course,

that

may an

When

an agent

a state readily

distinguishable from the perceived tree. Only if the object perceived

the state of perceiving that object

it.

is

thus distinct from

agent be said directly to perceive that object.

12

an agent directly perceives an object does not preclude causal

intermediaries between perceiver and object: whenever an agent sees a tree, light waves

are reflected

from the

tree to her retina; nevertheless, she

waves.)

I0

Perceiving God,

p.

21

".

Perceiving God,

p.

21;

“The Perception of God,”

p.

30.

2

Perceiving God,

p.

22; "The Perception of God,"

p.

30.

.

'

.
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does not perceive the

light

Alston announces that he will focus primarily of putatively direct
rather than
indirect perceptions

fundamental.

of perception

of God because direct perceptions are simpler and more

Indirect perceptual recognition and absolute immediacy, not
being species
at all,

Is there

a

play no role in his argument.

mode of consciousness

directly presented with

God?

in

which an agent appears

to herself to be

Yes. Alston argues as follows. Various agents report of

having directly perceived God. Their reports

relate various experiences

which range from

the proverbial mystical merging of individual identities to the divine to a

dim

tacit

awareness of God as sustaining an agent's very being. Sometimes those experiences are
sensorily mediated, as

when an

agent

is

aware of God by gazing

night, but they typically lack sensory mediation.

ecstatic, but

Alston

is

may

Sometimes they

be the consequence of discipline and planning

concerned are not ineffable

at the

14
.

heavens on a starry

are spontaneous and

Those with which

15
.

Here are some samples of the kind of phenomenon on the basis of which,
according to Alston, agents form beliefs about God.

I

was

in perfect health:

training.

We

we were on

our sixth day of tramping, and in good

had come the day before from Sixt

neither fatigue, hunger, nor thirst, and
I

was

my

state

to Trient

equilibrium.

14
.

15
.

felt

we had a good guide,
road we should follow.

subject to no anxiety, either near or remote, fore

can best describe the condition in which

.

I

of mind was equally healthy.

and there was not a shadow of uncertainty about the

13

by Buet.

Perceiving God.

When

all at

once

I

I

was by

calling

it

I

a state of

experienced a feeling of being raised above

p. 28.

Perceiving God, pp. 32-3; "The Autonomy of Religious Experience," pp. 2-3.

On the claim that religious
The Epistemology of Religious

“Literal and Nonliteral in Reports of Mystical Experience,” p. 83.

experience

is,

or even must be, ineffable, see Keith Yandell,

Experience, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 61-1
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15.

myself,

I

°f

as if his goodness and

—

it

felt

the presence of God

—

tell

1

of the thing just as

power were penetrating me

I

was conscious

altogether. ...The

of ecstasy may have lasted four or five minutes, although it seemed
at
the time to last much longer. ...The impression had been so
profound that
state

in

slowly climbing the slope

asked myself

were possible that Moses on
Sinai could have had a more intimate communication with God.
1 think it
well to add that in this ecstasy of mine God had neither form, color, odor,
nor
taste, moreover, that the feeling ot his presence was accompanied
with no
I

if

it

determinate localization.

It was rather as if my personality had been
transformed by the presence of a spiritual spirit. But the more I seek words to
express this intimate intercourse, the more I feel the impossibility of
describing the thing by any of our usual images. At bottom the expression
most apt to render what I felt was this: God was present, though invisible; he

fell

under no one of my senses, yet

Then,

in a

my

consciousness perceived him. 16

very gentle and gradual way, not with a shock

dawn on me

at all,

it

began

to

was not alone in the room. Someone else was there,
located fairly precisely about two yards to my right front. Yet there was no
sort of sensory hallucination.
neither saw him, nor heard him in any sense
of the word ‘see’ and ‘hear,’ but there he was; I had no doubt about it. He
seemed to be very good and very wise, full of sympathetic understanding, and
most kindly disposed toward me. 17
that

I

I

One day when I was
I

was aware of Him,

at

prayer

for

I

...

I

saw

Christ at

my

side

—

or, to put

it

better,

saw nothing with the eyes of the body or the eyes of
He seemed quite close to me and I saw that it was

the soul [the imagination].

He.

As

I

thought,

He was speaking

such visions were possible,

I

to

nothing but weep, though as soon as

me.

I

regained

my

usual calm, and

the time Jesus Christ

imaginary vision

was
If

I

all

to

be

He spoke

became
at

afraid at

my

His

first

say

I

side, but as this

could not see in what form. But

me

one

no imaginary vision, how then can

with greater certainty than

is like

.

.

was not an

most clearly

I

felt that

if

I

I

saw Him?

know and

He

If

affirm that he

one says

that

one

who cannot see someone though he is beside
somebody who is blind, it is not right. There is some

Anonymous, quoted

in

Anonymous, quoted

in

much, because a person

in the

is

is

him, or

dark can perceive with

William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, (New York,

NY.: Penguin Books, 1958),
17

to

I

similarity here, but not

16

word of assurance

my right, and was a witness of everything was doing....
see Him with the eyes of the body or the eyes of the soul,

do not
this is

that

and could do

cheerful and free from fear. All

like a person in the dark

that

first,

the time on

because
beside

I

seemed

me. Being completely ignorant

was very much

pp. 68-69.

Perceiving God,

p. 17.
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the other senses, or hear his neighbor speak or move, or
can touch him. Here
this is not so, nor is there any feeling of darkness. On
the contrary.

He

appears to the soul by a knowledge brighter than the sun. 1 do not
mean that
the sun is seen, or any brightness, but there is a light which,
though unseen,
illumines the understanding. 18

Normally, an agent
if

an agent describes her

is

the best judge ot her

mode of consciousness

character, if she describes

what she appears

own

states

of consciousness. 14 Hence,

as having a certain phenomenological

to herself to experience,

we ought

(in the

absence of powerful reasons to the contrary) to regard as accurate her description of those
appearances.

Of course,

that an agent accurately renders her

not entail that she accurately depicts that of which she

to herself directly to perceive

would be
that

foolish to

God, she may not

some human beings appear

to

direct

Theresa, quoted

St.

.

Perceiving God,

19

of his

own

p.

in

20
.

Perceiving God,

40. “Each person

beliefs,

Perceiving God,

p.

1

p.

;

and thus,

God

as a

realize functions taking

God, Manifestation beliefs or

Mystical Perception (MP).

M-

:o

p. 13.

is in

a uniquely favorable position to acquire

current conscious states.” “Self-Warrant:

Epistemic Justification,

to her,

it

to their consciousness; indeed, they habitually

direct presentations of

and the practice of forming such

.

Nevertheless,

awareness of God to a belief about God. Alston dubs beliefs

formed on the basis of apparent
beliefs,

so.

themselves to form beliefs about

Hence, some human beings have acquired bfds which

them from a putative

18

be doing

appear

themselves to be directly aware of God.

to

consequence of God's putative presentation
so.

in fact

may

aware; although she

deny the accuracy of her description of what appears

Moreover, agents appear

do

is

mode of consciousness does

286.

“Perceiving God,"

p.

655.
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A Neglected

knowledge

Form of Privileged Access,

in

Note

that Alston stipulates that perception

of God

is

perception of a being

understood roughly as the three central monotheistic religions have
understood that being,
viz., as

omniscient, omnipotent, benevolent,

etc.

21

Because Alston builds

into the concept

ot mystical perception a direct awareness of an object with specific
theistic properties,
beliefs

formed as a consequence of an apparent

reality

do not count as M-beliefs. 22 So stipulating does

members of non-theistic
they venerate.

beliefs

—

It

just

at least, if

Two

religions can not

means

that they

direct awareness of a non-theistic ultimate

not,

form justified

have to

call

of course, entail that

beliefs

by perceiving the object

those beliefs something other than

M-

they want to use Alston's terminology.

brief digressions. First, as mentioned above, Alston primarily concerns

himself with showing that

it

is

rational m

obviously a different practice than

does Alston distinguish between

MP;

and

s

for agents to regard

in fact

it

MP and CMP?

is

CMP as reliable. CMP is

a species of the

latter.

On what

basis

Different religions provide adherents

with different creeds and thus with differing grounds for evaluating M-beliefs. Just

because any incompatibility between an M-belief and a component of a given doctrinal

system

may

different

serve to rebut that M-belief, and because different doctrinal systems provide

grounds for rebuttal

to their adherents, there are as

systems as there are different religions.
suffices to distinguish

21
.

Perceiving God,

one

p. 2,

DP

23

And

many

different overrider

because a difference

from another, there are as many

29; "The Perception of God,"

p.

in overrider

system

different practices of

25.

This move has no substantive implications, since putative experiences of a different kind of
object can serve as the basis for the prima facie justification of beliefs about that different object

22

.

just the
23
.

same way

as M-beliefs

Perceiving God,

p. 7,

do

for beliefs about the theistic

30, 191, 262.
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God.

in

forming beliefs about

God on

the basis of our perceptual experience as there are
different

MP is actually composed of various distinct DPs

religions.

For reasons of brevity, his
restricts his attention to

own

familiarity,

one such practice,

mind, however, that the same arguments
will be available to Islamic

24
.

and no doubt his convictions, Alston

viz., the

Christian Mystical Practice.

in support

of the rationality of engaging

and Jewish variations of MP, not

MP

animist, etc., versions of something like

Keep

to

in

in

CMP

mention Buddhist, Flindu,

25
.

Second, Alston's argument differs from the kind of case more commonly made by
appealing to putative perceptions of God

from the premise

that

26

Arguments

.

some agents experience God

to the conclusion that

typically rest

on the claim

God

exists

that the

existence or activity of God provides the best explanation of peculiar religious

experiences like an agent's (apparently) losing herself in the divine, an undifferentiated

and ineffable union with God,

etc.

According

to this alternative formulation

of the

argument from religious experience, the explanandum (mystical union with God
proverbial sense)

explanans

24
.

27
.

is

a subjective experience to which an agent adds a supematuralistic

The bone of contention

Perceiving God,

p.

.

Perceiving God,

MP an
26
.

21
.

p.

276.

Wayne

therefore,

p.

in

whether or not supematuralistic

Religious Studies,

p.

177; “Religious Diversity

438.

'Something

awareness of God understood

Perceiving God,

is,

256; “Reply to Critics,’

and Perceptual Knowledge of God,”
25

in the

like,'

of course, because Alston builds into the concept of

theistically.

p. 3; 66.

Proudfoot, Religious Experience,

p.

108.
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explanations are the best available explanations of mystical union
noted,

is

28
.

Alston,

let

neutral with respect to the soundness of such arguments.

His project

very different

is

29
.

He

is

a direct realist about perception of God (as he

about the perception of objects in the natural environment): perception of God

is

be

it

is

the

presentation of an object to consciousness without necessary mediation by inference,

explanation or interpretation. Beliefs formed on the basis of direct awareness of God

enjoy justification,

indicates the

they do, because, and only because, the

it

way God

is,

not because appeal to

subjective experience. That

parallel to the

way

in

awareness of objects

Back

to the

which

is,

the

way

in

God

way God

appears reliably

constitutes the best explanation of a

which M-beliefs incur justification

beliefs about the natural

world are justified,

i.e.,

30
.

main

topic.

CMP appears, initially, to satisfy the internal

however, the troubles have just begun, troubles resulting from a respect

from SP.

If those

who engage

in

CMP

share with

in

members of SP

fact,

which

28

SP?

In part perception in

CMP

is

.

"Christian Experience and Christian Belief,"

.

Perceiving God,

29

p.

(typically) non-sensory /

p.

1

CMP

a disposition to

base beliefs on a putative direct awareness of an object, in what respect(s) does
differ with

precisely

via direct

(phenomenological) requirement for counting as a genuine perceptual DP. In

differs

is

whereas

CMP
that in

SP

106.

25, 286-87; "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 107.

30

For an analysis of the apologetic prospects of both explanatory and perceptual models of
religious experience, see William Hasker, “The Evidential Value of Religious Experience:
.

Perceptual and Explanatory Models,”

Essays

in

Honor

of William Alston,

in The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faith:
Thomas Senor, ed., (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press,

1995), pp. 150-69.
is that Alston admits that it is possible indirectly to
waterfall, just as it is possible to perceive a
majestic
of
a
perceive God, say via an awareness

31

.

The reason

for the ‘typically’ qualifier

94

always sensorily mediated.

is

seems incredible

God

that the

’

2

Why

this difference cause

awareness of agents

same way

in generically the

does

that they are

who suppose

CMP?

problems for

It

themselves to be aware of

aware of objects

in the

environment

is

neither mediated by sensory impressions, nor caused by the stimulation of
any physical

sense organ. Didn't Kant and

Hume

elevate to philosophical orthodoxy the

no perception without sensation? Clearly, Alston

there

is

ideas

which cannot be traced back

therefore consign his

According
presentation, as a

recalling,

work

to

is

claiming that there are some

any complex of sensory impressions; should we not

to the fire?

to Alston,

orthodoxy

in this case, is

mode of consciousness which

wrong. To suppose that

contrasts with reflection, introspecting,

3

’

Just as

it is

possible that there are

modes of presentation which

via the stimulation of senses different from the five which

is

that

can occur only via sensation, "simply evinces a lack of speculative

imagination."

it

maxim

also possible that there are

into a priori constraints

human beings happen

modes of presentation which

physical stimulation of the senses altogether.

fail to

lack of imagination

We can only know on the basis

waterfall via a mirror. Alston denies Gale’s claim that, invariably, “people in our

circumstance

who

to have,

operate through

We ought not translate

on what human beings can know.

operate

say that they perceive a sunset as an expression of God

s

human

epistemic

love, unlike those

who

say that they simply feel God’s presence or God’s comforting them, are making inferences to the
existence of God.” Richard Gale, “Swinburne on Religious Experience,” in Reason and the

Christian Religion,

p. 43.

That

is,

Alston resists assimilating indirect perception to indirect
p. 28. But

perceptual recognition, however frequently the two are confused. Perceiving God,

because he believes that indirect perception of God
indirect perceptual recognition of God, Alston pays
32
.

"The Autonomy of Religious Experience,"

.

Perceiving God,

33

p.

1

p. 3.

7.

95

is

either atypical or typically confused with the

it

little

attention.

of experience whether or not
consciousness, just as
leptons can

t,

More

we

God can

can

know

appear non-sensorily and directly to our

only on the basis of experience that

muons and

yet mountains and planets can, present themselves to us. 34

serious

is

the difficulty of identifying the

phenomenal content of mystical

perception. Agents form perceptual beliefs by attributing to external objects
properties
correlative to (typically) very

complex sensory

arrays.

Which

belief an agent forms

is

a

function of the complex of sensory qualia an object (apparently) presents to her. For

example, an agent will be disposed to form the belief that there
her rather than that there

striped,

is

round sensations.

An

SP

Why?

Because she has learned

that that kind

of sensory array

and not Porsches. The functions realized by the bfds

take an agent from the

way an

object appears to the

way

that object

viz.,

assumptions that a given sensory array reliably

indicates a given object with given properties.

According

35

to Alston, the generic notion

the paradigmatic but not sole instance,

selection of phenomenal qualities."

36

is

of perception, of which sense-perception

not "conceptually tied to any particular

(That

is, it is

possible that an agent perceive an

object without sensing that object.) Essential to the generic concept of perception

34
.

Perceiving God,

p. 59, 64, 95.

.

Perceiving God,

p.

.

Perceiving God,

p. 43.

35

36

is.

agent learns from experience what those functions are and thereafter adopts what

Alston calls adequacy assumptions,

is

a basketball in front of

a Porsche if she experiences the familiar orange, black-

reliably indicates basketballs

constitutive of

is

48, 84, 178.
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is

not

sensation but presentation, givenness, awareness. Nevertheless,
every instance of

perception must involve objects of perception being phenomenally
qualified in some
respect or other, perceived objects always present themselves as something:
good, green,

round,

etc.

If

no such respects are

available, there can be

ground and belief-- God's appearing

such and such a

in

no determinate

way and

relation

the belief that

between

God

is

such and such. Were putative perceptions of God to lack distinctive phenomenal
characteristics, that

would

surely count against

perceptual DP. In what respect(s)

is

as a genuine instance of

awareness of God phenomenally qualified

by Alston, and

In the reports cited

MP's standing

in those replete (in

discourse, putative perceptions of God present

God

my

these properties characterize

God

as giving rise to

is, if

in the

same sense

phenomenal

cannot be read from a phenomenal array

Or can

it?

visually appears

According

etc.).

to Alston,

in

ways

qualities

God does

in certain situations,

anything like the same

we must

But none of

etc.

on the order of

not present

Being forgiving

as a tree presents itself as green.

anything, a disposition to act in certain

God

as possessing various properties:

those proper to sense perception (colors, shapes, feels,

Himself as forgiving

CMP?

experience) in religious

perceived as loving, good, fatherly, wise, forgiving, condemning,

is

in

and therefore

way

as can greenness.

distinguish between the

from the properties of that object which give

way an

rise to those

17

object

appearances,

and thus between concepts of phenomenal qualia and concepts of the objective properties

which tend

37

to give rise to

phenomenal

qualia.

8

When we

.

“Literal and Nonliteral in Reports of Mystical Experience,”

.

Perceiving God,

38

p.

44-45; “Literal and Nonliteral

97

in

use 'green' in

p.

its

phenomenal

90.

Reports of Mystical Experience,”

p.

90.

sense to describe

use 'green' in

virtue of

its

which

some

object,

we

objective sense,

it

competent observers

in

But when we

pick out the physical properties of that object in

phenomenal

qualities under certain conditions:

spectra of light save green, an object will appear to

all

normal conditions

we mean something

[in virtue

we

will give rise to certain

given the property of absorbing

green,'

isolate its distinctive visual appearance.

like, 'This tree

be green

to

looks to

39

If,

.

me

when we

say 'This tree looks

as a green tree

would be expected

of its having such and such objective properties] to look under normal

conditions,'

we

are

employing an objective concept of greenness

to describe our

experience.

Alston argues that
loving, wise, etc., she

claiming that she

is

is

when an

agent reports of experiencing

God

as forgiving,

using objective concepts to describe what she experiences

aware of God as forgiving, an agent means something

40
.

In

T was

like

aware of God as presenting the kind of appearance a forgiving being would be expected
to present in such

and such circumstances.’

describe her experience, she

is at

.

“A phenomenal concept

is

appears to

me

red,

I

and that

When

its

it

.

I

use the

word Ted’

in a

phenomenal sense,

simply recording the qualitative distinctiveness of the
all. I am saying nothing about its continuing powers and

its

look.

its

p.

to

barrier to constructing a very

intrinsic nature, or

in

When, on

way

way of
saying that

it

visually

proclivities, its

anything else that goes beyond the visually

the other hand,

I

am

saying something about the

or another under one or another set of circumstances,

physical structure powers, or capacities.” “Literal and Nonliteral

Experience,”
40

no

am

disposition of the object to look one

and/or

principle

way

entanglements with other things,
sensible character of

is in

a concept of the intrinsic qualitative distinctiveness of a

appearing (looking, smelling...).

something looks

employing objective concepts

in

one with her ordinary practice of describing objects

sensorily perceived. For, although there

39

And

in

Reports of Mystical

90.

Perceiving God,

p.

46; “Literal and Nonliteral

98

in

Reports ot Mystical Experience,

p. 92.

complex phenomenal concept capturing just

the way, say, a football stadium appears to

an agent under various conditions, the magnitude of that task

Given the complexity ot the ways

capacities.

limited

we

in

features,

in that

way."

the familiar

human

cognitive

cannot but employ objective concepts in describing what

no position

we

beyond our cognitive

which most objects may appear, the

number of basic phenomenal concepts, and

limitations,

"Being

in

is far

to classify

complex appearances according

are driven to classify
4

them

in

we

perceive.

to their intrinsic

terms of what objective sorts typically appear

Similarly for perception of God.

'

How does

an agent

know what

it

would look

loving, etc.?

By

human being

regularly interacts with those to

like for

her experience with forgiving, loving,

whom

etc.,

God

to

human

appear as forgiving,

beings.

she commits wrongs,

Any

(healthy)

whose

forgiveness she requires, and (one hopes) whose forgiveness she receives. Those

"humble exemplifications" provide her with a model
normally acts
perceiving

in various kinds

God

There

is

41

42

a final problem.
43
.

Our

objective concept of greenness

How a green tree

presuppose that there

.

Perceiving God,

p.

47;

.

Perceiving God,

p.

48.

42

43
.

a forgiving person

of circumstance, a model she cannot but employ when

is

is

parasitic

on a

looks under certain conditions must be cashed

out by a phenomenal concept of greenness;

we

how

.

phenomenal concept

greenness

for grasping

some

when we employ an

objective concept ot

qualitative distinctness of the appearance

Perceiving God, pp. 45-47; “Literal and Nonliteral

99

in

Reports of Mystical Experience,"

p.

93.

captured in a phenomenal concept regardless of whether

we

are explicitly using that

phenomenal concept.

As

noted, such concepts are often

Nevertheless,

we

CMP,

etc.

What kinds of basic phenomenal kinds

Alston denies that

we

that there are such basic kinds of distinctive appearances

are capable of delineating

them

(as

we

are with respect to

the appearances of objects in SP). But this need not worry us.

We are

and categorize the phenomenal appearances accompanying our

different sensory

capacities because those capacities and the objects

a significant degree under our control.

them,

we

may be

44

By

we

will

varying the conditions in which

can determine the physiological and psychological conditions

stimulated

—

appearances

perceives

.

which they

in

We may therefore predict when

— “Whenever we

place a basketball in front

normal circumstances, she will experience round, orange qualia."

basis of this control and prediction of sensory appearances (which control extends

far into the past),

44

in

we employ

“Placing a basketball in front of competent observers in normal

have certain phenomenal appearances

of a competent agent

On the

able to identify

perceive by employing them are to

conditions causes them to have round, orange, qualia.”

we

are

CMP?

Though he does not deny
for

too complex to formulate explicitly.

can identify the basic kinds of phenomenal qualities of which such

concepts are composed: shapes, colors,
intrinsic to

much

—

we have been

“‘Roundness’

when

a basketball

Perceiving God,

p.

is

is

able to construct a shared language about those

the

word we use

to describe the

shape a competent agent

placed in front of her.”

49; “Literal and Nonliteral in Reports of Mystical Experience,

100

v
p.

94.

.

We are

not similarly in control of the object about which one

CMP forms beliefs.

Because God

what conditions God

CMP

is

s

intentions

will be present to an agent's consciousness, an agent

therefore of predicting

when

to identify the

she will perceive God.

phenomenal

in

and purposes determine when and under

incapable of determining under what conditions

whereby

who engages

God

who engages

in

tends to be perceived and

We therefore

lack the

means

features of mystical experience, categorize divine

appearances, construct an intersubjectively shared language for speaking of them, and

dimensionalize them.

Why? Because we

47

This does not count against the genuineness of CMP, however.

can explain

identify the qualia distinctive to

true, indeed,

given that

isolate divine

it

.

.

Perceiving God,

We may

is

unreasonable to expect that

CMP. 46 Given

we

should be able to

the possibility that this explanation

is

nature, our inability to

appearances provides us with no reason to doubt that there are such

is

it

genuine perceptual practice.

46

it

what we should expect given God’s

is

appearances and thus that

45

why

p.

49, 5

also explain

possible that

CMP has all

of the properties possessed by a

47

1

why

mystical experience

is

so often regarded as ineffable. “Perhaps

it

is

phenomenal qualities in a more direct way that is chiefly responsible for
the frequency of complaints of ‘inexpressability.’” “Literal and Nonliteral in Reports of Mystical
this inability to specify

Experience,”

p.

95.

47

should point out, though don’t have time to go into the matter in any detail, that Alston
spends a considerable amount of effort attempting to identify the role(s) an agent's prior beliefs
play in the formation of a given perceptual belief. See Perceiving God, pp. 77-101 and “Literal
.

I

I

Reports of Mystical Experience,” pp. 94-102. Of central importance is his claim
that we typically employ the beliefs to which we adhere prior to a given perceptual experience to
establish the identity of the object presented in that experience. Thus, “in supposing that have

and Nonliteral

in

I

been directly aware of God communicating a certain message to me, suppose that it is the God of
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, creator of heaven and earth, Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, that is
communicating that message to me. do not learn from that experience that the source of the
message is the creator of heaven and earth. Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, etc., but it is part of
I

I

what

I

take to be true

in

forming the M-belief.” “Religious Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge
101

2. 1.1. 2

External Requirements of Perception.
In addition apparently to being directly

must also

satisfy the external requirements

of a genuine perceptual practice

succeeds in perceiving some object, not only
with an external entity, but
right

How do we

way.

perception

is

if that entity

aware of God, an agent engaging
48
.

in

An

CMP

agent

she finds herself apparently presented

it

actually exists, and if she

related to

is

it

in the

determine what those external requirements are? Sense

our paradigm of a perceptual doxastic practice;

identifying

what those external requirements are

perception

is

we

begin, therefore, by

But because sense-

in sense-perception.

merely a species of perceptual practice, we need to abstract from a

requirement of sensory qualia, the stimulation of sensory faculties, and other
characteristics distinctive to sense perception.

“whether

it

of God,“

p.

439.

Why

me, unless

is
I

God .” 49

that important?

am prima

Because “the complete M-belief cannot be prima facie
communicator.”

facie justified in the identification of the

“Religious Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge of God,”
in

to determine

possible that those requirements should be satisfied by a non-sensory

is

experiential awareness of

justified for

Only then should we attempt

439. That

is,

I

can't be fully justified

am also justified in adhering to those beliefs by which
And why is that important? Because it shows that Alston's

forming a given M-belief unless

identify the object of perception.

p,

I

I

defense of the rationality of CMP depends upon the completion of the larger and even more
problematic project of defending the rationality the Christian scheme of things. Alston's defense

of CMP, even

if

entirely successful as far as he attempts to take

it,

still

more general vindication of the Christian scheme of things. Moreover,
of beliefs

in the identification

conclusion that

of objects perceived

is

depends for
his account

its

success on a

of the function

essential to defusing objections to the

members of CMP have no way of insuring

that they perceive the

same

object.

for example, William Forgie, “Mystical Experience and the Argument from Agreement,”
International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 7/3 ( 1 985): 97- 07.
1

1

48
.

Perceiving God,

p. 36,

.

Perceiving God,

p. 55.

49

“Why

54; "The Perception of God,"

See,

in

p.

32.

See Richard Gale, “Swinburne on Religious Experience,” p. 57.;
is Subjective,” in Philosophy and Phenomenological

Alston’s Mystical Doxastic Practice

Research, 54/4 (December, 1994): 871.
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Resolving that issue

is

complicated by the contentious nature of the philosophy of

perception. Widely divergent accounts of the concept of perception
cohabitate without

any signs of peaceful consensus

in the offing.

In this essay,

1

will briefly articulate

two

accounts of the concept of perception, Alston's Theory of Appearing (TA) and a causal
version of the Sense

Datum Theory

Alston's account

is

(SD).

very simple. According to TA, an agent perceives

appears as so-and-so to that agent/ 0

what

it

is to

TA endorses our common

X

iff

X

sense understanding of

perceive (an understanding Alston articulates in his phenomenological

account of perception), that

is,

as the direct presentation of an object. Perception

is

what

appears to perceivers to be: a relation between an independently existing object and a

it

cognitive agent.

for that

What

awareness

to

conditions must be added to direct awareness of an object in order

count as a perception of that object? Nothing, so long as the object

actually presents itself to the perceiver.

51

Note

that,

although

TA does

not analyze

perception into a certain kind of consciousness and some other factor (like causal

contributions of the proper sort),

it

does presuppose that an agent

causally related to the object of perception/

50
.

Perceiving God,

p. 55;

.

Perceiving God,

p. 56.

51

who

perceives must be

2

"Externalist Theories of Perception,

p. 74.

"The Autonomy of Religious Experience," p. 2. "If to perceive X is simply for X to appear to
one in a certain way, and if the concept of appearance is unanalyzable, then it would appear that
we can enunciate no further conceptually necessary conditions for perception. But that does not
follow. In declaring that the concept of appearance (presentation) is unanalyzable I was merely
denying that we can give a conceptually equivalent formulation in other terms. I was not denying
of God: A
that conceptually necessary conditions can be formulated in other terms." "Experience
52

1

.

Perceptual Model," quoted

in

Mark McLeod, Rationality and Theistic
103

Belief, p. 19.

According
components.

to

an agent

First,

in the external

SD, an

may

agent's perception of an object

who

perceives

is

directly

be analyzed into two

aware of an object

-

not an object

world, but ’images in the mind,' sense data. Second, an object in her

environment gives

rise to those

sense data. Perception

kind of consciousness and some further condition

53

may

What

.

by the genuine perception? Obviously, there are causal
perceived; perhaps the further condition

is

be analyzed into a certain

further condition

relations

between perceiver and

two must be causally

that the

must be met

related.

Unfortunately, there are a variety of causal relations between perceiver and perceived,

e.g.,

neurophysiological processes are clearly necessary for perception of any object to

occur

54
.

However, even though neurophysiological processes play a causal

role in the

process, they are not perceived. Hence, playing a crucial causal role in the process of

perception

is

not a sufficient condition of an object's being perceived. Clearly, the object

perceived must play a causal role of the proper sort

We may

identify for each sensory modality

the retina, transmission of sound

waves

to the ear

55
.

what

drum,

that role

We therefore

lack sufficient conditions for

causal role in the process of perception

for the proper sort

53

is in fact

Perceiving God,

.

"Externalist Theories of Perception," p. 76.

.

Perceiving God,

55

p.

56-7.

p. 57.

104

any modality, of
object playing a crucial

we do

of causal role in perception. Hence, "about

.

54

is,

when an

perceived:

reception of light in

Unfortunately, no-one has as

etc.

yet identified a causal condition for the generic concept, that

perception.

is:

all

not

know what makes

we can

say here

is that,

on

externalist theories [those

which require

of an object], in order that S perceive

there

must be some

Do
out in

’suitable'

agents perceive

TA and SD?

way

God

in

X

more than a

for perception

by virtue of undergoing sensory experience, E,

which

X figures in the causation of E."

Alston’s strategy for defending the rationality of engaging in

that agents actually perceive God.'

establish that

premise

in

7

Why? We

is, it

precludes

an argument to the conclusion that

related to an object; 'perceive'

a genuine perceptual

DP

the connotation of success

as

whether or

TA requires,

in

is

it

rational for an agent to believe that

is

Ordinarily, to perceive

a success term. If Alston

is

to use the

an argument the conclusion of which

and

(2)

(1):

amount of a

Which

it

it

is

God

exists, (1)

possible for

SD

entities

priori speculation

.

Perceiving God,

p. 57.

.

Perceiving God,

p.

57

to

be correctly

premise that

CMP

that she perceives

in his first

premise of

God

it is

possible for

to play

God

to appear to

an appropriate causal role

an agent,

in the

requires.

can appear to our consciousness

is

an empirical matter; no

can determine whether quarks and leptons but not rabbits

and mountains can present themselves

56

is

is

enjoys in ordinary parlance. Therefore, Alston attempts only

not, if

process of perception, as

Ad

him from

are currently attempting to

God, he must denude the employment of the concept of perception

to determine

CMP

CMP is a genuine perceptual practice, in order to use that proposition as a

CMP is reliable and thus that she perceives God.

is

56

according to the conditions for genuine perceptions laid

precludes him from a frontal assault on this question; that

showing

direct presentation

to

human

36, 54.

105

beings.

Such a matter must therefore be

answered inductively. Because there are many who claim

Himself to

their consciousness,

against that possibility

God

58
it

,

is

that

God

directly presents

and because there are no (good) empirical arguments

prima facie reasonable

can non-sensorily appear to

human

agents.

suppose

to

What

that

it

is

possible that

considerations might rebut this

prima facie case?

Two

objections are pertinent. First, because

mechanisms by which mystical perception

those

God

59
.

This objection

who engaged

light reflects off

in

of objects

in the

we

we

is

little

or nothing about the

environment, strikes the retina,

way

mechanisms by which

etc.,

were incapable of

a cognitive process

not a necessary condition of that process' being reliable and certainly not of

possibly being reliable

Second, there

is infinite,

how

60

is

no way

human

in

which an

agent

61
.

can he be manifest

infinitely powerful, omniscient,

God
in

is

too

'big.'

unchanging

Thus, Alasdair MacIntyre, "If

any particular object or experience? The

God and

definition of

God

58

notes, our best account of the nature of sensory perception provides us with

.

As Alston

as infinite

reason to suppose that

is

intended precisely to distinguish between

God cannot

.

Perceiving God,

p. 59.

.

Perceiving God,

p. 60.

.

Perceiving God,

p.

60

6I

good

present Himself to sensory experience. But that provides us

with no good reason for denying that
59

its

.

being could appear to a

God

imagine any way of

can discount the possibility of

perceiving objects in their environment. Understanding the

works

can't

however, because no-one would deny that

is arbitrary,

SP when we knew

lack any conception of the

occurs, because

perceiving an object save by sensory stimulation,
perceiving

we

God

directly presents

60.

106

Himself to non-sensory experience.

everything

finite,

but to take the divine out of the finite

world of human experience." 62 Dispelling

is to

remove

it

this objection requires that

from the

we

obfuscatory pictorial images of perception. Perceived objects need not

head

in order for that agent to perceive that object.

perception

is

More

entire

exorcize

fit

into an agent's

seriously, according to

TA,

a relational concept; in order for an agent to perceive an object, she needs to

be presented with that object, and properties

like aseity, infinity, immateriality, etc.

do not

preclude the possibility of such a relation obtaining. 63

Ad

(2):

As mentioned above,

there

is

no general

criterion

which

isolates that

causal condition which must be met by any object of perception, no matter the modality.

The causal

relation

between a seen object and the agent seeing
64

between a heard object and the agent hearing
of causal relations have

in

it.

common, and even

We are

less sure

it

differs

from the

not sure what those two kinds

what causal

relation a

perception differing from the familiar five sensory modes would have to be

such knowledge

we have

to decide the issue

The general contours of our search

by the seat of our pants,

are clear, however:

relation

first,

we have

in

to

mode of

like.

Lacking

an ad hoc manner.
determine what

an agent has actually perceived, accumulate a significant number of veridical perceptions,

etc.;

second, only then can

and the perceiving

62
.

"Visions,"

in

we

identify the causal process mediating the object perceived

subject. Identifying the causal relation proper to a given

New

Essays

in Philosophical

Theology, (New York: The MacMillan Co.,

1995), p. 256.
63
.

Perceiving God,

p.

60.

.

Perceiving God,

p.

69.

64

mode of

107

perception requires that

we

acquire a quite substantial amount of knowledge before

begin the process of isolating the causal relations giving
Similarly for

that

CMP.

In order to isolate the causal relation

an agent perceive God, we have

God. That

we have

is,

to

engage

in

knowledge

rise to that

to acquire a substantial

66
.

65
.

God must meet

in order

amount of knowledge about

CMP to determine the appropriate causal

between God and the perceiving agent

we

relation

However, our lack of control over the boundary

conditions of perception of God renders us incapable of identifying the appropriate such
causal condition. If God appears to us,

we

cannot place

God

in front

God

does so

cannot identify the conditions

we

can explain

God meets when

this deficiency in

we

possible to perceive

perception

members

67

God

and timing. Because
to

can and can't perceive God,

we

an agent perceives God. However,

our knowledge of the inner workings of CMP

as a consequence of the nature of the subject matter,

is

will

of us and manipulate our sensory apparatuses so as

delimit the various and sundry conditions in which

because

God’s

at

we

are warranted in believing that

it

without being able to isolate the causal conditions of such

CMP may be highly reliable, and thus epistemically under par, even if its

.

are incapable of identifying the causal relations

God

satisfies

when

they

perceive Him.

65
.

Perceiving God,

p.

.

Perceiving God,

p. 65.

66
67
.

65.

Alston mentions several possible such causal conditions (though not the mechanism by which
is met), viz., when God intentionally presents Himself to an agent's awareness or

that condition

when God keeps

a given experience in existence. In the latter case one

would have

to explain the

fact that agents often fail to perceive God. One might so explain by identifying various barriers
human beings erect between God and themselves which render them incapable of perceiving God
(as when a tree reflects light in my direction, but move behind an opaque wall, or my synapses
I

misfire, or

I

am

focusing on something other than the

108

tree).

2.1.2

CMP’s Overrider System
Does

the family of bfds by

means of which agents form M-beliefs have an

overrider system? Clearly, an agent

who forms

beliefs about

God on

the basis of her

putative direct awareness of God often evaluates those beliefs in light of
other beliefs.

Most members of main-stream

Christian communities

grounded on putative experiences of God
tenets of their creed.

God

telling

me to

68

would discount

the truth of beliefs

those beliefs were incompatible with central

if

Thus, for example, putative perceptions of God as

"kill all

of the phenomenologists

I

can

find,"

69

CMP would reject any

of

are defeated because

they conflict with central moral teachings of the Christian tradition. That
in

spiteful, or

is,

participants

M-belief not "in consonance with the picture of the nature,

purposes and doings of God that has been built up in that community." 70 Whether formed

by engaging

in

CMP,

by interpretations of sacred

texts, or

by natural theology, well-

established religious traditions provide their adherents with a rich, complex, and varied

doxastic and procedural grid by

beliefs.

71

Is

CMP's

means of which those adherents may evaluate M-

it

permissible that beliefs formed otherwise than by perceiving

overrider system?

Does

68

in (1.2.3), the overrider

Perceiving God: 188-91.

.

"The Autonomy of Religious Experience,"

p. 8.

.

"The Autonomy of Religious Experience,"

p. 8.

.

"Christian Experience and Christian Belief,"

70

71

compromise

the

autonomy of CMP?

systems of memory, introspection and SP

.

69

constitute

the influx of beliefs formed by natural theology,

interpretation of sacred texts, or church tradition

No. As mentioned

God

p.

109

113.

employ

beliefs

72

formed by other practices

As Coady has

.

argued, the vast majority of

sense-perceptual beliefs cannot be either corroborated or discontinued
without

uneliminable dependance on testimony
beliefs

formed

theology

in other practices:

73
.

MP's overrider system

memory, SP,

me

from sacred writings and natural

as well as

74

was

not,

and

still is

not,

investigative procedures for evaluating

merely an academic question

indicated by the (in)famous confrontation between

Let

employ

.

The necessity of providing checks and
beliefs

as well will

75
.

That

M-

this is the case is

Thomas Muntzer and Martin

Luther.

digress a bit to discuss that revealing case in point.

At

his first pastorate (Zwickau),

Thomas Muntzer

fell

under the influence of

Nicholas Storch and learned from Storch the stock in trade doctrines of medieval
millenarianism. Storch revived the old Taborite doctrine that the Last Days were

that the Anti-Christ

must

rule over the world,

72
.

73
.

74
.

Not

surprisingly, the ungodly

Perceiving God,

p.

were

that the Elect

Coming could

exterminate the ungodly, so that the Second

begin.

and

would

rise

at

hand,

up and

take place and the Millenium

identified with the privileged classes

76
.

159-61.

Testimony, pp. 133-51.
"Religious Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge of God,"

p.

447.

75

For ancient history, as well as present concerns, about the problems the Christian Church has
faced with the anarchistic tendencies of mystical experience, see Ronald Knox, Enthusiasm,
.

(London: Collins, 1950).
76
.

Storch held that "those

subjects, eat

in

authority live only

in lust,

and drink night and day, hunt, run, and

kill

consume

the sweat and blood of their

Everyone should therefore arm

in their fat nests, beating, killing, and strangling them, because once
sheep are easier to handle. Afterward the land-grabbers and
the
removed,
the bellwethers are
nobleman should be attacked, their property confiscated, and their castles destroyed." Quoted in
Niklas Hausman, "A Report concerning the Zwickau Prophets," in Christianity and Revolution:

himself and attack the priests

Radical Christian Testimony, Lowell H. Zuck,

ed., (Philadelphia, PA.:

110

Temple University

Press,

As with
by appeal

to

every doctrine of election, Muntzer and Storch
had to find some criterion

which the Elect could be distinguished from the reprobate.
They claimed

that the Elect

were those who received immediate revelations from
God. Immediate

revelations are instances of communication in which

God conveys

determinate

information without relying any of the five senses to convey
that information; they lack

mediation because

God does

not reveal Himself by stimulating physical sense organs.

Immediate revelations are roughly what Alston

refers to

save that the former tend to convey

specific information than Alston believes

is

much more

by the term mystical experience,

typically contained in M-beliefs. LInfortunately, because immediate
revelations are

necessarily unidentifiable by publicly accessible means, reception of immediate
revelations

is

not a helpful criterion for identifying the Elect.

Relying on another tradition,

claimed that only those

who have been

communication with God

God" and

this

77
.

According

time a mystical one, Muntzer and Storch

through great tribulation are capable of immediate
to this tradition, only the "pure in heart will see

suffering purges and purifies an individual of her sin.

Muntzer and Storch

integrated this notion of immediate revelation with their militant eschatology

were those willing

to take

up arms against the ungodly and were willing

— the

Elect

to suffer the

persecution this entails. Since the ungodly were identified with the privileged classes.

1975),
11

p.

30.

word in the abyss of the soul. The man who has
knows really nothing about God, though he may have
swallowed 100,000 Bibles. God comes in dreams to his beloved as he did to the patriarchs,
prophets and apostles. He comes especially in affliction." Quoted in Roland Bainton, Here I
Stand: A Life of Martin Luther, (New York, NY.: New American Library, 1950), p. 204.
.

"But

God does

disclose himself in the inner

not received the living witness of God

Ill

.

Muntzer and Storch advocated revolution
exterminate their rulers, and thereby

—

the peasants

initiate the

were

to take

up arms,

Second Coming.

Muntzer's combination of millenarianism and mysticism
exacerbated the social
unrest of the peasantry and helped to spark the

took up a pastorate

in Allstadt

German

Peasant's War. In 1523.

Muntzer

and formed the League of the Elect, which boasted 30 units

prepared to slaughter the ungodly. 78 Although the only rebellious
activity actually to

emerge from the League was a desecration of a
continued to escalate. In order to extinguish

Mary, tensions ran high, and

this volatile situation,

addressed a Letter to the Princes of Saxony,

and his brother Duke John

statue to

to banish Muntzer.

in

74

Martin Luther

which he urged the Elector Frederick
In the Letter, Luther attacked Muntzer's

revolutionary millenarianism on both political and theological grounds.

On

a political level, he argued that rebellion leads to social chaos, since

obliterates the distinction

it

between the legitimate, socially sanctioned, use of force, and

the illegitimate, socially dysfunctional use of force, as in banditry, extortion, and piracy. 80

78

"The basic principle of [Muntzer's] league was that all things are common to all men; that its
aim was a state of affairs in which all would be equal and each would receive according to his
need; and that it was prepared to execute any prince or lord who stood in the way of its plans."
.

Norman Cohn,

In Pursuit of the Millenium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical
Anarchists of the Middle Ages, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 241
79
.

80
.

Saxony Concerning
Augsburg Press, 1958).

"Letter to the Princes of

40, (Philadelphia:

the Rebellious Spirit," in Luther's

Works,

vol.

Luther writes, "Can you not imagine it, or figure it out, dear friends? If your enterprise were
then any man might become judge over another, and there would remain in the world neither

right,

would be only murder and bloodshed; for
wronging
someone was
him, he would turn to and judge and punish

authority, nor government, nor order, nor land, but there

as soon as anyone

Now

saw

that

when done by an individual, neither can it be endured
when done by a band or crowd. ...How, then, do you expect to stand with God and the world,
when you do your own judging and avenging upon those who have injured you, nay upon your
rulers, whom God has ordained." WL, 4:228.
him.

if that is

unjust and intolerable

112

[Luther believes he has justified the legitimacy
of any established social order with
various proof-texts from the Bible. 81 Since social
chaos
]

populace- even the most repressive tyranny
the Elector is duty

bound

to satisfy the

is

is

better than

never in the interest of any

no government

at all,

needs of his subjects, the Elector’s duty

and since

is

to crush

any rebellion.

On

a theological level, Luther attacked Muntzer's reliance on
immediate

revelations. Luther, as

well known, had a deep appreciation for the

is

depravity permeates an agent

s

way

in

which moral

every activity. Hence, he could not help but wonder

whether the enthusiasts' policy of legitimating some course of action by appealing
essentially private revelation

is

to

an

not an attempt, however innocent, to legitimate personal

pride and political aspiration. In order to guard against the danger of misconstruing his

own

subjective desires as a divine visitation, Luther requires of the enthusiast

intersubjectively accessible

Because Luther believes

means of distinguishing genuine from spurious

that

Muntzer has no such

criterion,

some

revelations.

and because he believes

that

the Scriptures are the only reliable source of true beliefs about God's will, he implores

Muntzer

to defer to the

canon when

his putative revelations conflict with the claims

expressed in the Bible, specifically, with those which prohibit insurrection.
This

is

just the position Luther takes in his Letter.

justify themselves (as they usually

them
Spirit

8I
.

to achieve their goal

means nothing,

WL,

for

writes, "If they attempt to

do with big words) by saying

by resorting

we have

He

the

to force,

I

would

word of St. John

3:233.

113

that the spirit impels

reply: ...their boasting about the

that

we

should

'test

the spirits to

see whether they are of God .'" 82

'examination,' in

An

agent

the spirits' by submitting to an

’tests

which she compares the claims she attempts

dreams and visions with the written record of God's
forbids insurrection. 8

is

will in the Bible.

by appeal

to

But the Bible

Hence, Muntzer's construal of immediate revelations as

-'

communications from God can only be a human,
Notice

to justify

that, for

sinful pretension.

Luther, an examination before one's peers on theological matters

possible only if those participating in the examination assent to the
claims espoused in

the Bible,

which they show by

textual analysis, careful exegesis, and dialectical probing.

Intersubjective evaluation of disputed claims in theology

assumption that the canon

is

possible only under the

the authoritative arbiter in theological disputes.

assumption about which Luther debated Eck
the Imperial Diet at

is

at

It

was

this

Leipzig, Cajetan at Augsburg, and before

Worms. Because he shared

this

assumption with his opponents,

Luther could refrain from relying on what he regarded as merely subjective urgings,
urgings which he claimed do not afford those privy to them reliable access to the divine
will.

What
placed

is

the moral of this story? That

strict limitations

members of the Church have

on which perceptions of God count as

historically

veridical, restrictions

Alston would clearly regard as constituents of an overrider system. More importantly,

82
.

83

"Letter to the Princes of Saxony,"

p. 52.

Have mercy on
good for you! A
more blessed death can never be yours, for you die while obeying the divine word and
commandment in Romans 13, and in loving service of your neighbor, whom you are rescuing from
the bonds of hell and of the devil." "Against the Robbing and Murdering Hordes or Peasants," in
.

"Therefore, dear lords, here

these poor people. Let

is

whoever

a place

where you can

release, rescue, help.

can, stab, smite and slay. If you die

Luther's Works, Vol. 46, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967),

114

p.

in

doing

54-55.

it,

members of the Church have recognized
of mystical perception,

the morally and politically problematic
character

in that the difficulty

of distinguishing genuine from spurious

perceptions of God risks apotheosizing merely

human

pretensions

84
.

There

is

good

theological reason to worry over the trustworthiness of
CMP. Although Alston evinces
little

recognition of the morally and socially dysfunctional tendencies
of

adduces the social entrenchment of that practice
in

it!

-

he notes that moral constraints are

in support

among

CMP - he

of the rationality of engaging

more important elements of CMP's

the

overrider system.

2.1.3

Other Features of CMP
Given

that there is a practice

direct presentations

of forming beliefs about

of God, and that agents

of a nexus of beliefs and procedures, does
ot genuine

into the

DPs? Clearly

it

does. Agents

who form

those beliefs evaluate them in light

who engage

in

beliefs

time, as, say, a result of the rise of modem science;

is

a socially established

CMP typically are socialized

formed by engaging

essential to such agents' identity; the overrider system of

CMP

the basis of putative

that practice share the other defining features

Church before the age of reflection; the

practice; etc. Hence,

God on

CMP

in

CMP are

CMP has clearly changed over
is

not reducible to

some

other

DP.

84

As Alston notes, that "the great mystics of the Middle Ages and Counter-Reformation almost
weary one with their incessant talk of the difficulties of distinguishing genuine from counterfeit
perception of God" puts paid to the claim that 'religious experience' is self-authenticating, i.e., not
subject to checks and procedures by which prima facie may be distinguished from ultima facie
justified beliefs. Perceiving God, p. 210. See George Mavrodes, "Real vs. Deceptive Mystical
Experiences," in Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, Steven Katz (ed.), (New York, NY.:
Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 235-58; Ronald Knox, Enthusiasm, passim; Christopher Hill,
.

Change and Continuity

in 17

th

Century England, (New Haven, CN.: Yale University Press,
The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During

1991), pp. 103-23; Christopher Hill,

the English Revolution,

(New York, NY.: Penguin Books,
115

1972), pp. 87-98.

2.2

Response

Weak

to Objections to the

Rationality of

CMP

Alston attempts to respond to the following objections

genuine DP: that
source ot

2.2.1

The

new

CMP

is

not universally engaged in (2.2.1); that

CMP

information (2.2.2); that

in the first chapter,

Every normal human being

is

SP

is

its partial

particularity' is

disposed to engage in SP;

some proper
engage

in."

86

is

part of the population

CMP. 85 But

no reason

is less

to

DPs we

CMP

is

a particular, DP.

only only some

human

determined that only those agents

suppose that a practice engaged

in

we

of truth than one

by

all

genuine just by "counting noses.” 87

prize as being highly reliable, viz., theoretical

agents engage in

may

CMP as

(Alston can not think of a

physics, higher math, and wine tasting. Moreover, claims Alston, there

why

in

this 'prejudice against

likely to be a source

We cannot decide which DPs are

Indeed, there are various particular

reasons

a

CMP is not a genuine

human beings engage

Somehow or other

distribution discredits

unfounded: "there

is

lacks an adequate overrider system (2.2.3).

a universal, whereas

a consequence of socialization or decision.

reason why),

CMP

claim that

CMP

Partial Distribution of

As noted

to his

perceive

CMP,

God who

viz,

may be good

because

God

has

satisfy certain (moral)

conditions: pride, envy, and hatred preclude agents from perceiving God, whereas love,

compassion, and humility enable perception of God.

85
.

Perceiving God,

p.

169, 197-99;

Experience and Christian Belief,"

God,"
86

p.

Religious Belief Rational?,"

.

"Christian Experience and Christian Belief,"

.

p.

can

p. 14;

"Christian

9-10; "Perceiving

659.

Perceiving God,

88

If that is the case, if we

"The Autonomy of Religious Experience,"

p. 120; "Is

.

87

88

p. 198.
p.

120.

Perceiving God, pp. 198-99, 268; "The Christian Language Game,"

116

in

The Autonomy of

explain the partial distribution of

then

its

CMP

in a

partial distribution fails to indicate

way compatible with
CMP’s

the reliability of

CMP,

reliability.

Pretty clearly, Alston addresses this objection not for
substantive but for
illustrative purposes:

it

exemplifies two defects which recur throughout the literature
on

the epistemic standing of CMP: epistemic imperialism
and the imposition of double

standards.

Objections afflicted with epistemic imperialism impose criteria
appropriate

for certain practices

would be

on practices

imperialist,

for

which those

and hence inappropriate,

criteria are inappropriate

to require

90
.

Thus,

it

of introspective beliefs that they

be empirically testable. With respect to the objection just mentioned, the requirement
that a practice be universal

exists

up

and has decreed as

to snuff

—

inappropriately imposed on

stipulated,

and yet enjoy only

double standard,
impose on

is

others.

because of their

i.e.,

9-

CMP. Why?

Because,

if

God

CMP may be highly reliable — and thus epistemically

partial distribution

91

That objection also runs afoul of a

.

improperly imposing on one practice a criterion one refuses to

How so?

Particular

partial distribution,

DPs

whereas

like theoretical physics are not discredited

CMP

is

discredited.

Religious Belief, Frederick Crosson, ed„ (Notre Dame, IN.: University of Notre

Dame

1981), p. 156. That there are such subjective conditions of apprehending reality

is

Press,

crucial to

MacIntyre’s rejection of the ‘Encyclopaedic’ understanding of rationality. See, for example.

Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, (Notre Dame,

IN.: University

of Notre

1990), pp. 17f„ 60, 97, 133,225.
89
.

90
.

91

Perceiving God, pp. 248-50; "The Autonomy of Religious Experience,"

Perceiving God, pp. 199,211,216.

.

"Christian Experience and Christian Belief,"

.

Perceiving God,

92

p.

1

p.

99, 211,216.

117

122-23.

p. 14.

Dame

Press,

Alston’s defense of CMP's presumptive innocence,
the innocence

consequence of its being socially entrenched, consists
of cooking the game against

CMP by

imposing on

in large part

it

enjoys as a

of accusing his

members epistemic norms which

its

are guilty of epistemic imperialism or of imposing a
double standard and thus

inappropriate tor that practice. Just what Alston
justifies

2.2.2

judgements of impropriety,

is

means by

‘inappropriate,’

which are

and

how

he

the subject of the next chapter.

CMP not a Source of Genuine Information
SP

is

a source of new information.

When

an agent forms beliefs based on

perceptual experience, the beliefs she forms afford her

know

she did not

bumps

new and unexpected

into Mrs.

Simpson,

belief that Mrs.

whom

Simpson

objects

is

insight; she learns

who engage

SP form new

in

beliefs

something

when an agent

she thought was in France, she forms

is in fact in

looks into his telescope, whatever confidence he has

That agents

new

before, she modifies dearly held prejudices, etc. Thus,

turns a corner and

the

critics

left in

Toledo.

When

Galileo

Ptolemaic astronomy shatters.

on the basis of direct presentations of

essential to SP's standing as a perceptual

DP, and therefore

to the standing

of

any putative perceptual DP.

An

agent

who engages

in

CMP, on

the beliefs [she] brings to the experience ."

categorial grid essential to

up

to expect to

the other hand, "just read[s] back to [herself]

93

.

have certain experiences of God

Perceiving God,

p.

is

socialized into the Church, adopts the

becoming a functional member of that

acquires the tendency to form beliefs about

93

She

brought

in certain conditions, and, hence,

God upon

having experiences of the

206; "Is Religious Belief Rational?," pp. 11-12.
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institution, is

appropriate

sort.

Those

beliefs, therefore,

can only reinforce the categorial scheme with

which she approaches her the world. Because nothing new

learned in

is

CMP,

it

cannot

be a genuine perceptual practice.
Alston grants that an agent brings to a putative experience
of God a categorial

scheme by means of which she organizes her experience,
conceptualizes
which she

presented, and, indeed, which crucially influences the beliefs
she fonns.

is

Similarly, however, with SP.

categorial

scheme

When

an agent wanders into the local mall, she uses a

to conceptualize the objects with

approach objective

reality

which she

we would

learn precious

environments. Alston writes, "indefinitely

same conceptual scheme, and

many

the fact that

I

bits

little

about our natural and social

antecedently possess the concept that

show

claim to derive from that perception .” 94 Those

I

presented. But to

of information can be formulated by

use to articulate a given perception has no tendency to
information

is

with a categorial scheme does not inhibit an agent from

learning about that reality; else

the

the object with

wrongly charged with learning nothing new by engaging

that

I

I

already had the

who engage

in that practice

in

CMP are thus

on grounds

that

they employ a categorial scheme to interpret their experience which they acquired during
4

socialization.

94
.

95
.

'

The objection under discussion imposes a double standard on CMP.

Perceiving God,

p.

206; "The

Autonomy of Religious

See Caroline Franks Davis’ treatment of this objection

Experience, pp. 142-165.

119

Experience," pp.
in

The

4ff.

Evidential Force of Religious

Inadequacy of CMP’s Overrider System

2.2.3

Now to

more

a

serious objection:

CMP's

overrider system, that set of beliefs and

procedures which confer upon prima facie justified beliefs
ultima facie justification,
not an adequate means for evaluating M-beliefs

96
.

Let's

be clear about

why

this issue is

so crucial to Alston's defense of CMP. Alston resolutely denies
that perception of
self-authenticating, incorrigible, indubitable, or any other property
of that

worth

its salt is

one

in

indicate the truth of

every legitimate

DP

tests

whereby

ilk.

God

is

Any DP

which agents are capable of determining whether or not grounds

which ordinarily

justification.

is

some

belief do, in this situation, so indicate; that

is,

allows for the distinction between prima facie and ultima facie

In order for an agent so to distinguish, she needs to have at her disposal
beliefs with initial credibility

considered. That

is,

every

DP

may

be checked for justification

things

all

must, on pain of epistemic illegitimacy, enjoy an adequate

overrider system.

Why might a critic

claim of CMP that

Consider SP's overrider system, as

have perceived some

object.

it

When

relates to

.

Martin
Gale,

in

On

overrider system

is

inadequate?

checking reports by other agents that they

an agent claims to have seen a snark

have means of checking her assertion:

% Perceiving God,

its

we

follow her

trail

back

in the

to the place

woods, we

where she

pp. 209-222; “Christian Experience and Christian Belief,” p. 122.

See C.B.

Religious Belief, (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1959), pp. 64-94; Richard
the Nature and Existence of God," (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 99
1

285-343; “Swinburne on Religious Experience,” pp. 39-63; “Why Alston’s Mystical Practice
Subjective,” pp. 869-75; Anthony O'Hear, Experience, Explanation and Faith: An

1

),p.

is

Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, (London: Routledge, Kegan and Paul, 1984), pp.
25-55; Michael Levine, “Mystical Experience and Non-Basically Justified Belief,” in Religious

God

Studies 25 (1989): 335-45; Mark McLoed, “Can Belief

in

Studies 24 (1988): 31 1-23; Ronald Knox, Enthusiasm,

pp. 576-77, 578-91.
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be Confirmed?,”

in

Religious

claimed

to

butts, etc.),

have seen the snark, search for evidence of snarks

(footprints, stool, cigarette

and make our determination on the basis of what any
of us can discern.

story fails to check out after the appropriate kind of
investigation, then

we

If her

regard her

assertion as false, and the utterer of that assertion as
deceptive, deluded, mistaken,

credulous,

etc.

Our confidence
SP

in

making

are publicly available,

i.e.,

that

that

judgement

is

based on the fact that the objects of

which one agent claims

have perceived

to

is

perceivable (in principle) by any of us and by employing the same cognitive
faculties she

would have had

SP

to

employ were she

are publically available,

conditions in which

it

is

because the conditions

all

to

have perceived a snark

who engage

in

SP can

97
.

Because the objects of

in principle agree

upon the

possible to apprehend putative objects of perception

in

which

it

is

possible to perceive objects

may

48
.

And

be determined by

any practitioner of SP, claims about those objects are intersubjectively evaluable.

Anyone can

evaluate sense-perceptual claims and can evaluate them by appeal to criteria

anyone can agree

on. In short, because

experience of one subject

97
.

None of this

is

we can

"specify conditions under

which the

relevant to the confirmation or disconfirmation of the

should be taken as an endorsement of the individualism implicit

in

claims

like the

following: "Whereas the test for the veridicality of a sense experience are based solely on other

sense experiences, those for the veridicality of a religious experience are not based solely on other
religious experiences, since the latter are based on what we hear other members of the religious
community say about their religious experiences, what we see in certain 'holy' books, etc."
Richard Gale, The Nature and Existence of God, p. 410. As if the tests we employ for

evaluating the vast majority of our beliefs about the external world are not ineradicably dependant

on the testimony of others.
98
.

"The Autonomy of Religious Experience,"

pp. 4-5, 15.

121

perceptual report of another subject,"

we

are able to engage "in the critical examination
of

sense-perceptual reports ." 99

That sense-perceptual beliefs are intersubjectively evaluable
grounds our
confidence in the
beings are

particular epistemic vices,

beliefs

we

particular judgements.

simple:

assertions, agents

human

who may

lack our

raise the probability that a given perceptual belief is true

If,

objects,

point,

on otherwise

and thus increases our confidence

for this reason,

judgements we make by engaging

sine

is

100
.

availability of the objects of perception renders us able to assess
publicly the

formed about those

The

heart of the answer

by having other agents check our

fallible;

The public

Why? The

SP.

reliability ol

of course,

in SP,

we

we

are rightly confident of

SP type

desirable but de jure!

-

most of the

overrider system

profligate cognizers; the intersubjective tests internal to

qua non of a perceptual practice

intersubjective tests of the

[And sometimes not just

SP

are elevated to a

SP type

for a perceptual practice.

101
.

a healthy check

is

are not merely

102

remarks, "the price of justification for an objective claim about the world

"The Autonomy of Religious Experience,"

of

are rightly confident of SP's reliability

not just that an

is

in the truth

]

is

As Alston
subjection to

p. 5.

I0

°.
Given, of course, that SP as a whole is reliable. To appeal to the publicity of SP's overrider
system in an argument for the reliability of that doxastic practice would be epistemically circular.

I0

‘.

I02
.

"The Autonomy of Religious Experience,"

p. 6.

Interestingly enough, long before Alston turned his professional attention to the epistemic

of religious experience, he addressed basically the same objection — the “consensual
corroboration objection” — to the cognitive status of “First Person Immediate Psychological State
status

Reports.” Because beliefs about our subjective beliefs and feelings are not publically checkable,

they are epistemically suspect, or

at least,

of no use for the genuine, behavioristic, science of

Psychology. Alston’s position on the matter
religious experience

some 20 years

SP’s but the difference

is

later

is

basically the

— CMP’s

same

that he takes with respect to

(introspection’s) overrider system differs from

a legitimate one, and therefore cannot count against the epistemic (or

Do Without
Coady, Testimony, pp. 66-75.

cognitive) status of M-beliefs (FRIPSRs). See William Alston, “Can Psychology
Private Data?,” in Behaviorism

1

(1972): 71-102. See C. A.

122

J.

appropriate objective scrutiny by other

members of the community. Objective epistemic

worth requires intersubjective validation ." 103

who engage

Obviously, those
M-beliefs

104
.

we saw

Although, as

in

CMP enjoy no such intersubjective evaluation of
Luther regarded with skepticism Munzer’s

briefly,

claim to be privy to direct revelations, and suggested some

such claims, the
[This

tests

committed

critics: distrust

CMP

for different reasons than non-theologically

And

counts against the epistemic standing of

this

the lack of adequate checks to belief formation renders the reliability of

suspect

to test

of CMP because of the inadequacy of its overrider system cuts

across the theism/non-theism divide.]

CMP:

of which

he suggests are worlds apart from those de jure in sense perception.

not to say that Luther distrusts

is

tests in light

CMP

105
.

This objection, according to Alston,
imperialism ."

106

The objector proposes

to

is

a "glaring example of epistemic

impose on agents who engage

in

CMP

procedures for checking beliefs properly required only of SP. The crucial point

the

is

ICb

Perceiving God, pp. 215-16, Alston's emphasis. Thus, according to C.B. Martin, a putative
perception of God can count as a genuine perception of an independently existing object only if it
.

is

subject to "a society of tests and checking procedures." Religious Belief,

He

beliefs are in fact disguised psychological claims.

be read off from

my

writes,

1

touch

such checking procedures that

I

it?

What do

others see?

It is

only when

I

what gives meaning

is

apprehending the paper? What I apprehend

the sort of thing that can be

is

touched and seen by others ." Religious Belief,
,

.

.

is

What would

admit the relevance of

p. 74.

to the assertion that

p. 6;

am

photographed

,

(Martin’s emphasis)

William Forgie, “Mystical Experience and the Argument from Agreement,” pp. 107-1

“The Autonomy of Religious Experience,”

I

10.

"Christian Experience and Christian Belief,"

122.

p.
106
.

Perceiving God,

p.

216. See “The

God," pp. 661-662; “Reply

to

M-

not to

can lay claim to apprehending the paper, and, indeed, the

admission of the relevance of such procedures

105

Otherwise,

experience as a piece of blue paper. Other things are relevant:

photograph reveal? Can

104

p. 72.

"The presence of blue paper

Autonomy of Religious

Commentators,”

p.

873.

123

Experience,”

p. 7;

"Perceiving

following.

We determine which tests are appropriate

on knowledge gotten by engaging

in

107

SP

.

More

for SP’s overrider system

by relying

generally, in order to determine

which

procedures are appropriate for the overrider system of a
given DP, one cannot but appeal
to the beliefs already

priori

formed via

which procedures we ought properly

belief, in the case

of SP, there

is

Why?

that practice.

no way

to

to

employ

There

is

no way

to

determine a

in order to evaluate a

given type of

determine a priori which procedures will

allow us to check beliefs formed about the natural environment
without relying on our
prior

we

knowledge

ot

what the natural world

learn that the natural environment

is

is like.

As

a consequence of engaging in SP.

composed of enduring physical

objects

casually interact with other physical objects in a law-like manner. Because

which

we have

acquired knowledge about the regularities exhibited by objects in the natural

environment,

we may

therefore isolate the conditions in which

agent to perceive a given object

108
.

And having

learned that,

it

is

possible for a given

we justifiably judge

intersubjective evaluability of claims about the objects of sense perception

non of any genuine practice of forming
the basis ot

its

what SP has revealed

.

108
.

109
.

a sine qua

beliefs about the natural world. In short,

about the nature of its subject matter that

"it is

we

deliverances to be subject to assessment in terms of the perceptions of properly

qualified others ."

107

to us

is

that the

109

"The Autonomy of Religious Experience," pp. 9-10.
"Christian Experience and Christian Belief,"

Perceiving God,

p.

2

1

8.

p.

122.

See “Reply to Commentators,”

124

p.

893.

on

take

Just as with SP, those

to construct

who engage

in

CMP may legitimately employ that practice

an understanding of its subject matter

in

order to determine what

appropriately be required of their practice's overrider
system

.

are required in order to corroborate or to discredit
M-beliefs

is

110

Determining what

who

beliefs those

who engage

in

CMP

relevance

is this to

the objection at

non-sensorily and non-systematically to

and justice, they reveal no dependable

111
.

beings. While the beliefs formed on

possesses enduring virtues like compassion

regularities in the

way God

beings which render possible predictions of divine presentations

Perceiving God,

As Alston
tests for

.

Let

me

112
.

human

Indeed, the

notes, this feature of the circularity of a given practice's overrider system

checking beliefs are parasitic on beliefs already formed

employ

interacts with

217.

p.

complementary, to the point made
but
"2

on the

hand? The understanding of God

human

God

the basis ot those perceptions reveal that

.

beliefs

M-

CMP is that of a sovereign, immaterial being who is present (for all we can

internal to

no

to evaluate the

form and, indeed, perhaps those very

which a given procedure was deemed appropriate

Of what

tell)

interacts with

perceive Him, and on the basis of that understanding formulate
procedures for

checking M-beliefs. These procedures are subsequently employed

basis of

tests

a circular process: agents

form an understanding of God's nature and purposes, as well
as the way He
those

may

beliefs

formed by

earlier that in

—

that doxastic practice. Perceiving

clarify a possible confusion.

In

is

slightly different,

checking a particular

order that those

God,

belief,
p.

who engage

—

that the

though

an agent also cannot

217.
in

CMP employ an

overrider system to evaluate their beliefs, they rely on the picture of God's nature and intentions

they have built up over the years. That picture provides them with an account of the kinds of
actions

God

is

likely to

approve or disapprove the kinds of properties he

That picture does not suffice to enable those

who engage

in

enable

me

to predict

.

Knowing

when she

that an agent

is

likely to display, etc.

CMP

behavior." Charles Daniels, "Experiencing God," Philosophy

49/3 (March, 1989): 491

is

"to make predictions about His
and Phenomenological Research

compassionate or loving does not suffice to

will act compassionately; such properties lack predictive value

125

.

understanding of God internal to

CMP provides those who engage in that practice with

reason to believe that God's action exhibits no regularities
of the proper sort and thus no
basis for predictions, viz.,

unable to
regard

it

test

God

is

sovereign and transcendent ." 3 Therefore, our being

M-beliefs in the manner appropriate to

as unreliable ."

4

SP cannot count

Rather, the understanding of God internal to

as a

good reason

to

CMP warrants us

in regarding this objection as imperialistic.

Alston concludes:

The upshot of all this is
world from SP gives us

that while

what we have learned about the physical

the wherewithal to hold particular perceptual reports
subject to a decisive test in terms of what relevant others perceive, what we
have learned from God and His relations to His creation, from
and other

CMP

sources, gives us reason to suppose that no such tests are available here

Therefore, they are not rightly imposed on

115
.

CMP.

Alston's response has a further implication. Suppose that an agent

who engages

in

CMP acquires an understanding of God as sovereign and transcendent, and thus
legitimately expects to be unable to predict under

God.

If she subsequently begins to perceive

God

which conditions she
in regular

and predictable ways, she

then has good reason to be suspicious of her perceptions. This
a situation in which an agent

who

will perceive

is

the analogue in

CMP of

believes reality to be constituted by enduring physical

objects begins to experience the physical world as chaotic, and thereby doubts that her

sufficient to underwrite the intersubjective tests proper to SP.

See "Reply to Daniels,"

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49/3 (March, 1989): 502.
"3
1

.

"The Autonomy of Religious Experience,"

.

Perceiving God,

p.

.

Perceiving God,

p. 87.

14

"5

2

1

8;

p.

1

1

"Precis of Perceiving God," pp. 866-67.

126

in

perceptions are veridical. In what respect are they
analogous? In that legitimate
expectations about her experience, based on her understanding
of the objects of her
experience, undermine her confidence in experiences
which
expectations. This

I

do not want

shows how misguided

is

is

meet those

O’Hear's argument:

to suggest that a religious explanation

religious experience

fail to

and interpretation of

necessarily incorrect, or that there could not be

circumstances in which such an explanation was more probable than
any
other. If people, after praying to a particular God or within
a particular
religious tradition, often had fairly specific experiences, internal
visions and
the like, of the divine beings of that religion, the probability that
the

experiences emanated from those beings would be greater than
experiences were inconsistent and irregular. 116

Let us take stock of Alston's argument for a moment. In 2.1,

argument
God. In

in support

of the claim

this subsection,

I

that there is a

CMP is not a genuine DP.

this chapter are

sound, then, by (EP3), those

If the

to several

arguments of the

who engage

in

regarding that practice as reliable. In the next subsection,

support of the conclusion that

CMP

is

externally massively inconsistent with

"6
.

1

the

outlined Alston's

genuine practice of forming beliefs about

have presented and responded

conclusion that

if

I

arguments

first

to the

two subsections of

CMP are rational w in
present Alston's arguments in

neither internally massively inconsistent nor

more well established DPs.

Experience, Explanation and Faith, pp. 47-8.

127

2.3 Vindication of the

Moderate Rationality of CMP

Having thus defended the case

for the claim that

CMP

genuine DP, Alston responds to arguments which purport

Thus he responds

may

to claims that

CMP

is

CMP

socially established

2.3.1 Naturalistic

(2.3.4).

unreliable.

science (2.3.3); or

CMP enjoys in virtue of being a

Explanations of Mystical Experience

including M-beliefs.

in

is

DP.

provide us with several proposals explaining

engaging

CMP

If his objections to those claims are cogent, Alston will

Marx, Nietzsche and Freud are famous

117

CMP, may

That agents adhere

for "explaining away’' religion.

why

agents form beliefs about God,

to religious beliefs, including those

an infantile

state.

claim that agents are perceptually aware of God. For
order to mount an explanation,

experiences of God.'’

1

18

They

formed by

be explained by the functionality of M-beliefs for the dominant

class, ressentiment, or regression to

But

if

...

we

And
if

that causes

problems for the

“God need never be mentioned

are debarred from taking those experiences to be

agents are not causally related to God, then according to

Alston has discussed Freudian objections in some detail in "Psychological Explanations of
in Faith and the Philosophers, John Hick, ed., (Oxford: St. Martin's Press,

Religious Belief,"

1964), pp. 63-102.
"8
.

that

gives rise to massively inconsistent beliefs

have vindicated the presumptive epistemic innocence

.

show

CMP gives rise to beliefs which are inconsistent with natural

of religious diversity

“7

a socially established and

unreliable because: putative perception of God

be explained naturalistically (2.3.1);

(2.3.2);

to

is

"The Autonomy of Religious Experience,"

p.

128

13.

in

both

TA and
God

about

SD, putative perceptions of God cannot provide us with justified

(whether or not

Alston
119

belief

But

.

For

is

it

is

God

exists).

dubious as to the evidential support for such explanations of religious

we need

not appeal to anything so controversial to explain religious
belief.

no doubt possible

neurophysiology will provide us with an adequate

that

why

naturalistic explanation ot

agents form M-beliefs. That

be able to isolate those brain-states which induce

God. But does

beliefs

that

show

in

CMP is unreliable?

that

is,

scientists will eventually

an agent an apparent presentation of

An

No.

explanation of the formation

of M-beliefs as a consequence of neurophysiological causes ought concern an agent who
engages

may

in

CMP no more and no less than that the formation of sense-perceptual beliefs

be similarly explained

1

J)

.

A neurophysiological
would

at best

to provide

show

that

What

is

wrong with

this

argument, then?

explanation, as well as a Marxist or Freudian explanation,

provide us with some of the proximate causes of M-belief formation. But

an explanation of M-belief formation by reference to proximate causes

God

plays no causal role at

fact that mystical experience

the process of perception. Hence, "the

can be explained

natural factors has no tendency to

God ." 121 Why?

all in

show

that

it

in

.

does not constitute veridical perception of

In order that an agent perceive

120

Perceiving God,

p.

233.

Perceiving God,

p.

231; "The

pp. 658-59;
I21
.

“Reply

to Daniels,” p.

Perceiving God,

p.

mere

terms of causally sufficient, proximate

God,

all

God need do

appropriate causal role in the production of belief — however remote.

"9

fails to

Autonomy of Religious
506.

232.

129

Experience,"

is

play

some

As we have

p. 13;

already

"Perceiving God,"

.

seen (2.1.1

.2),

we know of the

causal relations proper to each

perception, but not to perception

any reason

itself,

nor to

CMP. Have

may be

critics

who engage

in

show

that

God cannot

God

to the

to think that this case

causally interact with an agent

suitable causal role

can be made.

more remote than

that

It is

possible that

of synaptic

CMP
of M-

formation of M-beliefs?

whose M-beliefs

122
causally explained by "neurophysiological happenings in the
brain."

no reason

is

agents

to believe that a true neurophysiological
explanation of the formation

beliefs renders impossible a causal contribution of

Not unless

mode of sensory

God

plays

And

there

some

firings, as well as regression,

ressentiment, or functionality.

God may

Alternatively put,

bring about the desired affects by employing causal

processes of the sort identified by Marx, Nietzsche and Freud.

move

to

a boulder.

What moved

An

agent uses a crowbar

the boulder? Both the agent and the crowbar: each

“contributes part ot a sufficient condition.” Both the force exerted by the crowbar as well
as the intentional act by the worker, in those circumstances, suffice to being about the

God may

desired effect. Similarly,

bring about apprehension of the divine by initiating

the processes identified by the three masters of suspicion. “Indeed, this

standard Christian story about the work of the Holy Spirit,

through the church and

122
.

123
.

Perceiving God,

p.

its

23

activities, not

who

is

is

part of the

supposed to work

independent of or alongside the church.”

1

William Alston, “The Fulfillment of Promises as Evidence for Religious Belief,”

Theory and

123

in

Faith in

Practice: Essays on Justifying Religious Belief, Elizabeth S. Radcliffe and Carol

White, eds., (Chicago,

IL.:

Open Court

Press, 1993), p. 29.

130

J.

But does

God does and

they form beliefs about God. But

of God’s playing a suitable causal role

actuality

course. But

objects

play a suitable causal role? Those

it

who engage

in

CMP believe that

they think that their apparent apprehension of God
provides reason to think

why

so: that is

God

is

way

circular in just the

more remote than synaptic

isn't

recourse to

in the process

that an agent

CMP to establish the

of perception circular?

who engages

in

SP

Of

believes that

firings play a suitable causal role in the formation

of

their beliefs about those objects.

Isn't

Alston's answer to Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud disingenuous?

Isn't the

ol their objections to religious belief that causal factors rendering unreliable
other

operative in

CMP and thus render

formation of which

is

it

distrust

Isn't the

problem

explanations of a particular sort undermine our confidence in
think that this

Moreover,

I

is

is

good reason

undaunted. Suppose, he says,

modes of cognition
this is not the

.

our

that causally sufficient

CMP?
to argue.

think that, if any of their explanations of religious belief enjoy sufficient

regression to infantile stages of cognition.

l24

muddy up

what the three great masters of suspicion intended

evidential support, they constitute

however,

are

an agent's belief the

critical capacities ineffectual,

cognitive waters, in short, obscure the truth?

I

DPs

infected by wish-fulfillment or ressentiment? Doesn't wish-

and ressentiment render our

fulfillment

we

unreliable? Don't

point

to present

p.

is

CMP as unreliable.

the case that religious belief

What of it?

Can't

God

Alston,

is

caused by

use such regressive

Himself to an agent's consciousness? "Why suppose

mechanism God uses

Perceiving God,

it

to regard

to reveal

Himself to our experience?"

233.

131

124

(I

will

that

discuss Alston’s response to Marx, Freud and Nietzsche
in 3.6, where

argue that

I

it

is

inadequate.)

2.3.2

Massive Internal Inconsistency of CMP
Clearly, every practice, including SP,

memory,

introspection and inference,

generates inconsistent beliefs. So a puritanical rigorism, like that
displayed (selectively)

by Plato with regard

to SP, is out

produces inconsistent

beliefs.

Similarly, then, for

of CMP inconsistent? That depends

who

may

be regarded as engaging

CMP. To what

degree are the outputs

on how one individuates

in part

CMP but form beliefs

claim to engage in

qualities

A practice may yet be reliable which

of order. 125

such as that

God

that practice.

displays feminine

CMP,

in a different practice than

thus limiting the

number of inconsistent

beliefs

genuine participants in

CMP believe that God displays no feminine qualities.)

individuate

formed by engaging

in

CMP.

CMP in that way risks a proliferation of DPs.

those agents engage in

(This

For

125
.

126
.

It is

FMP. As Alston

Perceiving God,
‘Stipulate’

is,

a grouping of

1

p.

notes, internal

real, the

According to Alston, a

the basis of

grouping

group mechanisms into practices."

is

How we

to put those notions. Perceiving

Studies,

p. 176.
p.

But

to

problem of internal

CMP and other practices
127

234.

think, the correct word.

Perceiving God,

that all

of denying that

and external inconsistency vary inversely.

we want

.

assume

CMP who believe God to display feminine qualities, we stipulate

numerous bfds on

although those bfds are

127

to

in virtue

inconsistency returns in the form of inconsistent beliefs between

like

is

FMP — a feminist mystical practice. 126 And thus the

into existence an

Those

some

Hence, there

not.

do so

God,

is

132

has only a notional reality.

is

"no one uniquely right

And
way

determined by the theoretical uses to

p. 165.

236.

DP

similarity shared by those bfds.

See “Reply to Critics,”

in

to

which

Religious

The tack Alston takes

is

to individuate

CMP with reference to the authority

accorded to "the Bible, the ecumenical counsels of the
undivided church, Christian
experience throughout the ages, Christian thought, and
more generally the Christian
28

tradition

Of course,

he admits that vagueness

afflicts

each of these

criteria,

but

notes that the nature of the subject matter militates against
further "precising ." 129

Given

this

way of individuating CMP, Alston

calculus for determining

undermines the

when some

reliability

internal inconsistency

SP,

in

He judges

that

other basic practices renders

them more

case of external inconsistency between either of them and

is

becomes too much and thus

canceled

2.3.3 Conflicts

CMP does not give rise to too

1

’

reliable than

CMP,

mine

CMP.

Hence,

the latter's epistemic

0

.

between Science and

CMP

Alston's attempt to address conflicts between science and religion

brief and

affair,

inconsistency although Alston concedes that the lesser degree of inconsistency

memory and

standing

no

is

of that practice. Such judgements are a seat of the pants

lequiring an epistemic version of phronesis.

much such

further notes that there

will be briefer.

He

identifies three sources

is

agreeably

of possible conflict between

science and religion: between specific scientific results and specific doctrines, scientific

and religious methodology, and

128
.

129
.

13

°.

m
.

Perceiving God,

p.

193.

Perceiving God,

p.

193.

Perceiving God,

p.

238.

Perceiving God,

p.

240.

scientific

assumptions and religious doctrines

133

131
.

in

.

Those
vs.

conflicts

Huxley, Galileo

vs.

which have been given the most press are the
Cardinal Bellarmine,

etc.

However, such

first:

Wilberforce

conflicts as exist

do not

concern the central doctrinal positions of Christianity,
and certainly not the beliefs formed
via

CMP.

Recognizably Christian theologies have been articulated
long

admission that Huxley and Galileo had the better of their
opponents.
possible that
so far as

some

central such conflict

some of the human

between science and religion

Of course,

like lack

enough empirical support

it

will erupt.

sciences, e.g., behavioristic psychology, deny

responsibility and freedom, those sciences are incompatible with

behaviorism and the

after the

CMP.

And

in

human

But, fortunately,

to threaten the reliability

In order to allay tears that this lack of current conflicts

is

of CMP.

between particular (well-

confirmed) scientific theories and religious doctrines might be just a contingent feature of
the current state of scientific (and religious) knowledge, Alston provides systematic

reason for regarding that lack as not merely contingent. Taking a familiar line of

argument, he argues that the function of science

is

to

provide

human

agents with an

adequate account of the structure of the physical world, not to identify

purpose of either the cosmos or of beings

in

it.

origin or the

Reflecting on the purpose of human

beings, of God's intention vis-a-vis God's creation,

conflicts as occasionally erupt

its

is

the purview of religion.

between the two are therefore peripheral

to the essential

function of religion and easily resolvable by the revision of religious claims

As one might expect Alston
between

to argue, there are

CMP and science; there are only differences.

Such

132
.

no methodological conflicts

Those differences may be

explained and justified by the difference between the nature of physical objects and God.

12

Perceiving God,

p.

241

134

There would only be conflict
for both

domains; but,

to

if

someone suggested

that

one methodology should be used

no one's surprise, Alston argues

that to

do so would be

imperialistic.

Finally, the materialism

say, the theistic belief that

that the natural laws

God

presupposed by

which govern the natural world

working assumption

Berger's

And

1

.

-

would seem

to conflict with,

presents Himself to consciousness. For that belief implies

responds, however, by denying that materialism
rather, a

scientists

is

are

sometimes abrogated. Alston

one of the

results

of science;

it is,

methodological materialism to modify a phrase of

methodological materialism requires a scientist to assume only for

purposes of empirical research that the events she investigates have fully naturalistic
explanations.

It

does not require that she assert

naturalistic explanations

that, in fact, all

events have fully

134
.

2.3.4 Religious Diversity

The

diversity of religious

MPs

generates the problem Alston regards as most

seriously endangering the moderate rationality of CMP. Intuitively,

epistemically improper to regard

established

133
.

MPs

Peter Berger,

More

seems

CMP as reliable given that there are various socially

The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a

York. NY.: Doubleday Books, 1969),
134

it

p.

Sociological

Theory of Religion, (New

180.

committed to assuming, by virtue
of engaging in the scientific enterprise, is that there is a good chance that the phenomena he is
investigating depend on natural phenomena to a significant degree. These three qualifications
mark ways in which he need not be assuming strict naturalism. (1) He need only assume a
.

precisely, Alston writes, the “only thing a scientist

He need only make

is

assumption for the particular area of his
investigation. And (3) he need not assume even there that natural causes do the whole job in every
instance.” Quoted in Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse: Reflections on the Claim that

significant probability. (2)

God

his

Speaks, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 124-25.

135

the products of which are incompatible with the
products of

CMP but which,

like

CMP,

are not demonstrably unreliable. Alston sets up
that problem in the following way.
First, there are

genuine inconsistencies between different versions of MP

Alston adheres to a

realistic

depends upon what

is

concept of truth

whether or not a proposition

1

’

6

formed by engaging

in a

Buddhist

CMP are 'true' in 'Christian cultures' and that

MP are 'true'

in 'Buddhist cultures .'

Second, the inconsistencies among the products of the various
sufficiently massive that

is reliable,

any two such

MPs

cannot be conjointly

then most of the beliefs that issue from

of the incompatibility, a large proportion of the
will

135
.

be

false;

true

Hence, Alston cannot take the easy way out of

arguing that beliefs formed by engaging in

of MP]

is

the case, regardless "of anyone's actual or possible epistemic

position vis-a-vis the proposition ."

beliefs

—

135
.

and so none of these others

is

it

MPs

reliable.

137

are

"If

one [species

are true; and, hence, because

from each of the others

beliefs issuing

a reliable process ."

138

Perceiving God, pp. 256-66; "Religious Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge of God," pp.

433-34.
136
.

"A Doxastic

Practice

Approach

to Epistemology," p. 5.

See

A

Realist Conception of the

Human Freedom, and the Laws of Nature,” in Quantum
Cosmology and the Laws of Nature: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, Robert
Russell, Nancey Murphy, and C.J. Isham, eds., (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory

Truth, passim; ""Divine Action,

J.

Publications, 1993), pp. 185-86; ‘"Realism and the Christian Faith,” in International Journal for

the Philosophy of Religion 38 (1995): 37-60; “Religious Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge of
p. 434; and “Yes, Virginia. There is a Real World,” in Proceedings and Addresses of the

God,”

American Philosophical Association 52 (August,
137
.

In Peter Berger's terms, Alston rejects the

diversity.
138
.

A

1979): 779-808.

"Mary Poppins"

Far Glory, (New York: Doubleday Books,

Perceiving God,

p.

268-69.

136

1992),

solution to the problem of religious
p.

75.

Third, Alston assumes a worst case scenario
in which there are no

non-question-begging reasons
version of

MP over others.

in

support of the relative epistemic superiority of
any one

139

Fourth, there are three bad arguments which employ
the fact of religious diversity
to discredit

CMP.

(1)

CMP

Partial distribution provides

is

unreliable just because

no reason for doubting a

it

lacks universal engagement.

practice's reliability.

unreliable because the best explanation of partial distribution
entails
say,

because engagement

in the different variations

of MP

is

its

140

(2)

CMP

unreliability

best explained

is

—

by

socialization, wish-fulfillment, auto-suggestion, etc. Alston argues that
regarding such an

explanation as best presupposes the faulty assumption that

"if

any person or group enjoys

a certain kind ot cognitive contact with a sphere of reality, then any other person or group
that takes itself to cognize that reality in that

similar, results."

141

various versions of

“they cannot

all

Religious diversity

is

way would come up with

just as well explained

the same, or

by the hypothesis

that the

MP put their members in contact with a transcendent reality, though

have

it

exactly straight," or at least straight to the

same degree. 142

(3) If

CMP (or some other version of MP) were reliable, there would be some indication that
is;

some mark which

distinguishes

it

explanation of the diversity of MPs

139
.

°.

141

is

rest.

There

not;

hence the best

p.

484;

“Reply

of course.

to Critics,” in

p. 178.

Perceiving God, pp. 266-67; "Religious Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge of God,"

.

Perceiving God,

.

“Religious Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge of God,”

142

is

that all of them are unreliable, including,

“Religious Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge of God,”

Religious Studies,
I4

from the

it

p.

267.

137

p.

441.

p.

440.

CMP. But even SP
reliable are those

lacks a distinguishing mark; our only grounds for believing

we

acquire by engaging in that very practice

reason to believe that reliable practices will provide those

with any indication of their

reliability.

Of course,

143

be

no

is

not engage in them

CMP,

as with SP, by engaging in

--

to

In general, there

.

who do

agent has access to abundant internal indications of reliability

it

God

is

an

present on a

regular basis!

Well, what problem does religious diversity pose for

CMP?

The problem

is

one

of arbitrariness not of unreliability. Mere disagreement, the mere diversity of doxastic
,

practices, is not a reason to regard a particular such practice as unreliable

agent (a)

who

is

aware of the diversity of versions of MP and

(b)

who

144

Rather, an

.

persists in

regarding her favored version as reliable, and thus others as unreliable, and (c)
fully apprized

who

is

of the epistemic parity among the various versions, verges on a violation of

the principle of universalization.

What

is

the principle of universalization? Consider the following example.

two students were

to turn in papers,

A

If

and B, which by a massively improbable

coincidence, were word for word identical, then

I

would be

irrational

were

I

to fail to give

each of those papers the same grade. Barring extenuating circumstances, on what
legitimate basic could

I

differences between the

M3
144
.

possibly distinguish between them? Certainly, there

two papers over and above mere numerical

may

difference:

A

be

might

p erC eiving God, p. 268; "Religious Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge of God," p. 441.
A point made by Alasdair MacIntyre about the interminable conflicts afflicting “wholly

Versions of
secular humanistic disciplines’ like psychology and literary criticism. Three Rival

Moral Enquiry,

p. 6-7.

138

have been submitted inside a green folder and B inside a
differential grading

by appeal

called to account for

papers

--

my

to that difference,

I

red.

would be

grading policies. Although there

and perhaps even a difference relevant

If

I

were

irrational

is

to justify

my

and would be justly

a difference between those

in certain discourses, e.g., aesthetic

—

that difference is not relevant to the grade they deserve.

At the heart of — though not exhaustive of consistency, where the 'other' of consistency

arbitrariness.

If

you have a reason

is

tor x, then

reason for y lv .., y n so long as they are similar
,

arbitrary, not

when

she lacks reasons, but

them evenhandedly; not when she lacks

you have, on pain of arbitrariness, good
in all the relevant respects to x.

she has reasons and

by which

grades differentially papers between which there

is

differently in situations that lack important differences.

fails to

An agent

is

adhere to

to guide her behavior, but that

having rules, she makes unwarranted exceptions to those

who

is

not mere logical contradiction but

when

rules

the concept of rationality

rules.

An

arbitrary agent is

no important difference;

Because she

is

one

who

arbitrary, she

acts

is

irrational.

As Alston

MP are identical
other

MPs

formulates the problem, for

all

any agent knows, the various versions of

in all epistemically relevant respects.

with respect to

That

is,

CMP is on equal par with

criteria like social establishment, internal consistency,

consistency with other well-established practices, and significant self-support. And,

given the worst case scenario he stipulates, no version of MP enjoys any “external

which indicate

that

it

is

more

reliable than other versions.

Structurally identical

arguments, employing the very epistemic principles articulated

139

marks

in the

previous chapter

[(EP9) and (EP10)], support the rationality, of regarding

many

Although a member of CMP may believe with confidence
in contact

MPs

other

as reliable.

that her version

of MP puts her

with God, she knows that members of other versions believe the same, and.

presumably, with the same degree of confidence.

What should she do

in this situation?

What course of action

avoid the charge of arbitrariness meted out to those
universalization?

MPs

How can she treat all

versions of

who

not regard them

all

as unreliable, for

option, viz., withhold

commit

to

briefly

an agent to regard

it

is

just the conclusion

irresolvable conflict.

To

arbitrary.

that the conclusion of this argument, unlike that of the three

is that,

as reliable.

have no non-question begging grounds
This

She must, therefore, take the only other

par.

mentioned several paragraphs prior

irrational for

those practices. She ought

as to the reliability of each of the various practices.

one version of MP would be

Note

all

MP as reliable, and others as unreliable, because all

on the same

judgement

among

She ought not regard

mere disagreement does not warrant so strong a

conclusion. She ought not regard one

practices are epistemically

violate the principle of

MP equally?

as reliable, for there are massive inconsistencies

will enable her to

even

"Even

if

in

CMP

is

very reliable,

some form of MP

for determining

we would draw

if

which one

is

is

that is."

more mundane

Suppose a witness' account of an accident

arguments

it

is

reliable,

we

14 "

instances of

disputed by several

other witnesses, each of whom recall a different version of the events, but each of whom

had equally good access

l45
.

Perceiving God,

p.

to the accident.

What

270.

140

is

the epistemically proper attitude for that

agent to take with regard to her

abandon her account,

to

God, given

ot

all

it

is

it is,

It is

as reliable, or one as reliable. 'I'm not sure'

Similarly for

that

rendering of the events? Clearly,

reduce her confidence in her recollections.

accounts as unreliable, or
attitude to adopt.

own

CMP. As

confident as an agent

may

not to regard

is

identify an

some

alternative versions.

other versions of

that

the proper

that there are

to

no

is irrational if

CMP is reliable.

withhold assent to the claim that

What must Alston do
must

all

be of her awareness

epistemically relevant differences between the various versions of MP, she
fails to

not to

disputed by others, that those others enjoy structurally identical

grounds for regarding themselves as having perceived God, and

she

if

respond to the objection from religious diversity? He

relevant difference between the Mystical Practice of choice and

Only

if

he can

cite

some important

difference between

CMP and

MP will he evade the charge of arbitrariness in persisting in the belief

CMP is reliable and its alternatives are not.
Alston begins by identifying an important disanalogy between cases

in

which

various equally well placed witnesses to an accident articulate conflicting and mutually

incompatible reports and the situation in which members of a given

There

is

MP find themselves.

a crucial difference between unresolved disputes over matters of particular

empirical fact and over whole

accident, agents

know

DPs

in principle

146
.

With respect

how they

can employ the various procedures internal

to inconsistent reports about an

could go about resolving that dispute. They

to SP,

memory, and

inference to determine

Perceiving God, pp. 272-74; “Religious Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge of God," pp.
442-45.
l46

.

141

which observer

most competent, had the best vantage

is

point, etc.

Because the agents

involved lack that which they could in principle have, their lack
of that means ought

reduce their confidence in their beliefs. But just
is

missing

in the dispute

between

rival

MPs.

this

it

how

in

interlocutors might resolve a

unreasonable to discredit the position of any party to that dispute on

grounds that they cannot show that
impossible

shared means of resolving the issue

We do not know how that dispute could

principle be resolved. But to be unable to imagine

dispute renders

to

their position is the correct one.

It is

to

ask the

147
.

Alternatively put, those involved in an intrapractice dispute

may have

recourse to

a shared overrider system to resolve their difference; if the difference can’t be resolved by

employing the procedures constitutive of their overrider system, the most reasonable
course of action

to

is

withhold assent

because a resolution of the problem

until the dispute

is

can be resolved

a live possibility that

we

148

It is

.

just

regard the most

reasonable course of action to be that of withholding assent. But those involved

in

interpractice disputes can’t be assured that they have access to considerations which will

enable them to resolve their differences. They have no shared set of procedures in

of which they can adjudicate between conflicting claims.
procedures,

when

there

is

no

live possibility

And when

there are no such

of resolving the dispute, the existence of

uneliminated alternatives does not have the deleterious consequences

intrapractice cases.

1

47

It is

light

it

has in

not irrational for an agent to persist in regarding her version of

Perceiving God, pp. 273-74; "Religious Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge of God,"

I48
.

See

J.

L. Schellenberg, “Religious Experience

30(1994): 151-59.

142

and Religious Diversity,”

in

p.

443.

Religious Studies

MP as reliable even though she is aware of a plethora of uneliminated and incompatible
alternatives.

Alston constructs a counter-analogy to make

this point

149
.

Imagine that there were

three very different sense perceptual practices, a Whiteheadian, a Cartesian, and
an
Aristotelian.

Suppose

content, that each

that

each of these practices were equally as rich

makes possible

adequate overrider system,

SP were massively

etc.

in informational

a highly developed science, that each enjoys an

Suppose further

that the outputs

inconsistent. Suppose, finally, that there

determining which versions of SP were more

reliable.

of the three versions of

were no shared means

If these alternatives

were

for

actual,

agents would be in precisely the same situation with respect to SP as they currently are

with respect to

According

MP. What would

to Alston, “in the absence

competing practices
tight

sit

my

a rational agent do if she found herself so beset?

is

more accurate than

with the practice of which

activity in the

of an external reason for supposing that one of the

world .”

150

And

I

am

my

own, the only

a master and

which serves

in the possible

take with respect to that version

Suppose
one.

149
.

I5

°.

And

is

me

me

members of the

to

is

so well in guiding

because members of a given version of MP are

structurally identical situation in the actual world that

of SP find themselves

rational course for

in a

Aristotelian version

world Alston describes, the only rational course

to

to ‘sit tight.'

that the distinction

between

intra-

and interpractice conflicts

is

a happy

thus, suppose that Alston has identified an epistemically relevant difference

Perceiving God, pp. 273-74; "Religious Diversity and Perceptual Knowledge of God,"

Perceiving God,

p.

274.

143

p.

443.

between situations

in

which an agent

is

faced with uneliminated and incompatible reports

about an accident and those in which she
versions of MP. That only

a scenario in

which our

predicament

in

means

is

faced with uneliminated and incompatible

that Alston has identified a relevant difference

'gut reaction’

is to

which members of CMP

deny

rational status to a given belief

principle, viz., that there

seems

to

participant in

CMP,

if

or any other version of MP, forms beliefs on the basis of

As

a consequence of her engagement in

just such internal justification for other versions of

correct,

it

is

CMP

MP.

available by engaging in a given

other agents have access to the

the issue of

she commits herself to one such version?

has plenty of internal justification for believing that

made

from

be no relevant difference between various versions of

putative presentations of the divine.

considerations

in this case, to refrain blindly

What headway has he made on

MP and thus that an agent is arbitrary
Any

and the

find themselves. But the difference Alston cites

only requires us to be suspicious of our gut reaction
following our epistemic 'intuitions.’

between

is reliable.

And

Now this appeal

DP was

is

a

if

MPs can

abstain from engaging in those practices. But

now that we

she will lack

to

Alston’s argument

is

way of adjudicating

between the conflicting claims of the various versions of MP. Only
suppose that the dispute between the disparate

she

neutralized by the fact that

same type of consideration. But

neutralized only on the assumption that there

CMP,

be resolved

if

it

is it

realize that

is

reasonable to

reasonable to

we

lack the

resources for such interpractice adjudication, the most reasonable course of action to to

tight.

That

is,

for

any agent who engages

in a

given version of MP, and thus

who

is

thereby putatively put into contact with the divine, the most reasonable course of action

144

sit

is

to continue to

engage

The

in that practice.

and alternative versions

is

that

relevant difference between her version of

by engaging

in her

own

she has apparently been presented

with God; she should therefore persist in engaging in that
practice even
uneliminated alternatives.

And

we

because

faulted

2.4 Vindication of the Strong Rationality of

in section

1

.6,

I

CMP exhibits.
those

of

on grounds of arbitrariness. 151

CMP

Alston claims that there

is

epistemic standing of moderately rational doxastic practices,
self-support.

in the face

regard this as the most rational policy for

members of all versions of MP, we cannot be

As we noted

MP

a

way of strengthening

viz.,

by appeal

the

to significant

will briefly attempt to indicate the kind of self-support Alston believes that

Internal to the Christian tradition are various claims about the character of

who engage

in

CMP; by

engaging

genuine participant, undergo changes

more virtuous person. She

in

in

CMP,

an agent learns that she

moral character

will be less prideful,

more

—

will, if a

she will be transformed into a

tranquil in times of danger,

more

151

It should be clear by this point how wrongheaded are accusations that Alston's strategy for
defending the rationality of CMP is merely protective and insular (as alleged, e.g., by Matthew
.

Bagger
p.

in

"The Miracle of Minimal Foundationalism: Religious Experience and

Justified Belief,"

302, 303; and Dirk-Martin Grube, “Religious Experience After the Demise of

Foundationalism,”

in

uniqueness of CMP

Religious Studies 31 (1995): 37, 41. Alston defends the autonomy and

in

order to insure that

it

gets a fair hearing; in order to insure that M-beliefs

autonomy of CMP
"more mundane counterparts" (Bagger, p.
302) Alston takes pains to argue that CMP must be consistent with the traditional package of SP,
memory, introspection and inference if it is to be reliable. Amazingly, Bagger and Martin ignore
that. As
will argue in the last chapter, Alston’s advocacy of autonomy does undermine the
are evaluated in light of appropriate and non-question-begging criteria. But the

does not

entail that

it

is

immune

to criticism

from

its

I

mechanical application of substantive epistemic norms to any practice whatever. But that is a very
different proposition than the claim that no criticism of CMP is possible or that Alston intends to
insulate

CMP from

such criticism.

145

gracious to her enemies, and the

like.

That

is,

internal to

CMP are a set of loose

hypothetical
specifying that under such and such conditions,

changes

in character

152
.

God

is

likely to bring about such

and such

Thus, Jonathan Edwards:

forming a judgement of ourselves now... we should certainly adopt that
evidence which our supreme Judge will chiefly make use of when we come to
stand before him at the last day... There is not one grace of the Spirit of God,
of the existence of which, in any professor of religion, Christian practice is not
In

most decisive evidence.... The degree in which our experience is
production of practice shows the degree in which our experience is spiritual

the

and divine. 15

’

Saint Theresa concurs:

Like imperfect sleep which, instead of giving more strength to the head, doth
but leave it the more exhausted, the result of mere operations of the
imagination

is

but to

weaken

the soul. Instead of nourishment and energy she

reaps only lassitude and disgust: whereas a genuine heavenly vision yields to

her a harvest of ineffable spiritual riches, and an admirable renewal of bodily
strength.

I

alleged these reasons to those

being the work of the

showed them

who

enemy of mankind and

so often accused

the sport of

my

my

visions of

imagination.

I

which the divine hand had left with me: - they were
my actual dispositions. All those who knew me saw that I was changed; my
confessor bore witness to this fact; this improvement, palpable in all respects,
154
for from being hidden, was brilliantly evident to all men
the jewels

.

If those predictions are accurate,

and not just

throughout the membership of CMP, then

its

members with an

we have

in

an agent’s

own

reason to believe that

William Alston, “The Fulfillment of Promises as Evidence for Religious
“Taking the Curse Off Language Games,” pp. 42f.
.

CMP provides

The

Belief,' p. 10:

Quoted

in

William James,

Varieties of Religious Experience,

p. 37.

.

Quoted

in

William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience,

p. 38.

.

154

but

accurate rendering of God’s intentions and nature, of an agent’s

152

153

life

146

relation to

God, and the

recommends

Why

it

and

does

like.

ways

The

formed by

beliefs

moral transformation count as a species of self-support ?

that the predicted character

the positive epistemic status of

CMP,

CMP will

in support

predicted changes presupposes the issue

significant ? Because, if engagement in

transformation,

any appeal moral transformation

to support

Why

hand.

is this

by appeal

to those

type of self-support

CMP correlates positively with moral

is

not necessarily available to other practices. Because

reliability

it

it

need not have supported

would have been were

which appeal

to

its

it

itself,

it

is

circular one) in support of

thereby better off

not to enjoy that support.

structurally similar to

is

CMP

predictive success.

Note

arguments

that

in support

any appeal

to the fact

us successfully to predict events in the natural world will invariably be

predictions actually

presupposing

reliability

which

reliability

SP enables

of CMP’s

hand an argument (once again, a

infected by epistemic circularity

.

acquire those

be infected with epistemic circularity. 155 That

at

This argument in support of CMP

l55

we can

in

epistemically than

that

and because

skills,’

we have

supports itself in ways

of SP's

changes have come about only as a

CMP is reliable are the relevant beliefs about changes in character reliably

formed and thus any argument

CMP’s

that

this appeal to

perceptual skills only by engaging in

if

way

do not thereby recommend any other practice whatever.

consequence of having developed ‘perceptual

only

in a

that

in

Because we can determine

is,

CMP cohere

its

— how else

can

we

come about than by engaging

in

determine whether or not out

SP and thereby by

tacitly

reliability? Nevertheless, although worthless as a direct

Perceiving God,

p.

253.

147

proof of the

reliability

of SP, appeal to the predictive success of SP counts as significant
self-support.

Not just any old

practice puts us in the position to

make

accurate predictions about the

natural world; presumably astrology and the reading of crystal balls

supports

itselt in

ways

that

it

practices apparently do not,

SP enjoys
internal

in virtue

might not have supported

SP

s

itself,

and

do

ways

in

Because

not.

it

that other

predictive success does supplement the epistemic status

of being a socially established practice which

is

free

of massive

and external inconsistency.

Not

to state the obvious, but

self-support proper to SP.

character;

SP

CMP

CMP does not enjoy the same kind of epistemic

furnishes accurate predictions, if

affords accurate predictions, if

it

it

does, about our moral

does, about the natural world. But that

is

hardly reason to deny the epistemic importance of CMP’s version of self-support. The

kind of self-support

we

should expect differs from practice to practice; that enjoyed by

deduction differs from induction, introspection, and, of course, SP and
to Alston, the kind

of self-support

by the aim or function of that

we

CMP. According

should expect from a given practice

practice; the

aim of CMP

differs

from

is

that of SP,

difference accounts for the differences in what they are successful in doing

function of

“only the true in heart will see

156

Perceiving God,

.

See, for example, Gustavo Gutierrez,

p.

will.

that

The

Such understanding has moral conditions

God .” 157 Hence, we have

.

157

156
.

and

CMP is, generally put, to provide us with a map or the divine territory — to

enable us to understand God’s nature and

—

determined

to

master those moral

174, 250.

On Job:

God-talk and the Suffering of the Innocent,

Matthew J. O’Connell, trans., (Maryknoll, NY.: Orbis Books, 1985), xiii; The Truth Shall Set
You Free: Confrontations, Matthew J. O’Connell, trans., (Maryknoll, NY.: Orbis Books, 1990),
lnda and John Eagleson, trans., (Maryknoll,
p. 55-58; A Theology of Liberation, Sister Caridad
148

components
different;

have

to

it

if

is

we

are to be successful practitioners in

make our way around

to enable us to

provide us with an accurate

that aim.

provides

The
its

difference, in short,

practitioners with

is

CMP. The aim

of SP

is

very

the natural environment; hence,

map of that environment

if

it

is to

it

be successful

between the kind of significant self-support

legitimately different from that provided by

will

in

CMP

SP

to its

practitioners.

2.5

Summary

Argument

of Alston’s

In the first chapter,

I

attempted to reconstruct Alston’s general epistemic position

without employing that position to determine whether or not religious belief enjoys
positive epistemic status.

I

noted

that, in virtue

of the ubiquity of epistemic

circularity,

Alston despairs of the attempt to show that any of our most basic doxastic practices are
reliable.

We have, therefore, to make do with second best. We should sit tight with those

practices in

which we happen

to

engage unless

we have good

reason to regard those

practices as unreliable, viz., they are massively inconsistent, whether internally or

externally.

We

should also attempt to identify epistemically desirable characteristics

which selected practices enjoy even
directly

reliable.

and non-circularly

And of course,

manner, she must show

to

show

if

we

can't appeal to those characteristics in order

that practices

in order for

which enjoy those

an agent to act

in

an epistemically appropriate

that non-socially entrenched practices are reliable

premises formed solely within well-established practices.

NY.: Orbis Books, 1988),

characteristics are

p.

xxxiii-xxxiv.
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by employing

In this chapter,

I

have attempted

to reconstruct Alston’s claim that there is
a

religious practice of forming beliefs about

normative

criteria constitutive

God and

that that practice satisfies the

of Alston's general epistemic position. There

established practice of forming and evaluating beliefs about

presentations of the divine.

fairly, that is,

imperialism,

so long as

And

so long as

we

we impose no double

God on

is

a socially

the basis of putative

consider the epistemic status of

CMP

standards, and engage in no epistemic

CMP is afflicted with no demerits sufficient to render those who engage in

it

epistemically unjustified in so doing.

Before

I

turn to the task of evaluating Alston's position,

comments about
First,

not

all

formed by engaging

religious beliefs are

texts,

by appeal

to

in

CMP;

communally recognized

formed as a consequence of reflection on natural phenomena,

‘natural theology.’

laurels

assume

Clearly, these other

ways of forming

on the arguments Alston marshals
that they

make

will

three

his argument.

by the reading of sacred
are

I

may; he denies

that

in support

beliefs

of CMP.

and some

authorities,

that

may

And

others are formed

is,

by engaging

not rest for their

Alston does not

by vindicating the epistemic standing of M-beliefs
'’

he has thereby vindicated the epistemic standing of religious beliefs
Nevertheless, Alston articulates, or

that

I

may

fruitfully

will articulate in

os

be employed

some

p erce v n g God,
i

j

p. 4,

detail

at least,

in the

what

I

in

in general.

1

8

he pursues, a strategy when defending

CMP

defense of other ways of forming religious beliefs.

take that strategy to be in the next chapter.

286.

150

Second, Alston intends to provide an external justification of
the epistemic
standing of CMP, not just the internal defense favored by other
Refonned

Epistemologists like Plantinga and Wolterstorff. That

is,

he articulates a general

epistemic position by which to determine whether or not an agent’ s
engagement in some
doxastic practice passes epistemic muster and which he
application to

CMP. And

according to that position, those

strongly rational in so engaging.

strongly rational

is

commends

More

discemable by those

who engage

importantly, that those

who do

not engage in

CMP.

CMP are
in

CMP are

Alston’s claim

show

is

that they are

CMP as reliable, but that those who have no theological

predilections whatsoever have access to sufficient grounds as well.

determine whether or not

in

who engage

not just that Christians have available to them grounds sufficient to
strongly rational in regarding

independently of its

CMP is socially established,

Anyone can

internally consistent

and consistent

with more well-established practices. 159
Note, however, that Alston has not provided sufficient grounds for believing that
those

have

who engage
to

show

argument

is

CMP are epistemically justified in so doing.

it

is

strongly rational to believe that

proposition. (Rationality

I59
.

“I believe that

my

is

is

in this

book provide anyone,

CMP to be rationally engaged

how

he would

Rather, his

in.”

is.)

participant in

CMP or not,

Perceiving God,

p.

with

283.

a problem, however, with strong rationality. Alston claims that an agent learns to

discern the kind of character growth predicted by
true,

that,

CMP is reliable, a very different

not truth-conducive, justification

arguments

sufficient reasons for taking

There

To show

CMP is reliable, a task he assumes will meet with failure.

that

that

in

are those

CMP only by engaging

in

CMP.

But

if this is

who do not engage in CMP to determine whether or not that practice enjoys
And if they cannot determine whether or not CMP enjoys significant self-

significant self-support?

support, they cannot determine whether or not

CMP enjoys strong rationality.
151

Third, although in earlier essays on the topic Alston argued
that

same epistemic

status

we

accord to SP

160
,

he no longer adheres

consequence of SP’s superior overrider system
generated by

CMP

and of the

,

undefeated alternatives

163
,

fact that

to that claim.

is

faced with numerous incompatible yet

inferior does not entail negligible; Alston rejects the claim that

As

CMP

a consequence of its lower status,

claims conflict with the dictates of SP (taking

a

of the more numerous inconsistencies

CMP enjoys an inferior epistemic status than SP.

epistemic status altogether.)

As

161
,

CMP

CMP enjoys the

modem

science,

(Of course,

lacks positive

if particular religious

more

particularly, to

be a

constituent of SP), then the religious claims must be rejected or modified accordingly

16

°.

161

“Christian Experience and Christian Belief,”

Perceiving God,

p.

220.

.

Perceiving God,

p.

238.

.

Perceiving God,

p.

277.

,62

163

164
.

p.

Perceiving God, pp. 172-73.

152

120.

164
.

CHAPTER 3

THE AUTONOMY OF THE CHRISTIAN MYSTICAL PRACTICE

At the heart of the Reformed approach

are the following four claims. (1)

cognitive agent cannot but rely on a set of belief-forming practices,

introspection,

memory and

discursive justification.

e.g.,

Every

sense-perception,

testimony, for which she can provide no non-circular

1

(2)

The most powerful and venerable

set

of restrictions

demarcating the belief-forming practices which require discursive redemption from those

which do

not, viz., classical foundationalism,

restrictive, or arbitrary.

exposed, there

is

2

(3)

Once

is self-

referentially incoherent,

the vicissitudes of classical foundationalism are

no reason why a religious way of forming

of those practices

in

unduly

beliefs ought not count as

one

which an agent may engage without providing discursive

justification for so doing. Religious practices of forming beliefs enjoy a presumptive

innocence. (4) That a belief-forming practice enjoys a presumptive innocence does not
insure those

who engage

in that practice

reflection; rather, critical reflection

of ‘diplomatic immunity’ from

critical

assumes the burden of a proof of guilt. Religious

practices of forming beliefs are innocent until proven guilty.

or
formulating the Reformed approach in Alston’s preferred terminology, not Plantinga
in
position
their
frame
Wolterstorff
and
Plantinga
work,
Wolterstorff s. At least in their early
basic beliefs for
terms of ‘basic beliefs;’ they argue that rational agents cannot but rely on a set of
practices b\
the
with
which they can provide no discursive justification and seem unconcerned
'.

I

am

engaging

in

which those

beliefs are

formed and evaluated.

Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstoitf,
God, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
eds., Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in
nd
within the Bounds of Religion, 2 ed.,
Press, 1983), pp. 59-63; Nicholas Wolterstorff, Reason
28-55.
(Grand Rapids, MI.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1993), pp.

2

.

Alvin Plantinga, “Reason and Belief

in God,’’ in

153

(1) is a claim about pluralism: there are

beliefs

and there

engaging

in

no reason

is

some

assume,

to

much

numerous

distinct practices

less require, that beliefs

of forming

formed by

subset of those practices provide us with good reason to believe
that

practices not in that subset are reliable. There

is

no reason

persistent failure, every reason to deny, that one practice

evidence furnished by the others; that SP, for example,
evidence generated by introspection, deduction and

is

to believe,

likely to

is likely to

memory

and

in light

of

be reliable on the

be reliable given the

(Descartes).

This pluralism claim must be distinguished from Alston’s claim that distinct
doxastic practices are autonomous.

practice

is

autonomous

is

Most

generally, the claim that a given doxastic

the claim that internal to that practice are standards of

evaluation, types of input and output, procedures for evaluating prima facie justified

beliefs, that differ

are distinct

the

from those proper

DPs which

autonomy claim

is

are not necessarily probable

that the differences

plurality claim entails that

reliable

we ought

by premises formed only

activities, concepts, standards

jure in others.

reliable

The

to other practices.

between

3

The

on the evidence afforded by

not require of a given practice that

in other practices; the

of evaluation,

in

SP memory,

it

autonomy claim

etc., internal to

p.

162; "The

entails that the

one practice need not be de

CMP needs to be shown to be

introspection etc.; the

Autonomy of Religious
154

The

be shown to be

autonomy claim

supports the denial that the bases on which M-beliefs are formed must enjoy

\ Perceiving God,

others;

distinct practices are legitimate.

plurality claim supports the denial that

by promises formed

plurality claim is that there

Experience,"

p. 4.

all

the

characteristics enjoyed

checked

way

in the

What

is

by the bases on which sense-perceptual

sense-perceptual beliefs are checked,

the relation between the plurality and the

beliefs are

formed or be

etc.

autonomy claims?

Just because

there are various practices with distinctive types of inputs, outputs, checking
procedures,

conceptual schemes,

shown

etc.

does

it

make

sense to claim of one practice,

be reliable by premises generated by other practices,

to

and rational

intuition.

That

require of one practice that

is,

it

e.g.,

SP, that

e.g., introspection,

just because there are distinct practices

is it

it

be

memory

possible to

be probable on the evidence furnished by others. The

pluralism claim presupposes the autonomy claim.

I

believe that Alston’s defense of the autonomy of distinct DPs, and in particular

of CMP, constitutes one of his most interesting and important
he claims

that,

insights.

by advocating the autonomy of distinct DPs, he

contributing to, a "paradigm shift" in the field of epistemology.

importance to his project, Alston

distinct

may

DPs

fails to

more importantly,

distinguish between genuine and spurious

autonomy

between the autonomy claim and

DPs

critique, thus

undermining the Reformed claim

live possibility that they are guilty.

.

4

Surprisingly given

its

criteria in light

of which

we

claims. Moreover, Alston fails

(4) above.

that religious

criticism; that, although presumptively innocent,

4

carrying out, or at least

That

is,

Alston’s claim

CMP are autonomous seems to render them immune to external

that religious

like

is

provide a rationale justifying his claim that

are autonomous, and, perhaps

to address a tension

Alston concurs;

"The Autonomy of Religious Experience,"

p.

1

1.

155

we

DPs should be amenable of

should always open ourselves to the

1

I

3.1,

will attempt to

remedy

that, at least in part, in this chapter.

I

begin, in section

with an analysis of the kind of problem to which the autonomy
claim

provide an answer. In 3.2,

some

criteria

way

why
in

it

is

reasonable to believe that

is

criticism.

I

supposed to

CMP is autonomous.

is

is,

I

provide

autonomous

In 3.3,

which the autonomy of religious DPs makes possible a promising

strategy for defending religious belief. In 3.4,

autonomy

is

provide a rationale for the autonomy claim; that

by which we may determine whether or not a given practice

and some reason
indicate the

1

1

so objectionable to critics:

it

1

seems

indicate

why

to render

Alston's advocacy of

CMP

immune

then argue that this objection imposes a double standard on

to external

CMP.

In 3.5,

attempt further to allay concern that Alston's strategy for defending religious belief
renders such practices

that articulated

his account

immune from

external criticism by contrasting

by another defender of the autonomy of distinct DPs,

of the rationality of non-Westem practices of forming

my
viz.,

beliefs.

rationale with

Peter

I

Winch

in

argue that

Alston's metaphysical realism, unlike Winch's anti-realism, underwrites a fallibilism

about religious doxastic practices which, because
possibility that they

may be

it

opens

their participants to the

systematically deceived in believing as they do, invites

external critique. In a final section,

I

provide some indication of the limitations of the

appeal to autonomy as a strategy for defending the rationality of religious belief.

3.1

Comparison Criticism
Alston identifies two ways

in

which the weak

rationality

and psychologically established practice may be overridden,

156

of engaging

viz., either

in

a socially

by massive

internal inconsistency

among

the outputs of a given practice or by massive inconsistency

with the outputs of a more well-established practice. But his attempt to
respond to
various criticisms ot

CMP indicates that there is another potential overrider in the

neighborhood, one which Alston takes

at least as seriously as the other

an exchange between Alston and one of his most persistent
just

what

that overrider

Richard Gale

tests,

help us pinpoint

is.

lists in

belief must pass if an agent

those

critics will

two. Analysis of

some
is

to

detail the various tests

which a given sense-perceptual
5

be ultima facie justified in adhering to

or lack analogous tests, and thus lack cognitive status.

(I

it .

M-beliefs

fail

discussed this

objection in the previous chapter.) Alston responds as expected: the nature of God, God’s

transcendence and sovereignty, inhibits us from identifying circumstances in which
will be perceived

by competent agents; according

bad because, were

news.

It is

test all

of our beliefs

God)

is

because

in the

way we

not so suited; hence

we

constraints

reality suited to

we

test

M-beliefs as

understand that our inability so to

test

imposed on us by the object about which we form

5
.

6
.

On

fail to

denude

CMP of positive epistemic

the Nature and Existence of God,

Actually,

SP

isn’t

p.

is

we would be

able to

reality (in this case,

like.

It is

good news

a consequence of the

beliefs.

Because we may

CMP's impoverished

checking

status.

302.

we might like it. Don’t most of us wish
which we have of the laws of logic?

as ideal as

physical world like that

6

we would

our beliefs

yet be forming our beliefs about that object reliably,

procedures

tastes,

test sense-perceptual beliefs ;

cannot

good news and bad

to Alston, this is

our epistemic

God

157

to

have insight into the

Gale has
saying,

'I've

little

got good

patience with this maneuver. Alston's response

news and bad news;

the bad

untreatable cancer within six months and the

you have cancer ."’ 7 He even coins a new
committing the fallacy of thinking

news

is

good news

that

is

you

that

will die

we know

fallacy, the "Alston fallacy:"

that if he

is like

of an

why

the reason

"we

find Alston

can give a categorially based explanation for

a disanalogy between the religious and sense-experience doxastic practices,

analogy harmless ." 8 Again, “explaining

why M-experiences

nothing toward helping them to satisfy

.” 9

it

"the doctor

On

it

renders the

flunk a requirement does

the contrary. Gale argues, because

SP and

CMP are disanalogous in crucial respects, viz., the checking procedures constitutive of
show

their overrider system, Alston's attempt to

fails

that

CMP

is

epistemically respectable

10
.

What
claim that

is

the nature of the dispute between Gale and Alston? Both concur in the

CMP differs from SP in important ways; that CMP lacks something,
which SP enjoys. Both agree

intersubjective tests for M-beliefs,

that,

were

CMP

constructed to our epistemic tastes, M-beliefs would be amenable of intersubjective

checking. But neither claims that

inconsistencies

among

tests generates beliefs

1
.

8
.

9

.

M-beliefs.

which

And

lacking those tests itself generates massive

neither claims that

the Nature and Existence of God,

p.

319.

On

the Nature and Existence of God,

p.

322.

Alston’s Mystical Doxastic Practice

Note again

argument

that Alston's

doxastic practice approach

I

CMP’s

are massively inconsistent with

On

“Why

.

10

CMP’s

is

is

Subjective,”

p.

lacking intersubjective

more well-established

875.

not an argument from analogy; his argument hinges on the

articulated in the first chapter. Hence,

showing

that

SP and

CMP are

disanalogous in various respects does not entail anything about the epistemic standing of either.
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CMP

practices, e.g., SP. Rather, the

problem

and

epistemic standing. Gale claims that any respectable

that counts against

CMP’s

is

that

perceptual practice has that feature so that, because
respectable doxastic practice. Alston admits that

it it

had

status.

that feature, but that

it

does not require

Having an SP-type overrider system

doxastic practices. Gale

criticism ; the dispute

is

s

objection

is

is

it

lacks

it,

prize very

CMP

in order to

is

much,

not a

enjoy positive epistemic

desirable but not required of respectable

an example of what

I

shall call

is

comparison

- SP - which we

over whether or not a feature of one practice

ought also be required of another

therefore epistemically desirable,

- CMP.

structure of comparison criticism

confident of Beta's trustworthiness, that

true to false beliefs.

CMP

we

CMP would be better off epistemically

believe puts us in effective contact with reality, and

The

lacks a feature

it

is

as follows.

Suppose

that

we

are

gives rise to a sufficiently high proportion of

We have identified various epistemic excellences which Beta

possesses and are justly confident that

its

possession of those excellences accounts for

Beta's providing us with access to reality. Alpha, however, lacks one of those

excellences, E, or any functionally equivalent excellence for E. If both Alpha and Beta

ought to have some such excellence,

Alpha enjoys
property,

short,

is

we

infer (ceteris paribus) that the epistemic status

lower than that enjoyed by Beta; and

we may conclude

that

if

E

is

a particularly important

Alpha enjoys no positive epistemic

by comparing what we know about the kinds of activities

the truth with

what we know about the way

in

which
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status whatsoever.

that put

practitioners of

one

in

In

touch with

Alpha form

beliefs,

we

attempt to determine whether or not forming beliefs in the Alpha-type

way

is

a good

thing from the epistemic point of view.

Comparison
the

Reformed

criticism

strategy (or

is

some

an important species of argumentation," particularly
relevantly similar strategy)

if

ultimately defensible.

is

Why? Comparison

criticism enables us to engage in critical reflection in a principled

manner even given

the limitations imposed on us by our inability to attain a God's-eye

view of our epistemic

situation.

One who

Reformed epistemologists have been
one doxastic practice can be shown
practices,

that

levels such a critique

urging, viz., that there

is

is

admit what

free to

no reason

to believe that

on evidence from some

to be reliable

select set

of

and what many proponents of 'naturalistic epistemology' have been urging,

none of us has any idea of the features of a practice

that facilitate reliable belief

formation other than by engaging in actual ways of forming beliefs.

of forming beliefs to which
to acquire

we

By engaging

cannot but impute a presumptive innocence,

some understanding of how we can come

viz.,

we

into contact with reality.

in

ways

are able

We may

subsequently employ that understanding to criticize other ways of forming beliefs.

".

Thus,

it

seems

science’ hinge on
beliefs

to

me

that the

most

some supposed

interesting of the

supposed conflicts between ‘religion and
way in which scientists form their

difference between the

and the way religious believers form

their beliefs; the conflicts that get the

most

press,

like the creation-evolution debate, hinge on a putative incompatibility between religious
doctrines and the ‘assured results of modern science,' but are of comparative unimportance

because the religious tradition party to the incompatibility can revise their theological truthclaims. It is only when that kind of revision seems impossible that the conflict between science

and religion can seem intractable. And the putative
contrasted to the malleability of
religious belief which

is

more

intractability

serious,

doctrines and theories that receive so

I

of religious

belief,

when

grounds for a comparison criticism of
believe, than the various conflicts between particular

scientific truth claims,

much

attention.

On

Faith and Criticism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).

160

is

that putative contrast, see Basil Mitchell,

.

Unfortunately, comparison criticism harbors potential for the uncritical
rejection

of legitimate practices of forming

show of an excellence E

to

lacks

E ought

to

beliefs.

internal to

crucial

one practice

may

have E. Although E

The

would be a

for

to Alston,

To

may be

superfluous or even

reject the latter practice

we do

we

or headache;

system than

certainly won't die if we do. Granted that

CMP in fact has, why should we regard CMP

standing because

it

it

lacks

E

their

differ

on

their diagnosis

diagnoses? Alston argues that

which thereby enjoys

its

"sovereign sphere of cognition.

those criteria

is

why

should

we

that

we

is

we assume

epistemically

don’t

want a cold

prefer a better overrider

as altogether lacking epistemic

doesn’t?

So Alston and Gale

own,

of CMP.

How

do we adjudicate

CMP is an autonomous practice of forming

distinct criteria for validating beliefs;

Let’s call this Alston’s

Autonomy

CMP

Thesis.

is

a

Among

not the requirement that M-beliefs be intersubjectively evaluated. The

obvious question

is,

then,

how do we

determine whether or not a given feature should be

regarded as de jure for a given (autonomous) practice?

.

because

sense-perceptual beliefs

cancerous rather than merely a cold or mild headache? Granted

I2

in fact

be crucial to one practice’s capacity to put an

Gale commits just such a travesty:

that our inability to evaluate M-beliefs as

beliefs

which

is

travesty.

According

between

any such criticism

that another practice

agent in touch with reality, the very same excellence
counterproductive for a different practice.

problem

Perceiving God,

p.

221
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3.2

The Ontological

Principle

A resolution of the dispute between Alston and Gale depends on answering the
question,

“how do we determine whether

(autonomous) practice?
or not

1
'

or not a given feature

Faced with a comparison

some excellence E enjoyed by one

touch with

reality, is

criticism,

is

de jure for a given

we must

determine whether

which we believe puts us

practice,

in effective

reasonably to be expected of another practices. Alston's answer

is

straightforward: the nature, "kind," etc. of that about which an agent forms beliefs

imposes limitations on the way

He

adopts what

I

call the

13
.

Alston

14

which an agent

Ontological Principle,

determine the way in which
claim that the "nature ,"

in

we form

reliably

viz., that the

beliefs about

"kind of reality ,"

15

can form beliefs about object.

13

it .

nature of an object ought to

His texts are replete with the

"realm of reality ,"

16

"subject matter

" 17

about

distinctive, but not unique, in according the Ontological Principle systematic

is

Thomas Torrance writes, "it is always the nature of things that must prescribe for us
mode of rationality that we must adopt toward them, and prescribe also the form of

significance.

the specific

verification apposite to them, and therefore

it

is

convictions as to the distinctive nature of what

a

major part of scientific activity to reach clear

we

are seeking to

know

in

order that

we may

demanded of us." Theological Science,
develop and
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. viii. See pp. 168-69; God and Rationality, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 33; Christian Theology and Scientific Culture, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 67f.; The Ground and Grammar of Theology,
(Charlottesville, VA.: University of Virginia Press, 1980), pp. 8f.; Reality and Scientific
Theology, (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1985), pp. 1-3; Transformation and
operate with the distinctive categories

Convergence

in the

Frame of Knowledge,

(Belfast: Christian Journals Limited, 1984), pp. 42,

73-6, 265, 293; Theology in Reconstruction, (Grand Rapids, Ml.: Eerdmans Publishing Co.,
1965),
14

p. 15.

.

Perceiving God,

p.

254.

.

Perceiving God,

p.

249.

.

Perceiving God,

p.

229.

.

Perceiving God,

p.

242.

15

16

17

162

which those who engage

in

CMP form beliefs circumscribes the ways in which members

can
reliably

form and check

beliefs about

God. Canonically

put, the Ontological Principle is

the claim that,

(OP): the characteristics of an object ought to constrain the norms an agent
employs to evaluate the beliefs she forms about that object.
Several notes by

formulated,

to beliefs

happy

is

way of exposition.

completely general.

It

First, the

Ontological Principle, as

applies to beliefs about objects of any sort, not just

formed about God. So, although religious apologists may, and do, employ

effect, those

ways of forming

the Ontological Principle

science and of mind more

do the same.

would render disputes

(I

believe that an fuller appreciation of

central to the philosophy of social

fruitful.)

‘object,’

I

do not just mean an independently existing, discrete

of the sort paradigmatically exemplified by the typical
are 'objects' about

which agents form

and yet

mean

the ‘subject matter’ about

prosaically, ‘whatever

it is’

Mental

beliefs about them.

which an agent forms

about which an agent forms

entity,

states

none of which

their distinctive ontological

imposes constraints on the way a rational agent forms

I

chair, banana, etc.

beliefs, as are social institutions,

exist independently of human cognizers,

then,

to

concerned with the epistemic imperialism visited upon non-religious

beliefs are free to

Second, by

it

beliefs, or

makeup

By

object,

even more

beliefs.

Third, ‘characteristics’ should be understood broadly, to include not just the

ontological

makeup of an

object of belief, the stuff of which
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it

is

composed, but also the

form

that stuff takes.

18

Birds and plants

may

be composed of the same

that stuff is organized very differently in plants than in animals, the

rational agent

forms and evaluates beliefs about them

particularly important

when we concern

way

in

which a

differs significantly. This

ourselves with the

because

stuff, but,

way we ought

to

becomes

form

beliefs

about God. The characteristics of God which impose constraints on us are not just,

though they certainly include, God's incorporeal nature and God's transcendence; they
also include the

That

to us.

is,

ways

in

which God has decided

to

communicate information unknowable

they include the intentions and purposes God, as a free agent, pursues.

Fourth, the characteristics of an object constrain the norms an agent ought to

employ

to evaluate her beliefs, but they

Only some of the norms which

do not determine exactly what those norms

are improperly

employed

are.

to evaluate the epistemic status

of a given type of belief are rendered improper by the object's nature and characteristics.

Some

are improper because, for example, an agent does not have access to the doxastic

practices

(In the

which

are a condition of forming beliefs in the

terminology developed

limitations

on the epistemic norms

Fifth, to affirm

certain sort

later,

is

way

required by a given norm.

both practice- and object-imposed constraints place

it

of a norm that

is

it

reasonable to impose on cognitive agents.)

is

improperly employed to evaluate beliefs of a

not to claim that beliefs of that sort are subject to entirely different norms

than those proper to other practices.

It is

to claim that there are

some

legitimate

Torrance and Alston both claim that an object's nature does the constraining. But unless
God
God's intentions, and more specifically, God's chosen mode of communication, are part of
that
nature
nature, then both Alston and Torrance assume that it is more than just God's
18

.

form beliefs about God. More accurate, though less stylish, is
use 'nature,' I intend to be understood as meaning characteristic.

constrains the

way we ought

characteristic.

Whenever

I

to
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s

differences between one practice and others, not that the former

from the

latter.

absolutely different

All practices, for example, are no doubt subject to the laws of
logic;

every practice which gives
reliable

is

and thus

is

rise to

massive amounts of self-contradictory beliefs cannot be

epistemically out of bounds.

Amongst

the

norms

internal to the

overrider systems of distinct doxastic practices, then, there will be similarity and
difference, unity and plurality. (As

Law

I

will argue in chapter four, formal norms, like the

of Non-Contradiction, are universally applicable, that

is,

de jure for any doxastic

practice whatever, but substantive norms, like the claim that beliefs should admit of

public evaluation, are appropriately imposed on

I

some

practices but not

on

others.)

believe that an adequate defense of the Ontological Principle provides us with

what we need

for an adequate defense of the

distinguishing between genuine and spurious

Autonomy
autonomy

an adequate rationale for the Ontological Principle,

we

Thesis, as well as criteria for

claims. That

will

have

in

is, if

we can

provide

hand as well an

adequate rationale for the Autonomy Thesis and thus the means necessary to resolving
disputes like that between Gale and Alston. Alston fails to provide that rationale; he

relies heavily

on

justification.

I

its

intuitive appeal, without attempting to provide

will attempt to

do so now.
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any discursive

3.2.1

Examples of the Ontological Principle
Before articulating a rationale for OP,

render plausible the claim that

some such

successfully identified what that

Suppose

that

don't believe me.

location at which

signs of

its

principle

is

my

belief if

I

hope

will

have

I

I

retrace

my

I

tell

steps until

you about

we

it,

but you

return to the

claim to have seen the Flytrap. If we cannot find the plant, witness no

removal, and are not delusional or otherwise incapacitated,

species of bird, you don't believe that

I

If,

however,

I

my

claim to have

claim to have seen a rare

have, you insist on returning to the location at

claim to have seen the bird, you direct your attention to the very branch on which

I

when

the bird

was

grounds

that the bird is not

resting

I

saw

refuse to grant that

it,

where

Plants are stationary; birds move.

I

said

You

it

my

about the

latter in

ways

it

would be

belief is true, and cite as

was, you are simply being unreasonable.

insist

on employing procedures

bird-beliefs that are proper to plant-beliefs and the like.

first

examples

true (whether or not

Flytrap in the forest and

seen the plant will have been compromised.

which

will present several

is).

saw a Venus

can verify

I

I

I

I

We reasonably

irrational to investigate the

Why?

to substantiate

investigate claims

former just because the

kind of object interacts with our cognitive faculties in a different

way

than does the

second.

Consider another example.

is

a planet orbiting Alpha Centauri,

incorporeal nature,

orbiting

God can

Alpha Centauri can.

If there is a

it

is

not reflect

If

God, God

is

not a physical object. If there

a physical object. In virtue of God's essentially

light.

we want

to

In virtue

of its corporeal nature, the planet

determine whether or not there
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is

a planet

orbiting

if

Alpha Centauri, we

the telescope

powerful enough, the astronomer skilled enough, and there actually

is

planet there, she will detect

planetless.

hire an astronomer with an unbelievably powerful
telescope;

But no matter

If she doesn't,

it.

how

we

conclude that Alpha Centauri

powerful the telescope, no matter

astronomer scours the heavens, she cannot expect

to detect

how

is

a

is

assiduously the

God amongst

the celestial

beings she perceives. If she does not detect God, and thus concludes on that basis that the
universe

is

godless, she

Of course,

is irrational.

not every example

is

as clear cut as are those mentioned in the previous

paragraphs. For another example, and a more controversial one, consider the

longstanding debate between those
different than

constraints

free

human

knowledge of an
hand on

that

we form

actions are events of a sort

movements.

I

I

from which we are

can determine without having any

agent's intentions or beliefs whether or not water

to her child's head;

is

poured from her

cannot determine without access to her beliefs and

is

baptizing her baby. Because an agent's beliefs determine

which action she performs, those who form

must have access

human

beliefs about actions, constraints

beliefs about bodily

intentions whether or not she

in part

believe that

behaviors and that the properties making for that difference impose

on the way

when forming

who

to the latter's beliefs.

beliefs about another agent's actions

The observer needs

to find

some way

to

determine what the actor’s beliefs are and that cannot be accomplished merely by
observing the relevant agent's physical movements. Thus,
beliefs about an agent's actions,

what

that agent does,

we need

in order reliably to

to interpret (understand,

empathize with,

where interpretation (understanding, empathizing,

167

form

etc.) is a

etc.)

very

different kind

of cognitive activity than that

in

which we must engage

in order reliably to

form beliefs about an agent's physical movements. Once again, because of a
relevant
difference between

two objects of belief (in

two

this case,

events), the epistemic

desiderata proper to beliefs formed about one object properly differ from those formed

about the other.

It

seems

to

me

social science, theory of interpretation, etc.

far as

I

can

tell

—

lemmings.

to Taylor,

Human

human

19
.

-

without explicitly articulating, so

way

in

which we form

beliefs about

human

action.

beings are very different kinds of entities than are, say,

beings are self-interpreting animals, because our beliefs about

ourselves determine in part

identity

employs

writings on the philosophy of

the Ontological Principle in defending the legitimacy of a

non-scientistic approach to the

According

many

that Charles Taylor, in his

Lemmings

who we

are

and what

we

are; that

is,

they determine our self-

lack beliefs, and hence Lemming-characteristics depend on

Lemming-beliefs. This difference has great importance, according to Taylor, for the kind
of checks and constraints

we employ

we employ

to evaluate theories about

to evaluate theories about

lemmings

20
.

human

agents and those

Because human beings are

competent human being not only has some understanding (which may be also more
misunderstanding) of himself, but is partly constituted by this understanding. ...Our selfunderstanding essentially incorporates our seeing ourselves against a background of what I have
19

.

of

"A

fully

less

a set of "distinctions between things which are recognized as
of categoric or unconditioned or higher importance or worth, and things which lack this or are or
called 'strong evaluation,"’ that

is,

Human Agency

and Language, (Cambridge:
Taylor explains what he means by strong evaluation

lesser value." Charles Taylor, "Introduction," in

Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 19.
especially pp.
in Sources of the Self, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 3-52,
in "Selfpersonhood
human
of
nature
self-constitutive
the
19f. and 30f.; and what he means by
4576.
Interpreting Animals," in Human Agency and Language, pp.
20
.

Naturalistic science, according to Taylor, aspires to explain
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human

action

absolutely,

that

self-interpreting animals, the theories that a scientist forms
about a

human being can

change the way a human being thinks of herself, thus altering the object
of study
that the scientist

doesn

t

lemming when she

alter the

studies

it.

kind of exact prediction proper to theories in the hard sciences
beliefs in the social sciences.-

about persons because

it

1

Hence,

it

As
is

would be unreasonable

in a

way

a consequence, the

not properly expected of

formed

to reject a theory

does not admit of disconfirmation through failed prediction.

Rather, disconfirmation of social scientific theories ought to be evaluated in light of
criteria internal to

that they

theories

is,

hermeneutics. 22

To

require of theories about self-interpreting animals

be subject to the kinds of checks properly imposed on the natural

would be

imperialistic.

23

without taking into account properties which exist only

(e.g.,

in

secondary qualities, self-conceptions). Continuing the

previous footnote, Taylor writes, "A being

understood absolutely; and one

scientific

who

who

the experience of human beings
train

of thought quoted

in the

exists only in self-interpretation cannot be

can only be understood against the background of

distinctions of worth [strong evaluations] cannot be captured

by a

scientific

language which

Our personhood cannot be treated scientifically in exactly the
same way we approach our organic being. What it is to possess a liver or heart is something

essentially aspires to neutrality.

1

can define quite independently of the space of questions
it is

21
.

to

have a self or be a person." "Introduction," pp.

See "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man,"

in

in

which

I

exist for myself, but not

3-4.

Philosophy and the

Human

Sciences,

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 55f; and "Social Theory as Practice,"
Philosophy and the Human Sciences, pp. 91-101.
22
.

23
.

"Social Theory as Practice,"

To multiply examples

p.

further

Ill; "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man,"

would be

what

in

p. 53.

tedious, but not impossible. John Searle,

it

seems

to

me, uses the Ontological Principle to defend his account of the nature of the human mind. "In
spite of our modern arrogance about how much we know, in spite of the assurance and
universality of our science,

where the mind

is

concerned

we

are characteristically confused and

in disagreement. We let our research methods dictate the subject matter, rather than the
converse. Like the drunk who loses his car keys in the dark bushes but looks for them under the

streetlight, 'because the light is better there,'

computational models
works."

we

try to find out

rather than trying to figure out

how

how humans might resemble out
human mind actually

the conscious

The Rediscovery of the Mind, (Cambridge, MA: MIT

"the epistemology of studying the mental

no more determines
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its

Press, 1992), p. 247.

Again,

ontology than does the

3.2.2 Practice

and Object Imposed Constraints

Each of the preceding scenarios exemplifies the Ontological

Principle in action.

Epistemic desiderata proper to one doxastic practice are rejected as imperialistic
impositions on another, and

at the heart

of the rationale for such rejection

of epistemically relevant differences between the objects of belief.

is

a recognition

Illustrations are

helpful, but are there principled considerations supporting the Ontological Principle?

I

think that there are.

If

viz., to

we

are to

form our

beliefs in such a

as to achieve our central epistemic aim,

achieve a high a ratio of true to false beliefs,

the objects of our belief.

The

information about that object

failure to discharge

we

way

beliefs

if

we form

we must

acquire information about

about an object must be generated from

our believing truly

our central epistemic aim.

We

is

not to be a lucky accident and thus a

engage

in various practices

by which

gather information and thereby form beliefs: sense-perception, testimony,

introspection,

memory.

Constructed as she

is,

the typical

human being

is

capable of

acquiring information about objects in her vicinity via the stimulation of her visual

receptors by light generated or reflected by those objects, of her auditory receptors by

sound waves reflected by those
emitted by those objects,

etc.

objects, of her olfactory receptors

Our

five senses are not

by odoriferous

our only sources of information.

We acquire information about our feelings, beliefs, desires, and the
stimulation but by introspecting.

And

although

particles

memory and

like not

by sensory

testimony are parasitic on

epistemology of any other discipline determine its ontology. On the contrary, in the study of the
mind as elsewhere, the whole point of the epistemology is to get at the pre-existing ontology."
Ibid., p. 23.

The

parallel with the religious question

170

is

obvious.

other belief-forming practices for their inputs, and thus are not
basic sources of beliefs,

they are basic sources of epistemic justification. 24 That

is,

memory and

testimony are

sources of information inaccessible to an agent unless she engages in those
practices.

To be

sure, if there are

unattainable by those

reliably to

form

some

endowed with

objects discoverable by a sixth sense forever

a constitution like ours, then

beliefs about those objects. If

by the empathetic powers enjoyed by (so
then agents (like us)

who

some kinds of emotion

far as

we know)

means

at

impossible for us

are detectable only

science fictional characters,

lack those powers are unable to acquire trustworthy information

about those kinds of emotion. Although by rank speculation
truth or two, the

it is

we may happen upon some

our disposal are not conducive to our discharging our central

epistemic obligation with respect to those emotions.

That
constraints

we

are capable of engaging in certain practices but not others, then, imposes

on the way

engage only

in

which we from

in certain practices

kinds of things.

in

As

finite

epistemic agents,

we

can

and thus may reliably form beliefs about only certain

A bit of terminological

practice-imposed constraint.

beliefs.

legerdemain:

I

shall call

any such constraint a

A practice-imposed constraint is any limitation on the way

which an agent can acquire information

to

which she

is

subject in virtue of the

belief-forming practices available (or unavailable) to her.

There are various sources of practice-imposed constraints. The most important
source

is

an agent's constitution. Those outfitted with a well-functioning visual apparatus

Robert Audi, Belief, Justification and Knowledge, (Belmont, CA.: Wadsworth Publishing
Co., 1983), p. 38; Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, pp. 87f.
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but not the

means

Human

beliefs.

to

form beliefs via sonar cannot form

beliefs in the

that bats

form

beings form beliefs about other people's beliefs principally by
relying on

testimony; those with the capacity to read minds are not so limited.
constitution

way

may be

An

both extended and altered.

agent

Of course,

may employ

an agent's

her visual

apparatus to form beliefs about subatomic particles by employing an electron microscope,
a possibility foreclosed to those without the requisite technology.

fruits

of such technological sophistication have open

the less fortunate.

And

constitution to altering

to equip

human

it is

it.

them

possibilities inaccessible to

but a short step from extending an agent's physical

Perhaps future

scientists, via genetic engineering, will

be able

beings with the ability to generate beliefs via sonar in addition to their

normal visual capacities.

Those

altered

human

beings would then be subject to different

practice-imposed constraints than those to which

is

to

Those who enjoy the

we

are subject.

simply that every cognitive agent (save perhaps God)

constraints but that

we ought

is

The moral of the

story

subject to practice-imposed

not be too confident about what those limitations are.

:

~

For certain of our core doxastic practices, the transmission of the information

from

that about

which we form

beliefs to our capacities requires that

we be

causally

related to those objects. In order to acquire the information required to form our beliefs

Thus, William James writes, “One conclusion was forced upon my mind at that time, and my
impression of its truth has ever remained unshaken. It is that our normal waking consciousness,
rational consciousness as we call it, is bit one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it,

25

.

parted from
different.

it

by the filmiest of screens, there

We may go through

stimulus, and at

life

lie

potential forms of consciousness entirely

without suspecting their existence; but apply the requisite
in all their completeness, definite types of mentality which

a touch they are there

probably somewhere have their

field

of application.

No

account of the universe

in its totality

be final which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite disregarded. How
the question....” The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 298; see also pp. 327-28.

can

to regard them
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is

we must

reliably,

beliefs .-

6

example

Our
is

perceived

some

sort

with that about which

intuitions about particular doxastic practices bears this out.

sense-perception, that an agent

is

who forms

enter into causal relations of

is

The

accurately represent

O

O

does not succeed

clearest

causally related to the object putatively

a necessary condition of any genuine perception of that object.

a true belief about an object

we form

An

agent

on the basis of sensory impressions which

in perceiving

O, and thus

in reliably

forming a

perceptual belief about O, if O does not play a suitable causal role in the generation of her

Thus, suppose that

belief.

I

am

seated in front of a large black-bellied stove, that

I

am

having a visual experience as of such a stove, an experience generated by the stimulation

of my visual receptors by

light reflected

that there is in fact a large stove in front

transpiring of those events,

I

to believe that anything fishy

from

my

to

and the stove, so

me,

slips

that

my

I

thereby form the belief

belief reliably; so long as

going on, and so long as nothing fishy

can hardly be anything but justified in forming beliefs as

unbeknownst

that

of me. So long as nothing bizarre occurs

no doubt form

is

and

that stove,

an incredibly

lifelike painting

I

do. But if

I

in the

have no reason

in fact occurs,

I

someone,

of the stove in between myself

visual perception of the painting gives rise to a visual

26

The locution “causal relations of some sort” is intentionally vague; I claim only that reliable
belief-formation requires causal connection between knower and known without committing
myself to any particular analysis of causation, nor to an account of the different kinds of causation
.

apposite to different kinds of belief-formation.

I

have no idea what difference there

is

between the

kind of causal connection properly obtaining between an event that occurs in the past and an agent
who recalls that event, and the kind of causal relation properly obtaining between a crater in the

moon and

an agent

who

sees that crater.

I

suppose that identifying those differences falls to
My point is simply that an agent

physiologists, psychologists and to other types of scientist.

causally connected to a given object
object

in

in

no way, shape, or form cannot form beliefs about

a reliable, responsible manner.
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that

who

is

experience phenomenologically indistinguishable from the visual
experience

have had when actually perceiving the stove, then
the stove and certainly not forming

my

I

can hardly be said

beliefs reliably.

The break

originating with the stove and terminating in the stimulation of

my

precludes

and thus

saw him stoke

and

the stove.

that alter continues to believe the

Once

my

chain

sensory faculties

and justifiably.

is

that she

fire in the

potbellied stove,

same because she remembers

that

ego stoked

again, barring bizarre circumstances, alter no doubt forms her beliefs

If,

seems

alter recalls vividly that

however,

alter's

memory of the

to recall vividly

ego

that event reliably.

The

many

in fact stoked the stove, but

requisite causal connection

Or suppose

of the
that

if

does so as a consequence of her

in fact

formed her beliefs about

between past events and present

what would normally have been a

truth.

ego stoked the stove and mentioned

related the story to alter,

who

that fact to several other folks

thereby formed the belief that ego stoked the

long as the transmission chain linking alter to ego wends

competent authorities,

consequence of

events which never in fact occurred, and

recollection has been severed, rendering unreliable

reliable indication

event was wiped out as a

in a car accident, a further

abnormal neurophysiological condition, then she has not

who

in the causal

the stove, that as a consequence alter believed that he stoked the

consequence of severe brain damage suffered

which

be perceiving

reliable belief formation.

that alter

reliably

would

having the kind ot purchase on an object requisite for information gathering

Similarly with other DPs. Suppose that ego stoked the

stove,

to

I

alter's belief

most

its

way through

likely enjoys justification.
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lire.

So

the requisite

Suppose, however.

that during the transmission ot testimonial authority, an English
speaker fully in mastery

of her native language,

French speaker that "Ego stoked the stove."

utters to a

If the latter

lacks the capacity to understand any language other than her own, she cannot
testify
authoritatively to the claim that ego stoked the stove.

enjoys the

way "Ego stoked

Suppose

French speaker

that the

the stove" sounds, and persists in repeating

it

whenever she

is

addressed by English speakers. If alter happens to see her, and believes that she knows

something about the event

in question,

and thus asks her

if

Ego stoked

the stove (in

English), and if our French speaker responds by uttering the sounds "Ego stoked the
stove," the belief that alter forms thereby does not count as epistemically justified.

Although there

is

a connection of

believing that ego stoked the

sort

fire,

some

sort

between ego's stoking the

the connection

is

fire

and

not of the appropriate sort;

alter's

it

is

not the

of causal connection between the object of belief and the believer which undergirds

our testimonial DP. (Again,
So, then, if an agent

I

is

have no positive account of what
to

form

beliefs reliably, she

that connection

27

is.

)

must be capable of acquiring

information about the object of her beliefs. The ways she has of requiring information are

constrained by the

DPs

available to her. In order for the

DPs

available to her to enable

her to acquire information, she must be causally related in an appropriate

object of her belief.

No

way

to the

causal relation results in no information, and thus arbitrary belief.

should note, however, that the causal chain can't include the requirement that every link in
the testimonial chain needs to understand the utterance by which she conveys the relevant
information, as my example might seem to imply. After all, two agents, secret agents may by
she
previous agreement communicate via a medium who fails to understand the coded messages
27

.

I

,

utters at the appointed

meeting times,

at the

agreed upon cue,
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etc.

It

ways

the

in

which we can

causal underpinnings internal to the

reliably

DPs

form beliefs are constrained by the kinds of

available to us, they are further constrained by

the kinds of causal relationships into which different
objects of belief can enter. Given
that

human beings have

the capacity visually to perceive physical objects, the

characteristics ot different physical objects constrain the

reliably

in

form beliefs about those objects. Birds move around a

In virtue of that difference, beliefs

than those about plants.

It isn't

about both birds and plants
the

ways

same

set

if

which human beings can

lot;

plants are stationary.

formed about birds must be checked very

possible for an actual

human being

differently

reliably to

form beliefs

she insists on checking both kinds of beliefs by employing

of procedures. Reliable belief formation

is

constrained by the characteristics

of the object of belief.
Consider another example. Suppose that there exists a very strange

Holy

which has the property

Grail,

afflicted with

belief about

that

permanent amnesia about

it.

In virtue

of its having

any cognitive agent

its

reliable

memory

no-one can

beliefs.

that property, the Grail

testify.

No

which we have amnesia

And any

object

perceives that object

is

existence and location upon forming any

into those causal relations partly constitutive of both our

Clearly, any objects about

who

artifact, the

would be unable

mnemonic and

are those about

doubt the Grail remains 'undiscovered' because
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testimonial DPs.

which we can form no

which no-one can remember

property.

to enter

is

it

one

to

which

has some such

Detenders of CMP,
cannot reflect

God

like Alston, will

emit odors,

light,

resist the

be quick to point out that God,

if

God

exists,

touch of a hand, reflect sound waves; hence

cannot be tasted, seen, smelled, heard or touched.

Some more
limitation

terminological legerdemain.

on the way

in

An object-imposed constraint

which cognitive agents of a

certain sort can reliably

a

is

form

beliefs

about a certain kind of object, a limitation which obtains because of the kind of causal
interactions into

which

that object's characteristics enable (or

do not enable)

that object to

enter.

What

Agent-imposed constraints
form

beliefs.

further.

set

broad limitations on

Object-imposed constraints

What we can

reliably

kind of cognitive faculties
objects about which

An

between agent and object-imposed constraints?

are the relations

we

we form

form

does not

demarcated

in the first place

by the

beliefs.

in the first place.

reflect light

is

access to information even

enjoy and in the second place by the characteristics of

is

constraints render an agent incapable of

God

about which an agent can reliably

restrict reliable

beliefs about

object-imposed constraint

given kind of object

that

of no epistemic relevance

coming

if

agent-imposed

into effective cognitive contact with a

For a society of congenitally blind people, that

might be an interesting consequence of the divine nature but

not one which affects the epistemic standing of their beliefs about God. Because they
lack functioning visual apparatuses, and thus cannot perceive objects via the reflection of

light, that

about

an object cannot reflect light affects the epistemic standing of their beliefs

God

not a whit.

It

would be

as relevant to the epistemic standing of their beliefs
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about

God

as the properties of emotions

another agent

Why

s

which enable empaths

emotional state are to ordinary

is it

human

(if

any there are) to detect

beings, viz., not at

all.

important to get straight this relation between agent- and object-imposed

constraints? Because

it

indicates that object-imposed constraints are not epistemically

relevant tout court, but only for agents with a certain set of cognitive abilities.
Claims

about the epistemic relevance of object-imposed constraints must always be indexed to

God

particular kinds of agents.

mind

God

in

much

the

could have created us with intuitive access to the divine

same way God has provided us with

intuitive access to

had, then the constraints placed on us by our inability to control the

appearing to us would be moot. But because
in fact constrained to

form

beliefs in the

God

our own.

manner of God's

did not so hardwire us, because

way Alston

lays out,

subject to such and such agent-imposed constraints, and only then because

beliefs about a given subject matter,

we

we

are

God’s transcendence and

sovereignty do in fact place constraints on reliable belief-formation. Because

form

If

we

are

we wish

are thereby also subject to such

to

and such

object-imposed constraints.
3.2.3 Rationale for the Ontological Principle

How
truth

is

the discussion of object- and agent-imposed constraints relevant to the

of the Ontological Principle,

viz., the

impose on

claim that the nature of an object constrains

the

norms

for

an agent to form beliefs about an object reliably

rational agents

beliefs about that object?

(e.g.,

So long as

it

is

agent-imposed constraints do

not render that object inaccessible), then any epistemic

norm which

that she enter into causal relations with that object into

which she cannot enter
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possible

requires of an agent

(e.g..

because ot object-imposed constraints) (1) violates the ‘ought implies
can' dictum and

does not enable her to achieve her central epistemic aim, and thus

is

(2)

epistemically

indefensible.

First, to require

of an agent that she forms beliefs about an object

manner whilst evaluating her

actions in light of epistemic

in

a reliable

norms which presuppose

she can enter into causal relations with that object into which she cannot enter
require the impossible. But ought implies can;

it

is irrational to

she perform an action she cannot perform. Hence, any

norm which presupposes of an

Rather, an epistemic

norm

perform actions

possible for her to perform. And, of course, what

it

is

of reliable belief- formation

To

rationally defensible only if

is

is to

require of an agent that

agent that she can enter into causal relations into which she cannot enter

is

that

it

is irrational.

requires of an agent that she

is

possible by

way

determined in part by the nature of the object of belief.

require of an agent that she evaluate bird-beliefs in light of the checking

procedures apposite to the checking of plant-beliefs presupposes that she can enter into
the kind of causal relationship to birds

which

is

a condition of the possibility of reliably

forming beliefs about plants. But because birds move around a

lot,

no actual human

being can relate to birds like she can relate to plants. (Unless, of course, the birds about

which she forms

beliefs are deceased.)

Similarly, to require of beliefs about

they be based upon grounds of the sort on which

planetary objects

God

that

ought to base our beliefs about

to require

of an agent that she enter into causal relations with

literally, in the

nature of the case enter. God, not being a physical

would be

she cannot, quite

we

God

object, cannot reflect light

and thus cannot stimulate our visual apparatus
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in the

manner

appropriate to planets and

Failure to adhere to the Ontological Principle in
these

stars.

cases, e.g., requiring of bird-beliefs that they be checked
as
plant-beliefs,

and requiring ot M-beliefs

that they be

stimulation of our sense-perceptual faculties,

we would

validate

based upon grounds generated by the

to fault agents for failing to

is

do

that

which

they cannot in the nature of the case do.

But doesn't

this play into Gale’s

hands?

If we support the

appeal to the Ontological Principle, and

we

the 'ought implies can' dictum, haven’t

we done just what he

viz.,

of providing an explanation of why

function as

it

should because

it

can't!

I

support the Ontological Principle by appeal to

me

could have but doesn't seems to

do not think

to

accuses Alston of doing,

CMP doesn’t function as
so.

standing of some practice because that practice lacks

it

autonomy of CMP by

it

should

-

An objection to the

some

it

doesn’t

epistemic

epistemically desirable feature

be entirely reasonable; and

it

is

no response

to

such an objection to provide an explanation of why a practice which could have that
feature doesn’t have

it.

If that

was

the nature of Alston’s response. Gale’s critique

be appropriate. But to object to a practice that

some

feature

it

may

cannot possess, to impose on agents

which presuppose they can enter

Any

be reliable because

who engage

in

some

it

lacks

practice

norms

into causal relations they cannot enter, is unreasonable.

Second, recall that our central epistemic aim

false.

in fact

would

is to

believe the true and not the

epistemological censure of a procedure or practice must be justified on the

grounds that adopting that procedure or engaging
reaching our central epistemic aim.

enables those

who engage

in

it

to

We

in that practice inhibits us

from

pass positive judgement on a given practice

form beliefs

reliably,
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iff

and we pass negative judgement

it

on a given practice

iff

inhibits an agent

it

from forming her beliefs

which cannot be so substantiated has no place
It is

norms

unreasonable to require of agents

in light

unjustified,

in epistemic discourse.

who engage

in a

DP

that they adhere to

of which the beliefs so formed cannot but be judged as epistemically

even

if

those beliefs have been highly reliably formed. The norms in light of

which we evaluate our

must be

beliefs

sufficiently sensitive to enable us to detect

- what

those beliefs have been reliably formed or not
justification could

light

we produce

of norms they cannot but

for such a

fail

even

norm? Evaluating

DP

if that

is

when she does

beliefs

formed

the

in the appropriate

manner apposite

in a

DP

reliable is hardly an adequate

is

manner, and thus

to objects

is

Even

if

an agent

is

in

way of

precisely what

not allow 'the characteristics of the object to constrain

cognitive agents form beliefs about that object.'

an object

whether

other epistemologically sound

discriminating between reliably and unreliably formed beliefs! But this
the critic does

A judgement

reliably.

how

forming beliefs about

causally related to the object of belief in

and agents of that kind, the

critic requires

of her that she

adhere to norms which would unavoidably rule reliably formed beliefs out of epistemic

bounds.
Failing to adhere to the Ontological Principle, in short,

to

do what we can

result in our failing

to achieve our central epistemic aim; hence, adhering to the

Ontological Principle

is

a

good thing

to

do from

We made a correlative point when
arguments. That

would

is,

if

‘the epistemic point

of view.'

assessing the value of epistemically circular

epistemically circular arguments were acceptable, every practice

1

would come off as highly

reliable so long as the
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'test

we employed

to evaluate that

was whether

practice

DP.

in that

by looking
ball,

and

I

it

will

I

am

infallible.

this

It

I

into

or not the beliefs formed in a given

form the belief that there are

my

crystal ball,

and then evaluate

no doubt be highly confirmed
not very confused,

And

I

little

green

supported the beliefs formed

men who

that belief

in that belief.

If

will surely conclude that

because any practice, no matter

DP

I

inhabit the planet Pluto

by looking

apply this

my

into

'test'

my

crystal

enough times,

crystal ball is nearly

how disreputable,

can be supported by

kind of argument, epistemically circular arguments are insufficiently discriminating;

they lack standing just because they do not enable us to distinguish between reliable and
unreliable practice and thus to achieve our central epistemic aim.

In short, to rig the

central epistemic

that

it

is

game

so that a practice which does not enable us to achieve our

aim cannot but be judged

impossible for beliefs formed in a

to

be reliable

DP -

even

is

fatuous; to rig the

if reliable

-

game

so

to pass evaluative

muster lacks any epistemic merit. Epistemically circular arguments are objectionable
because they invariably ‘pass’ both reliable and unreliable practices; norms which violate
the Ontological Principle are objectionable because they inevitably

unreliable practices. In both cases, the problem

is

fail

both reliable and

an insufficient sensitivity of a given

criterion to the truth.

How is this relevant to the

status

of the Ontological Principle?

If certain

norms

lack epistemic merit because they require of an agent that she perform the impossible, and

if

what

is

impossible by

way of reliable

belief formation

is

determined

in part

by an

object's characteristics (capacity to fly, incorporeality, essential subjectivity, etc), then the

fact that certain

norms lack epistemic merit

is

a consequence, in part, of an object's
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characteristics.

Principle

But

is true:

that

the

is

way

just a

long-winded way of claiming

a rational agent forms beliefs about

that the Ontological

some

subject matter

is

constrained by the nature of that subject matter.

Let

me sum up

by laying out

in its essentials the

argument

in

support of the

Ontological Principle.

( 1

)

In order reliably to

torm beliefs about a given

object, an agent

must acquire

information about that object.

(2)

In order to acquire information about a given object, an agent

must be causally

connected to that object.
(3)

Hence,

in

order reliably to form beliefs about a given object, an agent must be

causally connected to that object.

(4)

In order for an agent to be causally related to a given object, that object must have
the requisite causal properties and she must have access to the requisite doxastic
practices.

(5)

Hence,

in order for

an agent reliably to form beliefs about a given object, that
about which she forms beliefs must have the requisite causal properties and she

must have access

to the requisite doxastic practices. (Reliable belief-formation

requires causal connection between objects and agents.)

(6)

If reliable belief-formation requires causal connection

between objects and agents,

norm which requires of an agent that she enter into causal
which she cannot enter, whether because of practice or

then any epistemic
relations into

object-imposed constraints,

(7)

epistemically indefensible.

Hence, any epistemic norm which requires of an agent
relations in

(8)

is

which she cannot enter

If the causal relations into

is

that she enter into causal

epistemically indefensible.

which an agent can enter

are determined in part

nature of a putative object of belief, whether or not an epistemic

norm

by the

is

epistemically defensible depends in part upon the nature of that about which an

agent forms beliefs.

(9)

Hence, whether or not an epistemic norm

is

defensible depends in part

nature of that about which an agent forms beliefs.
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upon

the

.

3.2.4 Relation

between the Ontological Principle and the Autonomy Thesis

The Ontological
principle and Alston

s

Principle, then, is true.

Autonomy Thesis? The

What

is

the relation

between

that

Ontological Principle provides criteria for

determining in what respects a given doxastic practice differs legitimately
from other
practices. Violation of the Ontological Principle

practice s autonomy.

It

sufficient for a violation

of a given

the subject matter of a given practice constrains an agent

belief-torming activity in such a

form and evaluate those

is

way

that

beliefs as she

it

is

s

not reasonable to require of her that she

forms and evaluates beliefs

then the evaluative criteria internal to those practices will

differ.

in another practice,

And because

they differ

legitimately, the practices of which they are partly constitutive are autonomous; those

practices enjoy their

Let

set

me

own

distinctive criteria for evaluating belief-formation.

introduce one final term of art.

of norms which are proper

formed

one practice on

some norm

N

is it

beliefs

in those practices are constraint-incompatible

constraint-incompatible

(a)

to

When

unreasonable to impose a given

formed

Two

in

another?

kinds of belief,

When

beliefs

A and B, are

iff

which

is

properly imposed on agents

who form

A-beliefs cannot but

defeat the justification enjoyed by B-beliefs;
(b)

the justification of B-beliefs

would be defeated by

N

even

if

B-beliefs were

reliably formed; and
(c)

the uniform overriding of the justification of B-beliefs could not but occur in
virtue of B-beliefs' possession of

If the

way an

some object-imposed

constraints.

agent should form beliefs about a given subject matter

is

constrained by the

nature of that subject matter, and different doxastic practices are individuated in virtue, in
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of the different subject matters about which members
of the practice form

part,

and

ways
is

it

beliefs

it

in

formed about those subject matters are constraint-incompatible,
then the

which an agent forms and evaluates

beliefs will legitimately differ.

plausible to suppose that the subject matters internal to
introspection,

differ in just the right

way,

legitimately different

ways of forming and evaluating

it

is

reliability,

we began

(2) isolating those features

that

we

SP and

Comparison

this essay.

at the

and (3) determining whether or not other practices which ought

risk

CMP

criticism

core of our

of our core practices which account for their

features have at least their functional equivalents.

is

because

beliefs.

of religious belief proceeds by way of (1) identifying those practices
life,

And

reasonable to suppose that internal to those practices are

Return briefly to the topic with which

cognitive

beliefs,

The danger with

this

to

have those

kind of argument

imposing on one practice the expectations legitimately required only of

other practices; the drawback with comparison criticism

time determining whether or not a feature indicating
unreliability for those

which lack

whether or not a given practice

The Ontological

is

that feature.

That

is

that

we have

reliability for

is, it is

a very difficult

one practice indicates

very difficult to determine

genuinely autonomous in a given respect.

Principle provides us with

some

28

principled guidance for

resolving disputes over that matter. Reliable belief-formation requires causal connection

between knower and known. Because

different kinds

of object enter

into different kinds

of causal relation, the kind of relationship between knower and known required for

28
.

In the

terminology

I

adopt next chapter, because we have access to no substantive epistemic
to any and every doxastic practice, our employment of comparison

norms which are applicable

criticism cannot but be an ad hoc affair.
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reliable belief-formation varies

or not a given epistemic

possible for an agent

norm

from one practice

is

who forms

to another.

We may determine whether

properly imposed on a given practice by asking
(1)

is it

beliefs about an object to enter into a causal relationship

with that object of the sort presupposed by the norm in question?; and
(2) would an agent

who

adhered to that norm be forced to conclude that she was forming beliefs

inappropriately whether or not she

first

was

in fact

case and ‘yes’ in the second, then the

A violation of the Ontological
practice

s

forming her beliefs reliably?

norm

in question lacks epistemic merit.

Principle, then, is sufficient for a violation of a

autonomy. But what about necessity? Can we violate the autonomy of a

practice without violating the Ontological Principle? Yes.

Ontological Principle

I

of many,

Consider the

if

The

rationale for the

have provided presupposes that some causal

between a believer and the object of belief. And
true

If ‘no' in the

I

not most, doxastic practices. But

way we form moral

relation

must obtain

think that this presupposition holds

it is

doubtful that

beliefs, e.g., the belief that

applies to

it

we ought

all.

not inflict pain on

innocent children without powerful reasons for doing so. That conviction does not rely

for

its

veridicality

on any causal

relation

between object and believer

—

the belief

expresses a conviction about what ought to be the case and not about what

case.

obtain

And between what ought

—

to be the case

for the simple reason that, alas,

case and what

is

brief,

Ontological Principle

is

I

of

what ought

to

be the case

think that this indicates that the rationale

little

in fact the

and a believer causal relations need not
in not invariably the

not the case cannot enter into any causal relations at

Though too

is

I

all.

provided for the

use in vindicating the autonomy of moral belief-
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Not

formation.

that

believe that moral doxastic practices cannot be the
object of

I

epistemic imperialism.

As

I

note

that they be evaluated in light

scientific beliefs is

beliefs.

no

at the

end of the next chapter, requiring of moral

of the same epistemic norms

less objectionable than laying

But just because the autonomy of moral practices

violation of the Ontological Principle, and because

distinct doxastic practices like

Principle,

done

3.3

down

regard

I

my

my

we employ

to evaluate

same requirement

the

may

M-

be violated without a

defense of the autonomy of

defense of autonomy as seriously incomplete.

Work remains

to

be

29
.

The Structure of Alston’s Strategy

that there

beliefs

is

no reason

to

to

for Defending

CMP

defending the rationality of religious belief is to argue

deny religious

which we cannot but assume

to

beliefs in

membership

that select category

in that select category are true. Alston’s modification

Reformed Approach

replace beliefs with practices: there

is to

religious practices fall into that select category of practices

to be reliable

and by engaging

whether or not practices not

CMP’s

in

which we form

is

no reason

form moral

has,

I

beliefs in light of

in that select category are reliable.

beliefs.

think, attempted to vindicate the rationality

But that

is

another story for another day.
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to

of the

deny

that

which we cannot but assume
which

Once he

status in that select group, Alston plays ’king of the hill’:

Habermas

of

be true and on the basis of which we determine

whether or not beliefs not

.

for

CMP relies entirely on an appeal to the Ontological

The Reformed approach

29

beliefs

to determine

vindicates

CMP is dislodged from

and the autonomy of the way we

its

place at the top ot the epistemic

hill

only

if

we can show that

Alston self-consciously pursues a strategy form insuring that

it

is

And

unreliable.

CMP will

not be so

dislodged.

Once Alston

lays out the contours of the Christian Mystical Practice, he
argues

that the various criticisms directed at that

imperialistic.

A critic who

DP

either

impose a double standard or are

imposes a double standard on

CMP objects to that practice on

grounds which should also undermine the epistemic standing of a

A critic

regarding as reliable.

whose objection

to

CMP

is

DP

afflicted

the critic persists in

by epistemic

imperialism employs criteria proper to another practice (SP, for example) which are
inappropriate to

CMP.

Alston's strategy

is

to divide

and conquer: arguments against

CMP either impose a double standard, in which case two practices are inappropriately
evaluated in light of different standards of evaluation, or are imperialistic, in which case
the standards of evaluation proper to one practice are inappropriately imposed on

another.

30

In both kinds of objection,

all

the

work

is

done by the term inappropriately.

We can now identify more precisely the grounds on which Alston's accusations of
impropriety

claim that

rest.

My

DP — CMP

afflicted

that this strategy for defending

CMP is parasitic on his

by a double standard impute a specious autonomy

for our purposes.

detriment of

An

argument which employs a double standard

to

a given

to the

CMP is one in which the critic evaluates CMP and another DP in light of

different criteria

.

is

CMP is autonomous.

Arguments

30

claim

even though there are no relevant differences between those practices

Perceiving God,

p.

248f.

188

which would warrant

A critic operating with a

this differential treatment.

CMP

double-standard argues that

lacks justification even though the grounds on which

she makes that judgement, were they employed evenhandedly, would undermine
the

DPs

positive epistemic status of

I

she regards as justified

have articulated or alluded

to several

lacks epistemic justification because

we

we

M-beliefs, even though

arguments which exhibit

that flaw.

cannot non-circularly show that

even though we cannot non-circularly show
justification because

31
.

that

SP

is reliable.

CMP

it

CMP

is reliable,

lacks epistemic

use M-beliefs to evaluate the prima facie justification of

we do

the

same with SP and

introspection.

CMP is unreliable

because mystical experience reinforces an agent’s conceptual scheme, just as SP does.

CMP

is

unreliable because

it

yields inconsistent beliefs, just like

SP and

introspection.

CMP is not a reliable perceptual practice because we have no idea which causal
mechanisms underlie perception of God, even though we would

we

to lack

an account of the mechanisms by which

M-beliefs cannot be formed reliably because
explanation of those beliefs, as

critic

would

introspective,

distinct

also

memory,

Arguments

.

we can

SP were

sense-perceptual beliefs.

provide an adequate causal

can with sense-perceptual

beliefs.

In each case, the

attempts to undermine the epistemic status of CMP by arguments which, applied

consistently,

3I

we

we form

refuse to junk

DPs -

undermine the epistemic

status

of sense-perceptual,

etc. beliefs.

afflicted

by imperialism offend against the legitimate autonomy of

CMP in particular. An argument vitiated by epistemic imperialism is one

Perceiving God,

p.

199.
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in

which M-beliefs

are evaluated in light of procedures properly

employed

to evaluate

sense-perceptual beliefs but which are inappropriately imposed on
M-beliefs because

sense-perceptual beliefs and M-beliefs are constraint-incompatible.

standard of evaluation

beliefs

is,

is

Whether or not a

appropriate depends in crucial part upon whether or not the

formed about a given subject matter can pass those

tests if they are reliable.

a necessary condition of a standard of evaluation's being appropriate

violate the

The shared language

not

such arguments in the second chapter.

CMP because we can manipulate the conditions in which we perceive physical

perceived by a given

we must

significant extent

be able to specify the causal contribution of objects

mode of perception

once again because God appears

on our

will.

but not on SP, explains

SP but not on CMP,

properly imposed on

His will, whereas physical objects appear to a

at

That

why

is

God imposes moral

restrictions

on membership

CMP is a particular and SP a universal

have discussed several times Alston's response

make

it

phenomenal appearances may be required of SP, but

for describing

objects but not God. That

CMP,

that

autonomy of a given DP.

We have articulated or alluded to several

not of

is

That

to the

mileage

critics like

practice.

rise to accurate predictions, but that

and for no different a reason, than the claim

CMP does not is no

that M-beliefs

ought

to

We

Gale attempt

out of CMP's peculiar overrider system. The claim that a reliable perceptual

ought to give

in

to

DP

less imperialistic,

be intersubjectively

evaluated.

The divide and conquer
innocence of CMP seems to

me

strategy Alston has developed to defend the presumptive

to

be very promising.
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It is,

however, easily and often

misunderstood. Although
impositions on

CMP,

on an entirely defensible rejection of inappropriate

rests

it

of Alston's strategy accuse him of attempting

critics

to

remove

religious belief from the arena of critical analysis altogether. Alston’s
advocacy of

autonomy, so his

critics claim, is

merely a protective strategy which

those engaged in the disinterested pursuit of the truth.

subsections of this chapter and

much of the

I

will

is

inappropriate for

spend the next three

next chapter, attempting to allay those

concerns.

3.4

Does Alston’s Strategy Invite Suspicion?
If

I

have articulated myself clearly enough, the reader

feature of Alston's strategy

which

is, if

anything, even

will already

have noted a

more disconcerting than

his

defense of the autonomy of CMP. Consider the procedures constitutive of CMP’s
overrider system. According to Alston,

facie justification

of beliefs

for their intelligibility

those

members form

in light

members of different

practices evaluate the prima

of different procedures and those procedures depend

on substantive renderings of the nature of the object about which

beliefs.

substantive renderings?

But

Given

this raises the question:

that the propriety

how do we

of the procedures internal

overrider system depends on the nature of the object about which

form

beliefs,

how do we

Clearly,

we do

identify those

to a

DP's

members of that DP

determine the nature of the object of our beliefs?

not have any a priori insight into these matters.

We

learn by

experience that plants are stationary and squirrels are not; that mountains are observable

but that

muons

are not.

Of course, we might have had
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such insight; surely

God

could

have created us with innate knowledge of answers
did not; hence

we form

we must

by experience the

learn

is

problematic.

ultima facie justified

if

it

We determine

God

characteristics of the objects about

which

whether or not a prima facie justified belief is

passes the tests constitutive of a DP's overrider system, but

determine whether or not the

tests constitutive

we

we

of a DP's overrider system are appropriate

they accord with the nature of that about which

could

such as these. But

beliefs.

This

if

to questions

we form

beliefs.

And on what

basis

possibly be warranted in forming an understanding of the nature of that about

which we form

beliefs than our ultima facie justified beliefs about that object?

no testing procedures without ultima
beliefs without testing procedures.

facie justified beliefs

We make

construct procedures for testing that which

use of what

we have

justified M-beliefs

way we

does more than raise a question;

it

CMP;

but those

who have

determine what that distinctive nature

is.

facie justified

learn in a given practice to

Once

again, an

activity.

acquire the tests by which

protestations at epistemic imperialism are predicated

subject matter of

we

already learned.

unavoidable circularity seems to invade our epistemic
Actually, the circular

and no ultima

We have

we

evaluate prima facie

invites suspicion. Alston's

on the

distinctive nature

a vested interest in regarding

of the

CMP as reliable

What's to stop them from constructing and

reconstructing an understanding of God's nature so as to insure that any objection

whatsoever to the

members

to

make

reliability

of CMP counts as imperialistic? Does

accurate predictions? Claim that

based upon that failure count as imperialistic. Does
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God

is

CMP not enable

transcendent and objections

CMP contradict itself massively?

Claim

that

God

is

inscrutable, or not

bound by

the laws of logic, and thus that objections

based upon that flaw are imperialistic. To gloss MacIntyre,
degenerate [doxastic practice] that

which enable

it

to

avoid being put

it

“it is

yet another

mark of a

has contrived a set of epistemological defenses

in question, or at least to

avoid recognizing that

it

is

being put in question, by rival [doxastic practices ].” 32
This suspicion can only be exacerbated by Alston's claim that
practice.

If

that about

CMP is a basic

CMP is basic, then those who do not engage in CMP lack reliable access to

which members of CMP form

beliefs.

And who can

possibly gainsay their

rendering of the nature of that about which they form beliefs? Simply put, no-one else
but those agents aware of a given kind of object are in a position to judge what properties
a given object possesses or doesn't possess. Surely those

basic practice, and thus

affords

its

who

who

don't

engage

in a

given

lack access to the subject matter engaging in that practice

participants, are in

no position

make judgements about

to

the characteristics,

properties, predilections, nature, etc. of the subject matter of that practice. In short, not

only does the nature of the object of belief constrain the checking procedures which can
reasonably be imposed on those beliefs, but only those already privy to reliably formed
beliefs about a given kind

of an object

of object are

Hence, those

is.

in a position

who engage

in

CMP determine what restrictions may

reasonably be employed in their epistemic activity.

examinations;

32
.

it

.

CMP does not just grade its own

provides the criteria by which those exams are graded

33
!

Thus, Preus

“Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science,”

60(1977): 461.
33

reasonably to judge what the nature

"Is

Religious Belief Rational?,"

p. 10.
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in

The Monist

expostulates, “clearly, the plea for
religion's refusal to submit to

as

it

is

self-serving.”

Before

we

autonomy

in fact

can be reduced to one thing:

any explanation other than

34

let

our suspicions run wild,

other universally respected

DPs

it

would be wise

same predicament

are in the

using our senses that physical objects don't

flit

when we know enough about them,

etc.

of tests by which to evaluate the

Beliefs

which pass those

justified beliefs to build

is like, etc.

tests

who

that

we can

the basis of what

initial credibility

CMP

don't engage in

CMP, we

learned

we

34
.

J.

make

adopt a

beliefs.

ultima facie

own exams,

As with CMP, because SP

is

a basic practice,

to gainsay the understanding

which we build up by engaging

in

because SP

is

a universal practice,

really concerns the critic,

I

we

us cautious,

it

it

but determine

SP —

of

unless, of course,

reality.

are hardly likely to level this

surmise,

is

not just circularity, but

circularity in conjunction with particularity. But, while the conjunction at issue

reasonably

by

that they stand in

We use those

they have a priori or direct intuitive insight into the nature of physical

What

learn

predict their activity

we have

don't just grade our

SP have no grounds on which

the nature of physical objects

objection at SP.

We

up an understanding of how the physical world operates, what

In short, in SP, as in

Of course,

is.

of sense-perceptual

count as ultima facie justified.

the criteria appropriate to the grading.

those

On

to apprize ourselves that

and out of existence,

in

orderly causal relations with one another and hence that

series

own, a claim as time-honored

its

may

provides no grounds for an objection to the epistemic

Samuel Preus, Explaining Religion: Criticism and Theory from Bodin

Haven, CO.: Yale University Press, 1987),

p.

203.
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to

Freud, (New

status of

CMP.

It is

only on pain of imposing a double-standard that

epistemic play in the case of

we

suspect foul

CMP when we do not suspect the same of SP.

epistemically relevant respects,

CMP and SP are similar:

both are basic

In all of the

DPs and

both

formulate the procedures proper to checking prima facie
justified beliefs on the basic of

what they have already learned by engaging

What

is

in

CMP.

the moral of this story? That the limitations

imposed on an epistemic

agent by her finitude underwrites autonomy as well as pluralism.
chapter,

we

veridical;

As we saw

in the first

cannot extract our eyes in order to determine whether or not our vision

we

cannot but make use of the practices

determine whether or not that practice
justification for our basic DPs.

facie justified beliefs.

is reliable;

which we always already engage

in

we

what we have already learned

checks, tests and procedures for evaluating what
a God's eye view by which to determine which

God's-eye view by which to determine

how

we have

DPs

we

evaluate prima

to formulate

already learned. Just as

are reliable, so

to test our beliefs.

but rely on those procedures, beliefs and dispositions in which

we

we

In both cases,

we

we have been

socialized in

cannot

Hermit?

Alston's doxastic practice approach to epistemology

veiled or not, hermetically to seal

practices of forming beliefs,

members

condemned

is

not an attempt, thinly

off different communities into different

to act in accord with

195

lack

also lack a

the effort responsibly to govern our beliefs.

3.5 Is Alston a

to

cannot provide non-circular

Similarly for the procedures by which

We can only use

is

communal

standards,

1

immune from

external criticism, and unable to

His defense of the autonomy of CMP

is

communicate with those on the

some sense

it

of reference to reality or by

or other depends on the language

game one

order clearly to differentiate between autonomy and
mere sprachspeilism,
Alston's realist rationale for

similar thesis. In 3.5.1,

1

35

worlds apart from a sprachspeilism which

vindicates the rationality of religious belief by
denuding
stipulating that reality in

outside.

autonomy with Peter Winch's

explicate Winch's 'version' of the

I

plays.

In

will contrast

anti-realist rationale for a

autonomy

thesis; in 3.5.2,

note the respects in which Alston rejects Winch's rationale; and in
3.5.3,

1

explain the

importance for Alston's doxastic practice approach to epistemology that he
does

reject

Winch's anti-realism.
3.5.1 Peter

Winch on Autonomy

Winch argues
in different practices

that

members of different

societies

(modem and

primitive) engage

of forming beliefs (science and witchcraft) and that internal

to those

practices are distinct criteria for forming and evaluating beliefs (roughly, experimentation

and poison

oracle).

36

The Azande,

a ‘primitive’ society to

which Winch

his treatment of the issue, explain sickness, injury, death, etc. as a

activity

of witches; they detect witches via a 'poison

fowl and a question

35
.

36
.

is

"Understanding a Primitive Society,

poison

is

administered to a

eds.,

(Notre

" in

Dame,

is

checked

p. 17.

Understanding and Social Inquiry, Fred Dallmayr
IN.:

Notre

Dame

University Press, 1977),

his position exactly correct either.

defense of autonomy with an alternative and fairly
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p. 166.

I

am not altogether too
am interested primarily in contrasting my
common defense.

have no intention of misrepresenting (or even slandering!) Winch, but

concerned to get

consequence of the

asked which admits of a 'yes or no' answer; the answer

“The Autonomy of Religious Experience,”

and Thomas McCarthy,

oracle':

refers throughout

I

I

by asking the same question the other way around
and administering the poison
fowl.

They employ an overrider system

to cull out false beliefs

with

to another

they enjoy a variety of auxiliary hypothesis to
'explain away' apparent contradictions,
the poison administered
’

etc.

7

The Azande

their experience

is

defective, those administering the oracle

practice of forming beliefs about witches

and internally coherent.

that practice is

in a distinctive practice

were

life

ritually unclean,

utterly lost

would be lacking ." 38

According

to

linguistic practices

sense.

What

is real

would seem

that that

DP

is

Winch, moreover, what we take

of the society

and what

is

in

which we

unreal

shows

WDP)

and

that, at least in the

Azande's culture, there are no more well-entrenched practices with which
it

an

In short, the

of forming beliefs (a Witchcraft DP, or

both socially and psychologically established. Given

massively incompatible,

e.g..

both rich, confirmed by

Moreover, "a Zande would be

bewildered without his oracle. The mainstay of his

Azande engage

is

and

initial credibility

WDP is

moderately rational.

to

be real depends upon the

live; "reality is

not what gives language

itself in the sense that

language has.

Further, both the distinction between the real and the unreal and the concept of agreement

with reality belong to our language."

which

Winch

exists independently of those

is

.

This does not imply that there

who form

who

explicitly

"Understanding a Primitive Society,"

Decline of Magic,
38

9

beliefs about that reality,

not a reality

even though

(New York, NY.:

p.

deny those doctrines. And Winch

167-68. See also Keith Thomas, Religion

"Understanding a Primitive Society,"

p.

166.

.

"Understanding a Primitive Society,"

p.

162.
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we

don't

explicitly

and the

Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964), pp. 208, 614, 643.

.

39

is

often accused of assenting to this heresy. Charity seems to require that

impute doctrines to those

37

’

rejects the "protagorean relativism"
into

which a denial

be checkable by reference to something
independent

that "men's ideas

- some reality..."

and beliefs must

plunges us

40
.

Nevertheless, he seems to have a very strange
understanding of the independently
real,

one which makes

community.

I

don't

it

seem

that

know of any

what

is real

depends on the

linguistic habits

other way, for example, of interpreting the following

passage, other than as an assertion that the reality of
God depends

sense

-

on the language we use

that the conception ot

the

God

has

Now,

if

to

its

mercy of what anyone cares

speak of God:"it
place, though,

to say; if this

I

clearly.

possible epistemic relation to the real.

God

repeat, this does not

were

so,

exists, is real, regardless

is

On

a

is

real exists

that

is at

it

reality ."

41

not at the

is

mercy

very different

whatever our actual or

more common-sensical understanding, God,

of whether or not the conception of God

is

is at

the

mercy

never a good reason to

that the object is real.

plays provides

Thesis.

.

mean

Winch's understanding of reality

Winch's claim that the independently

40

some unspecified

God would have no

of what people say; the malleability of a conception of an object

deny

in

within the religious use of language

is

than the more common-sensical notion that whatever

it

-

God's reality depends on whether or not the conception of God

of what people care to say, then

of a given

him with a

Winch argues

that

real is

rationale for claims

it

determined by the language game one

which sound very much

does not make sense for those of us

in the

like the

Autonomy

modern west

to

"The most radical position on the

Peter Winch,

who

cultural relativism of standards of rationality comes from
holds that belief-forming processes are no more than social practices for which

no overarching basis or justification. And the ultimate basis of Winch's position is his
denial that there is an objective world to which those belief systems may or may not correspond."
there

is

Daniel
41
.

Little,

Varieties of Social Explanation, (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1991),

"Understanding a Primitive Society,"

p.

162.
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p.

21

1.

Winch argues

Thesis.

deny

that

that

does.

does not make sense for those of us in the modern
west to

Azande

puts the

modern science

it

More

into effective cognitive contact with
reality, but that

precisely,

it

is

inappropriate for moderns to appeal to the

‘assured results of modern science' or to the standards
of belief formation and evaluation

proper to modern science as grounds for denying that the
Zande’s
puts

members of that

on the

that

we

reality.

linguistic practices of a society,

is real,

enjoy some concept of 'reality' which does not

linguistic/doxastic practices indigenous to our society. But

have any such concept of

what

there

is

Because the independently

no justification

contact with reality.

We have

course, this does not

commit us

for

own

put their

to

members
deny

to claiming that witches

Winch

rejects the persistent attempt to apotheosize

arbiter

of the true and the

no imperialism

we do

not

depends upon the

denying that the practices of forming beliefs

no basis on which

false.

real

rest for its

and different societies have different understandings of

indigenous to societies other than our

realities,

it

‘primitive society’ in a ‘strong position’ to get at the truth.
For that

judgement presupposes
validity

WDP is reliable, that

into effective cognitive

that witches exist

do

—

though, of

exist either. Like Alston,

modern science

into the sole

and

final

Different doxastic practices, different 'independent'

42
.

42

For a version of Winch’s defense of the autonomy of religious belief, see D.Z. Phillips, Faith
After Foundationalism, (New York, NY.: Routledge, 1988). For Alston’s attempt to distance
himself from Phillips’ version of the Autonomy Thesis, see “Taking the Curse Off Language
.

Games,”

pp. 16-48.
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3.5.2

Realism and Doxastic Practices
Unlike Winch, however, Alston does not justify the
constraints he places on

science, and

SP more

generally,

conceptions of an independent

does not commit him

to

reality.

43

to alternative

Nor does

it

are hermetically sealed off from those

Alston

human

is

we

about which

we

we form

etc.

beliefs.

concepts of truth,

members of particular

DP

such that those

Why?

criticism.

does not

own

not engage in that

is

a reality which exists independently of

believe, justifiably believe,

use to describe,

their

to claiming that

who do

a metaphysical realist. 45 There

beings; what

language

DPs have

commit him

on the inside are immune from external

and incommensurable

His defense of the autonomy of distinct DPs

claiming that different

justification, or reality. 44

DPs

by appeal

know, how we conceptualize, the

affect, bring into being,

make, determine,

that

Alston writes,

...My theory of doxastic practices differs radically from the various non-realist,
verificationist,

and

by writers

D. Z. Phillips and Richard Rorty, and by such rumblings as

like

relativistic versions

now current,

of Sprachspielism

deconstructionism that emanate from Europe.

am

represented

from supposing, with many
of these writers, that each "language game", "conceptual scheme", "discourse", or
what have you, carries its own special concept of truth and reality, that each defines
a distinct "world", or that truth
will let

.

My

theory of doxastic practices

what

is

it is,

little

(nothing

that

at all,

my defense

to refer to Alston’s defense

I

should say) to defend

of the autonomy

thesis

it.

is

firmly

regardless of how

Alston advocates autonomy, and does so by appeal to something

argument and claim

.

far

be construed as "What one's linguistic peers

recognizing a single reality that

but does precious

44

to

one get away with" (Rorty).

realistic,

43

is

I

like the

Hence,

is realistic.

I

I

we

think or

Ontological Principle,

should
will,

own up

to

my

however, continue

of autonomy.

"The Autonomy of Religious Experience,"

p.

1

7;

“Taking the Curse Off Language Games,” pp.

36-7.
45
.

is

"The Christian Language Game,"
a Real World," passim.

p.

138, 148; Perceiving
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God,

p.

I

55; "Yes, Virginia,

1

here

distinct doxastic practices, into cognitive
contact with

participants. Alston's defense

his affirmation

which those practices put

their

of the autonomy of distinct doxastic practices hinges
on

of the Ontological Principle, which presupposes that
what exists does so

whatever we believe about

it

and

in

whatever practice we engage, and on his claim

that

there are importantly different kinds of entities which
constitute the one independently

existing world.

Alston’s realism grounds his claim that

we

should adopt a

fallibilist attitude

toward the doxastic practices

in

open

by others who, although they may not engage

to critique leveled at us

doxastic practices in which

which we engage and therefore

we engage,

nevertheless

’live,

that

we

move, and have

within and therefore form beliefs about, the same reality about which
there

to

it,

is

a reality

and

if

which

exists independently of our possible

our beliefs are true

possible of any of belief that

it

is false.

If there is a reality

our possible and actual epistemic relations to
effective cognitive contact with reality, then

it,

it

and

is

if

a

it,

which

DP

is

or false by whether what a belief or assertion

is

it

to be,

we

of our control.

are

acknowledging a

We can,

this condition for truth

then

is

it

reliable iff

what we believe and

have

satisfied.

determined not by anything

we do

in the final analysis

or think, but by the
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it

puts us into

assert

is

it

is,

in a

way

is

rendered true

as the belief or assertion

liability to falsity that

But

If

always

DP that

would

fundamental way, out

of course, take such precautions as are open to us

is

beliefs.

exists independently of

unreliable. Alston writes, “In supposing that

is

their being’

we form

always possible of any

about

same

in the

and actual epistemic relations

our beliefs depict

iff reality is as

should always be

to ensure that

whether what we say

things are

—

the things

is

true

we

is

are

talking about .” 47 Because

be unreliable,

we must

it

is

always possible for our beliefs

never uncritically accept any

accept uncritically a given practice,

we

DP

to

be false and our

DPs

to

or any belief. If we should never

should always be willing to

listen to

those

who

regard us as failing to achieve our central epistemic
aim. In short, Alston's metaphysical
realism renders unacceptable any dogmatism which
would exempt any belief or any

from

criticism. This applies, not least, to

DP

CMP and other religious doxastic practices 48
.

Alston

is

clear that,

however

significant doxastic practices are for epistemology,

they have no metaphysical implications; they are epistemically
crucial but metaphysically
idle.

In fact, the direction of influence heads in the other direction,

epistemology.

As

a consequence of our experience of an object,

vocabulary, conceptual structure, checking procedures,
reliably to

form

beliefs about that object.

accompanying vocabulary,

itself

etc.

is real;

when we

47
.

48
.

A

what

is real

formulate a

structure,

and the

undergoes continuous modification as a consequence of
structure does not determine

should determine our conceptual structure.

We risk

imperialism

get the order reversed.

Realist Conception of Truth,

“Our

we

to

by which we are enabled

But the conceptual

what we learn about the object of belief. Our conceptual
what

from metaphysics

p.

264.

realist position leaves us free to

recognize the obvious fact that religious believers make
way things are or will be in the world,

cognitive commitments that have implications for the

implications that are testable by a variety of non-religious procedures.” “Taking the Curse Off

Language Games,”

p.

39.
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3.5.3

Realism and Fallibilism
Alston's metaphysical realism differentiates his
defense of autonomy from

Winch's

in

two

respects. First, the Ontological Principle

which imposes constraints on the norms by which
only relative to the conceptual structure

kinds of norms in light of which

it

is

we form

to

form beliefs about

beliefs

constraints

ot that

—

then

its

we

really the beliefs

on the norms properly employed

from external sources. Given

certain that the beliefs that

there

is

more we can

considerations

we form

that

toehold into even those

DPs

in

is

we

all

in turn

game does

-

if

what we

whatever sense

opens him up to

are finite and fallible,

true.

It is

And

we can

never be

always possible that

of our beliefs are open

to correction

that our understanding

by

of the nature

unavoidably open to correction provides

which they do not engage. That

which members of CMP and SP form
insures that the language

Alston

to evaluate those beliefs.

yet to take into account.

and characteristics of a given object

is real

hold about an object which impose

about an object are

learn about an object;

we have

it.

reasonable to evaluate on those beliefs;

Second, Alston's realism grounds a fallibilism which
criticism

the object

imposes limitations on the

believe about an object determines which characteristics that object
has

we can make

if

agent's evaluate justified beliefs

we employ

argues that the nature of that about which

makes no sense

critics a

the subject matter about

beliefs exists independently of those practices

not always have the last
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word on

the subject.

3.5.4

Immanent

Criticism

Suppose

we

that

grant that Alston's realism opens up the possibility
that, for any

doxastic practice in which

any practice

it

in

we

engage, that practice might be unreliable, and thus

which we engage, we should always admit

does not further our central epistemic aim.

spite ot his professed fallibilism,

Alston

We may

still

that, for

the possibility that engaging in

harbor the suspicion

fails to articulate criteria

with enough

that, in

‘bite’ to

enable us to show that obviously problematic practices like witchcraft
and astrology are
unreliable.

shown

to

ground

To

recapitulate, Alston argues that a socially established practice

be reliable

if either internally or externally inconsistent.

for critique, viz.,

comparison

suspicions might be further allayed

—

criticism.

so far as

I

have noted a third

In the interests of indicating

is

possible

—

I

will

may be

how

those

mention briefly a

fourth.

Winch’s

article

on ‘primitive

societies’ generated a considerable

amount of

discussion on the possibility of providing non-question-begging reasons for regarding as
unreliable doxastic practices

If

Winch

is

which

are in fact almost universally rejected in modernity.

correct in arguing the different societies enjoy distinct and conflicting

standards for evaluating beliefs, and if he

may

non-circularly

employ

is

correct that there are no ‘neutral' criteria

we

to rank alternatives with respect to their ability to put us in

contact with an independently existing reality, then so ranking doxastic practices like the

Zande's

WDP and modem science lacks justification.

This

is

just another formulation

Winch's version of the Autonomy Thesis. The following objection

204

to

of

Winch's argument

seems

DP

me

to

to be a cogent

one and

to indicate further

from enjoying positive epistemic

status.

Notice that a consequence ot Winch
societies, internal to

to another in

some

is

that

in great

one stage

claim that there are numerous distinct
practices,

we may justly judge one

he must explain transitions

in a

and between which

practice to be epistemically

given society from one practice

non-rational, perhaps purely causal way.

of a society change membership
manner,

s

which there are autonomous doxastic

there are no criteria in light of which

superior to another,

grounds for disqualifying a given

in doxastic practices; they

As
do

a matter of fact,

so,

sometimes

in

members
wholesale

numbers. Doxastic practices which are widely regarded as reliable

in a society s history are rejected

at

and replaced with what members of a society

regard as a superior practice. (They may, of course, replaced rejected practices with

nothing

vast

at all.) Just

such a transition seems to have been effected

numbers of agents

confidence in

modem

we

to

th

century England:

rejected witchcraft as a reliable doxastic practice and placed their

science.

explain the actions of those

are

in 17

What

who

are

we

make of such

to

transitions?

How are we to

perpetrated the change from witchcraft to science?

make of the grounds on which

those

who changed

allegiances

made

What

their

decision? Did they have any grounds or was that change just a surd fact in their personal

And

pilgrimage?

after

if

they did have reasons for rejecting witchcraft, and

having placed confidence

access to the truth, and

Winch does
those

if

we

in

‘modern science’

that they

they conclude

have thereby improved

cannot fault them for making such judgements

not proscribe disputes internal to a given society, then

who do

if

not participate in a given doxastic practice to
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make

it

is

—

their

even

legitimate for

critical

judgements

about practices

in

which they do not engage. After

circumstances an agent presents an argument

whether or not

that

argument

is

is

all,

who, when, or under what

of no relevance

at all to the issue

of

sound.

What kind of arguments motivate

the wholesale transitions from one doxastic

practice to another? Discussing this issue adequately

would require resolving a whole

thicket of thorny problems, a task

moment. Hence,

dogmatic and just

assert

what

I

I

will forgo for the

I

will

have

to be

take to be a plausible position, leaving an adequate

defense to another venue.

An autonomous

doxastic practice

may

incoherence as judged by standards internal

exhibit

some epistemic

to that practice. Just

enjoys distinctive evaluative norms does not entail that
those norms. Indeed,

it

would be amazing

if

it

defect or

because a practice

invariably succeeds in satisfying

such were generally the case. The history of

CMP is fraught with conflict over the meaning, propriety, reliability, social functionality,
etc.

of mystical experience. Similarly with any other doxastic practice which has a

history.

It is,

standards

moreover, possible that a given practice’s

may

persist over time:

members may come

failure to satisfy its

own

to regard that practice as afflicted

with an intractable incoherence. Such afflictions motivate members to cast about for

some

alternative. If they discover

some

alternative

which promises

to resolve those

incoherences, they have reason to adopt that alternative. The fracture, dissent,

argumentation, debate

is

made

possible by the standards internal to a given doxastic practice

not clearly distinct from the debate, dissent, argumentation and debate which leads an

agent out of some practice and into another.
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.

some

If there is

the incoherences

which

then

some

afflict

an account which explains

why B

practice B, and

is

to

form

members of B have reason

to

change

transition, they

on as before

I

may

if,

so afflicted and

members of B continue

long as

A which holds out the promise of resolving

alternative practice

moreover,

why

its

A promises to provide

affliction is

unavoidable so

beliefs in accord with the standards internal to B.

their allegiance to A.

Having made the

describe their decision as a learning process. “So long as

couldn

t

solve problem x. But

tackling the problem and

I

found out

after

I

could resolve the problems with which

I

would never have been able

I

learned about an alternative

I

approaching the problem

was

to resolve those

earlier faced.

problems had

I

I

I

continued

way of

new way,

in that

discovered, moreover,

that

why

continued on as before.”

Learning processes occur as a consequence of immanent criticism. Alasdair

MacIntyre has identified three
given practice, B,

formed

is

criteria for a successful

intractably incoherent

its

own

beliefs according to the standards internal to

able to resolve those incoherences. Third,

incoherences in

49

by

B

immanent

criticism

49
.

First, a

standards. Second, if members of

some

other practice A, they

B

would be

A provides an explanation as to why the

can’t be resolved given the resources

A affords to

its

members.

In

some new mode of reasoning about the same subject matter which
it does not suffer from the same defects as its predecessor; it
enables those defects to be identified more precisely; and it explains what it was about the
standpoint from which and in terms of which that predecessor more of reasoning was formulated
.

“What

is

being looked for

is

has, if possible, three characteristics:

which generated

A

its

inadequacies.” Alasdair MacIntyre, “Moral Rationality, Tradition, and

Onora O’Neill, Raimond Gaita, and Stephen R. L. Clark,” in Inquiry 26/4
nd
(1986): 451; See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2 ed., (Notre
Dame, IN.:University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 268; Three Rival Versions of Moral
Enquiry, p. 146; Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, (Notre Dame, IN.: University of Notre
Aristotle:

Dame

Reply

to

Press, 1988), pp. 349-69, esp. Pp. 361-62; “Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative and

the Philosophy of Science,” pp. 453-71
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short,

an immanent criticism

things

is

problematic,

the claim that, by your

is

my way

own

from engaging

Habermas has
Azande which

in

B and commit

articulated an

is at least

suggestive.

to validity in a

between

fact

therefore have

immanent

Habermas

modem

factual,

differentiate

to ‘this-worldly’

The motor of socio-cultural evolution

is

take to be what

distinct

in differentiating

phenomena, but not otherworldly
in all

aspects of

the cognitive success engendered

ever more comprehensive application of the distinction between what

I

between

normative and expressive claims

worldviews make the necessary distinctions

ought to be the case and what

good reason

distinguishes between three types of

which they

to

worldviews conflate

and value with respect

know why

criticism of mythical worldviews like the

thoroughgoing manner; religious worldviews succeed

phenomenon; and
reality.

You

I

A.

to

worldviews by identifying different degrees
validity claims. Mythical

your way of doing

of doing things resolves those problems, and

your way of doing things will invariably be problematic.
to cease

lights,

is

and ought

to

is

the case,

by an

what

be the case. The

inadequacy of ‘primitive' worldviews generates problems which can be identified but not
resolved by those

who

adhere to those worldviews. And, moreover, those

modem

worldviews have the conceptual resources

why

pre-modems cannot

the

who

inhabit

to identify those problems, to explain

resolve them, and to explain

how

a transition to a

modem

world view would enable a resolution of those problems. Lack of differentiation
generates problems which only a transition to more differentiated worldviews resolves /

0

50

Habermas writes, “I shall attempt to make the development of religious worldviews
comprehensible from the aspect of a development of formal world-concepts. In doing so,
be making tacit use of a concept of learning that Piaget expounded for the ontogenesis of
.
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I

shall

realize that

I

my

analysis of

immanent

criticism

however, have the advantage of indicating a respect

grounds for evaluating practices available

in

is

extremely sketchy.

which Alston

to him. Alston’s account

fails to

It

does,

employ

of doxastic practices,

unlike MacIntyre’s notion of tradition and tradition-constituted
inquiry and Habermas’

employment of a developmental

logic to rank worldviews,

is

conceives ot doxastic practices as resources on which cognitive agents
draw

forming and evaluating beliefs but pays

He

therefore pays

which lead up

who engage

attention to the

ways

in

which the

historically extended

may

arguments

provide those

given doxastic practice with greater confidence in the capacity of that

them

in

touch with the

truth.

And

as MacIntyre argues, surely that

large part a source ot our confidence in the reliability of

how

when

attention to the history of those practices.

to a practice's current standards for evaluating beliefs

in a

practice to put

little

little

He

severely a-historical.

the current theories

we

modem

science:

we

is in

understand

adopt are the product of a continuous pattern of formulation.

structures of consciousness. As is well known, Piaget distinguishes among stages of cognitive
development that are characterized not int terms of new contents but in terms of structurally
described levels of learning ability. It might be a matter of something similar in the case of the
emergence of new structures of worldviews. The caesurae between the mythical, religiousphilosophical, and modern modes of thought are characterized by changes in the system of basic
concepts. With the transition to a new stage the interpretations of the superceded stage are, not
matter what their content, categorially devalued. It is not this or that reason, but the kind of reason

which

is

no longer convincing.

A devaluation

of the explanatory and justificatory potentials of

entire traditions took place in the great civilizations with the dissolution of mythological-narrative

figures of thought, in the

modem

age with the dissolution of religious, cosmological, and

metaphysical figures of thought. These devaluative
evolutionary transitions to

processes

in the

new

shifts

levels of learning, with

appear to be connected with socio-

which the conditions of possible learning

dimensions of objectivating thought, moral-practical

expressive capacity are altered.”

Rationalization of Society, vol.

insight,

and aesthetic-

The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the
Thomas McCarthy, ed., (Boston, MA.: Beacon Press, pp.

1,
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67-8.

objection, reformulation in light of objection,
and so on. Could that not also be the case
for religious doxastic practices?

3.6

On

the Use and Misuse of Autonomy

As

I

have mentioned, Alston's defense of the autonomy of
CMP from various

imperialisms

is

one of the most interesting features of his work. Yet when
combined

with the innocent

until

proven guilty approach, advocacy of autonomy begs for some

account of the legitimate grounds for concluding that doxastic
practices are unreliable.

have attempted

to

supplement Alston’s rather weak attempt

in that direction

by

articulating the concept, and defending the legitimacy, of comparison
critique and,
briefly,

what

I

of immanent criticism.

My

take to be an illegitimate

of CMP. After

some degree

all,

by noting

final

attempt to allay fears on this front

employment of the Autonomy Thesis

illegitimate uses of the

the epistemic liberality

it

seems

Autonomy

is to

The objection was

that: reliable belief

which God need play no causal

Thesis,

we

foreclose to

to encourage.

religious belief

fail to

reason to believe that

show

God

that

is

not

I

amenable of fully

CMP by

naturalistic explanation.

provide an explanation of M-belief formation in

role; hence,

of Alston’s response, with which

note

formation requires causal contact between the

we may

object of belief and the believer;

is

more

in Alston's defense

Recall our discussion of Alston’s evaluation of the attempt to discredit

appeal to the fact that M-belief formation

I

M-belief formation

entirely agree,

is that

is

unreliable.

The

heart

naturalistic explanations of

CMP is unreliable unless they provide us with good
among

the causes of M-belief formation at
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all.

That

God

is

not

among

the proximate causes of M-belief formation
need have no detrimental

CMP,

implications tor

so long as

God

figures

somewhere

to the formation of a given M-belief. Thus, that

we can

in the causal chain leading

up

provide a complete

neurophysiological explanation of M-beliet-formation sheds
no light on the epistemic
standing of CMP.

But does

do not think
that

it

this dispose

of the arguments proposed by Marx, Nietzsche and Freud?

The problem Marx, Nietzsche and Freud have with

so.

has a complete natural explanation; the problem

is,

religious belief

rather, that

is

not

an adequate

explanation ot religious belief must have recourse to the wrong kind of cause.

Among

the

causes that figure in the generation of M-beliefs are pathological causes. The causal
history of religious belief

is

suspicious.

Alston realizes that his response does not fully convince and attempts to

supplement
experience.

his argument.

"Why

He does

so by appealing to the

suppose that the conditions

perception of the physical environment also

God? On

that

make

make

autonomy of mystical

for accurate (inaccurate)

for accurate (inaccurate) perception of

a typical hot sunny day in the Arizona desert a pair of sun glasses

is

an aid to

accurate observation; but they have quite the reverse effect on a cold foggy day in the

Aleutians.

And

from Arizona.""

surely

1

God

more

is

The appeal

different

from the Aleutians than the Aleutians are

to the Ontological Principle lurks in the background: the

nature of an object constrains the

way

it

is

rational to

form beliefs about

different kind of object than are the normal, physical objects

51
.

Perceiving God,

p.

233.
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we

I

it;

God

is

a very

perceive through sense-

perception; hence

way we

the

are constrained to

God

is

one of the many ways

in tact the case, then the

is

form

beliefs about

perceive physical objects; and perhaps the

beliefs about

that

we

we would

Freudian objection

is

God

way we

fail to

in

ways

that differ

from

are constrained to form

perceive a physical object. If

just another instance of epistemic

imperialism.

Alston

s

we

about which

response to Freud seems to be:

even

if that

God might

it

is

be just the

would involve us

normally be hallucinations. But
that

this

possible that perception of

feature or characteristic of

“possibilities

is

very different from anything

naturally form beliefs; given the Ontological Principle,

forming beliefs about
nature,

God

in

way we should form

any way of

M-beliefs given God's

forming beliefs on the basis of what would

response

God

is

inadequate.

He

fails to

connect the claim

occurs via regression to infantile states to any

God which would

come cheap" when

so constrain us.

the alternative

is

As

J.

S.

Preus notes, mere

a richly articulated theory

provides us with an explanation of M-belief formation and which entails the
unreliable

we

52
.

To appeal

to the distinctive nature

are justified in forming beliefs in

what

it

is

any way whatever. And

that is clearly not

given difference between

what

52
.

J.

it

is

some (otherwise

of forming beliefs about

which

CMP

is

of God to justify the mere possibility

about God's nature that so constrains us

justify the possibility

we

is

God

suspicious)

to

employ a

way without

rationale

that

identifying

which would

(or anything else, for that matter) in

what Alston

intends. Rather, in arguing that a

CMP and other practices is legitimate, Alston needs to justify

about the subject matter of CMP which warrants that difference. In the

Samuel Preus, Explaining Religion,

p.

21

1.
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terminology developed

earlier,

render the ban on what

is

do

he needs to identify the object-imposed
constraints which

normally hallucinatory behavior inappropriate.

doubt he can

(I

so.)

Alston misunderstands

this

external proof of the reliability of

my

energetic (and in

response and accuses the

MP. This would be

course, critics ol

show

that

a double standard on those

that the

it

is

even SP lacks external

who engage

CMP do not hesitate to make just that inference:

have an explanation ot M-belief formation which implies that
claim that

incumbent upon the

proposed explanation

show

theist to

that

Preus claims

is false.

of asking for an

quite a howler, given Alston’s

estimation, successful) attempt to

would be imposing

proof; the critic

critic

CMP

that, in

from the

in

CMP. Of

fact that

we

CMP is unreliable, they

is,

after all, reliable

and thus

order to provide a serious

contender to the Freudian explanation of religious belief, those

who engage

in

CMP

must

provide "’evidence” which indicates that naturalistic explanations of religious belief are
false."

'

Clearly,

what he has

in

mind

is

some

external justification of the reliability of

CMP.
But Preus and Alston overlook the
justification, for evidence, that

unreliable way, she

justification

we

5

\

J.

asking

-

is

when

in

God

is

the critic asks for a

accurately perceived in what would normally be an

or at least, she should be asking

of that claim. Given the understanding of God

believe that

who engage

is

God

alternative:

present only to those

who

-

for an internal

internal to

CMP, why

regress to infancy? Given what those

CMP believe about God, what reason do we have to believe that

Samuel Preus, Explaining Religion,

p.

21

1.
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should

regressing to infantile states

God

is

an accurate mode of perceiving God? What features of

(on a theistic accounting) render us incapable of perceiving

normal way?

If

we

autonomy becomes
possible that any

any evidence

God

more

in

like the

can't provide such an internal justification, then Alston’s defense of

the vacuous:

way

at all

we have

God

is

different

from physical

of forming beliefs about

that M-beliefs are unreliably

God

objects;

reliable

is

and

hence
that

it

is

means

that

formed may be written off with

impunity.

We can put the point in this way.

At the heart of Freud's explanation of religion

the claim that religious belief promises to the believer the (illusory) satisfaction of

is

desires she cannot satisfy, since the actual satisfaction of those desires

destructive: religion

is

comparison-criticism.

existing objects

That

is,

wish-fulfilment

We

54
.

The objection

is

best understood as a

which are proximately caused by wish-fulfillment tend not
it

so; hence, if

the case plays ‘too prominent' a role in the etiology of

is

respects to wish-fulfillment; if Freud

God

is

correct, the desire that

prominent a role in the genesis and sustenance of religious

54
.

To modify

M-beliefs are unreliably formed.

Of course,

a claim of Jeffrey Gordon’s, “although

Creator, a moral order

in the universe,

and an

it

belief.

its

to be true.

wishing that

some

belief,

then that

similar in important

belief has been unreliably formed. Religious belief-formation

to believe that

socially

learn from experience that beliefs formed about independently

wishing that something were true doesn't make

something

is

would be

exists plays too

Hence, we have reason

possible that wish-

remains possible that there is a benevolent
of these claims would be a

afterlife, the truth

remarkable coincidence, since they are based on [reasonably proximately] nothing more substantial
fortuitous
than wishes. If they turn out to be true, it would be similar to a case of amazingly
(1991): 313.
guessing.” “Freud’s Religious Skepticism Resurrected,” in Religious Studies. 27/3
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fulfillment

respect.

is

CMP

reliable in the religious case. Perhaps

But perhaps

need good reason

is

autonomous

in just that

In order to determine that in a non-question-begging way,

not.

CMP

to believe that

is

autonomous

in the relevant respect;

of God necessitates us to form beliefs by wish-fulfillment? Alston’s central

which he does not adhere consistently enough,
from sources external
acquire by

CMP

we have

then

Freud,

to

to

Marx and

to

deny

that

we need

what feature
insight, to

to provide reason

CMP to be justified in engaging in CMP; rather, the evidence we

stands on

employ

is

all

fours with that garnered by engaging in other practices. But

that evidence to provide an adequate response to the likes of

And

Nietzsche.

that

is

just

what Alston

fails

adequately to do.

What’s the moral of this story? That successful invocation of autonomy
criticism of a given practice always requires that

is

as

form

members

believe

it

to be, constrains us to

beliefs about other objects.

justification of the reliability

this

cannot be done

be: Alston’s appeal to

is

Once

we

indicate

form beliefs

again, this

is

why

in

ways

differently than

vulnerable to comparison criticism.

is

And

how

the object

A practice for

that

is

as

it

should

not a protective strategy designed to insulate religious

belief from criticism, but an appeal for fair and constructive criticism.

3.7

Summary

of the

Argument

In the first chapter,

I

we

not a matter of providing an external

to a practice constrains belief- formation.

autonomy

to blunt

the object of belief, if it

of a given practice, but a matter of showing

of belief as understood internal

which

we

articulated Alston’s criteria [(EP9) and (EP10)] for

the second
evaluating the epistemic status of any doxastic practice whatsoever. In
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chapter,

presented Alston's argument in support of the claim

I

and (EP10), there

is

and given
Thesis,

I

was a constant appeal

appeal to autonomy

is

that he provides precious

have attempted

CMP’s autonomy. Given

little

by way of argument

in

to provide that rationale in this chapter.

appeals to autonomy look very

attempted to indicate

to

why

much

support of his

But the appeal

I

show of presumptively innocent

if

is

have

of inconsistency, comparison criticism, immanent

religious

in this chapter

DPs

their

It is,

importance

then, possible

that they are guilty.

on the second half of the Reformed claim

religious doxastic practices are innocent until proven guilty, the

as well. If Alston

I

have indicated three more. Though more

for the critique of religious belief puts bite into Alston's fallibilism.

have focused

to

CMP from criticism.

and misuse of autonomy are powerful kinds of objection and

I

Autonomy

those concerns are unwarranted; in addition to Alston’s two

difficult to evaluate than considerations

If

think

(I

strategy for defending religious experience:

like attempts to protect

grounds for rejecting doxastic practices,

to

that

one of the most interesting features of Alston’s work,

autonomy generates concerns about Alston’s

critique,

according to (EP9)

a religious doxastic practice that enjoys positive epistemic
status. At

the heart of that argument

at least) the

that,

correct, that religious

DPs

they are not presumptively innocent, since

are absolved of guilt

we

focus on Alston’s formulation of the claim that

next chapter.
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first

cannot show

that

half merits attention

is

of

little

importance

CMP to be reliable.

CMP is presumptively

I

will

innocent in the

CHAPTER 4
SOCIAL ESTABLISHMENT, AUTONOMY AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF

Alston's practical rationality argument

epistemic status of CMP.

And

at the heart

is

crucial to his attempt to vindicate the

of his practical argument

is

an appeal to social

establishment. In fact, Alston's appeal to social establishment performs three distinct

functions in his scheme of things.

for

members

ot

It

provides support for his claim (1) that

it is

rational

CMP to regard CMP as reliable unless shown to be unreliable, (2) that

even those who do not engage

in

CMP have reason to believe (1) to be true, but (3) that

the truth of (1) does not license an unacceptable epistemic promiscuity.

First, the

ground floor

appeal to social establishment gains

— because

socially entrenched,

that is crucially important:

were

CMP entre’

into the epistemic

CMP enjoys a presumptive innocence. And

CMP presumptively unreliable until

shown

to be reliable,

CMP would be relegated to epistemic oblivion given Alston's denial that CMP is
amenable of non-circular support. After

all, it's

a lot harder to ride one of the old boys

out of the club than to keep him from entering in the

chance of hobnobbing with

if

it

pillars

first

CMP

place:

of the epistemic community

like

stands a lot better

SP and

introspection

doesn’t have to prove itself at the door.

Second, as

I

noted

at the

end of the second chapter

(2.5),

Alston claims to have

provided an external rationale for the positive epistemic status of CMP. Anyone, whether

participant in

engage

CMP or not, can determine whether or not

in that practice.

it

is

rational tor an agent to

Although we lack any external indications
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that

CMP is reliable,

and thus

that participants in

CMP are epistemically justified in so participating, anyone

can determine that that practice
is

no reason

at least

to believe

it

is

socially

and psychologically established and

that there

massively inconsistent, and therefore that engaging in

is

moderately rational. The appeal to social establishment

CMP

is

is crucial.

Third, the appeal to social establishment enables Alston to resolve what Alvin

Plantinga has called ‘The Great

Pumpkin Problem." Alston's

critics

argue that he

succeeds in vindicating the epistemic status of religious belief only by so watering
his epistemic standards that he is

committed

to regarding

practices as enjoying positive epistemic status.

objectionable just because

it

1

down

even obviously objectionable

Alston’s general epistemic position

is

provides us with inadequate grounds for denying positive

epistemic status to such dubious practices as astrology, witchcraft, divination, and the

like.

Alston admits that his epistemic

criteria are

weaker than we would

like

them

to be,

but denies that they are objectionably permissive. The claim that engaging in a given

doxastic practice

is

weakly

rational only if that practice is socially established provides

Alston with principled grounds for addressing

Having been content
chapters,

I

turn

now

this concern.

to articulate, explain

to criticism.

Although there

(More on

and generally defend Alston for three

is

much with which

Alston’s reliabilism comes to mind, as does his Theory of Appearing,

I

this shortly.)

to disagree

I

—

will focus

on what

take to be the most objectionable feature of his version of Reformed Epistemology,

his practical argument.

In 4.1,

1

provide a context for

my

objections by articulating

viz.,

The

Matthew Bagger, “The Miracle of Minimal Foundationalism, and Dirk37-52.
Martin Grube, “Religious Experience After the Demise of Foundationalism, pp.
\

See, for example,
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Great Pumpkin Problem,’ Alvin Plantinga’s attempt to resolve that problem
and
Alston’s appeal to social entrenchment provides
satisfactory resolution

Alston. In 4.2,

1

him with what he

of that problem than Plantinga’s. Then

argue

that,

even

if

I

takes to be a

how
more

begin to shie bricks

at

otherwise objectionable, Alston's appeal to social

establishment does not satisfy important extra-epistemic expectations imposed on the
epistemologist in pluralistic environments: Alston

fails to

concerns motivating interest in epistemology. In 4.3,

argument: he

fails to identify or to justify in light

raional for an agent to

open

engage

to the objection that

(EP10)

of exactly which goals

in socially established practices.

I

That

is

is,

1

argue that

so long as the overriding goal in light of which

more

in

is

(EP9) and

find themselves in the

better epistemic reason

to ineluctable practices than to socially established

whether or not engaging

to adopt

practically

seems neither necessary

we have

in a

we

evaluate doxastic

given practice enables us to form a high ratio of

true beliefs, cognitive agents in our epistemic predicament

were they

it is

a consequence, he

who

articulated in 1.3.2: social establishment

impute presumptive innocence

practices.

As

pursuing his epistemic policy (encapsulated)

nor sufficient for practical rationality. In 4.4,

practices

note a crucial lacuna in Alston's

not the most rational course of action open to agents

is

epistemic predicament

to

1

address the moral and political

would

act

more

rationally

austere criteria for presumptive innocence than Alston's

permissive social establishment criterion.

criterion fails as well, but that

it

(I

will argue later that the ineluctability

fails for instructive reasons.)

Alston can shore up his practical argument, event
course of action for any agent in the

human

if

1

argue that even

it

he can show that the most rational

condition
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In 4.5,

is

to

impute presumptive innocence

only to socially and psychologically entrenched practices,
according to his argument. That

is,

even

if

(EP9) and (EP10) are

count as moderately or strongly rational. In 4.6,
Alston’s defense of the rationality of CMP

CMP does not count as rational

is

1

throw

afflicted

my

true,

CMP does not

last brick.

I

argue that

by an inconsistency between two

projects at the heart of his defense. Alston’s defense of

CMP is internally unstable:

his

appeal to the autonomy of distinct doxastic practices undermines his attempt to articulate

and defend

and applicable, epistemic

neutral, universally acceptable

and (EP10). In

4.7,

1

criteria like

(EP9)

conclude by commenting on the implications of the demise of

Alston's appeal to social establishment for the rationality of religious belief.

4.1

The Great Pumpkin Problem
The general

justified in our

That claim

topic of this chapter

is

the

Reformed claim

ungrounded but defeasible commitment

elicits

would

that the general

I

are epistemically

to religious doxastic practices.

license even belief in the Great

proven guilty claim and the Great Pumpkin Objection are

Problem,

we

a natural objection: the epistemic standards of the Reformed position

are so lax that they

Given

that

theme of this chapter ands intimate

will attempt to identify just in

what

that

Pumpkin. The innocent
flip sides

of the same coin.

relation to the Great

problem

until

Pumpkin

consists. In so doing,

I

will

formulate Plantinga’s more well-known and more frequently discussed analysis and
resolution of that Problem (4.1.1), Alston’s very different resolution (4.1.2), and then

discuss the implications of their different resolutions (4.1.3).
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4.1.1 Plantinga’s Resolution of the

In his early

work on

Great Pumpkin Problem

religious epistemology, Plantinga exerts a great deal
of effort

attempting to discredit what he calls the evidentialist objection to religious
2
belief
.

According

to the evidentialist, belief in

warranted,

etc., iff

God

is

rational, justified, epistemically apt,

a cognitive agent bases her belief in

what counts as evidence

is

God on

adequate evidence, where

restricted to her other, non-theistic, beliefs.

An

agent

is

subject to epistemic blame, or, in increasing order of seriousness, she flaunts her

epistemic duties, or she abdicates from the search for the truth,
that

God

if

she persists believing

exists in the absence of adequate propositional evidence. But, according to the

evidentialist,

an examination of the available arguments

in

support of God’s existence

reveals that the theist lacks the requisite support; proofs of God’s existence, whether

traditional,

newly refurbished, or

the evidence against

entirely novel, lack probative force.

God’s existence furnished by the problem of evil, the lack of

adequate evidence for God’s existence

irrational

Even disregarding

is itself

sufficient to render belief in

God

3
.

See Plantinga’s “Reason and Belief in God,” pp. 20-39 and “Coherentism and the Evidentialist
Objection,” in Robert Audi and William Wainwright, eds., Rationality, Religious Belief and
Moral Obligation: New Essays in the Philosophy of Religion, (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University

2

.

Press, 1986), for an elucidation of evidentialism.
3
.

Thus, Anthony Flew:

presumption of atheism

“It is
is

by reference

justified.

If

it

is

to this inescapable

demand

to be established that there

for
is

grounds that the
we have

a God, then

to

have good grounds for believing that this is indeed so. Until or unless some such grounds are
reasonable
produced we have literally no reason at all for believing; and in that situation the only
of Atheism,
posture must be that of either the negative atheist or the agnostic.” The Presumption
(London: Pemberton, 1976),

p. 22.
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There

is,

however, a

We don’t require of all

fly in the evidentialist’s ointment.

of

our beliefs that they enjoy discursive redemption; not every
belief is faced with the

Law of Non-Contradiction

evidentialist challenge. Is the

memory

reliable?

Do

contents of my mind,
least

I

Does anything

exist?

if I

exist?

discursive justification, if a cognitive agent

we

I

is

law of logic?

valid? At

and without benefit of

evidence for any belief

don't accord a presumptive innocence to

some

beliefs or others, the

of justifying beliefs never gets off of the ground. So Plantinga poses the innocent

activity

question: if we must accord a presumptive innocence to
beliefs?

Why

is

belief in

This question

is

God

easily

some

beliefs,

first

why

not to religious

singled out as requiring discursive redemption? 4

answered by those evidentialists who adopt the account of

rational belief-formation constitutive of classical foundationalism. 5

of the

our

to the

modus ponens

in the affirmative,

to articulate

Is

have reliable access

exist? Is sense perception reliable? Is

some of these questions must be answered

whatsoever. If

Do

really a

chapter, classical foundationalism

is

As

I

noted

an amalgam of two distinct claims.

a foundationalist claim about the structure of justification: a belief is justified

based upon other justified
based upon

still

terminates with

beliefs,

at the

and those other

end

First,

iff (1)

it

is

beliefs are justified in virtue of being

other justified beliefs, and so on, until the transfer of justification

some immediately justified

belief(s); or (2)

it is

based on something non-

doxastic like a perceptual experience. Second, a classical claim that every immediately

4
.

“Reason and Belief

.

The

5

in

God,”

p.

24.

classical foundationalist version

of the evidentialist objection

is

not the only formulation ot

the objection. Plantinga discusses and dismisses coherentist versions of the evidentialist objection
most
to religious belief in “Coherentism and The Evidentialist Objection.” It is nevertheless the

prominent and provides the clearest reason why

belief in

basic.
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God ought

not be counted as properly

Only

certain, or incorrigible, or indubitable beliefs
count as "properly basic,” as justified

without evidential support from other beliefs.

Why, according

to the classical foundationalist, shouldn't belief
in

properly basic? The belief that
evidence,

belief that

all.

And

and

etc.,

God

this

God

exists

is

count as

exists does not enjoy certainty, incorrigibility,
self-

therefore not immediately justified. 6 If she

is

God

not immediately justified,

it

is

correct,

mediately justified

is

because the

if justified at

provides for the propriety of the evidentialist objection to religious

belief:

she requests that the theist produce a chain of reasoning in virtue of which
belief in
is

putatively justified and politely denies that the theist

Given
on

parasitic

7

latter.

As

I

that evidentialism, in

its

is

God

successful in so doing.

most prominent and

influential manifestation, is

classical foundationalism, Plantinga joins the torrent of voices declaiming the

have already noted

(1.8),

Alston doesn’t have foundationalism

itself in his

6

“Now suppose that we return to the main question: Why should not belief in God be among the
foundations of my noetic structure? The answer, on the part of the classical foundationalist, was
.

even

does not have the characteristics a proposition must have to
is no room in the foundations for a proposition that can
be rationally accepted only on the basis of other propositions. The only properly basic

that

if this

deserve a place

belief

in

is

true,

it

the foundations. There

propositions are those that are self-evident or incorrigible or evident to the senses. Since the

proposition that

God

exists

is

none of the above,

it

is

not properly basic for anyone; that

well-formed, rational noetic structure contains this proposition
Belief
7
.

in

Most

God,”

no

p. 59.

centrally, Plantinga finds the classical version wanting because self-referentially

incoherent. Clearly, the claim that classical foundationalism
inclusion in a rational noetic structure
rational in so doing.
justified or (2) based,
beliefs,

is,

foundations. “Reason and

in its

is

if

an agent

who

satisfy

its

own

criteria for

adheres to classical foundationalism

true

is

true

is

must enjoy

to
its

be justified

in

if

(1

)

is

to be

certain and immediately

an agent

who

adheres to the claim that

so believing, the claim that classical

justification in virtue of being based,

proximately, on certain and immediately justified beliefs.

forthcoming. Hence, the classical foundationalist

is

And

committed

that kind

whether remotely or

of support

to the claim that

it

is

is

hardly

not rational to

See Alvin Plantinga, “On Taking Belief in God as
Joseph Runzo and Craig K. lhara, eds., Religious Experience and Religious Belief,

believe that classical foundationalism
Basic,” in

must

whether remotely or proximately, on certain and immediately justified

classical foundationalism
is

true

But the claim that every belief must be either

neither certain nor immediately justified. So,

foundationalism

is

is

true.
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does Plantinga. Plantinga

sights; neither

toundationalism in order to argue that

is

interested in refuting classical

we have no

reason not to be quite a

latitudinarian than the classical foundationalist with respect to

basic.

He

is

interested in liberalizing classical constraints

argue that there are no principled reasons
properly basic

when formed

God

no discursive justification for

that belief.

Objection .”

that liberalizing

8

move opens

Having rejected

do not count as

For some agents

in

some

even though they can provide

Plantinga up to “The Great

classical constraints

basicality so as to

religious beliefs

exists is rationally held

more

what counts as properly

on proper

in the appropriate circumstances.

circumstances, the belief that

But

why some

bit

on proper

Pumpkin

basicality, Plantinga

prescinds from articulating what he takes to be more adequate criteria for proper

basicality.

must be

He

articulates

no substitute

certain, incorrigible, etc.

As

for the classical claim that properly basic beliefs

a consequence, he

is

regularly charged with opening

the door to relativism, subjectivism, and the like: if Plantinga

situation,

we

is

right about our epistemic

lack non-question-begging grounds for objecting to such obviously

objectionable beliefs as Charlie Brown’s conviction that the Great Pumpkin will return to

(Lanham, MD.: University Press of America, 1986),
8
.

God,” pp. 74-78. Note that the Great Pumpkin Objection is distinct from
approach is just a protective strategy by which those with
Reformed
the

“Reason and Belief

the accusation that

p. 15.

in

religious convictions insulate themselves from the "unforced force' (Habermas) of rational

argumentation. The

Epistemology, so

latter

far as

I

accusation

am

is

plainly false.

Reformed approach

is at

entirely consistent with the claim that she
is

corpus of Reformed

is

rationally justified in so doing.

who
Not

refuses

to belabor

heart a rejection of the claim that an agent requires

propositional evidence for her belief that

she

in the

aware, does the position get aired that a cognitive agent

to consider objections to her religious convictions

the point, the

Nowhere

God
is

exists if she

is

rational in so believing

and

rationally compelled to cease believing in

faced with adequate evidence to the contrary.
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that

is

God when

s

the

pumpkin patch on Halloween Eve.

If Plantinga denies us the

wherewithal

to

deny

positive epistemic status even to belief in the Great Pumpkin,
then "anything goes’;

Plantinga

s

defense ot the rationality ot belief in

effective distinction

Exactly what

between
is

the Great

epistemology? Clearly,
of religious

in

God and

belief:

fanatical

critics

God

succeeds only by obliterating any

and rational ways of forming

Why

Pumpkin Problem?

employ

it

beliefs.

a problem for Plantinga’

is it

to discredit Plantinga’s defense

because Plantinga can articulate no relevant differences between belief

belief in the Great Pumpkin,

it

is irrational

for

properly basic but not belief in the Great Pumpkin. But

him

why

to regard belief in

is that

what those differences

9

are.

This does not

to claim that there is a relevant difference

Pumpkin but

much

mollify his

that

we

9

Brown should

in the

regard as probative. In

fact,

we have

a position to

Plantinga

Great

Brown

is irrational.

But then,

without having any rationale for that claim

isn’t

reason to

we have no argument

only register our conviction, unsupported by any rationale

believe Charlie

irrational

as

that he lacks criteria for identifying that difference renders us incapable of

believe that Charlie

we can

is in

critics: for

between belief in God and

providing an argument against belief in the Great Pumpkin which

all;

God

a problem? Plantinga

denies vociferously that there are no differences; he just denies that he
identify

of the rationality

we can

at

articulate,

decrying an agent’s belief as

itself irrational?

So long as we

in God as Basic,” pp. 14-15. Thus, Joseph Runzo miswhen he asserts that, for Plantinga, "'a belief is properly basic
only for some individual or community of individuals,” and that ""a belief is only properly basic
relative to some system of belief, some particular world view.” ""Worldviews and The Epistemic
Foundations of Theism,” in Worldviews and Perceiving God, p. 122. (Runzo s emphasis) For
Plantinga, whether or not some belief is properly basic is not up to a given individual or
.

Alvin Plantinga, ""On Taking Belief

characterizes Plantinga’s position

worldview; rather, what an individual takes to be properly basic depends upon her worldview.
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assume

that rational agents are willing

and capable of providing reasons

convictions, Plantinga s defense of belief in

God

for their

consigns to irrationality beliefs

we

hold

with great conviction.
Objections of this
to expect that

we

sort,

according to Plantinga, are groundless:

are capable of articulating

basic from non-basic beliefs.

Why?

some

beliefs

we

10
.

have no a

we

are

priori insight into

for articulating criteria for proper

by identifying a

suitable spread of

be obviously properly basic, as well as a suitable spread of

take to be obviously non-basic, and attempt to identify the necessary and

sufficient conditions

beliefs

to

We

Our procedure

basicality should, therefore, be an inductive one: start

which we take

unreasonable

His answer hinges on the way he believes

for a properly basic belief.

beliefs

is

neutral criterion for distinguishing

constrained to formulate criteria for proper basicality.

what makes

it

which demarcate the obviously basic from the obviously non-basic

Not having

settled criteria for distinguishing obviously basic

non-basic beliefs will invariably result

in differing

obviously basic. Theists will tend to take belief in

convictions as to what counts as

God

to

therefore to count as part of the data set in light of which

sufficient conditions

be obviously basic, and

we

identify the necessary

of proper basicality; non-theists will tend not

be obviously basic, and therefore not to count as part of the data
identify the necessary

and

sufficient conditions

from obviously

of proper

and non-theist alike begin with differing convictions as

to take belief in

set in light

basicality.

to

.

“On Taking

Belief in

God

as Basic,” pp. 15-16.
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God

of which

Because the

to

we

theist

what counts as properly

the criteria they formulate as a consequence of their ‘induction’ will just mirror the

10

and

basic,

.

conflict of conviction at the deeper level.

And

'beneath' an agent's deepest convictions,

we

because there

is

no appeal 'beyond' or

should conclude that

we

of distinguishing between properly basic and non-basic beliefs of the
classical toundationalists aspired.

failing to provide

way

lack a neutral

sort to

which the

Hence, Plantinga avers, he can hardly be faulted for

such a criterion."

4.1.2 Alston’s Resolution of the

Great Pumpkin Problem

Whereas Plantinga formulates
undermine the epistemic

status

the evidentialist objection as an attempt to

of the belief that

God

exists,

Alston formulates that

objection as an attempt to undermine the epistemic status of practices of forming beliefs

about God. There

show

is

no reason, Alston argues,

premises beliefs formed by engaging

".

I

CMP

that religious doxastic practices,

in

to

assume

that

we

are in any position to

in particular, are reliable

by employing as

any particular subset of our non-religious

have been formulating Plantinga’s analysis of, and response to, the Great Pumpkin Problem
early work on epistemology. In his more recent work, he displays even less concern about

in his

the possible promiscuity licensed by his epistemic position. Briefly put, Plantinga argues that a
belief

B

has warrant that property which distinguishes true belief from knowledge,
,

iff (1)

B

is

produced by a properly functioning module of our cognitive faculties (2) the segment of the
module which produces B is designed to produce true beliefs, (3) there is a high objective
probability that
in

which B

is

B

is

true

when formed

in

the appropriate circumstances, and (4) the circumstances

formed are appropriate. See Warrant and Proper Function,

counts as a properly functioning belief-forming faculty will generate

what counts as a properly basic

belief.

pp. 3-20.

at least as

much

For what counts as proper belief formation

metaphysical convictions as to the nature of human beings

—

a topic about

is

is

really about the

human design

plan,

we

dissensus as
a function of

which we expect

much, and tolerate considerable, conflict of opinion. Thus, Plantinga writes, “when
the de jure question

What

we

see that

see that the epistemological

question as to the rationality or lack thereof of Christian belief has anthropological, and hence
ontological and ultimately religious roots.

What you properly

take to be rational, at least

of metaphysical and religious stance you adopt;

in question, depends on what sort
upon the kinds of beings you think human beings

sense

it

in

the

depends

are, and what sorts of beliefs their noetic
produce when they are functioning properly.... And so the dispute as to whether
theistic belief is rational cannot be settled just by attending to epistemological considerations;
at bottom not merely an epistemological dispute but a metaphysical or theological dispute.

faculties will

“What’s the Question?,”

p.

41
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it

is

doxastic practices

you

— and

there

is

no reason

to

please. Moreover, any requirement that

assume

we show

that

even

if

CMP is as reliable as

CMP to be reliable by employing

premises formed by memory, introspection, sense-perception and reason

can

t

do

Problem

that for SP, so

arises: if

why CMP? But

then his

own

is

version of the Great

arbitrary:

we

Pumpkin

CMP needs no external justification, why does astrology, witchcraft or

the reading of chicken entrails ? 12

Alston, unlike Plantinga, worries about possible permissive implications of his

argument.

He

is

as allergic as

witch or astrologer

defending

— not

to

is

anyone

mention

else to the prospect

racist or bigot

of the philosophically acute

~ employing

CMP to vindicate the practices in which they engage.

however, he has

built into his general epistemic position criteria

his strategy for

Unlike Plantinga,

which exclude such

(epistemic) undesirables from co-opting his defense of CMP. Because of the

formulated the problem of the status of religious belief — what should

we

can provide no non-circular proof of the

may

reliability

practices provides

for an agent to

15
.

engage

in SP.

for claiming, not just that

memory, and

given that

Pumpkin Problem which

His practical argument for engaging

him with grounds

has

of basic doxastic practices?, Alston

avail himself of resources for answering the Great

unavailable to Plantinga

we do

way he

are

in socially established

it is

moderately rational

other respectable doxastic practices, but also

that idiosyncratic practices like astrology, divination,

and telepathy need something by

Dirk-Martin Grube, “Religious Experience After the Demise of Foundationalism,” pp. 40-5;
Matthew Bagger, “The Miracle of Minimal Foundationalism,” p. 302; Charles Daniels,
12

.

“Experiencing God,” pp. 490-91.
13
.

“A

Doxastic Practice Approach to Epistemology,"
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p.

23.

way of truth-conducive

support for their reliability. If Cedric

beliefs about the future of the stock

is

in the habit

of forming

market by reading tea leaves, Alston argues, we

should not presume that his practice

is

reliable unless he

can show that

because his practice does not enjoy the social entrenchment shared by
Cedric needs to show that his idiosyncratic practice

is reliable

it is

reliable;

CMP and SP alike.

by appealing

to

considerations generated by practices with a more impressive pedigree. If those on the
fringes of society dabble in the magical arts in order to

we may
the

communicate with the dead, then

regard the beliefs they form thereby with suspicion. If some cult springs up in

backwoods of Appalachia

the

members of which form

predictions about future

mutations influencing the evolutionary prospects of humankind by ingesting a rare and
hallucinatory fungus, those

newcomers must prove

to us that their practice is reliable if

they are to act in an epistemically upstanding manner. Alston’s epistemic standards, then,

do not license an agent

to

engage

in

any practice whatsoever; his appeal

to social

establishment does not allow everyone and anyone, even the Great Pumpkin, access to

that select club

have available

of presumptively innocent practices. By employing (EP9) and (EP10), we
to us

arguments which

we may employ

to

show

that idiosyncratic practices

are epistemically objectionable.

To be
would

like;

sure, Alston’s social establishment criterion

we may

introspection,

might not be as strong as

we

look wistfully back to the foundationalist's privileging of

memory, reason and (sometimes)

expectations should not

move

sense-perception.

us to give his policy short
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shritt.

But our disappointed

First, the social

many of the

innocence

establishment criterion undoubtedly excludes from presumptive
doxastic practices

we

are likely to reject outright;

it

is likely that

there will be a significant correlation in the actual world between those
practices Alston's
social establishment criterion excludes

counter-examples to
proper. After

all, if

generations of the

set

and those

of epistemic standards in

some

we

are likely to regard as effective

light

of which they are putatively

practice has enjoyed widespread participation by

members of our

practice as simply and utterly

society, then

we

many

will be less likely to regard that

beyond the epistemic pale and therefore

as not

even a

candidate for presumptive innocence.

Second, Alston intends for the social establishment criterion to work

in concert

with the various grounds for excluding doxastic practices which distinguish mere weak
rationality

engaging

from moderate

in a

rationality.

given practice only

An

when

agent,

you

that practice

will recall,

is

is

moderately rational for

socially established

and not

itself

massively inconsistent or massively inconsistent with other deeply rooted practices

I

may

add, subject to debilitating comparison criticism or immanent critique).

likely to

be the case that

we

will

if there

were a socially entrenched astrological

that the astrologer’s predictions will be correct often

inconsistency with

it

is

have some such grounds for denying positive epistemic

status to those socially established doxastic practices

even

And

(or, if

SP and testimony?;

can't

we

of the Azande’s witchcraft practice?
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which

are obviously objectionable:

practice,

do we

enough

to avoid

really

have

to

worry

massive

provide a convincing immanent critique

4.1.3 Neutrality, Social

Let

me

remark

Establishment and Rational Discourse

briefly

on the significance of some of the differences between

Alston and Plantinga's responses to the Great Pumpkin Problem. One way
of
formulating Plantinga's resolution of the Great Pumpkin Problem

we can

discover any neutral criteria by employing which

not a given belief

is

failing to articulate

we may

is

that he denies that

determine whether or

properly basic and thus that he can hardly be held accountable for

such

criteria.

14

Alston denies Plantinga’s denial. In Alston's Theory

of Doxastic Practices, (EP9) and (EP 1 0) express the equivalent of a criterion for proper
basicality

— they

constitute criteria for identifying those practices

it

is

epistemically

proper for an agent to regard as reliable until shown to be unreliable. (EP9) and (EP10)
are neutral in the sense that they are supported

by arguments which employ premises

which any human being has access: they do not depend

for their justification

to

on premises

available to Alston as a consequence of his engaging in particular doxastic practices like

CMP. Because we

l4
.

On

are

all in

the

same epistemic predicament, and because Alston

neutral criteria, see Alasdair MacIntyre’s characterization of the Encyclopaedic tradition in

Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. For example, “For Adam Gifford and almost all his
educated Edinburgh contemporaries, it was a guiding presupposition of thought that substantive
rationality

is

unitary, that there

is

a single, if perhaps complex, conception of what the standards

and the achievements of rationality are, one which every educated person can without too much
difficulty be brought to agree in acknowledging. The application of the methods and goals of this
single and unitary conception to any one particular subject matter is what yields a science.” Three

moving toward that
replacement, appealed to two sets of premises, one true and one false. The true premises concerned
those injustices to individuals and to groups of which the preliberal university was surely guilty.
The false premises propounded the thesis that human rationality is such, and the methods and
Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry,

procedures which

it

has devised and

p. 14.

in

Again, “Liberalism,

which

it

has embodied

in

itself are

such

that, if freed

from

external constraints and most notably the constraints imposed by religious and moral tests, it will
produce not only progress in enquiry but also agreement among all rational persons as to what the
rationally justified conclusions of such enquiry are.” Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, p.
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articulates his epistemic criteria

( 1

.4.2.

1 ),

on the basis of reflection on the human condition

any human being can

and should recognize

their legitimacy.

arguments Alston lays out

Any human

in his corpus should

being

who

carefully reflects

on the

conclude that (EP9) and (EP10) are

correct.

Why
take

it

is

Alston so desirous of articulating neutral

criteria for evaluating beliefs?

that neutral criteria are valuable because they enable us rationally to resolve

conflicts of belief; because they

change her

That

beliefs.

we

make

it

possible for ego rationally to persuade alter to

believe that there are such neutral criteria

the possibility of rational discourse. Appeal to neutral criteria

to articulate

grounds for some proposition

will also regard as a

which ego judges
alter,

good reason

that she has

for that proposition.

makes

good reason
After

all, if

is

it

a condition of

possible for ego

to believe that alter

the criteria in light of

that her reasons for belief are probative are genuinely neutral, then

whether or not she adheres

to those criteria, is nevertheless capable

of apprehending

the legitimacy of ego’s epistemic standards and therefore of ego's argument. There

then

I

some hope of persuading

assumption,

if

her by presenting the argument. If ego doesn't

And

if

alter

would take

ego believes that she has available

arguments

this

she doesn’t believe that alter will regard the reasons she articulates in

support of her position as probative, then there

good reason

make

is

to

is little

to her

no reasons

be a good reason, perhaps because

are fundamentally at odds, then there

at all.

point in presenting her argument.

in support

of her position that

their criteria as to

is little

what counts as a

point in the presentation ot

In order to foreclose the possibility that ego and alter will find
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themselves

such an epistemic impasse,

at

criteria are of

we

importance, then, because they

conflicts of belief

aspire to articulate neutral criteria.
Neutral

make

possible rational resolution of

15

.

Alston employs his neutral
respect to belief in God.

establishment

is

I

began

criteria in order to

this chapter

make good on

by indicating

social establishment

sort

I

which makes

of epistemic

it

do double duty

is

It

that

it

turns out that the feature of

provides a neutral criterion

to

have provided an

CMP just because CMP counts as enjoying proper epistemic status

criteria the legitimacy

of which

whomever, regardless of whether she engages
practice).

that Alston’s appeal to social

have just been discussing. Alston can reasonably
claim

external rationale for

in light

with

crucial both to his external rationale for
the rationality of engaging in

CMP and to his response to the Great Pumpkin Problem.

of the

that possibility

Similarly, Alston

is

accessible to any cognitive agent

CMP (or any other parochial doxastic

able to provide principled and non-question-begging

grounds for denying positive epistemic
astrology just because those

in

is

status to obviously objectionable practices like

who engage

in that practice are able to

judge that his

epistemic criteria are correct and that in light of those criteria their idiosyncratic
doxastic

.

I

realize that there

presented indicates

is

more to be said about this. For example, the argument I just
agents might aspire to articulate criteria which are neutral as between

plenty

why two

them without worrying about whether they are neutral for all rational agents. So long as they share
criteria of rationality, why would they concern themselves with whether or not other
agents, agents
to whom they do not address their arguments, also share those criteria? There is a distinction
between criteria which are neutral as between two interlocutors and those which are universally
neutral. Alston is interested in the latter.

formative role here. For those

who

Why?

For

my

money, pluralism plays an important and

Alston does (and we do), its
nearly impossible to engage in discourses without running into interlocutors of fundamentally

And that pushes Alston (us) to develop
human being
universally neutral criteria.

different persuasions.

persuasive to any

live in a society as pluralized as

—
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criteria

of rationality which are

practice requires a truth-conducive justification

Alston’s general epistemic position,

associations,

is

its

it

lacks.

In both cases, the neutrality of

legitimacy regardless of particular or parochial

essential to his project.

As one would

expect, Plantinga’s willingness to abdicate from the task of

articulating criteria for proper basicality

of parochial commitments,

is

which

internally related to his inability to

God. Just because the

rationale for belief in

are recognizable as legitimate regardless

criteria for

mount an

external

proper basicality to which theists

adhere differ from the criteria for proper basicality to which non-theists adhere, and just

because belief in

God

counts as rational because properly basic, he can hardly expect to

be able to provide an argument to the conclusion that belief

employ epistemic

4.2 Social

rational

which

is,

will

then, crucial to his version of the

project of vindicating the positive epistemic status of religious belief.

entrenchment

is

objectionable;

articulate in ascending order

The

first

why

objection

is

I

can’t and won't discuss

of importance, will keep

what follows

I

will

why

all

actually not an objection at

all;

of them. Five, which

it is,

a

also

I

I

will

occupied.

rather,

an attempt to

Pumpkin Problem cannot

whom Alston addresses his work.

make

It is

Alston’s appeal to social

me more than

Alston’s putative dissolution of the Great

persuasive power to those to

that in

is

Entrenchment, Epistemology and Pluralism

extremely problematic. There are any number of reasons

explain

God

criteria non-theists will regard as unobjectionable.

Alston’s appeal to social entrenchment

Reformed

in

but lack

should warn the reader

number of grandiose and unsupported claims about
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the

.

function of epistemology in

Nevertheless,

As
which a

I

hope

that

Peter Berger,

it

modem

is

society

— what follows

is

et. al.,

have argued, modernity

is

distinctive in the degree to

within the same political, economic, and social framework

16
.

Mormons, Agnostics, Jews,

Nationalists, Marxists, Buddhists,

same

theological) while shopping at the

theaters, playing the

same

participating in the

social coordination.

same

sports, attending the

political processes.

How

and the

like co-exist

Fundamentally different

and often conflicting value-perspectives thrive within the same

wax

argument than hunch.

an interesting hunch.

plurality of worldviews, religions, political ideologies,

their being (to

less

social space. Christians,

etc. live,

move and have

same supermarkets, going

to the

same schools, and, of course,

Pluralism, however, generates problems of

so?

Social order requires cooperative relations between (in large-scale societies with

complex economies) often anonymous

agents.

The behavior of diverse agents

is

typically

‘pre-coordinated’ as a consequence of socialization into shared institutions. Socialization

into shared institutions insures that

activity in light of

commonly

.

society govern their everyday

held expectations as to what counts as legitimate behavior

in various stereotypical situations

16

members of a given

17
.

When

that 'pre-established'

Peter Berger, Brigitte Berger, and Hansfried Kellner,

and Consciousness, (New York, NY.: Vintage Books,
The Sacred Canopy, pp. 127 ff

harmony breaks down.

The Homeless Mind: Modernization

1973), pp. 64-82; see also Peter Berger,

background of our everyday interaction 'the Lifeworld.'
come to an understanding in the horizon of a lifeworld.
always
“Subjects acting communicatively
Their lifeworld is formed from more or less diffuse, always unproblematic, background
convictions. This background serves as a source of situation definitions that are presupposed by
disagreement
participants as unproblematic. ... It is the conservative counter weight to the risk of
Communicative
of
Theory
The
understanding.’’
that arises with every actual process of reaching
17

.

Habermas

calls that taken-for-granted
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when
have

the assumptions as to what counts as a legitimate expectation conflict,
social agents
to

‘become’ interlocutors

— they have

to restore the disturbed

consensus by

communicating with one another. Restoration of disturbed consensus
the communicative activity of the relevant agents:

raises various validity claims,

which acquire

consequence of the reasons she

is

alter, in uttering

is

routed through

a given speech act,

their capacity to guide ego’s activity as a

prepared to offer ego in their defense .' 8

By

unthematized, taken-for-granted background of assumptions, rules, values,

relying on a

etc., alter is

able to repair the broken consensus by providing ego with what ego takes to be good

reason to act in such-and-such a way.

This low-level incarnation of rationality

rationality

—

is

—

what Habermas

calls

communicative

crucially important to maintaining social order in modernity

employment of rational argumentation
resolve their dispute by recourse to

in

everyday

some shared

set

life

breaks down,

if

19
.

agents

of considerations, and

if

If this

fail to

individual

1, Reason and the Rationalization of Society, p. 70. See also pp. 335-37; The
Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, Lifeworld and System, Thomas McCarthy, trans.,
(Boston, MA.: Beacon Press, 1987), pp. 140-48, 121-26; Maeve Cooke, Language and Reason,

Action, vol.

p. 14ff.
18

writes, “Owing to the fact that communication oriented to reaching understanding
basis,
validity
a speaker can persuade a hearer to accept a speech-act offer by guaranteeing
has a
that he will redeem a criticizable validity claim. In so doing, he creates a binding/bonding effect
.

Habermas

makes the continuation of their interaction possible. Moral
Consciousness and Communicative Action, Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen,
trans., (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1990), p. 59. See William Rehg, Insight and Solidarity:
The Discourse Ethics of Jurgen Habermas, (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press,
Theory of
1994), p. 28; Maeve Cook, Language and Reason, p. 12; Jurgen Habermas, The
between speaker and hearer

that

Communicative Action, vol. 2, Lifeworld and System, p. 74, 126-27, 262; A Reply to My
(Cambridge,
Critics,” in Habermas: Critical Debates, John B. Thompson and David Held, eds.,
MA.: MIT Press, 1982), p. 234.
19
.

Jurgen Habermas,

(Cambridge, MA.:

The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity,

MIT

Press, 1987), p. 322.
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agents and communities guide their activities by
privatistic and eccentric standards of
propriety, then recourse to manipulation, deception,
force to resolve disputes

more

likely

20
.

But recourse

pluralization renders

on a systematic basis

to force

more and more

difficult the sustaining

communicative action and not by power. Simply

some

dispute, they

more

dispute,

and the more

difficult

to

difficult

it

is

it

will be for

will be for

them

unstable. Unfortunately,

of consensus by

put, the less

them

becomes

two agents agree on

to agree as to the nature

to arrive at a rationally

prior

of their

grounded

resolution of that dispute.

It

seems

why many

to

me, and

I

admit that this

is

pure speculation, that one of the reasons

regard epistemology as of particular importance

purports to provide us with the means necessary to

which

is

is

that the epistemologist

make good on

a moral conviction

crucially important in a pluralistic society. If the social cooperation necessary

for social order breaks

communicate

down, and

to restore

if

it

breaks

down

(in part)

because those

who need

to

consensus lack the shared values and commitments necessary

to

resolve their differences, and if most of us want to avoid restoring consensus by

censorship, power, domination, then

the appeal to force. That

we want

we

crave

some means of restoring consensus without

to maintain social cooperation without

undue or

unnecessary force provides the epistemologist, the guardian of the canons of rationality,
with an important social and moral mandate. What

20
.

It

seems

to

me

that this

is

is

that

mandate?

the heart of Alasdair MacIntyre’s thesis in After Virtue. Moral

claims, devoid of any rational justification, are in fact attempts to manipulate others in order to

achieve one’s

own

preferences.
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An

essential part

of the epistemologist’ s calling

standards ot rationality which

we must assume we

and rational argumentation. (This

is

is to articulate

share in order to engage in meaningful

one of those grandiose claims

evidence, empirical or otherwise, but which

I

think

and vindicate those

is

for

which

I

have no

nevertheless plausible.)

If a

given

epistemologist denies that there are criteria which enable us rationally to
resolve the
disputes generated by the pluralization of worldviews, if her position
undermines our
ability to negotiate

everyday
vocation

way

our

out of the disputes which arise in the ordinary interaction of

life in pluralistic societies,

its

point.

I

then she has failed in the very task which lends her

use the normative terms ‘calling’ and ‘vocation' intentionally, for the

expectations placed on the epistemologist in a pluralistic society are unavoidably moral.

A

‘good society’

is

one

in

which disputes among people of good

the application of power to compel belief. But

through coercion only
epistemologist

-

and

may

who

is

if

we

called to

show

that

we

rationally resolve our differences

heart of epistemology

are so capable. Otherwise put, only if

—

succeeds

do

we have

As Charles Taylor

by

are able to avoid compelling belief

are capable of engaging in rational argumentation.

else but the epistemologist?

(unnecessary) domination.

we

will are not resolved

in articulating criteria

And

the

someone

-

by which we

the option of living in a society free of

has argued, “the moral vision burns

at the

.’’ 21

Plantinga has forsaken this element of the vocation of epistemology. If things are
as Plantinga claims they are, if members of different communities

set

2I
.

of convictions as to what counts as properly basic, and

Sources of the

Self, p. 407.
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if

come complete with

they form their criteria for

a

identifying properly basic beliefs in light of those convictions, then the
hope of forging

consensus via communicative action

Absent neutral

which Plantinga denies we have access, we seem incapable of

criteria, criteria to

articulating

in pluralistic societies evaporates.

arguments which

grounds they have reason

we can

in

good

faith believe provides

our interlocutors with

to regard as compelling.

Alston purports to provide us with neutral

criteria,

those which agents should

recognize as legitimate regardless of parochial convictions, and thereby to have
his epistemic calling.

unobjectionable

which

—

But

it

seems

which they

satisfies the desiderata

clear that,

even

is,

(EP9) and (EP10) are otherwise

are not, nevertheless, they

mandated by the

do not provide us with

pluralistic context in

ourselves. For in pluralistic societies, there are

practices each of which

if

fulfilled

numerous

criteria

which we find

socially established doxastic

according to Alston, presumptively innocent. The social

establishment criterion has the same implications Plantinga’ s more intransigent

dissolution of the Great

commitments

as to

Pumpkin Problem

what counts as

adjudicating doxastic disputes

which only one

an retrenchment of communal

rational belief-forming activity

and no means of

among members of different communities.

which there were no deep-rooted
in

has:

conflicts of belief

In a society in

between communities, a society,

religious doxastic practice enjoyed

say,

hegemony, then perhaps Alston

doxastic practice approach would provide us with epistemic criteria

we

s

could employ to

discourage pluralization. But in those societies which are already pluralized to a high

degree, societies

whose members include those
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to

whom

Alston addresses his work, the

appeal to social establishment does not address the concerns motivating the
Great

Pumpkin Problem.
Let

me

be clear about what

have been claiming.

I

I

am

banking on the claim that

the epistemologist’s contribution to the division of intellectual labor

some way of resolving our
her,

felt

criteria is

we

be correct.

are to

may

with

we want from

make good on some of our most

be able to provide us with such neutral

one of them argues, as Plantinga explicitly and

cannot have that which our moral convictions require, then

their epistemic positions cease to

is

we

When

she has an audience.

Alston implicitly do, that

interest us

if

moral convictions. That she

why

to provide us

disputes without employing force; that’s what

what (we think) we need from her

deeply

is

be of

That their epistemic positions cease to

interest.

no argument against them; on the merits Plantinga or Alston may very well

It is,

rather,

are headed and listen to

an explanation of why

someone

else

who

we

turn

them off when we see where they

claims to provide that which they argue

is

unavailable.

4.3 Social Establishment neither Necessary

nor Sufficient for Rationality
mandate

If Alston’s appeal to social establishment fails to satisfy the social

imposed on the epistemologist by concerns outside of her
light

of standards internal to epistemology. Alston argues

rational for

engaging

in a

given practice

has a going concern in that practice

established.

But

(1) an agent

may

if

if

discipline,

that

it

is

an agent

also defective in

is

practically

she has a going concern in that practice and she

and only

it it is

act rationally
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even

socially

if

and psychologically

she engages in practices which

not socially established and (2)
practices

which

it

may

not be practically rational for her to engage in

are socially established. Hence, the social establishment of a
practice

is

neither necessary nor sufficient for the practical rationality of engaging in
that practice.
First, necessity.

entrenched, that he

and

is

Amie

that

lives in a society in

socialized into that practice so that

is

that he is privy to

Alston

Suppose

no good reasons

correct, at least moderately,

Unfortunately, Amie’s society

is

to believe that

it is

CMP

and perhaps strongly,

which

CMP is deeply

deeply rooted

is

unreliable.

rational for

in his psyche,

Amie

is, if

engaging

overrun by brutal but highly devout polytheists

impose draconic measures which they intend

to discourage participation in

in

CMP.

who

any religious

doxastic practices other than their polytheistic practice. (Note that the polytheistic
imperialists provide no grounds for regarding

work and concluded

that objections to

CMP as unreliable; they have read Alston’s

CMP they once took to be compelling are in fact

afflicted with epistemic imperialism!) In a couple of generations,

have nearly eradicated

CMP

practicing

lifetime been

entrenchment

CMP; Amie

into their dotage.

is

one of those

CMP, we may

faithful

once had.

::

Is

it

no longer

few who have

persisted in

stipulate, has in the course

denuded of its Constantinian trappings

it

Amie’s oppressors

—

it

of Amie's

no longer enjoys the social

practically rational for

Amie

to

engage

in that

he therefore required to produce non-circular justification for CMP now that it lacks social
If Alston is correct that there is no non-circular justification of CMP, has CMP
been consigned to epistemic oblivion as a result of its having been forcibly suppressed? Surely
not. Arnie cannot have acquired the obligation to show that CMP is reliable, and thereby to be

22

.

Is

entrenchment?

committed

to rejecting

account the

CMP,

because his culture has fallen to the imperialist. He should take
the reasons why CMP has been denuded of social

establishment are entirely unrelated to any indications of its reliability,
epistemic status it enjoyed prior to the coming of the imperialist.

This raises an interesting problem for Alston.

modern

into

manner of its demise; because

societies are

more

It is

should have the same

a truism (whether true or not!) that

secular than pre-modern societies.
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it

The term

‘secular’

is

famously

He

practice? Hardly.

has sacrificed greatly in order to continue to participate in

has been the object of persecution and ridicule.

had
in

And he

CMP not been deeply rooted in his psyche.

Amie’s psyche,

that

would despair of his

it

life

practically rational for

CMP;

he

could hardly have endured that

Isn’t the fact that

CMP

is

deeply rooted

provides his sacrifices with meaning and significance, that he

were

him

to

his theological convictions false, sufficient for

engage

in it?

And

is

that not the case

being

its

even though

CMP is

no longer socially entrenched?
Second, sufficiency. Imagine a culture in which
there

is

CMP is deeply entrenched —

a state-sponsored church body, the most powerful politicians participate in

business supports

it,

etc.

In particular, suppose that the beliefs

it,

big

formed by the members of

CMP tend to legitimate the current social order — religion plays its customary
And

ideological role.

ambiguous, but

then suppose that there are a few dissidents who, not only do not

we mean by

if

the secularization thesis that the political, social and

economic

influence of religious institutions and symbols has decreased as modernity has developed, then the
secularization thesis implies that religious doxastic practices are less entrenched

now

than they

once were. And, of course, in the formulations of certain sociologists, the secularization thesis
amounts to the claim that the process of de-institutionalization is inevitable. Why does this raise a
problem for Alston? If CMP's presumptive innocence depends upon its social entrenchment, and
if its social entrenchment is decreasing and will do so inevitably, then Alston has to take a stand on

what the causes of secularization

are.

If,

for example,

some

“barrier theory”

case that the progressive and inevitable process of secularization
increasing cultural influence of modern science, or of increases
individuals, then the best explanation of secularization

is

in the level

would seem

is

true, viz.,

best explained

to

it it is

the

by the

of education of modern

impugn CMP’s

reliability.

But if the best explanation of secularization does not entail CMP’s unreliability, tor example, it
religion is less attractive to moderns because they deny that moral claims have cognitive status, as
Alasdair MacIntyre argues, or simply because moderns have available to them alternative, nonmoral sources, as Charles Taylor argues, or if religion doesn t decrease in influence, but
only transforms the manner of its expression, as Robert Wuthnow argues, then Alston is entitled to
regard CMP as reliable even if it lacks social establishment entirely. That is, if the best
explanation of the erosion of CMP’s social entrenchment has little or nothing to do with its
religious,

lacking social establishment shouldn t count against it. Whatever tack he
which Alston frames the issue as to the epistemic status of religious belief forces

unreliability, then

takes, the

him

way

in

its

to take a position on topics often regarded as irrelevant to that issue.
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engage

in

CMP,

but believe that

it

of support to a social order which
those dissidents to engage in

is

inimical to a just social order

disguised repression.

is

CMP?

Is

it

—

that

CMP

CMP

Hardly. They believe that

legitimates ordered

would

require dismantling the current regime. Clearly, then,
that a doxastic practice
is

a pillar

practically rational for

disorder, repression disguised as justice, and that
a genuinely orderly society

established

is

socially

is

not sufficient for an agent's being practically rational
in engaging in that

practice.

Although these examples indicate

employs the

synonymous with

is.

the

most (an)

Here

is

what

efficient

practically rational, that

is

wrong with

the

means

is,

the

An

action

is

it

is

2
.

'

do not specify

To claim

that

is

an action

is

instrumental in bringing about a desired end, that

available to a given end. Adopting the policy of

to socially established practices is

most (an)

efficient

that

means

we

to

some

supposed

end. But to

to

be

what end?

evaluate the practical rationality of a

never practically rational tout court whether or not some
;

practically rational depends, in part,

properly to be judged

way Alston

think has gone wrong. Practical rationality

of what goals does Alston propose

given action?

action

I

to claim that

is

imputing presumptive innocence

In light

is

instrumental, or means/ends rationality.

practically rational

is

something

social establishment criterion in his practical argument, they

exactly what that

it

that

on the goals

The martyr may count

of which that action

is

as stupifyingly irrational if her actions are

judged as to whether or not they maximize expected

23

in light

utility yet

count as supremely

With one important exception: under no circumstances is it practically rational for an agent to
adopt some policy or pursue some course of action which it is impossible for her to consummate.
.
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rational

judged as

it

to

whether or not she discharges her moral obligations. As Richard

Foley has argued, judgements of rationality are
that

it

is

some proposition

rational to believe

whenever someone
entitled to ask

perform some action) and a

(or to

give an account of what

tries to

two questions: Rational

“...whenever someone claims

elliptical:

is

fortiori

we

involved in such claims,

for what, with respect to

what goal? And

are

rational

from what perspective ?” 24
Alston claims that the most basic way
socially established practices

agent’s action

social

in

it

life,

would be
action

is

expected

24

is

to

then

it is

engage

if

the case that the

an action

is

that

it

maintains social order

most

rational policy to pursue

is

practically rational only if

it

in

25
.

If

in only those practices

modes of

would be

least, that

claim

maintains just

to

is

modes

which enjoy

And

social establishment.

if

an

practically rational only if it conduces to the maximization of a given agent’s

utility

—

surely this

—

is

a

common

Rationality,

p.

understanding of rationality, then

138.

He

it is

unclear

writes further that “the main thesis here

— tend

claims about the rationality of a person’s actions or beliefs
of rationality
they
be elliptical, and the corresponding thesis is that such claims tend to be elliptical because
be
can
turn,
in
view,
of
point
made.
A
are
to make explicit the point of view from which they
evaluation
the
which
identified by identifying a goal and by identifying a perspective from
may
concerning how effectively the person is satisfying the goal is made. Accordingly, one
that claims

from a claim of rationality by making explicit the point of view
presupposes.” The Theory of Epistemic Rationality, p. 140.

remove the

25
.

an

unlikely to be the case that the most rational policy to pursue

The Theory of Epistemic

.

practically rational

only those practices which enjoy social establishment. At

not obviously false. But

of social

which the policy of engaging only

practically rational only if that action maintains established

then perhaps

life,

engage

is

is

in

ellipsis

Perceiving God,

p.

276.
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it

is

to

fail

whether or not

it

would always and everywhere be

which enjoy

practices

Alston

social

rational to

engage

in

only those

and psychological establishment.

tails to articulate

any kind ot a justification

for privileging the

maintenance

of social order. Unless he can provide some such justification, unless he can
show that
maintaining social order (the de facto social order and not even some idealized social
order)

is

we

the goal in light of which

should make judgements of practical rationality,

then his restriction on those practices in which

engage

is

simply gratuitous.

I

it is

practically rational for an agent to

up an argument

can’t conjure

in Alston’s support

has any plausibility

at all.

those practices

practically rational to impute presumptive reliability

it

is

Hence,

take

I

it

that Alston’s social

which

entrenchment restriction on
indefensible.

is

4.4 Social Establishment versus Ineluctability

In the previous subsection,

rational

depends upon the goal(s)

any number of goals

in light

I

noted that whether or not a given action

in light

may

may

evaluate the practical rationality of a

count as practically rational

in light

goals and irrational in light of others. If Alston’s practical argument

of some of those

is to

go through, he

has to provide some justification for the claim that the most rational policy
to regard socially established practices as innocent until

so.

I

I

practically

of which such judgements are made. There are

of which an agent

given action; the same action

is

will argue in this subsection that there

is

proven

guilty.

He

is

for an agent

has not done

a plausible alternative practical argument.

will argue that an agent desirous of discharging her central epistemic

aim who finds

herself in the epistemic predicament generated by her inability to provide non-circular
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justification for her basic epistemic practices

would be

best served by imputing

presumptive innocence only to ineluctable doxastic practices and to require
of all
eluctable practices that they be

in ineluctable practices.

also believe that

it

is

shown

Although

I

to be reliable

by premises formed by engaging only

will conclude that this

argument

is itself

defective,

I

vastly superior to Alston’s, and therefore undercuts his claim that

imputing defeasible innocence

to socially established practices is the

most

rational policy

available to agents.

4.4.1 Practical Rationality

Before

and Ineluctable Doxastic Practices

turn to that argument,

I

relevance of my alternative from the

to

whether

arise if

it

we

is

I

will begin

start.

rational for an agent to

Simply

engage

by indicating why Alston dismisses the
put,

Alston claims that the question as

in a given doxastic practice

believe that she has no option but to engage in that practice.

does not even

A human being

has no choice but to engage in the standard package of sense-perceptual, introspective,

inferential,

and mnemonic doxastic

practices; these practices are not only socially

established but also ineluctable. If an agent cannot but engage in the standard package,

then there

is

no issue as

course of action

is

to

whether or not

ineluctable

is

it

is

practically rational for her to

26
.

many

cases, that

Perceiving God,

p.

it

is

so.

That a

grounds for denying the relevance of practical

considerations: "one objection to thinking of this as practical rationality

clear, in

do

is that it is

.”
possible for [an agent] to adopt any other course

168. Again, “if

I

lack the

power

2 '1

not

But, if

A or to
A as a means to a

effectively to decide whether to

employing

it is not appropriate to think of me
‘Means-end’ talk along with ‘pursuit of goals’ talk and ‘acting with a purpose' talk, is
indissolubly bound up with the possibility of effective voluntary control of the alleged ‘means.'
we don’t have that control, this conceptual scheme is inapplicable.” William Alston, “Richard

not-A,

as choosing, selecting, or

goal.
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It

true, this

would undercut Alston’s employment of practical considerations

to determine to

which practices we should impute presumptive innocence.
Alston suggests that
’original position' in

While assuming

what the

we

adopt the curious policy of entering into a hypothetical

which we assume

most

practically rational course of action

not engage in the standard package.

would be

we

attempt to determine

for an agent

by the ubiquity of epistemic

who found

circularity.

rational course of action be for an agent if she could choose in

human beings

she engages? That actual
put too fine a point on

form

we need

that hypothetical attitude, Alston suggests that

the dire epistemic straits generated

the

that

when Alston

it,

lack that choice

is

assumes

What would

which

practices

beside the point. So, not to

attempts to determine

beliefs given epistemic circularity, he

herself in

how a

rational agent

would

that that agent believes that all

of her

doxastic practices are eluctable.

This assumption

is

doubly unfortunate:

favor of the practical rationality criterion.

it

Why

is ill

is

denying the relevance of practical questions given
an agent has no choice but

it

to

motivated and

it ill

it

cooks the game

in

motivated? Alston’s reasons for

ineluctability are unconvincing. That

adopt some course of action

is

compelling reason

to regard

as practically rational for her to pursue that course of action. For an agent to attempt

not to engage in a practice she

knows

to be ineluctable

is

supremely

irrational.

As Alston

p. 136. This seems to me clearly wrong. Suppose that
employing
a computer which transposes thoughts to words.
the only way can communicate is by
lack a
(I am suffering from Parkinson’s Disease and have lost the requisite motor skills.) That
spread of alternative means of communicating doesn't entail that the computer is not the means by

Foley’s Theory of Epistemic Rationality,”
I

I

which

I

communicate. And

practical rational for

me

to

it

surely doesn’t entail that

employ

the computer

it

is

neither practically rational nor not

as a means.
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remarks in a different context, “by the time honored
principle
...it

makes no sense

to speak

of S's being permitted or forbidden

do A.” 27

effective choice as to whether to

The

is

is,

of course, an explanation as

do not

rationality

arise

when an

to

action available to her, what

need to deliberate about
is

that course

rationality

In

it

is

of action

is

if

S lacks an

to

show

that

no other course of

seems

that issues

of practical

When

it is

definitively settled

by the

an agent has but one course of

do

is

so obvious that she does not

some course of action,

the ineluctability of

we can adduce

in support

of the

of her so acting.

what respect does Alston’s denial of the relevance of ineluctability

game

in favor

to practical

of his social establishment criterion? Because the

may

affect

which course of action

it

is

practically

Suppose, to take perhaps an overly simple example, that an

wishes to travel from Los Angeles to

drive a car, ride in a bus, or take a train.

“The Deontological Conception of Episteinic

.

Alston seems to recognize that

in

New York as quickly

Assuming

.

p.

it

the strongest kind of evidence

rational for her to pursue.

28

A

Far from being irrelevant to the question as to whether or not

it.

spread of options open to an agent

who

why

rational for her to

practically rational for pursuing

questions cook the

27

is

seems moot because

unavailability of alternative courses of action.

agent

do

agent has one and only one course of action open to her.

practical rationality question only

an agent

to

can,'

a real possibility. 28

There

The

'Ought implies

strongest argument in support of the

practical rationality of pursuing a given course of action

action

that

as possible

may

that the latter option will get her to

Justification,” p. 118.

an earlier essay, “Christian Experience and Christian Belief,”

133.
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New

York more quickly than

her destination

is

rational choice

would be

on a plane, we

will

rational choice.

the

first

two options, and

that the time

it

will take to reach

the only goal in light of which the alternatives
are to be judged, the only
to take the train.

Obviously,

if

we add

a fourth option, e.g., fly

have to recalculate and will no doubt conclude

that flying is the only

We would be mistaken if we introduced the fourth option but refused to

recalculate.

believe that by claiming that the ineluctability of

I

questions of practical rationality

moot Alston commits

that he is interested in determining

agent to pursue if an she
for purposes

of the argument

one of the options open
claim that

it

is

that all

to actual

rational for an agent to

2

^

it

is

stipulating

practically rational for an

which practices she engages he assumes
,

of our practices are eluctable. He thereby brackets

human

beings: if there are no ineluctable practices, the

practically rational for an agent to impute presumptive innocence only to

ineluctable doxastic practices

perhaps,

to in

By

a similar blunder.

what course of action

had a choice as

some course of action renders

whom

is

unworthy of consideration. And just as

flying

is

it

is

practically

not an option to take only a train, so also

practically rational for an agent

who can

practices to engage only in those practices in

is it,

opt out of any of her doxastic

which she has a going concern. But

if

we

reintroduce the bracketed option (flying on a plane/adhering to the epistemic policy that

an agent

is

practices),

to

29
.

show

If

rational to impute presumptive innocence only to ineluctable doxastic

does the original calculation go through?

I

do not believe

that in the next section.

Alston can resolve the problem

I

pointed out in the previous section.
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so.

I

shall attempt

4.4.2 Ineluctability as a Criterion for

Suppose
choose

in

that

we

Determining Presumptive Innocence

agree that, in those possible worlds in which an agent

which doxastic practices she

will engage, the ‘social

establishment’ criterion suffices to cull out those practices

But

to regard as innocent.

in those possible

which she cannot but engage

in a

given

set

it

and psychological

is

moderately rational for her

worlds (which includes the actual one)

of practices,

it

is

rational for her to

presumptive innocence only to ineluctable doxastic practices. That

is,

At

least, that is

what

I

will attempt to

Consider the following epistemic principles.
for ‘socially established’

and ‘eluctable’

is

re-

not as rational

show.

(I

have just substituted ‘ineluctable’

for ‘non-socially established’ in

(EP9) and

(EP10).

(EP1

1): It is

iff that

DP

is

rational m for an agent to regard as epistemically justified a
( 1 )

DPs; or

(2)

an eluctable practice that has

been shown to be reliable by premises formed by engaging

which

it is,

(EP12):

in virtue

of satisfying

It is rational,,

justified iff that

DP

ineluctable, substantially internally consistent, and coheres

sufficiently with other ineluctable

DP

(1),

in practices in

already rational mors for her to engage.

for an agent to regard a given

DP

as epistemically

(1) ineluctable, substantially internally consistent,

is

coheres sufficiently with other ineluctable DPs, and enjoys significant
self-support; or (2) an eluctable practice that has been shown to be reliable

by premises formed by engaging
satisfying

( 1 ),

already

Three brief notes about (EP1

in practices in

rational,, for

1)

which

her to engage.

and (EP12).
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in

impute

when we

introduce the excluded option, the epistemic policy Alston recommends
as any other.

may

it is,

in virtue

of

First, a

note about ineluctability.

I

assume

that actual, living, breathing

human

beings cannot but engage in the practices constitutive of the
standard package. All
beings have dispositions to enter into and engage

in their

memory,

human

introspective,

perceptual, and inferential practices. Because part of our natural endowment,
our

dispositions to engage in practices cannot be modified, adjusted, altered (barring
an

unexpected and improbable

from

scientific discovery, supernatural intervention, or visitations

extraterrestrials!).

This does not preclude the possibility that different agents in different natural and
social environments will develop different bfds even though they

doxastic practice. Although

about trees whenever

we

we have

cannot but engage in SP, that

trees.

the capacity to discriminate

But not

perception

is

at all to

in the

same

tend to form beliefs

a tree-like sensory input depends upon whether or not there

are any trees in our environment. Moreover, given that

may develop

we

engage

more

form beliefs about the

not possible for actual

human

we have formed

this tendency,

we

or less finely amongst different types of

social

and natural worlds by sense

beings.

Second, a note on overriders of the presumptive innocence to be imputed,
according to (EP1

human

1)

and (EP12), to ineluctable doxastic

practices.

Given

that actual

beings cannot but employ the standard package of SP, introspection,

inference

when forming

practices. This

is,

beliefs,

an agent can hardly be

irrational for

memory and

engaging

in those

of course, entirely consistent with the claim that she might be

epistemically defective for so doing.

It is

certainly possible that an agent

constitutionally compelled to engage in SP, for example, and yet for
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SP

is

to

be massively

inconsistent with introspection,

memory and

inference.

could hardly be regarded as practically irrational were

Were

to she

this the case,

engage

though she

in SP, so

engaging

is

not conducive to her achieving her epistemic aim.
Though weakly rational in engaging in

SP, she

is

not moderately rational; the

overridden by

its

weak

rationality

of engaging in SP would be

massive inconsistency with more well-established practices.
Hence, she

would not be moderately

rational for

engaging

in

even ineluctable practices.

Third, a note about eluctable practices. At the heart of Alston’s
doxastic practice

approach to epistemology

is

the attempt to provide non-question-begging grounds for

requiring of some practices that they enjoy non-circular justification without laying
that requirement for all practices.

latter is practical: the

The

down

relevant difference between the former and the

former practices lack social entrenchment, the

alternative approach encapsulated in (EP1 1) and (EP12),

I

latter

enjoy

it.

In the

have kept with precedent and

provided practical grounds for distinguishing between presumptively innocent and
presumptively guilty practices. Ineluctable practices are presumptively innocent; thus, SP,

memory, and
(EP1
for

1)

the rest of the standard package are presumptively innocent. According to

and (EP12), under which conditions would a

engaging

in eluctable practices like, say,

Presumably under conditions

CMP,

rational agent be practically rational

crystal ball reading,

parallel to those Alston lays

down

and astrology?

for Cedric’s idiosyncratic

practice of reading sun-dried tomatoes to determine the future of the stock market, viz.,

that his practice be

shown

to

be reliable by premises formed by engaging

doxastic practices.
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in ineluctable

Note the

similarities

Each presupposes

between (EP9) and (EP1

and between (EP10) and (EP12).

no non-circular justification of doxastic practices (whether

that there is

crystal ball reading or SP).

1)

In light of that, each provide practical

grounds for taking a

subset of the available practices as reliable (SP but not crystal ball reading). Each further
requires that

all

practices not in that subset (crystal ball reading) be

from premises formed by engaging

My

to

criteria are not as permissive:

mnemonic,

to

be reliable

in those in that subset (SP).

In spite of these similarities, Alston's criteria allow

moderately rational for an agent

shown

engage

it

is

introspective, inferential,

him

to

conclude that

it

is

in practices other than the standard package.

moderately rational for an agent

to

engage

in her

and sense perceptual doxastic practices (or whatever

practices turn out to be ineluctable) so long as those practices are free of massive internal

and external inconsistency. Although Alston sometimes appears
simply

isn't

argue for

is

any other alternative
that there are

0

But

Because we are engaged

we

is

30
.

in

it

that

is not.

should be as restrictive as

is

engage

commend

p.

clearly, all

shown

to

be

we want

to

reliable.

And

possible in delimiting those practices

in

he needs to

themselves to rational reflection

an epistemic discourse,

without proof ot

determine what the rational course of action

Perceiving God,

claim that there

Why?

possible exemption from being

rational for an agent to

to

one for which he plumps,

“no alternatives

as superior” to his candidate.’

practices as

to the

to

168.
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is

reliability.

allow as few

we

that

take

means
it

to

that

be

Because we are attempting

given our epistemic predicament, and

given the overriding goal to believe the true and not
the

false,

we

should be as miserly as

possible in letting doxastic practices in the door without
a pass.

Perhaps the best way to put

engaging

this point is the following:

in certain doxastic practices;

we

cannot do otherwise. Hence,

regard those practices as reliable, even though
are going to

have

to use

them

to

by nature,

we

form beliefs whether we

like

we can

it

about showing that eluctable practices are reliable?

imposing

use to

show that

The moral of the
properties.

A

chances that

set

difference of non-epistemic property

it

is

go

from

believing

form true beliefs

-

for believing that the premises

arguments which purport

to

show

may

warrant drawing a different

practically rational for an agent to pursue. If

difficult not to

the property of being impossible not to engage

two

How should we

their reliability

will

we

story? Different practices have different non-epistemic

of practices has the property of being

different

we

We

eluctable practices are reliable are themselves reliably formed.

conclusion as to which course of action

one

so.

We are committed to

once again, even though we lack truth-conducive reason

we must

from engaging;

refrain

By showing

in ineluctable practices.

this restriction will increase the

cannot but

or not. But there are

should not regard them as reliable until provided with reason to do

that

we

are stuck

cannot show them to be reliable.

plenty of other practices of forming beliefs in which

premises formed by engaging

we

in,

in,

an agent will have

that she

different sets of practices. Hence, there are as

engage

is

at

and another has
her disposal two

rationally permitted to

many

practical

arguments

engage

in

in support

of

the rationality of engaging in doxastic practices as practices possess interestingly different

non-epistemic properties. Which argument

we

254

accept ought to be determined by

epistemic reasons,

reason

that

is

if

those are sufficient to decide the issue.

we ought

reliable as is possible.

to

And

the relevant epistemic

exempt as few doxastic practices from being shown

The multitude of practical arguments

that

we saw

to

in the

be

previous

subsection are available in support of the practical rationality of
a given course of action

may

be reduced to only one: regarding only ineluctable practices as
presumptively

reliable

is

the

most

rational course of action available to us given the ubiquity of

epistemic circularity.

4.4.3 Is Privileging Ineluctable Practices Arbitrary?

Has Alston already

Thomas

Reid's critique of

discredited the alternative approach

Hume

and Descartes approvingly

privileged introspection and deduction by requiring that

reliable

by premises formed by engaging

from an "undue

strategy suffers

those practices.

'

2

my

arbitrary

In like manner, perhaps

over her eluctable practices

It

in those practices.

partiality": the lack

between the various practices renders

is

guilty of

all

my

undue

32
.

Both

Hume

He

cites

and Descartes

other practices be

shown

to be

Reid argues that their

of epistemically relevant differences

any attempt

to privilege

one or some of

attempt to privilege an agent's ineluctable

partiality.

alternative epistemic criteria

would be

to

confuse practical rationality with epistemic

Recall the importance of distinguishing between practical rationality and

epistemic justification. At the current level of argument,

.

have sketched?

should be clear that to claim that Reid’s undue partiality response holds against

justification.

31

31
.

I

we have eschewed

Perceiving God, pp. 150-51; and “Christian Experience and Christian Belief,"
Perceiving God,

p.

151.
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epistemic

p. 119.

considerations (because they

fail

us) in order to determine in

which practices

it

is

rational

for an agent to regard as reliable without argument.
Practical considerations are therefore

relevant to determining in

which

practices

it is

practically rational for an agent to engage.

In addressing the classical foundational ist privileging
of the standard package, Alston

objects to the propriety of privileging certain doxastic practices on
epistemic grounds
there are no

not to

good epistemic reasons

CMP. He

memory

but

correct in so objecting. But he fails to provide us with reason not to

is

privilege certain practices

practical reasons

for according presumptive innocence to

-

is

on

practical grounds.

what Alston's argument

just

In fact, privileging certain practices for

is all

about; he just seems to overlook the

possibility of alternative practical arguments.

The
that there is

practices,

alternative

I

have sketched

in this subsection neither implies

something epistemically wrong with the particularity of CMP and

i.e.,

that

engaging

in

such practices

only a proper part of the population engages

to particular the

same epistemic

that is because there

and

nor presupposes

particularity.

is

status that

is

in

like

not likely to produce true beliefs because

them.

we ought

It is

to

true that

we ought

not accord

accord to universal practices. But

a contingent correlation (in the actual world) between eluctability

Every normal human being finds engaging

in her

most familiar and

widely shared practices ineluctable; hence, every normal human being engages
practices.

naturally,

Not every normal human being

some engage and some do

Of course,

it

finds engaging in

not engage in

could have been, though

being happened to engage in what

is

it

for actual
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is

CMP

in those

ineluctable; hence,

CMP.

not actually, the case that every

human

human

beings an eluctable practice.

According

to

(EP1

1)

and (EP12), a universal and eluctable practice
would have lower

epistemic status than an universal and ineluctable practice.
The former would have to be

shown

to

be reliable by premises drawn from the

latter.

Hence, our grounds for

privileging ineluctable practices do not rest on an
unjustifiable prejudice against
particularity.

4.5

The

Social Establishment Criterion

Suppose
in the three

criterion

is

Undermines

that Alston provides an adequate response to the

the

most

if that is the case,

presumptive innocence

Some

I

articulated

CMP does not enjoy proper

will argue that

we

should accord to

CMP

is

a standing defeater of the

in virtue

of it social establishment.

doxastic practices have been socially established as long as

have been able to form

beliefs, viz.,

Other doxastic practices ‘have a

memory,

history.’

phase, there were no Christians at

a Pre-Christian Era then
;

all

CMP

some people learned

this is the

Perhaps

to

—

form

beliefs

this is a Transitional

CMP acquired

CMP — this

by engaging

in

CMP

Era\ and

social standing

Age of Constantine. (Perhaps we
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we

into three phases: during the first

and thus there was no such practice as

shortly after that (world-historically speaking),

—

beings

introspection, sense-perception, reason, etc.

although that practice was not socially established

entrenchment

human

CMP is one of those practices.

simplistically periodize the history of the

social

I

rational policy for an agent in Alston’s hypothetical thought

epistemic status according to (EP9) or (EP10). There

is

argument

previous subsections. Suppose, then, that adopting the social establishment

experiment. Even

may

CMP

and thereby

find ourselves at the

cusp of another stage

entrenchment

it

in the history

once enjoyed

-

of Christianity,

this

What was CMP's epistemic
According

to

would be

viz.,

when

the

Church loses the

social

a post-Christian era.)

status during the pre-Christian

and Transitional eras?

(EP9) and (EP10), an epistemically fastidious agent desirous of engaging

in

CMP during those two phases in the history of Christianity would be epistemically out of
order were she to engage in

the conclusion that

argument was,
reliable

is reliable.

But, as

we have

or will be extant: he denies that

on the evidence furnished
Hence, Alston seems

practices.

in

is,

CMP

CMP without having in hand some non-circular argument to

to

to us

seen, Alston believes that

we can show

that

CMP

is

no such

probably

by any subset of our non-theistic doxastic

be committed to the claim that any agent

who engaged

CMP prior to the Age of Constantine is epistemically out of order for so doing.
This

govern

is

exceedingly strange. If Alston

their beliefs in

is

correct, those in the

good epistemic order only

if

Age of Constantine

CMP is socially established and yet

CMP can achieve social entrenchment only if some cognitive agents in the pre-Christian
and Transitional eras flaunt

their epistemic obligation to the truth

socially established practices for

That

is,

and engage

in

non-

which they can provide no non-circular justification.

a causal condition of the possibility of the proper epistemic status of some agent's

engaging

in

pursue the

CMP is that some other (ancestral) agents fail to discharge their obligation to

truth.
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It

seems

generates tor

to

me

CMP.

that this

undermines whatever support

In order to determine

why,

that

it is

practically rational for

is

members

its

to

None of this, of course, shows

engage

its

social establishment

explained by

is

its reliability

is

1

that

it;

it

is

to the claim

that her practice is reliable;

it

is reliable.

it

An

that the epistemic support a practice enjoys in virtue of

not a consequence of

(see

in

commits her

only shows that she has non-truth-conducive reason to believe that
implication of Alston's position

of practical

socially established has as a

practically rational for an agent to engage in a given practice

that that practice is reliable.

social establishment

recall the function

considerations in Alston's argument. That a practice

consequence

its

But

.4.2.3).

the support a practice enjoys in virtue of

best explanation of that practice entails

social establishment’s being best

this is entirely consistent

social establishment

its

its

its

unreliability. Just as

inconsistency undermines whatever support

its

with the claim that

may be

overridden

if the

massive internal

social establishment affords

some

doxastic practice, so also does the fact that the social establishment of a given doxastic

practice

is

best explained by supposing

it

to

be unreliable undermine whatever support

its

social establishment affords that practice.

If Alston is correct that

CMP enjoys no non-circular justification,

any adequate

explanation of CMP's social establishment of CMP must include the claim that

social establishment because, at least in part,

as laid out in (EP9) and (EP10).

To be

its

just

means

enjoys

originators flaunted their epistemic duties

sure, just because those prior to the

Constantine failed to adhere to (EP9) and (EP10) does not entail that

it

it

CMP

Age of
is

unreliable

that they failed to provide non-circular justification for their idiosyncratic
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—

practice.

But

it

explanation of

should count against the positive epistemic status
of CMP that the best

CMP

s

social establishment

must incorporate the claim

social establishment only because those in the
phases prior to the

that

it

enjoys

Age of Constantine

failed to adhere to the best available epistemic
criteria. That agents in the

Age of

Constantine should be rational
mors only because their ancestors' engagement in
lacked rationality mors overrides the prima facie reliability
It

may seem

we

strange that events of which an agent

the epistemic status ot her beliefs. Thus,

internalist predilections that events

it

will

is

accord to

entirely

CMP.

unaware could

affect

be highly counter-intuitive to those with

which occurred

(or failed to occur) in the distant past

could undermine the positive epistemic status of the beliefs of those

be uninformed of those events. The simple believer
history of her practice, or mistakenly believe that

entrenchment; and for her, according to the

CMP

it

may

who may

very well

never have thought about the

has always enjoyed social

internalist, the fact that her ancestor’s

abdication from pursuit of the central epistemic aim was causally necessary for the

entrenchment of her doxastic practice matters not a whit

to the epistemic status

of her

participation.

But

this is

an internal critique of Alston’s defense of CMP; what matters

Alston takes epistemic justification to be and he has no such

According
status

to Alston, facts about

of her

beliefs.

If

basis of her reading of

internalist

is

what

qualms.

which agents have no ken can influence the epistemic

an agent forms beliefs about God’s nature and purposes on the

some

sacred text, and

forms her beliefs unreliably. And, even

if

if that text is in fact

she lacks any reason
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a fabrication, then she

at all to

believe that what

she takes to be a sacred text

forming her

beliets.

is

a fabrication, she lacks epistemic justification
for so

She may be epistemically blameless

in

forming beliefs about God's

nature and purposes on the basis of her reading
of he fabricated sacred text, but she

is

not

epistemically justified in so doing (see 1.1.1).
Similarly, if the best explanation ot the genesis of
that

its

some

founding members engaged

non-circular justification ot

CMP incorporates the claim

in a non-socially-established practice

without having

and

if that

explanation constitutes an

overrider to the moderate rationality of engaging in

CMP,

then an agent

CMP

is

CMP’s

not moderately rational tor engaging in

some

who engages

in

CMP — regardless of her ignorance of

dubious history.

We may
at

its reliability,

generalize this point to include

all

doxastic practices which both (1) were

point in their history not socially entrenched and (2) are not amenable of non-

circular support.

According

to (EP9), an agent is

moderately rational for regarding a

given non-socially entrenched practice as reliable only
justification for that practice.

if

she can provide non-circular

So long as Alston accepts the general claim

that there is

no

reason to expect that a given doxastic practice can be shown to be reliable on the

evidence generated by other practices, then he seems to be committed

to the

claim that

those practices which have not always enjoyed social entrenchment are socially

entrenched,

to (EP9).

at least in part, as

The

a consequence of their originating agent’s failure to adhere

best explanation of their entrenchment cannot but, therefore,

reference to their disreputable origins. Thus, every agent
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who engages

make

in a doxastic

which has not always been

practice

moderate

rationality

of regarding that practice as

4.6 Alston’s Epistemic

I

socially entrenched has a standing defeater to the

reliable.

Antinomianism

have presented the following objections

to Alston’s appeal to social

establishment. First, that Alston’s appeal to social establishment, even

if

otherwise

unobjectionable, fails to provide that neutral criterion he needs in order to mount an
external rationale for

CMP and to resolve the Great Pumpkin Problem (4.2).

Second, that

the appeal to social establishment succeeds only if Alston can articulate and justify goals

in light

that

of which adopting the social entrenchment criterion counts as practically

he has not done

succeeds

in

so,

and

that he

is

rational,

unlikely to do so (4.3). Third, that, even if he

providing that justification,

we would

nevertheless have good epistemic

reason to adopt an alternative proposal,

viz., that

accorded presumptive innocence

Fourth, even if Alston can defend the claim that

(4.4).

adopting the social establishment criterion

epistemic discourse,

is

the

only ineluctable practices should be

most

rational course of action even in an

CMP does not enjoy positive epistemic status according to that

criterion (4.5).

Suppose
objections.

I

that

Alston has a ready and compelling response to each of these

have one

last trick

up

my

sleeve.

I

will argue that a fundamental

incoherence vitiates Alston’s defense of the rationality of religious

belief: Alston's

defense of the autonomy of distinct practices undermines his attempt to vindicate
generally applicable restrictions on the practices rational agents regard as presumptively
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innocent. Alston's antinomian defense of the

nomian appeal
4.6.1

autonomy of distinct DPs undermines

to social entrenchment.

Nomians and Antinomians
Alston

s

argument

in support

distinct stages (related in chapters

attempts to lay

down

of CMP’s moderate rationality proceeds

one and two respectively). In the

in

first stage,

two

Alston

the epistemic law about doxastic practices, a law
encapsulated in

(EP9) and (EP10). (EP9) and (EP10) are doubly universal: they provide
us with
for evaluating the epistemic status of any

and every

doxastic practice with which

might come into contact and they recommend themselves
rational reflection

who

is

on the human cognitive

situation

to us as a

and therefore

sufficiently reflective about her cognitive limitations.

articulate universally acceptable

his

his

I

we

consequence of

any and every agent

to

call

criteria

Alston’s intention to

— epistemic laws —

and applicable epistemic principles

nomian project.
In the second stage, Alston attempts to insure that the

evenhandedly applied.
allowances for

its

When we

law

is fairly

evaluate a given doxastic practice,

we

and

should make

distinctive features; our application of universal epistemic principles

does not warrant a homogenization of the practices available

to us.

Hence, Alston

jealously guards the autonomy of CMP. In so doing, he employs a rationale (which

articulated in chapter three) for vindicating the

autonomy of any

practice whatever.

Alston's concern for and attempt to vindicate the autonomy of distinctive doxastic

practices his antinomian project.
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I

I

call

Both projects serve Alston's overriding goal
of defending CMP’s positive
epistemic status. Alston

s

nomian

project

makes possible an

external rationale for

CMP.

provides him with a response to the Great Pumpkin
Problem, and, most importantly,

allows him to claim that

CMP

is

innocent until proven guilty. Having secured

presumptive innocence, Alston has to respond

to accusations

And

of guilt.

to

its

respond to

those accusations, Alston avails himself of considerations
of autonomy. Both projects

work well

in concert.

The

first

absolves Alston of the need to show

second provides him with the materials

Although

in his

to

hands the appeal

respond to claims that

autonomy

to

is

CMP is reliable, the

CMP

is

unreliable.

tightly controlled,

it

has

implications for epistemic discourse disturbingly similar to those antinomianism
has for

moral discourse. What are those implications

for

moral discourse? Antinomianism, a

heresy which recurs intermittently in the history of Christianity,
convert

is

no longer obliged

to

is

the doctrine that the

adhere to otherwise universally binding moral norms

those constitutive of the Decalogue). Whether because she believes she cannot
that

God

will forgive her

no matter what she does, the antinomian believes

not rely on external moral norms in order to determine

how to

act.

As

(like

sin, or

that she

need

a consequence,

appealing to moral considerations to dissuade the antinomian from pursuing some course

of action she

is

intent

on pursuing

is

catechism to her

spiritual director:

knowledge he

no longer bound

with God.

is

God

created

all

of no

“When

to

avail.

a

man

Thus, a “Free Spirit” reciting her
has truly reached the great and high

observe any law or command, for he has become one

things to serve such a person, and
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all that

God

ever created

is

the property of such a

man.” J

Along

-’

same

the

line

whole world should be destroyed and perish than
one act

to

which

his nature

'

moves him.

critique, those actions she is inclined to

4

of thought,

that a ‘free

The antinomian

perform are

is

“it

would be

man’ should

better that the

refrain

immune from

from

external

in fact permissible; she is a

law unto

herself.

Why

does Alston’s appeal

to

autonomy have antinomian implications

epistemic discourse? If the argument

is

I

for

presented in support of the Ontological Principle

sound, there are no substantive epistemic norms which are universal in the
senses in

which (EP9) and (EP10)

are universal.

possible doxastic practice

D to

which

epistemically improper even if it

is

35

For any such norm N, we

may

conjure up some

N is inapposite, that is, such that N would render D

as reliable as

couple of examples shortly.) Because

we may

you

like.

Just be creative.

(I

provide a

conjure up such counter-examples to any

substantive epistemic norm, then the project of articulating and defending universally

applicable norms

is

doomed

to failure.

Every substantive epistemic norm will have only

limited application, viz., application to only those practices the nature and characteristics

of the subject matter of which do not render those norms epistemically indefensible. But
that substantive epistemic

norms

are of limited applicability undermines attempts like

Alston's to provide criteria universal criteria like (EP9) and (EP10).

33
.

Norman Cohn, The Pursuit

More

.

35
.

p.

179.

Ibid., p. 178.

The

it

of the Millenium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical

Anarchists of the Middle Ages, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970),
34

precisely,

qualification ‘substantive’

is

important. In indicate what
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it

means

shortly.

undermines the constraints on presumptive
innocence

built into

(EP9) and (EP10),

viz.,

the appeal to social establishment.

Instrumental Imperialism

4.6.2

In chapter two,

is

supposed

to

I

noted various violations of CMP’s autonomy:
for example,

be unreliable because

it

CMP

does not generate publicly checkable predictions

even though the nature of the object of M-beliefs
does not
counts as epistemically imperialist because

it

act predictably. This objection

would undermine

the claim that

CMP is

epistemically adequate even if it were entirely reliable.
But imperialism, in addition to
its

epistemic varieties, assumes

at least

one other, instrumental,

guise.

deftly detects instances of the former, he fails to recognize
that his
vitiated

by an instance of the

latter.

instrumental imperialism, that

doxastic practices,

I

is,

Whereas Alston

own

position

is

Just because (EP9) and (EP10) are guilty of

just because they violate the

autonomy of certain

claim that Alston's antinomian impulse conflicts with his nomian

impulse.

in 4.4.

In order to

comer our

According

to

(EP1

1),

quarry, consider the alternative epistemic policy

shown

to

be reliable.

neither ineluctable nor amenable of non-circular justification. Hence,

the epistemic cold. But according to the understanding of the

internal to

believes in God,

supposed

is

CMP,

whether or not an agent engages

in

from the

free

CMP

way God

CMP,

a matter of how she exercises her ‘free will.’ But

to result in part

sketched

a rational agent accords presumptive innocence only to

ineluctable practices and requires of all others that they be

humanity

I

or,

is left

out in

interacts with

more

generally,

if belief in

employment of an agent’s cognitive
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CMP is

God

is

capacities.

then belief in

God

cannot be ineluctable. According to the
understanding of God’s

of interacting with humanity internal
with Alston that

(EP1

1) is

CMP,

like SP, is not

tantamount to claiming

whether or not

it

to

is reliable.

And

CMP, CMP must

in

this

shows

is

if

we

agree

amenable of non-circular proof, then adopting

we

that

should regard

for that there is

CMP as unreliable regardless of

no epistemic

can be no good epistemic justification for an agent

What

be eluctable. Now,

way

justification.

who engages

that practical requirements

of the

in

sort to

Hence, there

CMP to adopt (EP1

1 ).

which Alston appeals

formulating his general epistemic position can violate the
autonomy of a doxastic

practice just as surely as can epistemic requirements. Just
as requiring that M-beliefs be

intersubjectively evaluable violates

its

autonomy, so also does requiring

ineluctable in order to enjoy presumptive innocence violate

everything

is

going just as

information about God,

it

it

should, even if

its

that

autonomy: even

CMP is an infallibly reliable

cannot be ineluctable. Indeed,

if

it

CMP be
if

source of

is infallible, it

must be

eluctable.

If

(EP 1

1

)

and (EP 1 2) violate CMP's autonomy

perfectly reliable and yet

(EP 1 0)?

Do

they violate

would

CMP

its

autonomy of which

is

sense that

violate both of those principles,

s

autonomy? Of course

CMP which supports the claim that
establishment. But

in the

it

is

impossible for

CMP could be

what about (EP9) and

not; there

is

no reason

CMP to enjoy

internal to

social

not hard to conjure up hypothetical examples of practices the

violated by (EP9) and (EP10).

principles aspire to universality, the

mere

And

because Alston's epistemic

possibility of a counter-example
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undermines

the claim that (EP9) and (EP10) are
universally applicable, that

employed

to evaluate

any and every doxastic

is,

that they are properly

practice.

Consider what course of action Alston would
enjoin an agent

Cromwell -

to

Egod

that as a

human

affairs.

beliefs about

respects to God, save that that being

therefore,

beliefs

—

call

Cromwell

it

-

An

—

EMP —

do so

--

to

is reliable.

show

that her

newly acquired practice of forming

That being unlikely, Alston seems

will respond

to

make

short

work

by availing himself of the strategy Alston

of CMP. Given what Cromwell has learned about the very nature

even though

who

beliefs about

EMP may yet be highly reliable.

Egod

is

and Egod seldom wishes

is

to contact us.

36

Egod

is

an “absolutely

presents herself to our cognitive faculties only

when she wishes

Alston, in virtue of attempting to

guilty of imperialism, viz., instrumental imperialism. Just

as Alston denies that beliefs formed by engaging in

.

DP, and

and Charlie Brown before Cromwell).

Cromwell

impose (EP9) on Cromwell,

6

who forms

certainly not be engaging in a socially established

(as with Cedric

elusive" being, one

that

those of a particularly vile and

of Egod, the social establishment of a practice of forming

to

Call that being Egod.

isolated subject (say, one every several hundred
years)

by (EP9), have

articulates in defense

-

is evil.

and does so only intermittently, as a consequence of her
indifference

But, of course,

impossible

him

consequence of being aware of that being, Cromwell
has learned

Egod would

would

of

all

presents herself only to isolated individuals

vicious character

to

call

pursue were he to claim that he has recently
been directly presented with a

being identical in

Suppose

-

CMP need be intersubjectively

David Conway, “Mavrodes, Martin, and the Verification of Religious Experience,”
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p. 164.

evaluable in virtue of the nature of the
object about which those

form

beliefs, so also

EMP need not be socially established

object about which those

who engage

in

EMP

form

restrictions are inappropriately

imposed on

restrictions are inappropriately

imposed on EMP.

CMP;

in virtue

beliefs.

in the

who engage

In the

in

CMP

of the nature of the

first

case, epistemic

second case, instrumental

Things only seem to get worse from here. For
suppose that Cromwell learns
the only individuals to

whom Egod

deigns to present herself are agents

in being, not just evil, but also indifferent.

only those agents
in

who

who

that

are alike her

Hence, suppose that Egod reveals herself to

care not a whit that she does so.

What an agent

learns

by engaging

EMP explains why that practice can not be psychologically established and

nevertheless might be highly reliable.
to require

Were

this the case,

it

of an agent that she have a going concern of any

presumptively innocent

would again be

sort

whatsoever

imperialistic

in order to

be

in regarding that practice as reliable 37
.

37

We don't

to Alston’s

have to make things up, however. Consider the likely response of believers in faeries
(EP9) and (EP10). Keith Thomas writes, “for one striking aspect of faerie-beliefs was

their self-confirming character.

The man who believed

in faeries

could, like the astrologer or the

magician, accept every setback and disappointment without losing his faith. He knew that he
could never count on seeing the faeries himself, for the little people were notoriously jealous of
their privacy and would never appear to those who were so curious as to go looking for them.
Mrs. Parish told Wharton that the faeries had a way of beckoning to any person they wanted to talk
to

which was

‘so quick... that

they ever reappear to those

none but those for

who

whom

it

was intended could see

it.’

Nor would

betrayed their secrets. [That would render social establishment

quite difficult!] Joan Tyrry said in 1555 that she

would never again see the faeries after having
them before an ecclesiastical court. Everyone knew that a
regular supply of faerie gold would dry up immediately its recipient bragged of it to anyone else.
It was this elusiveness which made the fairies such admirable vehicles for the confidence trickster.
been made

to confess her dealings with

Alice West, for example, impressed upon one of her intended victims that ‘there was nothing so
necessary as secrecy, for if it were revealed to any, save them three whom it did essentially
concern, they should hazard not only their good fortune, but incur the danger of the

consequently

lie

open

to great

mishaps and

fearful disasters.’

...

fairies,

and so

There was an impenetrability

about fairy beliefs which protected them from easy exposure. As Sir John Falstaff said: ‘they are
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What conclusion should we draw from

the case of Cromwell and

Egod? That

Alston's antinomian project undermines
his nomian project. The strategy he
employs to

autonomy of CMP may be employed

vindicate the

socially established practices

it

and thus the

to vindicate the

autonomy of non-

of (EP9) and (EP10). Alston can't have

falsity

both ways; he can't adhere to the rationale for the
Ontological Principle

the third chapter, and thus to his defense
of

I

articulated in

CMP as articulated in the second chapter,

without jettisoning his attempt to justify the universally
applicable epistemic principles
formulated in the

first

chapter.

And

with a

little

creative imagining,

examples of doxastic practices the autonomy of which
epistemic

4.6.3

norm you

Formal

vs.

is

violated

we can

I

conjure up

by any substantive

please.

Substantive Criteria

In the third chapter, after having articulated a rationale for the
Ontological

Principle and thus for the legitimate

spent

some time and energy defending Alston from

autonomy

CMP

ot

external critique.

I

is

noted

that, in

comparison

the argument

discussion?

fairies;

I

Is

criticism,

different doxastic practices,

I

the claim that his defense of the

just a protective strategy designed to

internal) Alston incorporated into

viz.,

autonomy of relevantly

undermine the possibility of

addition to the consistency criteria (external and

(EP9) and (EP 1 0), there are other grounds for

immanent

have been pursuing

critique,

and misuse of appeals

in this section

work

there a tension or inconsistency between

to

autonomy. Does

against the grain of that earlier

my

earlier attempt to

he that speaks to them shall die.”’ Religion and the Decline of Magic,
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critique,

p.

defend

614.

Alston from the claim that his defense of CMP

is

too permissive and the argument in this

subsection that his antinomian project undermines
his nomian project?

After

Although

shown

I

all,

the thesis for

have had

my

down

that laying

which

sights

I

have been arguing

on Alston’s appeal

we

the restriction that

to socially established practices violates the

argument requires

that

I

identify

raises a disturbing question. In

establishment, have

I

its

my

is

completely general.

to social establishment,

should accord presumptive innocence only

autonomy of EMP,

the generality of my

implications for other epistemic norms.

it

taken out any innocent bystanders? Does

my

also undermines the universality of less dubious epistemic

To

And

this

eagerness to discredit Alston’s appeal to social

claim that Alston’s

appeal to autonomy undermines the appeal to social establishment commit
that

and have

me

to claiming

norms?

take the most extreme example, what about the various overriders of

presumptive innocence Alston builds into his epistemic principles? Could the antinomian
project be of use in defending the positive epistemic status of a practice

set

of massively inconsistent beliefs?

After

all,

haven't

And

inconsistent?

“that whore.

some

if this

point of view lacks advocates.

is

logically

didn't Luther (proudly and with disdain) dismiss the pretensions of

Reason"

obey God?

not as

Christians claimed that the doctrine of the Incarnation

in

claiming that

cannot freely choose to obey

to

Its

which generates a

God and

human

wills are so infected with sin that they

yet that they are capable freely of choosing to not

(If that’s not a contradiction,

it

comes

pretty close.) Doesn't Tertullian

express the sentiment motivating such dismissals of logical consistency by admonishing

us to believe Christian creeds just because they are absurd?
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And

can't Luther

and

Tertullian defend the internal inconsistency
of their doctrinal systems by appeal to the
inscrutability of

God

or the mysteriousness of the Incarnation?

contradictory beliefs be conjointly true, are

evaluation of an agent's beliefs? After
contradictions, then

what

we

And

if

it

possible that

is

not over and done with the epistemic

all, if it is

epistemically defensible to assent to

isn’t epistemically defensible?

In order to broach this problem,

I

need to distinguish,

albeit crudely,

between

formal and substantive norms. Epistemic norms are
more or less substantive, more or
less formal.

A

formal norm expresses a requirement that beliefs formed

in a

doxastic practice enjoy a certain structure, whatever their content;
thus the

given

norm

that a

doxastic practice should not generate massively inconsistent beliefs,
that

is,

doxastic practice should not generate beliefs of the structure
p and ~p,

a formal norm.

That our beliefs should be
inconsistency

is

forming activity
Substantive

also a

is

not just of formal inconsistency, but also of probabilistic

norm of a formal

in light

norm

free,

nature; thus, that

of Bayes’ Theorem

falls

a wastebasket category.

I

we

should govern our belief-

on the formal end of the continuum.

define

it

negatively: a substantive

any epistemic norm which requires of a doxastic practice some
of a non-formal nature. Thus,

to require

formed therein be publically checkable,
practice, that

it

is

it

is

norm

characteristic or property

of a given doxastic practice that the beliefs
that

every agent be disposed to engage in that

provide us with accurate predictions of future events, that

established, that

that a

ineluctable, or that beliefs

indubitable, are substantive norms.
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formed therein be

it

is

socially

incorrigible, infallible,

is

It

seems

to

me

very plausible that every doxastic practice,
no matter

subject

its

matter, should generate beliefs which, on the
whole, conform to formal norms like that

proscribing adherence to formally inconsistent beliefs.
Thus, whatever the content of the
beliefs

formed

mental

states, the

in a

given doxastic practice, whether about God's nature,
one’s

mental states of others, or physical objects, those beliefs
should not

have the structure p and not

any and every

own

p.

rational agent

Formal norms are doubly universal: they are acceptable

and they are applicable

every doxastic practice. This

is

to the beliefs generated

not the case with substantive norms: the

to

by any and

more substantive

a norm, the less universally applicable and the less likely to be compelling
to every agent.

For example, the requirement that beliefs should be publically checkable
required of some practices not others.

And

to evaluate a given doxastic practice. Thus, the

relevant the

the

autonomy of a given

autonomy of a given

practice.

practice; the

I

am

appropriately

appeal to autonomy will be crucially

important in determining whether or not a given substantive norm

employed

is

is

appropriately

more formal

more substantive a norm,

inclined, therefore, to

deny

of limited applicability. The autonomy of a given doxastic practice

a norm, the less

the

more

that formal

is

relevant

norms

are

relevant only to the

applicability of substantive epistemic norms.

Here, then,

is

my

considered opinion. Formal epistemic norms like the

Law of

Non-Contradiction and Bayes’ Theorem are universally applicable and acceptable: they
are appropriately

employed

to evaluate

any and every doxastic practice and they should

be accepted by any rational agent. But formal norms are insufficient to
doxastic disputes. Hence,

we

settle

most

cannot but supplement them with more substantive
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criteria.

Those substantive

be of limited application,

criteria will

e.g.,

sense-perceptual beliefs

should admit of discontinuation via failed prediction
whereas introspective and M-beliefs

need not, and they will be of limited acceptability,

e.g., theists

may

regard consistency

with sacred texts to be the sine qua non of any M-belief,
non-theists will regard such
consistency to be of no relevance to the epistemic status of a
given belief. Whether or not
a given substantive criticism

legitimate

is

whether or not a given formal criticism

and not the

latter requires that

violates the

autonomy of the

or not a given substantive

or not applying

The

it

to a

we

is

is

a

much more

determining

legitimate, given that evaluation of the former

determine whether or not the criticism

practice criticized.

norm

difficult affair than

violates the

And

at the heart

autonomy of a given

in question

of determining whether
practice will be whether

given practice violates the Ontological Principle.

rationale for the Ontological Principle, then, does

undermine a mechanical

application of substantive epistemic norms to any practice whatever, without regard for
the peculiarities of its subject matter. In order to level an effective critique of a given

doxastic practice,

we need

evaluate a given practice

to

allow for the possibility that the

may be

criteria in light

of which

we

inapplicable: according to the understanding of the

subject matter internal to that practice, agents are forming their beliefs exactly as they

should even though in so forming they violate some privileged criterion

accustomed

to

employ

of a given practice,

to evaluate other practices.

we need

to

engage

we

are

In order to level an effective critique

in ‘hermeneutics’ in order to arrive at

understanding of how things ought to go

in light

an

of the self-understanding of the object of

our critique. Perhaps that understanding will render ineffective objections which are
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a ppropriately leveled at other practices. But once
these constraints have been identified,

once we identify the kinds of criticisms a given practice renders
superfluous and those

we may

does not,
practice,

we may

initiate the

process of evaluation.

avail ourselves

of any and

have

articulated.

more

criteria tor evaluation is better than

4.6.4 Alston’s

Given the limited

all

And

applicability ot epistemic norms, having access to

having access

in the tirst.

He

in the

still

to less.

He cannot

is

internally unstable.

The

second stage undermines the nomian strategy

therefore faces a dilemma. Either he represses his

impulse or he represses the antinomian impulse.

and he

I

Choice

antinomian strategy prominent

substantial.

in evaluating a doxastic

ot the kinds of criticisms Alston and

Alston’s two stage argument in defense of CMP

prominent

it

If the former, the

nomian

consequences are

reasonably claim to have provided an external rationale for

faces the Great

Pumpkin Problem.

Indeed, the Great

CMP

Pumpkin Problem

does he have no reason to deny Charlie Brown’s belief in the Great

intensifies: not only

Pumpkin presumptive innocence, but
followers

may

practice.

The prospects

Charlie

Brown and

of Alston’s strategy

avail themselves

the rest of the Great

for defending the

Pumpkin’s

autonomy of their

for a successful external critique of fanatical or idiosyncratic

doxastic practices are dim. And,

if that is the case,

Alston joins Plantinga

at the

margins

of the epistemic community.
If the latter,

principles.

to

Alston can attempt to articulate perhaps more adequate epistemic

But then

his defense

be completely reworked and

of CMP’s autonomy, and thus his defense of CMP, needs

who knows whether
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it

will

emerge unscathed from

its

reworking. If M-beliefs are held to the same standards
to which sense-perceptual beliefs
are held,

I

doubt

it.

Which option should Alston adopt?

I

believe that he should opt for the

We cannot but assume that at least

reasons tor this are fairly simple.

practices in the standard package are reliable. In order to
think at

presumptive innocence

some

to

memory,

Memory

from introspection, and

all

our cognitive endowment,
package,

doxastic

we must impute

all,

inference, sense-perception, and introspection, or to

differs in important aspects

from inference. But

if

we

tolerate considerable

autonomy within

if

we have no justification

for not tolerating

all

on the kinds of practices

chaff by wielding principles like (EP9), (EP10), (EP1

viz., the

practice or other.

such diversity inhabits the core of

autonomy outside

should impute presumptive innocence. Attempting to

autonomy of some

from sense-perception, both

three

should, therefore, place no restrictions at

them,

some of the

My

subset thereof. But the practices constitutive of the standard
package display

considerable diversity.

the

latter.

sift

1),

the standard

it

as well.

We

to

which an agent

the epistemic

wheat from the

or (EP12) will invariably violate

The universal substantive claims

internal to

appeal to social entrenchment and ineluctability, are of doubtful epistemic

value.

4.7

The Great Pumpkin Problem Again
I

claimed earlier that neither Plantinga nor Alston's attempts

Pumpkin problem have met with
their attempts

have

failed

is

to resolve the Great

general acceptance and suggested that the reason

why

because they seem to undermine the possibility of negotiating
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doxastic disputes without recourse to force. Both
succeed in vindicating the rationality of
religious belief by denying (Plantinga explicitly

access to neutral criteria in light of which

And

disputes.

this violates the

rejection of his version of

grounds.

a

I

coming

we may

moral impulse

successfully to defend Alston, that

is,

and Alston by implication)

we have

rationally resolve our doxastic

at the heart

of epistemology. In order

to address the concerns

Reformed Epistemology,

will leave that task for another venue.

that

I

which

would have

to

I

believe motivate

do so on normative

But not before providing something of

attraction.

An

opposition between religious belief and scientific belief seems to

me to

pervade, not only popular culture, but also the more rarified airs of the philosophy of

Much

religion.

of the recent work

in the

philosophy of religion

two camps, both of which presuppose some important

is,

distinction

crudely, divisible into

between

‘religion’

and

‘science.’

First,

of accessing

many simply assume
reality.

imprimatur of the

that ‘science’

Truth claims about objective

scientific

community. The

scientist pursues the truth contrasts sharply

the

way

beliefs.

viz., that religious

first

outcome

the latter in the less widely

is

fallible,

reality, if

our privileged means

made, must enjoy the

rational, critical process

by which the

faith.

This prejudice results in either of two

convictions are dismissed as irremediably irrational, or that

religious adherents form beliefs

The

though

with the uncritical, authority-ridden,

credulous commitments underlying religious

outcomes,

is,

is,

after all, just like the

way

scientists

classically exemplified in the positivist critique

known

evidentialist
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arguments

in

form

of religion;

support of central religious

doctrines like the resurrection of Jesus
Christ.

(I

will ignore the latter option for
the

duration.)

The second camp

which recent philosophy of religion has congregated

into

denudes religious creeds of their truth-claims altogether.
Faced with the

members of this

critique,

way of hie

that,

Religion

a

is

'

somehow

way of life

Wittgensteinian camp' like D. Z. Philips resolve religion
into a
or other,

may form

do not make

independently existing

we employ

in

truth claims about reality.

truth claims, well, then

beliefs in as distinctive

Both camps presuppose

criteria

makes and presupposes no

or an expression of emotion or something like

religious doxastic practices

practices

reality,

make

them

to

like.

truth claims about an

our sense-perceptual and scientific doxastic practices. Both options

The

positivist critique is clearly unacceptable to those

with religious convictions and the Wittgensteinian revision loses too

—

Because

members of such

and eccentric a way as they

that if religious beliefs

that.

then they must be evaluated in light of the epistemic

leave a great deal to be desired.

transmutation

positivist

religious people act

on

their convictions in part

much

in the

because they believe

be true and would not so act were they to believe their convictions false

38
.

(And

,8

It seems to me that the ‘interpretation of religion’ philosophers like D. Z. Philips articulate
should be regarded more as a program for reforming religion than as a description of the actual
forms of life to which religious agents are committed. And as a program for reforming religion
.

find

from

it

1

To denude religious forms of life of reference to reality, to excise
claims about God and God’s interaction with creation, would undermine the

entirely without merit.

CMP truth

potential for critique (both of an agent’s individual life

Why would

and of society)

internal to religious

ways of

own welfare in the attempt to undermine some unjust social
God hates injustice if she was not thereby committed to claiming
that God exists independently of our conception of God and has opinions about what's right and
wrong which don’t depend for their existence or legitimacy on what we take God to believe about
life.

an agent risk her

practice because she believes that

those matters?
the

more

(I

must confess,

I

have a

difficult

time figuring out what Phillips means by a

radical ‘anti-metaphysical’ statements he makes. If I’ve misread him,
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I

apologize

lot

in

of

it

seems quite a short step from the claim

that religious beliefs are false to
the claim that

they are neither true nor false.)

Perhaps as a consequence of the manifest
inadequacy of the available options.

Reformed Epistemology has emerged

as a third alternative to positivism and

sprachspielism. Alston neither cedes to science
the status of sole arbiter of truth nor does

he denude religious creeds of their truth claims.
Religious doxastic practices afford their

members access
which science

to the truth in a

affords.

To

way which

whom

those for

is

religious belief

merely expressive, the Reformed alternative

is

likely to

is

complementary

to, that

both important and yet not

be more attractive than both the

and the Wittgensteinian.

positivist

Articulating

some such

traditions, but also for those

It

different from, but

seems

subject to

much

to

alternative

who engage

me, quite frankly,

the

same

is

in

important, not just for

no religion

that religious

at all.

members of religious

Why?

and moral doxastic practices are

criticisms so long as the criteria in light of which

we

evaluate

them

are lifted

when

evaluated in light of criteria properly employed to evaluate scientific beliefs.

from 'modem

science.’ Neither moral nor religious beliefs fare very well

(Neither religious nor moral claims, for example, are amenable of intersubjective
evaluation; both admit of considerable diversity; both

natural causes, etc.)

Given

scientific belief-formation,

have open

that

we

to religious belief.

may

be explained by proximate

moral belief-formation differs

have, roughly, the

First,

same

we may admit

advance.)
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that

in

important respects from

three options open to us that

we

moral claims are truth claims but

that,

because they are formed and evaluated
differently very differently from the
way

form and evaluate

scientific beliefs, those

or at least seriously in error. Second,
status

and assert

that they are

moral claims are putatively
scientific beliefs, but that,

The

adhere to them are irremediably

we may deny

that

merely expressive (or the

where

my

irrational,

moral claims enjoy cognitive
like).

true, that they are differently

by

third option,

who

we

Third,

we may admit

that

formed and evaluated than

different, they are properly different.

lights, is

hands down the most preferable. Moral

convictions, if they are worth acting upon, are worth
acting upon only if true. They only

have the power

to

motivate us to sacrifice our

own

well-being for the good of others

if

they are more than expressions of emotion, or constitutive
of a form of life into which

have been socialized, or the
It

this is correct,

like.

then

we

can hardly sustain our moral qualms about the

antinomian implications of Alston
particularly, his defense

rejecting the

we

s

version of Reformed Epistemology, and more

of the autonomy of distinct doxastic practices.

Reformed approach

is

that

it

If

our reason for

undermines the possibility of making good on

our conviction that disputes amongst people of good will should be resolved without
recourse to force, that

is, if

our

real

concern

is

a moral one, then that conviction itself

should be more than a mere preference, an irrational urge, or a private conviction. But
is

more than an

—

for

we

irrational

certainly don’t

scientific beliefs.

respects in

urge only

if

moral convictions are autonomous

form and evaluate moral

beliefs like

we form and

But religious and moral doxastic practices are similar

which both

differ

from

scientific beliefs.
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The very

in

rationale

in

some

it

respect

evaluate

many of the

which enables us

to vindicate the cognitive status ot

conviction that

force.

Hence,

autonomy

is

we

far

should resolve disputes

religious belief.

is

beliefs

will without recourse to

I

am

not, that

dead anything

ways we form

is

is,

unjust.

39
.

I

am

God

of

viz., that

claiming that a failure to appreciate the

practices, especially those doxastic practices

SP and modem

which

are

science, threatens the rationality not only of

but also the

way we form

beliefs about what’s right

A successful case for the autonomy of the former, then,

cannot but aid the case for the

latter as

well

40
.

Although he inhabits a very different philosophical world than Alston,

.

rationality

defending a version of Karamozov’s Theorem,

permissible

beliefs about

and wrong, just and

way we form

depends upon whether or not we can vindicate the

importantly different from

39

among people of good

not claiming that vindicating the rationality of the

autonomy of distinct doxastic

the

undermines our particular

a condition of the possibility of vindicating them.

and justify moral

God

in general

from undermining our deepest moral convictions, Alston's
defense of

Of course, I am

if

moral claims

1

believe that Jurgen

Habermas has attempted to do for matters of justice what Alston has attempted to do for mystical
experience. Habermas has argued that (1) engaging in moral critique requires that we vindicate
the rationality of the way we form moral beliefs, (2) moral beliefs are formed rationally when they
conform to a suitable version of the principle of universalization, (3) and that conformity to the
principle of universalization constitutes the uniqueness of moral belief-formation. And Habermas
anything but a

is
40
.

I

theist.

have not forgotten the point

I

made

in

belief do not exist independently of those

the previous chapter that, because the ‘objects’ of moral

who form moral

beliefs, reliable belief-formation about

matters of right and wrong does not require causal relations between believer and the object of
belief. Thus, the case for the autonomy of religious belief will differ from the case for the

autonomy of moral

belief.
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4.8

Concluding Comments
I

would

like to

Epistemology. As
is

I

conclude with two general comments about
Reformed

have remarked several times,

at the heart

of Reformed Epistemology

the claim that religious doxastic
practices are innocent until proven guilty.

Where does

the preceding discussion leave that claim?

First,

innocence. Nothing

religious doxastic practices like

I

have said or argued

is

inconsistent with the claim that

CMP enjoy presumptive innocence.

Alston

is

correct:

we

can provide no non-circular justification for any
of our basic doxastic practices and
should not therefore discriminate against religious
doxastic practices because they are not

amenable of non-circular proof. To discriminate
standard on practices like

CMP. CMP,

in that

way would be

as with SP, introspection, and

to

impose a double

memory,

is

presumptively innocent.

However, the claim
from the claim

distinct

that religious doxastic practices are presumptively innocent

is

that religious doxastic practices are presumptively innocent

because socially and psychologically established. The

presupposes a criterion for

latter

distinguishing between presumptively innocent and presumptively guilty practices
which
is

entirely without merit. Furthermore,

criterion

by which

to

make

I

do not believe

that

we have

that distinction in a non-arbitrary

access to any

and non-imperialist way.

That the social and psychological establishment criterion lacks merit puts paid
Alston's practical argument in support of regarding religious practices like
reliable.

Hence, Alston's ambitions of providing some external rationale
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CMP as

in support

of

CMP,

a rationale recognizable as compelling
regardless of one’s parochial convictions,

fail utterly.

That the social and psychological establishment
criterion lacks merit, and thus
Alston

s

practical

argument

tails,

does not, however, discredit

support of the innocent-until-proven-guilty thesis.
There
practical

argument

in support

Alston's, although,

Pumpkin Problem

human
at all

am

I

Because

we

practical reason that

in

practices

some

we

it

of no avail

is

hoped

we

arguments

in

at all in

helping us to solve the Great

are and living in the environment

and thus

some doxastic

to

engage

practices,

in

would

we

for

engaging

in doxastic practices.

doxastic practices provides us with no help

it

is

Of course,

at all in

For

do, have no option

some doxastic

and because

be).

practices.

practically

perform those actions she cannot but perform, we have

we need

all

that

the

we must

determining in which

should engage. But that this practical argument proscribes no practices

just the flip side

of the claim that

substantive criteria by which

presumptive innocence,

it

is

in

much more powerful

his appeal to social establishment

beliefs or other

cannot but engage

rational for an agent to

engage

afraid,

(as Alston

some

a

practical

of regarding a given practice as presumptively reliable
than

beings, constructed as

but to form

is

all

that

it

enjoys some legitimacy: just because

we might

it

lays

is

down no

exclude certain practices from enjoying

not vulnerable to the antinomian implications of Alston's

appeal to autonomy.

Second,
believe that

we

guilt.

Does

the preceding discussion provide us with any reason to

should not require of innocent practices that they be vindicated from

accusations of guilt? Otherwise put, have

we

reached any conclusions which render
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it

impossible to

show of a innocent

practice that

it

is

guilty? Otherwise put again, does
the

appeal to the autonomy of distinct practices
undermine attempts to show that those
practices

which we provisionally regard as

claim that

we

The

should adhere to the innocent-until proven-guilty
policy

shortest

answer

to these questions is that

believe that innocent practices cannot be

showing

that

like.

reliable are in fact unreliable? If
so, then the

shown

to formal

norms

empty.

have provided no reason

to be unreliable.

that a given practice is unreliable is

So long as we appeal

I

is

I

at all to

have shown, however,

more complicated than some would

like those proscribing

massive internal and

external inconsistency in order to discredit a given
practice, critique

is fairly

simple: just

determine whether or not the outputs of a given doxastic practice
are massively
inconsistent with the outputs of another practice. Attempts to
discredit a practice on such

grounds do not discriminate against a practice on the basis of its enjoying or
lacking some
non-formal property and are therefore not complicated by considerations of autonomy.

Appeal

D

to substantive

because

that

it

norm even

a substantive

practice

the

that

violates

is

if

it

norms

some

were

norm and

is

another matter.

substantive norm,

When we

we need

entirely reliable. Invariably,

others will not.

As

criticize

some doxastic

to insure that

some

D

would not

practice

violate

practice or other will violate

a consequence, attempts to

show

that a given

unreliable are unavoidably piecemeal: what works for one practice will violate

autonomy of others. But
it

is

this

does not show that

unreliable. That ‘something goes’ for

one

we

cannot show of a given practice

practice, say astrology, that doesn’t

’go’ for another, say SP, does not entail that anything goes for

astrology).
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SP

(or for that matter,

The innocent-until-proven-guilty

policy, then,

emerges unscathed when

dissociated from Alston's appeal to social
establishment. This brings

me

to the

second

comment.

I

mentioned

in the introduction to this dissertation
that

one of Alston’s

achievements was to situate the Reformed position on
the rationality of religious belief

where

it

occurs anyway: in specific practices which have a
definite location in social

space and historical time. Whether or not

it

is

rational to believe in

simply of whether or not the cognitive faculties with which
function properly

when

generating beliefs about

practices by engaging in

independently existing

which an agent forms

reality.

As

I

God

all

human

fail

is

not a matter

beings are outfitted

but of whether or not the social

beliefs afford her reliable access to an

have argued, however, the uses

the social incarnation of religious belief

God

miserably.

What

which Alston puts

to

starts as a

promising

reorientation of the issue derails quickly in an appeal to the brute facticity of
social

entrenchment. This

is

unfortunate, given that his recognition of the social dimensions of

belief could have provided Alston with the opportunity to reflect on the various moral and
political questions

with which the question of the rationality of religious belief is

ineradicably entwined.

And

it is

doubly unfortunate, given

that

Reformed

Epistemologists have consistently ignored those questions.

This

in

is

particularly striking in Alston's case because of the history of ‘enthusiasm'

western culture and even of the influence of enthusiasm on

some agents have claimed

to

modem

be privy to direct dispensations from

285

philosophy. That

God

has consistently

been recognized as an epistemic claim with
important
(Ironically, given Alston's appeal to the
social

implications are often of a radical nature:
tear

down

God

political

consequences

entrenchment of CMP, those

41
.

political

often seems to be telling the enthusiast to

the existing order, including that of the established
church!) So long as the

enthusiast resists privatizing her religious practice,
so long as she

is

willing to act in the

public realm on the basis of private revelations from God,
whether or not an agent has
private access to the divine intentions she claims to have

question. Simply put, the reliability of

politically important

CMP raises the spectre of agents who can and

need provide no publically defensible justification
activities.

becomes a

for

extremely controversial political

Epistemic antinomianism threatens political anarchy via religious enthusiasm.

Alston’s failure to address the political and moral implications of his epistemic
policies renders

him vulnerable

more well-known counterpart
status

of religious

belief,

he

to

much

the

same objection commonly leveled

at his

(Plantinga), viz., that in his haste to vindicate the epistemic

fails to

accord systematic significance to the ways in which

moral turpitude, power relations, envy, pride,

etc.

corrupt the

ways we form

In

beliefs.

theological terminology, Alston underplays the epistemological importance of sin, and

overplays the epistemological relevance of providence or of the doctrine of creation

41
.

42
.

42
.

In

See, for example, the brief description of Luther’s conflict with Muntzer in chapter two.

This

is

particularly apparent in Plantinga’s version of

Plantinga, a crucial

component

in

what

it

Reformed Epistemology. According

takes for a belief to be enjoy epistemic warrant

to

for that

is

belief to result from the proper functioning of cognitive faculties designed (successfully) to

produce true

beliefs.

Not

function’ and ‘design.’

surprisingly,

Of course,

we

find a sustained discussion of the concepts of ‘proper

the notion of design harks to the doctrine of creation: an agent

forms beliefs rightly when she forms her beliefs as God created her

to.

Nowhere does one

find a

sustained analysis of the concept of corrupted cognitive faculties, of ways of forming beliefs which
are vitiated by power, for example.
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SO doing, Alston succumbs to what
viz.,

I

take to be the perennial failing of
religious believers,

a failure to distinguish between what

establishment betrays

little

is

and what ought

sensistivity to the

to be.

His appeal to social

manner of a given doxastic

entrenchment and of the dubious record of religious
doxastic practices
Alston need not have done

so.

which render religious belief unreliable.

If,

may

religious doxastic practice

social entrenchment

unreliable.

A

is

is

Marxist critique of religious

way

in

if the

may

belief,

is

way

in

indicate that that practice

which Alston dismisses so

which Alston formulates the

religious belief. Moreover, such a critique

justifiable

is

continued entrenchment of

functional for the status quo, then the

achieved and maintained

naturally follows from the

be infected with power

for example, religious belief

prone to legitimating the current social order, and thus

some

in that regard.

That religious doxastic practices are socially

established has as a consequence that religious
belief
relations

practice’s

which

its

is

lightly,

issue of the rationality of

on theological grounds: a proper

recognition of sin renders the careful examination of the power relations undergirding
religious doxastic practices not just appropriate, but also a matter of faithfulness.

Alston's version of Reformed Epistemology provides a helpful framework within

which

to provide

an analysis and critique of the

political

religious truth claims and the doxastic practices in

Alston, however,

fails

and moral implications of

which those claims

are generated.

adequately to consider or answer those questions. But by

identifying the inadequacies and oversights of his defense of the rationality of religious

belief,

we may

discern a

more appropriate

task for the religious epistemologist.
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A

more adequate Reformed Epistemology would

consist, not just

of attempts

to

vindicate the presumptive innocence of
religious belief, and not just of attempts
to defend
religious belief

self-criticism,

from imputations of unreliability from

i.e.,

an attempt to determine

how

its critics,

but also of an element of

one's own, and one’s community’s, ways

of forming beliefs have been compromised by
power, greed, hubris, self-deception, and
the like.

Its

hard to imagine that religious doxastic practices
like

CMP could maintain

their epistemic innocence if they are not
also substantially free of injustice.
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